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THE

'

RISINGS
ON THE

North-W est Frontier.

Being a complete narrative, w i t h specially p r e p a r e d
m a p s , of t h e various risings o f t h e F r o n t i e r Tribes i n
t h e Toehi Valley, t h e S w a t Valley, t h e C o u n t r y of t h e
Mohmands a n d Mamunds, a n d t h e C o u n t r y of t h e
Afridis a n d Oralizai; a n d of t h e several punitive c a m paigns undertaken against these tribes, as w e l l a s the
t w o m i n x expeditions s e n t a g a i n s t the U t m a n K b e l s
a n d t h e B u n e r w a l s : t h e w h o l e covering a per-iod extending from t h e middle of J u n e 1897 t o tha e n d of
J a n u a r y , 1898.
(Compiled from the Special War Correspondence of the "Pioneer." )
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INTRODUCTION.

T H E AREA OF DISTURBANCE.

N the extent of tlie ares affected, more obviously than in any
o l l ~ c respect,
r
the Indian Frontier disturbances of 1897-98 differ
fronl all previous border troubles. Froni Waziristan on the left
tx) Buncr un tlis light a stretch of more than 400 miles of our borderI:tnd, irillalited, as Sir George White said i n a speech at the United
Service Club in Si~nli~,
by 200,000 first-rate fighting men, has been
invulveil in t h e outlrealr, and the dates of the various risings indicate an
itIentitj of design and a unity of purpose never before discernible in
t l ~ eliistory c~ffrontier disturbances. "The disturbed area on the true
fro~rtier,nanlrly, the one wliich we guard and protect," wrote Sir Eobert
IJtrw in all :t~*ticlein the iVationn1 Keuiew, L'conlmences with the
il~uur~tains
on the riglit bank of tlie 1 1 ~ 3 near
~ s Dirbund, where the
river emerges fro111 the hillb into the plains. Fronl this point the
frolitier line follows the line of mountains: i t takes a long sweep to
the norttl and t l ~ e nLends round to the west and south, enclosing the
I'est~rt~var
Valley, and it completes a rougli senlicircle a t ICohat. From
IioIi;~tour fro~ltiergoes west to Thull and then north-west up to the
I~(aatlof the ICurram Valley. Tlle tribes which inlnlediately face us on
thih f~trxltierline, cun~n~erlcing
s t the top of the semicircle a t Dirbund,
trll tltc I ~~ilrlx,
are, t;~kingtl:enl in their order, the Bunerwals, the Swats,
t,l~eI:triisr~ fihelu, and the Mol~rtiunds; then come the Khyber Pass
:tll~lt,iie .ifridis, a r ~ dlastly, on the nortllern flank of the road from
iiclf~zttto Tliull, t11e Orakz:~i. Tliore are rnany other minor tribes aud
.ctc.tiri~~%
uE the larger ones with diifel.ent names, but t o niel~tionthem is
u f i i r cuufuahg, Tlkc ;~,Luvc are our i u u e d i s t e neigllbours, and are the

princip;d tribes, and they led the others with them to a great extent
ir such risings as we are dealing with.
"Our positions for the defence of this line,-(prior to the outbreak)
-taking them from the top of the semicircle, have been ' Hoti Mardan,'
the head-quarters of the Corps of Guides ; in advance of it i n the hills
the Malakand position with its outpost a t Chakdara; then, further
rouud the semicircle, the forts of Abazai, Shabkudhr and Michni, and
then Peshawar with its outpost of Jamrood guarding the entrance of
the Khj-ber Pass; then, crossing the spur of the hllls which run down
towards the river Indus, me come to the station of Kohat with its outposts on the road to the Kurram Valley a t Hangu and Thull, and the
flanking position of Fort Lockhart and minor posts on the Samana
Range. These posts were all occupied by troops or police, while beyond
them, the road to Chitral, the Khyber Pass, and the Kurram Valley
were held by tribal levies."

The map facing the firgt page affords a comprehensive view of the
whole affected area. The actual tribal outbreaks and their dates were
as follows:The Maizar outrage on the 10th of J u n e ; the attack on the Malakand and Chakdara positions on the 27th July ; the attack on Shabkudhr on the 9th August : the threatening attitude of the Afridis and
Orakmi on the 18th August, and the attack on the Khyber Pass on the
23rd August. Thereafter the narrative of events turns from tribal
;~b'gresuiou,and follows the punitive operations of the Government of
India's forces.
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P A R T I.
THE TOCHI VALLEY AFFAIR.

P A R T I.
THE TOCHI VALLEY A F F A I R .

THE MAIXiiR OUTRAGE,

Tric Frontier disturbances of 1597 began, as lias been bviefly shown,
on tlie 10th of June, wlien a startling outrage was conlmittecl on a B~.itiull
party in the Tochi Valley. Katurally enough the first account of
tlle affair which reached head-quarters in India from t h e Tochi
gave but scanty details, but i t was unfortullately certain that tlie
casualty list was a heavy one ; three British Ofiicers, twenty-two men
of the native ranks and two followers being killed, while three other
British OfEcers and twenty-four men were waunded. The three Officers
killed were Colonel A. C. Bunny, 1st Sikhs, Captain J . F. Browne, IZ.A.,
and Lieutenant H. A . Cluickshanlr, RA, both of No. 6 Bombay
Mountain Battery; whiIe the wounded were Lieutenant A. J. M.
Higgiason and Surgeon-Captain C. C. Cmsidy of the 1st SiBhs, and
Lieutenant C. L. Seton-Browne, 1st Punjab Infantry.
I t appeared that Mr. Gee, Political Officer in bEne Tochi Valley, left
Di~tbaKhel on the moraiag of the 10th June, with a n escort of 300 men
from the 1st Siklls and 1st Punjab Infantry, two guns of No. 6 Bon~bay
Mountain Battery, and twelve sowers of t h e 1st Punjab Cavali*y.
Colonel Bunny, conimanding the Tocl~iColumn, was i n charge uf t h e
escort. The object in view was to fix a site for a new outpost beyond
Sheranni, nine miles beyond Datta, Khel, and also to realise a fine which.
h.%dbeen imposed upon the local tribesmen some months back. The party
got as far as Naizar, which is sorilewhat to the south of Sheranni, a n d
halted. What exactly occurred there was riot explained in the first hasty
despatches, but Mr. Gee, in a short preliminary report, stilted that a
cowardly and treacherous atkack was made ilt 2 P.M., when the troops
were a t rest, and the little force was suddellly ruslled by a large body of
tribewen. A desperate fight followed, the escort lrad t o beat a retreat,
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and they were follosved for four llliles along the road to Datta 1ChelCaptain H. A. Coopel; 1st Sikhs, was in command a t that post, and t h e
first uews he received was at 5 o>clock,when a sowar arrived, who s t a t e d
tliat the troops had been attaclied, their British Officers killedor wounded, ancl that theirs anim~nition was running short. Captain Cooper
ordered out two co~npaniesof infantry with a fresh supply of ammunition, and sent with them the only two British Officers who, with himself,
liad been lefc at Datta hllel. Ttiese reiriforcenlents enabled the retirement to be completed, the tribesmen desisting from the pursuit and n o t
venturing near the post.
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r l l t i l more complete i~iformstion arrived i t was not possible to
judge how it came about that an escort of such a size was surprised.
The Pulitical 0Aice1:s reference to the cu\~srdlyand treacherous manner
in wl~iclithe original zttscli was niade, pointed to a species of tribal tactics not unconin~onon the border, namely, the appearance of headmen
professing friendliness, the gathering of tribesmeu about the canip, a n d
then the sudden rllsll of others lying hidden near a t hand. J u d g i n g
from the casualties, the British Officers seemed to have been the first to
be attacked, for all six nere killed or wounded. The losses among t h e
native 1:tuk were distributed as follows :-1st Punjab Cavalry, 2 sowars
-rs-ounded; No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery, 2 killed, 3 wounded ; 1st
Sikhs, 12 killed, 13 wounded; 1st Punjab Infantry, 8 lrilled, 6 wounded.
Two followers Tere also killed, and one other was wounded. The mountain battery had four mules killed and five wounded, b u t the guns were
brought safely into Datta Khel. Nineteen commissariat mnles were
lost, while the cavalry detachment had three horses killed.
The tribesmen concernedin the affair belonged entirely to the Madda
E h e l sub-section of the Darwesh Khel Waziris. They hold the country
a t the western end of the Dawar Valley, through which the Tochi River
runs. The Darwesh Khel Waziris had hitherto behaved extremely well,
and as portions of the tribe dwelt in British territory, it was not expected that they would give trouble. During Sir William Lockhart's expedition against the Mahsud Waziris, they showed no disposition to join
with their fellow-tribesmen. Conjecture was therefore rife as t o why
the men of t h e Madda Khel sllould so suddenly have committed themselves. Meanwhile it mas clear that their pnnishment would have to be
an exempIary one. True, the season was not very favourable f o r
t h e ruove~uentof a large force, but it seemed quite posxible t o carry
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o u t punitive nieasnpeR with a small column. For tile moment it was
decided to immediately reinforce thegarrison of Toclli with one battalioll
of native infantry, and to move an additional regiment to Bannu.
followii~g nloves were therefore ordered :-33rd Punjab InfiLntry,
froln Rannu to Tochi Valley; 3rd Sikhs, from Kohat and the 14th
Sikhs froin Ferozepore to Bannu ; 2nd Punjab Infantry, from Abbottabad t o Kohat.
W i t h i n twenty-four hours of the receipt of the first intelligence
t h e following further particulars arrived regarding the disaster :Mr. Gee, the i?olitical Officer,with his escort, arrived a t Maizar, as already stated, on the morning of the 10th June, nothing having occurred
o n the road from Dattea Khel to excite suspicion regarding the attitude
of t h e tribesmen. H e was met a t Maizar by Sadda Khan, Malik of
Shepanni, and other local headmen, whose bearing was quite friendly.
The troops were halted near the village, and Mr. Gee, with only the
cavalry detachment (12 sabres), proceeded to Datoi, a few miles away,
accompanied by some of the maliks. The visit was an uneventful one,
a n d t h e .party returned to Maizar. Sadda Khan had meanwhile provided
food for all the British Officers and also for the Mussalman sepoys in
t h e escort. This was partaken of, and such a show of hospitality threw
t h e p a r t y off their guard, as even among the Pathalls the lives of
guests a r e usually held sacred for the time being. At 2 o'clock, just as
t h e Officers had finished their lunch, fire was opened upon them from the
village towers, and all six were shot down, almost at once. A t the same
time a continnouv fire from all sides was directed against t.he sepoys,
some five hundred tribesmen joining in the attack. The position was
apparently unsuitable for defence, and the troops began to retire over
t h e hills in the direction of Sheranni. The number of their assailants
rapidly increased, and i t was calculated that a thousand men were
engaged in the pursuit before the river bank was reached opposite
Sheranni. It was clearly established that the tribesmen had planned the
attaclr beforehand, as fresh parties appeared from the hills between
Sheranni and Datta Khel. The troops did not reach the latter post
until 11 o'clock a t night. Their march was necessarily a slow one, as a
running fight had to be maintained for four miles, ancl they were encumbered with their dead and wounded. Nine riiles only were lost,
which spoke well for the sepoys. The Waziris were said to have lost
ninety killed and a considerable number wounded, Anlong the fornler
were four mullahs and a malik. It was satisfactory to learn that the

wounded OGcers anc1 nirn were on the mhole doing well. Lieutenant
IIigpinson was severely mounded in the left arm; Lieutenant SetnnBrom-ne llnd a flesh wound in the thigh ; Surgeon-Captain Cassidy was
hit in the knee.
L:~terinformation received a t Ariny Reacl-Quarters from the Tochi
fully confirn~edthe first estimate of the bel~aviourof the troops in the
atTair a t 3P;lizar. I t appeared that Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny, tliough
mo~.t,zllywouncleil, almost irnmeditttely the tribesmen opened fire, managed to issue orclers under which the retirement froin the neiglibourhood of the towers and walls of the village was effected. The men had
to fall back tn.0 miles, as no ilefensive position offered, but thereafter
the? quite held their own against the attack. Short~lessof arnnlunition alone conlpellecl further retirement, but this was made without
disorcler. Not only so, but when reinforced by the two conipanies froin
Datta Khel, bringing up more ammunition, the troops faced about and
shelled Slleranni village.
Thus, from a nnniber of separate reports, a fairly complete idea of
the circumstances of the disaster -mas now obtainable, but the following
simple, s t m i g h t f o r ~ a r daccount of the affair from one of the few survivors of the little party of Officers presented the events in a more connected form and in a clearer light :"The recent attack on the military escort which accompanied Mr.
Gee, Political Officer, Tochi, to Sheranni and Maizar was the work of
the Madda Khel section of the Utmanzai Darwesh Khels. The Madda
Khels occupy the Tochi Valley from Sheranni, nine miles above Datta
Rhel, up to the Amir's boundary, and a portion of them who were not,
as a tribe, concerned i n the attack live in the Eazha, which is a northern
tributary of the Tochi. Sheranni and Maizar are on the main Tochi
route from Birmd or Ghazni to Bannu, and the tribe is under agreement to keep this road open. Maizar, mhich is the name given to a collection of villages a t the mouth of the Shawal Algad, eleven miles from
Datta Khel Camp, had already been fixid on as the site of the most
westerly levy post in the Tochi, and it was nlainly for the purpose of
finally selecting the site for this post that the Political Officer proceeded there on this occasion. B e had also arranged to meet all the
Madda Khel Maliks of the Tochi there, to discuss the question'of the
distribution of a fine which was outstanding against tlle tribe.
"The escort consisted of 200 rifles 1st Silchs, Lieutenant-Colonel
Bunny i n command, with Lieutenant Higginson, 100 riflea 1st Punjab
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Infantry under Lieutenant Seton-Browne, four guns No. G Bombay
Mountain Battery under Captain Browne, E.A.,with Lieutenant Cruickshank, and 18 sabres 1st Pnnjab Cavalry, and Surgeon-Captain Cassidy,
Medical OfEcer. The escort marched from camp Datta Khel a t 5 A.M.,
and after balling twice on the road reached Maizar a t 9-30. Maizar
consists of a number of cultivated terraces gradually sloping down t a
the Shawal Algad, and the men were halted on the highest terrace a t
an open space under some trees not far from a kot belonging to the
Drepilari section of the Madda Kbels. This spot was pointed out by
the malilis themselves as the best place to camp, as there was plenty of
room, and water was available near. The guns were placed close to a
garden wall in a field clear of the trees. The approach to this camping
ground is over a small kotal and down a narrow lane through fields
bounded by low stone walls. The lane runs straight from the kotal to
the camping ground, which is close t o a threshing-floor and then curves
round to the north to the kot. The men were ordered to keep their
arms wit11 them and not to pile them. A11 neceseary precautions were
taken-guards, pickets and sentries placed mere considered necessary.
As soon as this was settled Mr. Gee and Captain Browne, R.A., taking
tile sowars, 1st Punjab Cavalry, and accompanied by some of the maliks,
visited Datoi, which lies a few miles further on in the Tochi, while those
left behind made themselves conlfortable under the trees.

Tochi
in tile
:IloliKll
:, manhbour.
cn had
r'cnfter
tllruni.ithout
9 fro111
[ltand
2

ilea of
owing
v sur'e con-

d Mr.
,rk of
I:~dda
Datta
e not,
tllern
Tochi
$

<'The Political Officer returned about 12 o'clock ; the question of
the fine was said by the maliks to have been settled amicably; food was
provided Ey the leading maliks for all the Mussalrnan sepoys, and there
was not the slightest suspicion of unfriendliness on the part of the tribesmen. After lunch, about 2 P.N., Colonel Bunny ordered the pipers t o
play for the villagers to listen to, and they played one tune. J u s t as
they began another, a man was seen waving a drawn sword on a tome'
in the Drepilari kot, and the villagers suddenly cleared off towards t h e
village. A single shot was fired, apparently as a signal, and a fusillade
a t once commenced, directed at the British Officers, who were together
under a tree, and the Sikhs. This was taken up on all sides, the sepoys in
the meantime falling in a t once and taking u p positions. Lieutenant
Seton-Browne was hit in the leg a t t h e second or third shot, and Colonel.
Bunny was mortally wounded almost immediately after. The guns
then opened Gre and did great execution among a party of men who
attempted to rush them, but as they were in an exposed position tho
two British Officers afforded an easy mark for tile men in the bmgk

(:qttailrn R r o n ~ ~was
e ]lit a t about the fifth shnt and Lieutenant
Cnl.ili~khP~:t~~li
sllt,t
nln~ostdipectly after. This mas all withia five
~t~in:rtt-ref the fir.st shot, and as the enenly's fire did not slacken, a n d
tile gt1ti.i 11::d r.iitt.~lclrtl t l ~ e i rarun~nnition, a nlovenlent was made
h,ick tu.rvardl: t h e k,,tal,
guns limbering up find going first u p
t h e lane.
cL
tllc- I
Illfantry
~
retired, the Waziris cnulc out in great numbers
F r ~ ma11 qiilt 3, lrnt n .stnntl n ; ~ sn~ncleround the corner of the bagla $0
: x l l , ~ wtltc* \v,*:irlrl+.dillell to retire. I n the nlenntin~eLieutenant Higginhtln wa-;~
;-lir~tt l i r r i ~ the
~ l ~arm and Surgeon-Captain Cassidy in the knee.
The \'i:izit.is .r\-tartx, Il~,\verrr;successfully held in check by a mixed p a r t y
of 1st Sikh3 and 1st P~nljnbInfantry, and the latter retired up thekotal
when every vnu was over. Successive positions vere taken up on the six
ritlces a ilich stretch fr on1 Jhizar to the plain above Sheranni, a distalice
of nbt+l~t
trio niik-, m13 tliuudi tlre TS'aziris followed up in a most deterrllillrd ftii.41ic~n
and occupied all available positions on the hills round, the
setirelnivrs w;is orderly and tinlr was given for all the wounded to get
8afel.v u u t vtl t~ rile plain. Lieutenant Higginson was shot in the arm a
ht.~oudtime ~vltilc*
trussing the hiI1s. The force eventually toolc up a good
p ~ a i t i onl,irilt
~ ~ a mile f ~ * u the
n ~ last ridge about 5-30 P.N., and waited
there u n t i l reinforceulents (two compnnies of the 1st Sikhs) with more
anr1nunitil311u11dt.r Lieutennnt deErett, E.A., arrived from Datta IChel.
Thcse reir~furee~nents
cowred nine mjles in 13 liours and arrived at
G - l a P.N.

The tribesmen had been in the meanwl~ile kept thoroughly in
cheel;, and the guns were now got to work again, and tEle heights and
the village of She~~nnni
Tere shelled. This put an end to the business
anrl nu further opposition was met mitl~. Tlie Khiclclar Khels, who live
on the Tochi bel~rwSlier;tnni, behaved well, bringing out water for t h e
sepoys and supplying cherpoys for tile wouncled. The rear-guard reached camp a t 19-30 P.X. Colonel Bunny and Captain Browne died on the
road. One Sabadar (1st P. I.) and 92 Inen were killed and 25 mounded.
Nearly ail these were Sikhs and not &Iussaln~ana.The enenly are reported to have :ost 00 killed and u a n y wounded.
"The causes of this treacherous attack are not a t present clear, b u t
all the circ~rmstaneespoint to its being premeditated. It is known
thmt SCI~ILP
of the nlaIiks w r e implicated, and one or two of them were
killed. Once the afiLir conliuenced i t no doubt; became a matter of
' g h a a ' bat it does riot appear that the nlullnhs had previously worked
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up the tribesmen. The fact that they attacked a party who Ilacl just
eaten food with them-contrary to all Patlian codes of honour-1.enderj
the matter additionally hard to explain."

To complete the story the following roughly written notes of the
action a t &Faizarwere received privately from Datta K1iel:-

m

"The enemy held a nullah in front in great strength and had lilled
the village walls and a 10-foot high wall on the right, the latter .with
picked marksmen. They also held the rising ground and some huts
on the left, and a tower in the rear. Our troops were rested on the
ground between. The 1st Sikhs and the 1st P. I. and all the Officers
were under the trees to the left front near the nullah, and 60 to 70
yards from the walls on the right. Yickets were out at the front and
rear, and the guns were unlimbered a t the right rear 10 yards from the
10-foot wall. The mules were unsacldled. A t the set-off Captain
Browne and Lieutenant Higginson were hit by the first volley and
Colonel Bunny was struck shortly afterwards while talking to Mr. Gee.
Captain Browne and Lieutenant Cruickshanlr doubled to the guns and
Captain Browne was hit immediately by a marksman on the wall. The
guns opened fire with case shot on the nullah. Lieutenant Cruickshank was hit by a marksnlali on the wall, but raised himself up on one
knee and continued directing the fire on the nullall till hit a second
time and killed. The guns fired reversed shrapnel when the case shot
was exhausted, and were commencing common having exhausted shrapnel, when orders were received to retire. I n limbering up a wheel a
mule was shot, but Havildar Amardin ran back under fire and piclced
up both wheels, 72%~.each, l ~ n ds b r t e d to rejoin the Battery. H e was
shot dead and the wheels were not recovered. Cruickshank's orderly
up a gun weighing 200%~. single-handed and carried i t to the
gun mule. The mule was shot dead, so he carried it to the relief mule.
Then he went back and brought in Lieuteuant Cruickshank's body.
One N.-C. 0. of the battery was hit by a .450 express bullet. SurgeonCaptain Cassidy was hit by a Inan in the tower. The ammunition and
hospital mules stampeded, so 4,000 rounds of M.-18. ammunition, the
deld hospital, and the Veterinary stores fell into the -enemy's hands.
The enemy also captured a helio which they now flash from the top of
"a hill. Subadar Narain Singh, 1st Sikhs, conducted the retirement till
the arrival of Lieutenant cieBrett who threw 28 shells into Slleranni.
One shell struck a mosque, blowing up the mulbah, who ~ v a stvaving a
greeu flag, into the-air. All tlze bodies were brought in by friendlies.

(

8
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Sikhs and Patl~nnswere alike mutilated. Mr. Gee rendered great
asvistance throughout and conveyed the order to the guns for the retirement, but escaped being hit. H e has it that over 100 of the enemy
were killed, and their wounded are reported to be dying daily."
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All was now known that could be known of the main incidents
of the outrage, but as the details emerged there was much to say of
the gallantry show11 by the troops. Colonel Bunny, though nnlortally
wounded a t the outset, directed the retirement. Captain Browne, B.A.,
though faint from loss of blood, owing to a severed artery, looked
carefully after the withdrawil of his guns. Lieutenant Cruickshanlr,
R.A., after being shot down, staggered to his feet and fought his
guns until h i t b y a second bullet which killed him. As to the men
with the section of t h e battery, they were Sikhs and Punjabis, and
their conduct was beyond praise. There were only sixteen shells for
each of tlie two guns, and these were quickly expended as the tribesnlell were within a hundred yards. I n order to prevent a rush while
t h e mules were being got ready the native gunners fired powder
charges. It has already been related how the gunners carried a gun
and limber when the mules were wounded. Havildar-Major Mahomed
Ismail and Havildar Nehal Singh par ticularly distinguished themselves. The native drivers vied with the gunners in their gallantry.
They assisted in carrying off the wounded, and some of then1 even
began coolly loading u p spare mules with the over-coats of the detachment in spite of the hwvy fire, but Captain Browne ordered them to
lead the mules away as the risk of casualties was toogreat. One of the
Salutris of the battery, named Kewsl, did his best to dress Captain
Browne's wound, regaraess of the enemy's approach. As to the infantry, Subadar Narain Singh, 1st Siklm, must come first on the list
not merely for personal gallantry, but for the niilitary qualities he displayed. No sooner had the attack begun than he recognized the immense importance of saying the reserve ammunitioi~(ten boxes, each
containing 600 rounds), as he knew the sepoys had only twenty-two
rouncb in their pouches. H e told offseven ixen to fetch the boxes, and
they succeeded in carrying Yix back t o the firing line. These were
opened and the packets a t once distributed among the two con~panies
of the regiment. Sepoy Shiv Singh made two journeys for this ammunition and was twice .wounded, Narain Singh, as senior Native
Officei-, had the burden of carrying out the details of the retirement,
under orders issued b y Lieieu tenants Eigginmn and Seton-Erowne who
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were both suffering s-verely from theirwounds. H e did his work
admirably. Subadar Sundar Xingl.1, 1st P. I., must be braelreted with
Narain Singh. He, with his brother Sundar and Jamadar Sherzad,
1 s t Sikhs, formed up a party of sepoys to cover the retirement, and
not a man budged until the order was given that they might fall back.
The enemy closed with them, hand-to-hand fighting taking place, but
the tribesmen could not force their way through this small body of determined men. I t was here that the great majority of the casualties
occurred. Sundar Sing11 was killed, sacrificing himself in order to give
more time for the retirement to be effected. H e mas a young Officer,
having entered the service in 1883. Jamadar Sherzad surely earned
the Victoria Cross if such a decoration were given to the Native Army.
H e first of all cs~rriedLieutenant Higginsoti away, then possessing himself of a rifle hc covered by his fire a party of three nien carrying
Surgeon-Captain Cassidy to a place of comparative safety, and finally
h e shared in the desperate rear-guard fight. Subadar Nnwab Khan,
1st Silrhs, was among the last to leave the ground. H e was twice shot
in the leg, but his wounds did not interfere with his cool discharge of
duty on the way to Datta Khel. Coming now to the rank and file the
gallantry shown was so universal that i t is difficult to single men out.
Chief among those who distinguished themselves were Lance-Naik I s l ~ a r
Singh, 1st P. I., who killedseveral of the enemy with the bayonet, himself escaping untouched; Eugler 1321%Sing]], who first assisted in saving the reserve ammunition, then with a rifle taken from a dead man
doing some fighting, and afterwards distributing packets of cartridges
anlong the sepoys whose supply was running out; Sepoy Allayar Khan,
1st P. I., who carded Lieutenant Seton-Browne to the first defensive
position taken up ; Lance-Nailr Assa Singh, 1st P. I., who assisted the
same Officer when the enemy were pressing closely upon the troops
during the retirement ; and last, but not least, Sepoy Nurdah, 1st P. I.,
who drove off a party of tribesmen by shooting two of them a t close
quarters and then with s few corrirxdes charging them with tlie bayonet.
H e was severely woundccl in the affray.
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THE OFBICI.~L ACCOCXT.

FIXALLY
t h e r e was the oEcia1 version of the affair, contained in the
report of Mr. Gee, the Political Officer in Tochi, which may be given
in full :Maizar is t h e name given to a group of Madda Khel villages
situated above t h e junction of the Shawal Algad and the Tochi, and not
the name of o n e single village. It consists of a number of broad cultivated terraces sloping down to the stream, and is occupied by Drepilari,
Khoji Khel, Ali K h a n Khel and Macha sections of the Ger portion of
the Madda K h e l tribe. It lies two miles beyond the village of Sheranni,
and is about eleven miles distant from Datta Khel Camp.
The main r o a d to Bir~ualand Ghazni, which the tribe is under
agreement t o k e e p open, runs through it, and it forms part of that tract
of the Upper T o c h i in which a more extended influence was contemplated as conipared w i t h the hill tracts of Darwesh Khel country. As long
ago as September 1896, I had visited Sheranni aud Maizar with the view
of examining possible sites for the Shera~inilevy post, and you had
concurred generally with me that the post should be somewhere between
Sheranni and Maizar.

I

I

1
I

I

M y chief o b j e c t in making the present visit was to select a final site
for this post, as tlie building season was already far advanced and the
sanctioned plan a n d estimate were expected back frow the Public Works
Del~artment,a n d , if possible, to establish a temporary post there for the
Sheranni levies, who si~lceour occupation of Datta Khel have been kept
clove to camp. I had asked Colonel Bunny to accompany me in order
that he might give me his advice in the final selection of the site. In
nly letter, d a t e d 15th J u n e 1897, I have explained the circun~stanceconnected with t h e realisation of the fine in Honda Ram's case, and my
intention of discussing the details of distribution with all the maliks
concerned on m y visit to Maizar. This was an additional reason for
going np the valley, though the fact that I asked the jirgah to meet me
a t Msizar was m e r e l y due to my intention to halt there as being the
most convenient place.
Under o r d i n a r y circun~stances,with the valley quite peaceful, as we
believed it to be. an escort of sowars and maliks would have sufficed to
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visit Maizar, as the road lies through open country, and the kotal above
Maizar is visible from Datta Khel Camp. I asked Colonel Buncy if he
would mind taking out the same number of men as were employed on
my recent visit to the Kazha. That visit had an excellent effect on the
Kazhamals, and as I had not visited Maizar for some time, 1 was of
opinion that the sight of a large escort would have a good effect Ghere
too, especially in view of the early commencement there of the levy post.
Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny agreed to my proposal.
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The following is the detail of the escort that accompanied me :200 rifles 1st Sikhs with Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny and Lieutenant
Higginson.
100 rifles 1st Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant Seton-Browne.
2 guns, No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery under Captain Browne,
R.A., and Lieutenant Cruickshank, B.A.
12 sabres 1st (P. A. V. 0.) Punjab Cavalry.
Surgeon-Captain Cassidy, 1st Sikhs.
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The 9th was originally fixed for the visit, but owing to ra,in i t wns
postponed till the 10th. Sadda Khan and Alambe had been sent on
one day in advance to make what preparations were required and collect the local maliks for the purpose of discussing the distribution of
the fine in Honda Ram's case.
A start was made from Datta Khel a t 6 A.M. and Maizar was
reached a t 9-30. I was accompanied from Datta Khel by Khan Bahadur Chulam Muhammad Khan, Assistant Political Officer, Malilrs Nabbi
Khan, Sabil and his son Dande and Hhanadin of the Kazha ; Shadam
Khan, brother of Malik Sadda Khan, Mozammil Khan, his nephew, a t
present officiating as Levy Jaruadar, and Kotan Khan, Kabul Khel.
A t Ziarat village I was joined by the Kliiddar Khel Maliks, Salehdin,
Cful Samid, Syad Khan and Khan Wazir, and a t Sheranni by the
Madda Khel Maliks, Khan Habib and Zer Makhmad. Sndda Khan
and Alarctbe were already a t Maizar, and met me there.
Sadda Khan showed me the place where he wanted the troops
to camp and where a number of aharpoys had been placed in readiness. This was under. some trees on the topmost terrace, close to a
threshing floor and not f a r from the Drepilari kot of Modai, a small
malik. I showed the place to Colonel Bunny and the troops were halted
there.

( I2 g
T x~i.ziton at once wit11 most of the maliks mlm had come with
mn,l tltr c..i\:ilr~- $0 as to inspect Datoi, and callle back before i t w a s
liut. &fi,re going, howerer, I and the Assistant PolitiCd Officer
i.:i\v rr ,!iiib of the -iIaiiar. Jlalilis, and the!. mere told with reference t o
tile iinc in flondn Eanl's case that I would have them all up and disc ~ - iiie
s matteron lny return. Sadda Khan and A'litmbe stayed i n
K U U ~1): 111)- eider. C,yjt,ti~l
Brourne, X.A., and Lieutenant Bigginson
acconlpartiuii x:ic t n n a ~ d sI>atoi ;ind we retllrned to canlp a t 11-30,
e 1 1
f
t
. The people of the villages round a t t h a t
L 1

tirnu nppr:~rt.d perfeeti:;

friendly, and talker1 freely to the Pathan

,,c~~oYs.E t e l > t l i i l xcrlr:ired
~~
in the nay of grass and wood had been
hu~ti~lied
; :~r:cl : ~ i ~ v ir~iddngnt
fuud which had beeu cooked in one of t h e

3I:ii/,:r L o i d \!as l ~ r o i r l ~down
t
for the sepoys, and a special point was
iL:ndt. uf ti:e ZritieIi Oniiceibspnrtaliing of some of it. I then made
eiicluitieq ah to wliethrr the lucal j i r p t h , whi~11had been sitting under
O ~ I ~ t~r L
~ tL. ,:~t':irfor bunle time, were ready to come and see me, and I
nn> toIJ try the lssistant Political OScer that they had come to a n
tt~liic':i~ic
ngrcement by then~selvesand that all that was necessary was
tlinc
s i ~ u n l d come np later and make a formal statement before
nle. This n-as nhnt ?iZ,~likSadda Khan had led Ghulam Mnhammad
1CIi:~n to l~elitve; but if the evidence available is to be trusted, Sadda
1Cllnn'- hf.tt<-mcvtwas a delibe~xtelie, for at that very time the Maizar.rvnl~ I~nrl r t ~ f i ~ q t t las
, they 11ad the day before, to be bound by Sadda
I<li:lli'r pl(i!~rs'~l*and must have been preparing for the outbreak. H a d
Sarldc~
given us the slightest inforruatioll of this attitude on t h e
p:Ut of the 3laiznrwals, which he, as well as the other Mad& Khel
?rl:iliks, wlio had been there all d&y, must have been perfectly well
aware of, there would have been plenty of time to prepare for an attack.

The attack actually clid not take pIace till a little mhile after this,
al)out 2 P.M., n l ~ e nv e had just finished lunch. I was preparing to g o
r o ~ ~ nvith
d
Captain B r o w s and look a t sites for the post. The pipes
liar1 begun to plq- a t tiie request of the maliks, for the villagers to listen
to, ancl the sepoys and ourselves nere seated under the trees. T l l ~
pipes played one tune and had just commenced a second, when suddenly
all the villagers cleared off to-vards the Drepilari k o f . It wds seen t h a t
something was wrong and theorder to fall in was given, but a t the same
nionient a signal sllot was fired vhich nau foIlowed by an irregular
\rolley apparently nimed a t tlie Officers under the tree. Lieutenant
Sato11-Eriwmc \Tiis hit in the thigh a t the second or third shot, a n d
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Surgeoil-Captain Cassidy carried him to a place of con~parativesafety
by a snlall bhusn stack and tied up his wound. Colonel Bunny and
myself had meanwhile gone towards the trees where the men were, b u t
the Colonel was mortally woullded in the stomach just as he got there,
and Lieutenant Higginson was shot in tbe left arm alnlost a t the same
minute. The firing had now become general from all the kots round.
The guns then opened fire with case and did great execution among
a body of men who had come out of the Drepilari hot and attempted to
charge them. As they were not protected b anv cover, the two Royal
Artillery Officers afforded an easy mark for the men who were shooting
from towers around, and Captain Browne was hit in the arm a t about
the fifth round from the battery, and Lieutenant Cruickshank was shot
very soon afterwards, first in the arm and thenin the chest, the second
wound being fatal. It is niuch to be regretted that no medical aid was
available for Captain Browne. The bullet had severed the artery, and
had a proper tourniquet been applied, his life would have been saved,
but Surgeon-Captain Cassidy was shot in the knee while going towards
the lcotal and could give no assistance.
After about five minutes from the comnlencement of the attack, tho
guns having expended all their ammunition linlbered up, and Colonel
Eunny gave orders for a genernl retirement towards the kotal. This
was effected along the lane which had low walls on either side of it. As
far as the kotal we were exposed to fire on both sides, and practically
all the casualties occurred before the kotal was reached.

A fine stand was made a t the corner of the garden by thelane, with
the result that the battery and the wounded men were all safely over
the lrotal before the ~ositionwas evacuated. It was here that the
greatest lossin men occurred, including Xubadar Xundar Singh, 1st
Punjab Infantry, andmany individual acts of gallantry were peltformed
which will be duly brought to the notice of Government by the Officer
Commanding Tochi Valley. The retirement was then continued across
the six ridges which extend from the kotal above Maizar to the sloping
plain above Sheranni, xliich is a part of the Tsirai plain. A position
was taken up on each ridge i n succession, and the retirement was conducted in an orderly manner, time being given for all the wounded to
get safely out on the plain, a distance of about two miles. Directly Maim?
itself was evacuated, the tribesmen canle on in largenurnbers, which were

( 14
constantly bring increased by reinforcements from every village round
including Sheranni. Tliey followed up the force closely and persisteiltly
:tnd also occupied all the heights they could along the line of retirement.
Tllcy were unable to do much damage owing to the steady behaviour o f
the rear-guard, and they must have lost a good niaily men themselves.
Lieutenant Higginson had the misfortune to be shot again in the l e f t
arm while crossing the hills.
The force eventually took up a good position about a mile from t h e
last ridge s t 5-30 P.M., and waited there for reinforcenlents from Y a t t a
Khel, which arrived a t 6-15 P.N., under Lieutenant deBrett, R.A.
Sorne sowars of the 1st Punjab Cavalry had been despatched as soon as
possible to fetch them and warn the camp. These reinforcements covered a distance of nine miles in one-and-half hours. They consisted of
t w o conlpanies of the 1st Sikhs and extra gun and rlfle ammunition.
The tribesmen meanwhile, whose numbers had probably increased
t o well over 1,000, had been kept thol.oughly in check, and as soon as

the gun was got to work (tlie second gun had lost its wheels) the g a t h e r ing began to disperse. The heights all round, which had been C ~ O M - d e d
with men, were shelled, and then Sheranni village, from which I h a d
nlvself seen large parties issuing to intercept our retirement. This was
continued until I received a message from Khan Bahadur Ghulam MUIlanlmad Khan a h o had escaped vid tlie Tochi with a few nialiks, to the
effect that he had arrived close to the village and was in danger of
being hit.
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No further opposition was met with. The Khiddar Khels of Z i a r a t
village gave us great assistance in bringing out water for the men a n d
c'larpot/s for the wounded, and though a few of them undoubtedly joined the Madda Khels, the maliks, who hadgone straight back f r o m
hfaizar when the attack began, were entirely successful in preventing
the tribe from joining.
Captain Browne, B.A., had by this time died from loss of blood, a n d
Colonel Bunny did not live to reach camp. The rear-guard reached
camp a t 12-30 P.M. Khan Balladur Ghulam Muhammad Khan a l s o
came in the same night.

It appears that when the outbreak occurred, Sadda Khan had
just come over to him from thejirgah with Kotan Khan and stated that
the fine had been arranged for and would be paid up i n five days, and
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alnlost directly afterwards the firing began.
Gliulanu Muhammad
Khan had just gone down to a lower terrace to perform his ablutions,
and he was a t once joined by Nabbi Khan, Khangai Macha, Alimad
Madda Khel, Wadin Saidgi and the Khiddar Khel levies and Border
Police. His munshi and clerk were also with him. This party was
afterwards joined a t different times by Sadda Khan, Shadam Khan,
Dande, his brother, Khan Habib, Zerin and Mozamnlil Khan and they
went dowu the Shawal Algad to the Tochi and took refuge on the
other side of the Tochi in Tarmori Kila, the inhabitants of which were
just preparing to join the fight. From there Sadda Khan was despatcled to Sheranni to keep the people quiet, and he returnedafter two hours,
saying he had dispersed the lashkar and the road was clear. Nothing
could have been further from the truth. I n consequence of what he
stated, Ghulam Muhammad Khan started down the Tochi, and, as
already stated, arrived a t Sheranni when i t was being shelled. Mozammil Khan and Alam Shah, the Madda Khel Daffadar of Kazha, were
the only Ger Madda Khels who came on with the Assistant Political
Officer to camp.
The next day I called the Khiddar Khel Maliks in and asked them
to arrange to bring in the dead, and this they eventually did with the
assistance of Kotan Khan, Kabul Khel, and 1 think great credit is due
to them for the performance of this service, especially as the bodies
were much mutilated, Mussalmans and Sikhs alike.
The following is the list of casualties on our side :Three British Officers killed. Three British Oficers wounded.
Native ranks killedOne Subadar and seven men of the 1st Punjab Infantry.
Twelve men and a Kahar of 1st Sikhs.
One Havildar and one driver, No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery.

It is a significant fact that of the above total 17 were Sikhs, though
the force was conlposed of nearly an equal number of Sikhs and Mussalmans.
Wounded1st Punjab Infantry-Two men severely, two men slightly.
1st Panjab Cavalry-One man slightly.
1st Sikhs-Twelve men severely, one mule-driver ddngerously,
eight men slightly.

No. 8 Bonibag. Mountain Battery-Two
slightly, one Rahar slightly.

men severely, one man

The Waziri loss in killed has been put a t 100 by the maliks, from
whom enquiries have been made, and as it is probable that a good many
have died since of their wounds probably a total of 100 is not very wide
of the mark.
This is also the opinion of Native Officers who had the best means
of judging. A large number (some 30 or 40) are said to have been killed
outside the DrepiIari ?sot by the case shot, and very nearly as many were
killed a t the corner of the garden where the stand was made. All
along the line of retirement the tribesmen pressed close, and a number
of them were shot down.
t

:

*

Here ends the Political OEcer7s report. The narrative of the
hft~izaroutrage however cannot properly be closed without mention of
the rew:rrds granted to those who had taken part in the action connected
with the outbreak.
The military reports received from Lieutenant-Colonel Gray regarding the Maizsr aEair were published as despatches. The Commanderin-Chief placed on record his appreciation of the heroic conduct of
Officers and men, arid declared that " the action was a deed of arms
second to none in the annals of the British Army.'' The Government
of India 'L most heartily endorsed this view.''
The two surviving British Officers who mere present a t Maizar,
Lieutenant A. J. M. Higginson, 1st Sikhs, and Lieutenant C. L. S. SetonBrowne, 1st Punjab Infantry, both of whom were severely wounded,
were recommended for the Distinguished Service Order.*
With regard to Mr. Gee, Colonel Gray, in his report on the Maizar
affair, thus referred to the Political Officer whose escort was attacked :
"Though i t is not my business to report on Civil Officers, i t would
be uujust to omit mentioning that Mr. Gee's exertions and presence of
mind were of great value in the help he rendered during the retirement and in sending to call u p the reinforcements!'
On the recommendation of General Corrie Bird, supported by the
Commander-in-Chief, the three ~ r i n c i p a Native
l
Officers with the troops
engaged in the Maizar affair were given the Order of Merit a t once
as a reward for their gallantry. Subadar Sundar Singh, 1st Punjab
* Lleutenan~I%ie,gir~sot~
did not live t o receivc
cabs id^ had already sncc~~mbed
to his wound.
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Infantry, who was killed, was also gazetted to the Order of Merit, so as
to enable his widow to draw a larger pension. Subadar Narayan Singh,
1st Sikhs, whose coolness and gallantry were so noticeable, was admitted
to the Order of British India, with the title of Bahadur ; 23 NonCommissioned Officers and men were given the Order of Merit ;Jhanda
Singh, cook of the 1st Sikhs, was also admitted to the Order of Merit,
though a non-combatant, for having carried off a box of ammunition
under heavy Ere. The widows of eight men killed were admitted to a
pension of the 3rd class of the Order of Merit. Later on there was
pl~blishedin the Gazette qf India a full list of rewards for the Noncommissioned Officers and men. This list will be found among the
appendices.
There is only one more fact to chronicle. An impression gained
ground, when the news of the outrage was first published, that the
Madda Ehel had singled out the Sikhs for attack and that the Mahomedan sepoys escaped lightly. This was altogether erroneous. N@
such distinction was made, and indeed in the m616e it would have been
impossible. It is sufficient to mention that of five sepoys killed in
the splendid defence a t the garden wall three wereMahomedans and
t l ~ aboth
t
Sikh and Mahomedan bodies were afterwards found mutilated
in the horrible manner peculiar to the frontier tribes.

A special Gazette was subsequently issued, containing a despatch in
which the gallantry of Lieutenant de Brett, R.A., on June IOth, near
Sheranni, was warmly acknowledged. This Officer, i t appeared, in his
keenness to keep his battery in continuous play, rammed the charges
home in a mountain gun with a sepoy's rifle without sponging out between the rounds-a most dangerous thing to do.
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CHAPTBR 111
TBE PDNITIYE

EXPEDITIOR.

AS i t appeared imperative to punish without delay the villages
of Maizar and Sheranni, which were immediately concerned in the
treacherous attack on the Political Officer's escort, the Government of
India arranged within the next two or three weeks for a punitive
columli to move into the offending country from Dattn Khel.
The expeditionary force consisted of two Brigades. Major-General
G. Corrie Bird, then commanding the Punjab Frontier Force, was given
the chief command, and the principal members of his staff were as follows :-Assistant
Adjutant-General, Major J. Wilcocks, D.A.A.G.
a t Nagpore ; Assistant Quartermaster-General, Lieutenant-Colonel J. E.
Nixon, 18th Ekngal Lancers ; Ordnance Officer, Major C. H. Wilson,
R,.A.; Intelligence Officers, Major G. V. Kemball and Lieutenant G. K.
Cockerill of the Intelligence Branch at Army Head-Quarters ; Superintendent, Army Signalling, Captain G. W. Rawlins, 12th B. C.; Field
Engineer, Major I. Digby, Madras ;Assistant Field Engineers, Captain
A. L. Schreiher and Lieutenant W. D. Waghorn ;Principal Commissariat
Officer, Major G. Wingate, Peshawar ; Transport Oficers, VeterinaryMsjor G. J. R. Rayment and Captain H. James, Mian Mir ; Provost
Marshal, Captain P. Malcolm, 4th Gurkhas ; Principal Medical. Oficer,
Surgeon-Colonel R. H. Carew.
The two Brigades were composed as followfi :1st Brigade: Colonel C. C. Egerton, Corps of Guides, Comtnanding ;
D. A. A.-G., Captain H. B. B. Watkis, then a t Army Head-Quarters ;
D. A. Q.-M.-G., Major F. Wintour, Allahabad ; Commissariat Oficer,
Lieutenant E. A. R. Howell, Sialkot. Troops :-The Peshawar Mountain
Battery, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, the 1st Sikhs, the
1st Punjab Infantry, and the 33rd Punjab Infantry.

I

2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General W. P. Symonq Sirhind District,
Commanding; D. A. A.-G., Captain J. MacN. Walter, Devonshire
Regiment, then on the Staff at Lucknow ; D. A. Q.-M.-G., Major M. H.
S. Grover, then D. A. Q.-M.-G., Punjab Command. Troops :--No. 6
(Bombay) Mountain Battery (4 guns), the 3rd Battalion Rifle Brigade,
the 14th Sikhs, and the 25th Punjab Infantry. The two squadrons of tho

1st Punjab Cavalry already in the Tochi Valley and No. 2 Company
Bengal Sappers and Miners were also ordered to form part of the expeditionary force.
Fuller details of General Corrie Bird's staff and of the staffs of the
two Brigades, as well as of the conlposition of the force, are added i n
an appendix.
Full political power was vested in Major-General G. Corrie Bird
during the operations in the Tochi Valley. Mr. Gee was appointed
Chief Political Officer attached to the General, while Mr. Lorimer and
Mr. Kettlewell were Assistant Political Officers, each attached to a
Brigade. A proclamation was at once issued notifying to the tribesmen in and about the Tochi Valley the reason for the expedition.
While the concentration of the Tochi Field Force was yet in progress, speculation was rife as to the nature and strength of the opposition which our troops would be likely to encounter a t and beyond Datta
Khel. News received from native sources mentioned that agathering of
tribesmen in strength was contemplated a t Sheranni and Maizar. The
Mahsud Waziris, who were then lying to the south, were said to besending a contingent to join the Madda Khel, while another tribal force was
reported to bemoving from Birrnal in Afghan territory. As against this,
the Darwesh Khel in the Upper Tochi Valley were certainly not unanimous a t that time in the matter of further hostilities : the Khiddar
Khel sub-section had brought in the bodies of sonle sepoys killed in the
retirement from Maizar, and their headmen were holding aloof from the
Madda Khel. It seemed improbable also t h a t t h e tribesmen of Birmal,
who are subjects of the Amir of Kabul, would cross into British territory. It was quite likely, however, that restlems spiritv among the
Mahsud Waziris would join their kinsmen in Tochi. Later news from
the Wnziristan direction stated that the Khiddar Khel a n d the Sadgis
from Eirmal were helping the Maizarwals to remove their goods i n h
Afghan territory, thus giving the tribesmen a free hand for fighting.
The latter, however, showed no desire meanwhile to assume the offensive
against the Datta Khel post.
At this early period there appeared upon the scene a figure of some
note-an old acquaintance, the Mullah Powiudah-whose movements
thenceforth bcame a matter of considewble interest to our Intelligence
1)cp;trtruent in Tochi. The tactics of the Mullah up to the time of the
~ ~ c l i l u i n aconcentration
ry
of our troops a t Bannu were however of a kind
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which showed that his influence over the Mahsud Waziris as a body was
not as great as three years previously. H e a t first tried to induce the
tribesmen t o send a contingent to help the Mndda Khel, but there was
such a faint response to his appeal that he promptly changed his ground
.and wrote into our Political Oificers in the Tochi offering to mediate be-tween the Government and the people of Maizar and Sheranni. This
step was, of course, taken by him in order to increase his prestige i n
Waziristan and the adjacent country : i t was a clever move, but the
Government could not recognise his position in any way. The Madda
Khel are a section of the Darwesh Ehel Waziris, and with the latter the
>fullah had nothing whatever to do. H e had, in fact, no status, and it
would have been most unwise to have any dealings with him. As a
possible enemy be had to be watched : as afriendly mediator he was put
aside. Mediation moreover was not called for. The Madda Ehel had
deliberately
the attack on Colonel Bunny's detachment and had
carried i t out in the most treacherous way. Their offence was clearly defined and their punishment would need to be exemplary. A tribal rising
of the ordinary local kind, or a raid upon an outpost, is not of material
consequence in the borderland. Such disturbances are more or less expected whenerer our troops occupy positions beyond the old frontier line.
But- the Maizar affair was of an entirely different complexion, for it involved a breach of hospitality and could only have been successful by
cunningly contrived treachery. The Mullah Powindah himself was said
to have denounced its treacherous character, but probably if he did so a t
all he only did it when he found that the Mahsuds would not obey his
summons t o raise a force to help the Xadda Khel.
From all that couId be learnt it seemed that the great majority of
the Darwesh Ehel, many of whom held lands in British territory, were
as little disposed as the Mahsuds to commit themselves to hostilities.
Lest, however, in view of these facts and in the light of subsequent
events it should be thought that the Field Force was too large for the
work before it, it may be a t once said that the Government of India were
anxious not to set the whole frontier from Kurram to the Gumal in a
blaze by sending up a small force which would invite attack, and it was
expected that large military preparations would have the effect of checking the fanaticism of any clans who might be hesitating whether
they should join the malcontents in the Upper Tochi Valley. It was
known that t h e Madda Ehel against whom the Tochi Valley Force
were about to move, could muster only 11,200 fighting men, but it was
irupossible to say with certainty that no other section of the Drzrwesh
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and Mahsud Waziris would join them, and hence the necessity for
being prepared for more than a mere promenade to Maizar, Sheranni
and Datoi. The Dawaris also, who hold the greater part of the Tochi
Valley, were known to be an ill-conditioned and fanatical lot, who
might give trouble along the line of communications in case of any
check to our troops beyond Datta Khel. The Kabul Khel of Birmal,
who were said to have made common cause with the Madda Khel, are a
section of a big clan of the Utmanzai, and they were in a position to
fight with the comfortable assurance of being able to get away whenever
they had had enough, for Birmal is in Afghan territory and is only a
day's journey from Sheranni. It was therefore impossible to foresee t h a t General Corrie Bird's force would find no enemy when the
advance was made from Datta Khel. As had been proved a t Wano,
5,000 or 6,000 tribesmen can assemble so quickly, and t,heir movements
are made so secretly, that their presence is first announced by a rush
of swordsmen on .our pickets. Waziri tactics are, as a rule, based on
surprise, and valleys which may have been empty of men in the morning may smarm with thousands after nightfall. If opportunity offers
for striking a sudden blow the tribesmen do not generally hesitate to
deliver a u attack. The affair a t Wano itself was but a repetition of that
a t Palosin in 1860, when our losses were 63 killed and 166 wounded, in
addition to 60 casualties among the levies. Any force which moved u p
the Tochi Valley had to be prepared for attaclr, not only from the south
but from the north also, for there was no guarantee that the tribesmen
from the Kurram border to the Gumal would not suddenly be infected
with a spirit of hostility.
And now to follow the actual course of events. The concentration
of the troops was carried out as rapidly as possible consistent with the
collection of supplies and transport. Bannu being the base, l h t t a
Ehel was fixed upou as the advanced base from which the force woulcl
only have to advance about 13 miles to reach Maizar and Shewnni,
and 6 nliles further to reach Datoi (some tribesmen of which psrticipated in the Msizar outrage), To ensure the safety of Rannu itself and
to keep the peace on the border the following additional moves were
ordered :-200 sabres of the 3rd Punjsb Cavalry and the whole of thc
3rd Sikhs from Kohat to Eannu ; the 2nd Punjab Infantry from
Abbottabad to Icohat, and 250 of thc 4th Silrhs from Dera Ismail Khan
to Jandouln, Sarwslrai and 1Iniclari Kacli on thc Mahsud frontier. As
a spccial precaution against thc efl'ects of the heat the Sritisll soldiers

in the Tochi Field Force vere provided with sola topees in l i e u of
helniets and with sun glasses. It is probable that this t h o u g h t f u l
measure saved Inany casualties that mould otherwise have occurred
from sunetroke and fever.
The concentration a t Bannu was of course uneventful, but the advance to D a t b Khel aid Saidgai, Idak and Boya was not made q u i t e so
serenely, as shots were repeatedly iired into camp, a sentry being killed
in this way a t Datta Khel.
The Engineers en route from Bannu had rendered valuable service
in cutting a good road, partly through solid rock, all the way t o Boya,
and in constructing (in twelve days) a crib and trestle bridge, 600 feet
wide, over the Tochi River a t Boja. As a result the march t o D a t t a
Ehel n7as accomplished with the minimunl of difficulty, and t h e Field
Force was then within striking distance of the doomed villages,
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CBAPTER IV.
THE WORK OF

DESTRUCTION,

WITHOUTa blow being struck or a shot being fired, Sheranni wag
6ccupied by General Egerton's Brigade of the Tochi Field Force on
J u l y 20th. General Bird and his Staff accompanied the Brigade. The
rear-guard saw a body estimated a t about 500 men some 2 miles from
the road who disappeared into the further hills.
On arrival a t Sheranni the cavalry reconnoitred the scene of the
action a t Maizar and found one man who was brought in prisoner. The
carcases of five mules and two ponies were seen lying where they had
been shot down, and about five yards from the wall of one of the kothis
an ordnance pack saddle and one or two other articles of Government
property were found and brought in.
Sheranni itself was quite deserted. I t s wood wall was torn down
to serve for firewood for the troops, as the hills in the vicinity were
barren of vegetation. There was a certain quantity of bhusa, barley
and clover about in the village, and the fields around were fairly
advanced in cultivation. After the bhusa had been gathered and
sufficient wood accumulated the destruction of the village was begun.

A few shots were fired into camp that night by a band of about 10
to 20 men, but no large body of the enemy was anywhere discernible.
This absence of opposition wag variously explained. The Madda
Khel tribesmen in a body, with their families, were reported to have
crossed the Afghan frontier into Birmal, leaving only scouts to watch
the approach of General Corrie Bird's force. As Birmal is a tract which
usually yields only sufficient supplies for its ordinary population, the
position of the Madda Khel, if this report were true, threatened to become a very awkward one. I n another direction i t was reported that
the Mullah Powindah had assembled 7,000 Mahsud Waziris near Razani
in the adjoining Khaisora Valley to the south, and that his intention
was to attack Boya or Datta Khel after the advance from the latter
post to Sheranni had been made. As a precautionary measure two
companies were ordered from Miran Shah to Boya. Boya is the post
on the line most exposed to Waziri raids, as a fair road is said to exist
to i t from Khaisora, but it had been strongly entrenched bjr the Sappers and was believed to be impregnable against any tribal attack.
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T\'hcn nil drfcnsivc armngcmcnts had bee11 completed news was received
that thc BIullnh Powindah had abandoned his intention of attacking
our troops in the Tochi Valley, and that his gathering of Mahsuds had
dispersed. Every precaution, however, was still taken a t Datta Khel,
Boya, Idak, and Miran Shah to guard against possible surprises, while
all convoys were strongly guarded. Reports from Wano showed that
southern XTaziristan was quiet, and no demonstration seemed likely t o
be made in that quarter ; in fact the Mahsuds as a body had apparently
shrunk from committing themselves to helping the Madda Khel. Later
news made i t almost certain that the Mullah Powindah had returned
to his own village in Waziristan, and i t mas further ascertained that
there was no large gathering of Mahsuds a t Razmak. The Tochi Field
Furce had therefore little prospect of getting any fighting worthy of t h e
name, unless some totally unexpected tribal combination occurred.
The night of the 25th of July witnessed the successful destruction
of the towers and fortified houses of Sheranni. The next day parties
from each corps went out to Maizar to destroy the fortified houses a n d
towers of the villages. The defences of Drepileri kot were destroyed
by the Highlanders and Sappers. The towers were blown up, and after
the troops had left, smoke was seen rising from the direction of Drepih i , the result probah!y of some woodwork catching fire after t h e
csplosions necessary to demolish the towers. As a high wind was
blowing, and the kot contained a large quantity of bhusa, most of it
was probably burnt. The troops were again occupied on the 21th of
July in destroying the kots in the Maizar settlement to the north of the
viIlage of Drepilari. The village itself, which caught fire, was already
pretty well destroyed. On tlie 25th J u l y the kots to the south of it were
destroyed, as also were those in the village of Tormor, which lay some
two miles up the stream of Sheranni on the left bank of the Tochi.
With the exception of intermittent and ineffectual sniping, varied
by small seizures of straggling camels and donkeys, there was nothing
all this time to suggest the presence of a n enemy in the neighbourhood,
and the position eventually became very tiresome. Finally, on the 5th of
August, letters were sent to all the leaders of the Madda Khels, inviting
them to come in under safe conduct and hear vhat the terms demanded
by the Government were. It was, of course, well understood beforehand
that nothing less than the surrender of the ring-leaders and the payment
of heavy fines could well be exacted by General Bird. When first sumzlloncd tlle ualiks llung back and i~pparentlyplaced no reli~lloeon tlie
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safe conduct promised them. General Bird, however, utiIized the services
of some of the headmen of the neighbouring tribes, and on the 16th of
August three Madda Khel Maliks came in. The following afternoon
General Bird held a Darbar a t which some Kazha Khel and Tori Khel
Maliks were also present. I t was announced that Government demanded
the return in good condition of the property which had been lost a t
Maizar, the surrender of some 18 headmen, the payment of a fine still
for the murder of a Hindu writer there, and a further fine
of Rs.10,900 for the outrage. Ten days was given them in which t@
take the terms to the tribe and discuss them and to give an answer. T h e
Dalabar did not last more than half-an-hour, and the people were told
.that no discussion was to be permitted ; they had been sent f o r merely
to receive the orders of Government.
On the 22nd of August the tribes were reported to be stiTT discussing the terms imposed on them, and thereafter news from the Tochi
Valley became very scant and infrequent. On the 2nd of September
there was said to be a probability that the sons @f the M a d h ' K h e l
Maliks would come in that day and give their answer to the terms
imposed by the Government, but the expectation was not realised. The
same day a coIumn, under the Eon'ble Montagu Curzon, consisting of
the Rifle Brigade, the 1st Punjab Infantry, two guns, and a company of
Sappers, marched to Landi Khel to make a mad along the right bank of
the Tochi River to Datoi, and was fired a t on arrival and also a t night
when in camp. The next evening a berated reconnoitring party under
Major R. M. Maxwell, while returning to Miran Shah from towards the
Khaisora Valley, was also fired a t in the dark by parties from both sides
of the river near the village of Argun ;but no mischief was done.
I n this uneventful manner the Tochi Valley punitive operations, fop
want of an enemy to punish, came to be generally regarded as a t an>end.
The aspect of affairs was not enlivened when, on the 14th of September,
the Madda Khel definitely refused to accept the terms offered them, for
as they still carefully avoided a collision with our troops By remaining in
Afghan territory their contunlacy only converted a position of perplexity
into an absolute deadlock. I t was perhaps rather sanguine to expect that
a t this stage any frontier tribe would agree to give u p leaders whose
execution was admittedly a foregone conclusion, Our troops meanwhile
could do nothing. There was no enemy to fight and it did not seem in
the least likely that there ever would be one. Nevertheless, the Government of India decided to Ieave the Tochi Force in occupation for a
time with tlie general idea of thek continto overawe the Waeirisi

' A t the end of September the political situation Was much the same.
T h e Madda Khel showed no signs of submitting to our terms, a n d
were still over the border. I t was stated that the Amir had offered
them land and water, but in Turkistan, and that they could not nlake
u p their mind whether o r not to accept the offer. No doubt they hoped
by staying out to wear down the patience of Government, and so be readmitted to their own land on terms less severe than those already
deliberateIy imposed on them for their conduct.

A month later-October the 29th to be exact-five headmen belonging to the villages of Tornlor, situated about two miles a1)ove Sheranni,
came in and surrendered themselves to General Bird. On the 31st of
the month Khan St~lleband three other Sheranni Maliks came in,
followed shortly afterwards by Sadda Khan and his brother Shadam, t h e
lleadmen of the hladda Khel tribe. I t was decided to try then1 b y a
tribunal to be specially assembled for that purpose. On t h e 1 4 t h
November General Bird received the submission of the whole of t h e
Madda Khel tribe unconditionally, and among those who fiurrendered
were four more of the seventeen men who were demanded by name f o r
their share in the affair a t Maizar. A good many of the proscribed
headmen, vhose families took refuge in Afghan territory, were said
to be experiencing a difficulty in getting away from their asylum a n d i n
removing their families. Five of the
men for instance were
ready to come in and surrender unconditionaIly on the 13th November,
but during the night receivednews that their faillilies had been detained
beyond the border, and they naturally went off to obtain their release
before surrendering to General Bird, which they had sworn o n t h e
Koran before their whole j i ~ g a hto do.
General Corrie Bird proceeded to Datta Khel on the 15th November,
taking with him his prisoners and the jirguh of friendly tribes, f o r t h e
purpose of finally deciding the question of assessment and distribution
of fines among those concerned, and of obtaining proper security f o r
payment. These points were duly settled, and it was understood that
the tribe as a whole mould be admitted back to its territory a t once.
The work assigned to the Tochi Field Force was accomplished, and t h e
Tochi Valley no longer formed part of the "disturbed area,"
St is b u t fair to add here that though the force only experienced desultory opposition on the part of the enemy, it had to fight against iLn
unhes~lthyyeasou in the hottest time of the year, alld agaiust diificulties
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tvllich olhy those \vho %reactually acquainted with the Toclli TTallcycan
ploperly appreciate. Moreover, the expedition has been productive of
a t least one permanently useful result outside the scope of its strictly
fiiilitary purpose : a very large extent of country, the whole of it
in fact that lies between the Tochi Valley and the Kurram River a t
Thal, Ilas been accurately surveyed aud mapped by Lieutenant Pirrie,
tile Survey Officer with the Tochi Force. The gazetteering and recotltx~issal~ce
work WAS done by Major Kernball, who on one day reacl~ed
the village of Biland Khel which is only some three miles from Thal.
II

*

II

In order to preserve the continuity of whntis to some extent a
separate narrstive, we hnve carried events in the Tochi Valley uninterruptedly from the Mitiear outrage in June to tlie submission of t l ~ e
cdstiysted tribesmen in Noven1l)er ; and have nnde no 111e11tion of tlle
graver occurrences which were being coacted the greater part of tliia
tirrle in oLIier territories on our North-West frontier. Tllus, while
Genela1 Carrie Bird's pu~litiveforce was engaged towards tlie end of
July in destroying Sheranni and Maizar, tlie M,~l:ck;~ndl~osition W:LY
being fiercely assailed by tthousanclsof Swatis ;and to this ~tirriugpe~iod
the story now revel Is.

PART 11,
THE RISING IN THE SWAT VALLEY.

P A R T 11.
THE R I S I N G IN T H E SWAT VALLEY.
CHAPTER I.
THE ATTACK ON THE MALAKAND,

A N outbreak no less sudden than that in the Tochi Valley, and inBnitely more s e r i o ~ si n its extent and sustaiuecl ferocity, began a t the
Malakand on tlie 26th of July when our strategical position a t the
head of the Pass was attacked by about 2,000 tribesmen. mostly belong3ng to the Swat country. The assailants were for the moment driven
back with great losses, but also not without a severe loss to the garrison,
.one British Officer being killed and four others wounded, in addition
to several casualties in the native rank and file.
From all the information ultiniately available it appeared that on
the morning of the day in question, which was a Monday, news reached
Malakand that a disturbance had taken place a t Thana, a village afew
h~ilesto the north-east, opposite Chakdara (the outpost of our Malakand
position) where the suapension bridge crosses the Swat River. It did
not then seem that anything very serious had occurred, but later in
the day further reports were received to the effect that the LLMad
Fakir," a mullah who had gained much notoriety locally, had gathered
some hundreds of tribesmen about him and was bent upon mischief.
I n the evening the levies employed on the road to Chakdara came
flying into camp, their report being that the Swatis had risen ea
marse, and that the "Mad Fakir " was marching down the valley with
the intention of attacking Malahnd. Colonel Meiklejohn, Commanding
'the Malakand Brigade, decided, after consultation with Major Deane,
the Political Officer, to send out a column a t 3 A.M. in order to disperse
t h e tribal gathering. But the mullah and his following anticipsted this
action by attacking the camp a t half-past ten o'clock a t night, a most
unusual hour for Pathans, who usually wait until just before dawn.
A t 9-45 P.M., while the troops were engaged preparing for the
march a t daybreak, s levy jaluadar arrived with the news that the
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Uudclhist and graded roads, and that the l~illsideseart of the camp were
e
was at once sounded, all
pickets
covered wit11 I';~tIl~ns.~ t l aInrn1
\rere doubled, and the regiments fell in on their alarm posts. Lieutecomnlanding the 45th Sikhs, taking as
nant-Colonel AlcRae, who
man?- men as he could get together, a t once doubled up to the poillt
.rvllere the old Buddhist
reacIles the top of the hill, and arrived
~t the narrow gorge through which the Buddhist road passes just i n
time to meet a mass of several hundred Pathans creeping silently up
the road. I n another few minutes they would have been in the camp.
IIe gave then1 a very hot reception, holding this gorge for about 20
minutes, :~nd finally falling back, as the enemy took possession of
ground con~manding the gorge, to a very strong positio~l completely
whole remaining time. Colonel
barring the road, which he held
bl[cEne's p101npt action and the stubborn resistance vhich he, aided
?il:~j*rTayIos and his small party, offered to vastly superior numbers, urltloubtedlv saved the carnp from being rushed on that side.
AS Colonel &Rae fell back to the more easily defensible position he
WRY reinforced by Lieutenant Barff, and thenceforth that night they
held in check immense odds, fighting unremittingly till daybreak.
>l:tjor Taylor T V ~ Y~vocndedin the side by a bullet early in the fight, a n d
was carried a\T:Ly to hospital, knowing that he could not recover.
LL

I n the centre and left of the camp, on the alarm sounding, Lieute11ant Clin~o,with a company of the 24th Punjab Infantry, had manned
the walls of the bazar comnlanding the nppoaches fro111 the graded
road and the gorge below it. Another company of 24th Punjab I n f a n t r y
under Lieutenant Costello had nlaniled the walls of the coluuiissariat a n d
hospital enclosures facing the gorge from the North Uarnp, and a t h i r d
company of thc same regiment supported the pickets 011 the left.
The remainder of the regiment was held in reserve in their camp.
NO. 5 C'onlpany Sapperv and Miners had fallen in a t the walls a n d
abattiv surroundiug their own camp.

It was a pitch dark night, and a t about 10-15 the Erst shot w a s
fired. The enelny made a vigorous rush a t the Abbott Road picket and.
qvelapowered it. Dashing through the opening thus made tlley gained,
* Iharc .ire tuu ~,lacci,quite dist~nctfro111c x l l otllcr, ho ~ i ' ~ n ~ c and
r l , both obtailr
melrtlor~in c?iff*relit parts of ttlc Iiarlxtlr~c Thc Khar now refexrcd t o is bilu+tcUl ~ n
tllo
road botueen Malilkn~lcllaud Ohakdara. The other Khar heu ou t l i ~norther11 cuufincu
of the Mohrudud country.

t,lie high ground 'hcllind tllc Snppcrs ' lines and s~~rron~idecl
t l ~ ~ camp
ir
aild the colnnlissarint goclown. Coloilel Meiklejoli~r,with his T).il.A.-C:.,
went at once to the 24th Punjab Infantry cany and ordered Lieubenant-colonel Lamb to bring up another company of this regiment t o
strengthen the Sappers, and proceeded with then1 to the Sappers and
Miners' Camp. Lieutenant Clinlo's company was now also ordered into
this enclosure, as the enemy were getting round his left flank and in llis
positioll he partially masked the fire which Lieutenant Costello could
bring to bear on them. I n these positions the troops remained all night.
The enemy came on with great determination, charging the al~attis
defended by the Madras Sappers and Miners over and over again.
The corps behaved splendidly, driving their assailants back and I l ~ l d ing their own manfully under a hailstorm of bullets and rocks showered on them from the rising ground close in front of their abattis.
Twice, however, the enemy got through, once taking possession of their
quarter-guard, in which was all the arnnlunition of the corps and some
spare rifles. I n trying to check this charge Lieutenant Watling was
wounded 1)y a ghazi, who leapt the abattis, but whom he ran through
as he got in. The man struck him across the shoulder and necl; first,
but apparently with the back of his sword, and then as he fell cut
hini again above the heel. Sergeant Byrlle of this company was killed
here. Colonel Meiklejohn was a t this time watching the defence on the
south and south-east faces of the enclosure, to which place Lieutenant
Watling was carried, and where Major Herbert, who had also been
shot, was being attended to by Surgeon-Captain Langston. LieutenantColonel Lamb, commanding the 24th Punjab Infantry, was leaning over
Major Hel;bert, asking him about his wound when he himself was struclr
by a Pullet above the knee, shattering the bone. Colonel Meiklejohn, on
hearing that the quarter-guard had been taken, a t once decided that i t
must be retaken, and getting together 10 or 15 men with Captain
Holland and Lieutenant Clirno, led then1 on to the attempt. As they
got sear they made a dash, Colonel Meiklejohn leading Almost immediately two Sappers werkshot and fell dt his feet, his orderly was cut
down a t his side and a Pathan struck him across the chest with the flat
of his sword. This was really the galIant Colonel's second escape, for
the bullet which had wounded Major Herbert had first passed through
Colonel Meiltlejohn's gaiter. Captain Holland was shot here, the bulIet
passing across his back, going under both shoulder blades, but missing
his spine, leaving four holes. The reception that this party got caused
slight checli, but Colonel Meilrlejohn, who .was now atanding ahead

alone, was immorable, shooting down his assailants with his r e v o l v e r a s
they came for him. The check wzs only momentary, and the sepoys,
cheered on by Lieutenant Climo, dashed up to him and into the guard,
driving the enemy from the enclosure and saving the ammunition.
Some of the enemy had at the commencement got into t h e con~missariat e~lclosureand into the room where Honorary-Lieutenant Manley,
C'onlnliss~riatOfficer, and Sergeant Harrington were. L i e u t e n a n t
&Innley went for them with his revolver, shooting two, and w a s t h e n
killed. Sergeant Earrington had a wonderfuI escape : h e had no
weapons, the room was dsrlr, and he stood with his back to t h e wall
as still as he could. The ghazis walked round the room f e e l i n g t h e
wall, but just missed him, and thinking the room was empty left. Ah
they canle in he had heard them say in Pushtoo : " There s h o u l d be
two here,:' showing that the men knew the place well and e x p e c t e d t o
find him there. The attack was carried on for the rest of t h e night
wit11 great vigour, and the enemy, having possession of commauding
ground on two sides of this enclosure, brought a severe cross fire t o bear
on the defenders, and continually cl~ilgedright up to the a b a t t i s . It
was so dark that, althoogli their yells and shrieks could be h e a r d , they
could not be seen till within five yards of the men's rifles. A t 2-30 t h e
sonncl of pipes and "toni-toms " coming up the graded road indicated reinforcelnents coming to the enemy, and Colonel Rleiklejohn t h e r e f o r e
ordered Lieutenant Rawlings, 4th Punjab Infantry, to go up to t h e f o r t
and bring down 100 men to this enclosure. The enemy were p r e t t y well
all round the enclosure, and i t was a risky thing to be asked t o do, butLieutenant Rawlings, accompanied by one orderly, did it gallantly and,
shooting a ghazi who attacked him on the way .with his revolver, rec
turned safely with the reinforcements.
A t 4-30 A.X. the enemy withdrew, taking most of their dead w i t h
them, but some 40 bodies were picked up in the camp, most of which
were recognised as those of men who had been in the habit of b r i n g i n g
wood, grass, milk, eggs, etc., for sale into camp.
One very unfortunate incident of the fighting was that t h e enetny
succeeded in looting 19 boxes of ammunition containing 10,400 rounds,
After the Madras Sappers had been attacked, these boxes, b e l o n g i ~ l gto4
their reserve supply, had been loaded upon mules ready to be t a k e n u p
to the fort. The animals were standing in the lines when the tribesnlen
ten~pornrilycaptured the quarter-guard, and in the confusion mules
and ammunition disappeared,
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A brave deed was performed by Lieutenant E. W. Costello. During the hottest part of the fight, while the football ground was overrun
with the enemy's swordsnlen and swept by a heavy fire froni both the
enemy and our own troops, Lieutenant Costello dashed out upon the
ground from the hospital enclosure and, with the assistance of two sepoys,
brought in a wounded Lance-Havildar who was Iring 60 yards away
i n the open. For this he was, on the 9th November, awarded the
Victoria Cross.
Our losses on this the first night were-British
Officers :-Eilled :
Honorary-Lieutenant L. Manley, Comnlissariat Department ; wounded
dangerously :Major W.W. Taylor, 35th Sikhs ; councied seriously :
jieutenant-Colonel J. Lamb, Commandant, 24th Punjab Infantry ;
Major Herbert, D.A. and (4,-M.-G. ; Captain W. F. Holland, 24th
Punjab Infantry ; Lieutenant F. W. Watling, R.E., Madras Sappers
and Miners. British N.-C. Oficer :-Tillled : Sergeant Byrne, Madras
Mappers and Miners. Native ranks :-Rii'lled, 21 ; roourrded, 31. It n l q
be added that two days later Major Taylor died of liis wound, and on
the 23rd of August Colonel Lamb also succumbed.

&amp and on
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THE SITUATIOB I N THE STAT COUNTRY.

THErising in the Malakand was totally unexpected. Since the time
when the Cliitral Campaign came to an end the Lower Swat V a l l e y
had been singularly peaceful, and the people seemed well content w i t h
the new order of things. Trade had expanded, the Chitral road h a d
been kept open without any difficulty, and splendid crops were e x pected in the valley. Everything in fact seemed to make for P e a c e Suddenl-v the "&Pad Fakirn appeared on the scene and q u i c k l y
cathered about him a large fighting force, whose boldness in a t t a c k ing a stronghold like Kalakand showed with what desperate COurWe
they were inspired. He chiefly had with him men from Upper Swat,
Mian Guls as they are called, from their adherence to the p r i n r i p l e s
inclllcated by their great Akhund who died some years ago. T h e s e
tribe,e.sillmare noted for their fanaticism, but another motive for t h e i r
action was the resentment excited by the Khan of Dir's attempts to
extend his authority over them. Once the Mad Fakir" had succeeded
ill making a disturbance a t Thana, he was joined by the Lower Swa.tis,
carried away by the rising tide of enthusiasm, and as the news of the
movement spread the lawless Utman Khels from the west and a s e c t i o n
of the BunerwaIs from the south-east also sent contingents.

,

The suddenness of the attack on the 26th July illustrates the
lnarvellous rapidity with which the tribesmen on our borders can be
mustered for warlike projects. The few hundreds who assenlbled in
the first instance a t Landaki had their numbers swollen by men f r o m
Thana, Aladand and Khar, as the c L Mad Fakir " made liis way d o w n
the valley; and by nightfall the gathering was so large that t h e
mullah was able to attack the Malakand at once. But for the n e w s
brought by the levy jamadar the pickets might have been rushed b e f o r e
they had been doubled, and the regiments would not have had time
to reach their posts. The tribesmen apparently waited until after s u n s e t
before beqinning their stealthy movement along the hills, and this f u r t h e r
accounts for their sudden and unexpected appearance. Their numbers o n
this first night were fortunately smaller than on subsequent n i g h t s ;
otherwise, with the troops broken up into two parties-in
the N o r t h
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Fanaticism did not entirely account for this deterlllined rising in a
country which had been singularly peaceful for twu years. The 1c Mad
Fakir" was, undoubtedly, a power in the country a t that cime, but his
fiery preaching was not the sole incentive which made the villagers
of Swat leave their rice-fields d t a nloruent's notice, swarm about the
Malakaod, fighting with a heroic disregard for their lives, and when
repulsed turning with savage fury (as will afterwards appear) upon the
isolated garrison a t Chalrdara.
When the pl~rdnhwas lifted from Swat in April 1895, the people
of the valley fought one action on the Malakand and then quietly made
their submission. A t the close of the campaign they accepted willingly enough, as it appeared at the time, the new conditions which
mere established. They were formally brought within the sphere of
British political influence, though permitted to nianage their own tribal
concerns ; their headmen were subsidised in return for the levies which
they provided ; they benetited materially by the demand for supplies
required by the troops left in occupation of the Malakand and Chakdara ; the trade of the valley developed rapidly, owing to the improved road to Bajoxr and Chitral and the bridging of the Swat and
Panjkora Rivers ; and, to add to all this, some of the material benefits
of civilisation were placed within their reach. Major Deane, the Political Officer to whom their interests were entrusted, was acceptable
to them, and they showed marked anxiety to refer their disputes to
hinl for decision. No resentnient was openly mainfested a t the presence of our troops in the country; the relations between the sepoys
and villagers were of the most friendly kind ; and not a Yingle disturbance occurred. The annual relief of the Chit12algarrison was carried
out in 1896 and again in 1891 without a shot being fired in Swat,
and the Government of Irldia might fairly have congratulated itself on
the peaceful outlook beyond the Malakand.

8

We have spoken so far only of Lower Swat, through which the
Chitral road runs. I n Upper Swat the some conteiitnie~ltdid not
altogether prevail, tlloagh no danger was anticipated froin that quarter.
The reason for unrest in the upper country was the growing power of the
K h a n of Dir, the man whom Umra Khan had driven into exile among
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*Ile Swatis, b u t who rose as t h e Chief of Jhandoul fell. Mahomed Sharif
Khan, after the campaign of 1895, had all the prestige which attaches
t o a border chief directly supported by the British Government, and he
began t o extend hie authority over that portion of Upper Swat which
adjoins Dir. Further, the people in t h e Talash Valley beyond Chakdara
were nlade to feel that h e might possibly claim to exercise control over
them. Exactly how far he pursued a forward policy is not for the
present purpose worth inquiring into, but it is certain that the Upper
Swatis grew alarmed a t his pret,ensions. The Mian Guls, the four
grandsons of the old Akhund, began to fear that such power as they
had might disappear, and i t was difficult to reassure them. A nlan
calling himself Mohamed Ibrahim appeared in Simla a t the beginning
of July bringing a letter addressed to the Lieutenant-Governor of
the Punjab from one of the grandsons of the late Akliund of Swat.
It was a n attempt to play a trick which is common enough in the East.
Those who enlployed him had addressed Major Deane direct regarding
their grievances and had simultaneously sent the emissary to rnalre a
separate representation at head-quarters. They hoped to obtain conflicbing orders and thus to mealren the authority of the Political Officer
on the spot. Their scheming was so transparent that it was seen
through a t once, and their emissary was referred back to Major !)cane.
This was the situation in the S m ~country
t
when the " Mad Fakir
appeared on the scene.
According to tribal reports this man is a native of Swat, who, in
his ~ a r l i e ryears, travelled to Central Asia and eventually settled in
Mazar-i-Sharif, the Amir's chief cantonment in Afghall Turkistan. H e
lived there for ten years and then moved to Kabul. During the summer of 1897, he visited Bajour, the Utman Kllel* country and 13uner,
preaching the necessity of waging war against all enemies of the Faith.
H e was in league with Hajab-ud-din, the notorious Mullah of Had&,
whose fanatical hostility to the British Government was already notorious and who was destined t o play a n active part in subsequent frontier
troubles. When t h e '(Mad Faliir " appeared in Upper Swat in July,
the fame of his preaching spread far and wide. H e gradually worked
his way down the valley, with a huge rabble of Inen and boys a t his heels,
and on July 26th was a t Landaki within hail of Chakdara. I t was not

* This name is also borne bv several unimportant sub-sections of other and quite
dist'inct ttibes. In this part of thk book it refers only to the clau dwelling between Swat
and Bajour.
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till then that he tool< the final step which brought about the rising.
H e claimed to be inspired to work miracles ; the Heavenly Host were,
lie said, on his side ; and he announced that with or without help from
I+ listeners he would sweep our troops from Chakdara and the Malakand in eight days. His excited appeals to the fanaticism dormant in
every Pathan were responded to in a manner little short of marvellous :
his progress from Landalii to Thana and thence to Aladand, both
villages in view of the Chakdara post, must have been a triumphal one ;
the villagers flew to arms ; our levies hastily retired, except such as
joined his standard ; all the headmen, with one solitary exception,
were carried away by the popular enthusiasm, and by nightfall a resolute body of tribesmen were on the move to attack the Malakand, while
another party turned their attention to Chakdara, The mullah had
roused the whole valley, and his standard afterwards became the rallying point for tliousands of fighting nlell from Upper Swat, Euner, the
Utman Khel country, and even more distant parts.

SooS after daybreak on the 27th of July, in fact i ~ m e d i a t e l ~
ehenly had withdrawn after the repulse of their initial attack on the
hfalakand, Colonel hxeiklejohn, in accordance with his original idea, sent
out a column consisting of four guns of No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery,
one squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers, and the 31st Punjab Infantry.
These troops mere ordered to pursue and break up any gathering i n t h e
Swat Valley and open u p communication with Chakdara. They found
themselves opposed to large bodies of tribesmen, but the cavalry pushed
on towards Chakdara. The guns and infantry, however, had to return
to Malakand. It then became clear that the rising was serious and
Colonel Bleiklejohn wired down south to Madan ordering t h e Corps of
Guides up with all possible speed. H e withdrew the troops from the
North Malakand Camp, concentrating his brigade in and about t h e
entrenched position on the Kotal, where they could best be utilised in
repelling any attack in strength. A t the same time he telegraphed to
the head-quarters of the Punjab Command a t Murree asking that reinforcements might be sent. During this same day (July 87th) bodies
of tribesmen appeared on the hills about the Malakand position, b u t
did not venture upon any determined advance. They were fired
upon when within range. The Guides arrived in the evening, though
they had received the order to proceed to Malakand only a t 9 P.M.
the night before. They thus completed the march of 32 miles, with
a long climb of seven miles a t the end of it, in most oppressive heat,
ih something like I6 hours. It mas a march to be proud of. They
dropped a detachment of infantry a t Dargai* a t the font of the hills
SO as to keep the road open.
The garrison in the Malakand a t that time consisted of one squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers, No. 8 Mountain Battery, No. 5 Company
Madras Sappers, the 24th and 31st Punjab Infantry, and the 45th Sikhs,
or something under 3,000 men. Of these, 25 cavalry and 200 infantry
were ordinarily detached to hold the outpost a t Chakdara and the

* This place will not be confused with the now famous heights of the same rlame on
the Bamana Hange.
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bridge-head on the Swat River. The Chakdara post was considered to
be impregnable, and was armed with Maxim guns which could sweep
the bridge. As ample supplies and reserve ammunition are always
stored there, not the least fear was entertained regarding the safety
of the post itself. I n response to Colonel Meiklejohn's denland for reinforcements the following nlovemellts of troops were promptly ordered
from Murree :-No.
7 British Mountain Battery from the Murree
Gullies, the 35th Sikhs from Peshawar, the 18th Dogras from Now&era, to Malakand ; three squadrons 11th Bengal Lancers from Now.
&era, and the 22nd Punjab Infantry from Jhelum, to Mardan ; the
37th Dogras from Sialkote to Peshawar ; and one Native Infantry regi.
merit from the Bengal Command to Nowshera, where there was only
a small detachment of British troops, as the Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders were absent on service in the Tochi Valley.
When Colonel Meiklejohn evacuated the North Camp on Tuesday
afternoon, July 27t11, the tents in the camp had to be left standing, as
no camel transport was available to move them and they were too
heavy for the mules, being of the pattern known as "European private's." The enemy burnt them, and as the conflagration must have
been visible for miles, the tribesmen from a distance flocked in to see
how far successful tlle Swatis had been. The nunibers of the enemy
were thus greatly increased, and at 8-30 P.M. they again attacked
Malakand on all sides.
The Malakand force had by this time been redistributed, the 24th
Punjab Infantry with two guns holding a conical hill on the north side
of the camp commanding the approaches from the North Camp direction, and the 31st Punjab Infantry with two guns and the main body of
the Guides occupying the central enclosurt ; two guns and 100 of the
Guides were sent to strengtl~entlie 45th Sikhs on the right, while a party
of 50 men were sent from the Fort to Maxim Point to close that side
of the camp and command the water-supply. The attack commenced at
8-30 P.M. and was carried on with the same determination as on the
night before, but this time the enemy did not penetrate. They, however, succeeded in capturing the Serai, which was outside the line of defence, and in which 25 men of the 31st Punjab Infantry had been placed.
The enemy attacked it with great vigour, and eventually mined it and
set fire to the door. The picket held on nlanfully as long as they could,
but ultin~atelyharl to let themselves down by tlle back wall and retire
to Llle euclosu~e,in doing which they lost ten men. The 45th Sikl~sand

24th Puajab Infantry were equally vigorously attacked, but t h e y
drove off the enemy with great loss. As day dawned the enemy began
pressing the 24th Punjab Infantry, and Lieutenant Climo, who was in
command of the regiment, decided to deliver a counter-attack. Accordingly with 100 men he advanced up the spur to the east to meet t h e m
and delivered a tremendous 6re. The !enemy drew off, but were pursued
and driven from crest to crest in grand style, losing about 90 killedLieutenant Costello Tvas mounded in this brilliant little counter-attack,
and our losses altogether on the second night were :-Lieutenant
Costello slightly wounded ; native ranks, 10 killed, 45 wounded.
All day during Wednesday, the 28th July, desultory fighting was
going on in every direction round the camp, and large bodies of t h e
enelxy could be seen collecting from all directions and joining our foes
on the hills. -kt 10 o'clock in the evening they attacked again from a l l
sides, and with the same viaour as they had shown both nights before.
The distribution of the troops remained the same as on the 27th. The
attack comme~~ced
on the enclosure in which were the Sappers a n d
afiners, the 31st Punjab Infantry and the Guides-and the brunt of t h e
fight fell on this position all night, the enemy continually charging in
the dark right up to the abattis and breast-works, but they did n o t
penetrate. The 31st Punjab Infantry suffered heavily, the 46th Sikhs
also had a very severe time, but they niust have killed a t least 200 of
the enemy. The fighting was incessant a11 round the camp, and lasted
till 3 A.M. It was inlpossible then to estimate the total losses of t h e
enemy ; they were certainly very large, and in the early morning t h e
tribesmen could be seen dragging away bodies over the hills. T h e
troops, however, had beell fighting now for about 60 hours without
sleep, and were too exhausted forpursuit, with the risk that they lllight
have to fight again the following night. Our casualties on this the t h i r d
~ i g h were
t
: British Officers-Lieutenant Ford, 31st Punjab Infantry,
seriously wounded ; Lieutenant Swinley, 31st Punjab Infantry, slightly
wounded ; Lieutentant Maclean, Guides, slightly wounded. Lieutenant
Maclean had a narrow escape, the bullet going into his moutll a n d
comillg out of his cheek. Native ranks-2 killed, 16 wounded.
Signalling communication was re-established with Chakdara on the
29tl1, when i t was ascertained that they also had been attacked twice b y
day and three times by night but were holding their own. Lieutenant
Minchin, Political Oficer a t Chakdnra, signalled that large bo~liesof
men were streaming down the valley, the number being calculatcd a t

5,000, and that a
night,. The detl
night showed h.c
heavy that unler
not have been r6

All day duri
employed streng
trees, and anyth
bonfires to light
advance to reac'
the afternoon 1
Eatson, who WI

The same r
force than had a
delivered on hot
ly the enemy di
Isy the bonfires
portion of the (
24th Punjab I r
had to bear tht
be carried on v
No. 8 Bengal :
which had be
great havoc wi
defenders. Th
night, culminat
suddenly cease1
attack this nigh
himself. On tl
lowers on to fig
three nights (
believers begar
leader's prayer
dheni and ther
able to call to I
argnnient thal
firn~lybelievi
their hands a
wmed spirits

but they
niF b e g a n
o was i n
Accordeet t l i e n i
epursued
10 killed.
r-attack,

5,000, and that another attaclt might be expected on the Malakand that
night. Tile determination of the tribesmen in their repeated attacks at
night showed how large was the gathering, for their losses had been so
heavy that unless fresh nlen were constantly arriving the attacks could
not have been renewed.
All day during Thursday the 89th July, the troops a t hlalakand mere
employed strengthening the defences, clearing the field of fire of huts,
trees, and anything thet could give cover to the enemy, and in arranging
bonfires to liglit up the appro~chesover ~vhichthe enemy were bound to
nclvance to reach the ceiltral enclosure. The force was augmented in
t h e afternoon by one squadron 11th Bengal Lancers, under Major
Beatson, who were taken into the Fort.
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The same night the garrison was attacked by a very much Iarger
force than had appeared on the three previous nights ; the attack was
delivered on both flanlrs and in a most determined manner. Apparently the enemy did not like the idea of crossing the belt of light given
by the bonfires in front of the Sapper enclosure, and conseclnently this
portion of the camp had a less severe night of i t than before. The
23th Punjab Infantry on the left and the 45th Sikhs on the right
had to bear the brunt of the fighting this time, and i t seemed to
be carried on with even greater ferocity than before. The guns of
No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery, commanded by Lieutenant Wynter,
xllich had beell working almost ineess~ntly for 84 hours, played
great havoc with the enemy and rendered valuable assistance to the
defenders. The attaclr began a t 9-30 and was pressed vigorously all
night, culminating with a tremendous effort from 2 to 2-30, when it
suddenly ceased, and the enemy drew off. The increas.ed fury of the
attack this night turnedout to be due to the presence of the c L X a dFakir"
himself. On the three previous nights he had sent his infatuated followers on, to fight, saying that he would stay behind and pray. After
three nights of defeat, and ht~vinq suffered very heavy losses, the
beliex-ers began to feel a little dissatisfied with the efficacy of their
leader's prayers, and suggested that he should come himself and lead
Chem and then perhaps the heavenly hosts which he professed to be
able to call to his aid would come down and assist them. I t was anargument that he dared not resiat and so he came. His followers,
firmly believing that the '.infidels " were now to be delivered into
their hands and that the heavens woulcl be opened and crowds of
=rued spirits would descend a i d help them, dashed on to our ranks,

l ~ t l1,y rhe l?:~ltirl~imselfand his Grstl~eutenantand faithful conlpinionTllr latter was killed a i d the Fsliir llirliself wounded. This p r o b a L ) l ~
I~appcnctla t 2-30, when the enonly withdrew, thc Fakir hilnsclf f l y i n g
b ~ tok Landaki. The accident to their leader considet~ablyshook the
Lclief of his follorver~in liis divine power and his rapid retirement to
Lsndaki was no cloubt regarded by tllenl as a proof that he had n o t a
very strong belief in Ilimself. A t any rate, the fighting, though a g a i n
resunled the nest night, was no longer pushed with the same spirit as
IlitIlerto. Our casualties t l l ~nigllt
t
(July 29th) were : British Ofiieer1,ieutcn:~ntCostello, seriously \voundcd. IIe had already been s h o t in
the arm, but insisted on going on wit11 Elis duty, and was again sllot in
t h e other a1~11, the bone being fractured. Native wnks-killed
one,
\rounclcd 17.
A curious fact afterwards came to light which illustrates the kind
of reverence felt by thc tribesnlen for their mullahs. Tlie " Mad Falcir's ''
w u n d necessitated the amputation of two joints of one of his fingers, and
these joints were buried with great ceremony, a skandard being p l a c e d
aver tlleril and a shrine erected. But the most amusing thing was t h a t
the Fakir gave out that anyone who had a wish or want had only to pzy
a visit to the stwine in order to get i t fulfilled-and he was believed,
The four night attacks on Malakand had been made with the g r e a t est determination, and the total losses resulting had been very heavy.
They amounted to 36 killed and 106 wounded, including 15 followers
killed and 11 mounded, :,ostly in the first attack. The casuaIties a m o n g

the British Officers were the noticeable feature of the affair, two h a v i n g
been killed and nine wounded. The regiments being short of Officers,
the control of the fire could not be so good as i t would have been with
it full complement, and ~ h erepeated and long night attacks caused an
enornlous expenditure of ammunition, but fortunately the supply was
in excess of the regulation number of rounds, which would ordinarily
have been 400 per rifle.
All was pretty quiet during Friday, the 30th July, but a very l a r g e
organisecl gathering was see11 to have joined the enemy, and i t was
evident that though the t w o leaders were hers de conzbat the tribes h a d
no intention of giving up the fight yet, and the garrison prepared f o r
another attack in the night. I t began a t 9-30, but was not delivered wit11
the salue energy ru before. A lleavy thunderstorm broke over t h e scezle
in the middle of the night, aild the enemy, taking advantage of t h e
groi~terclttrkness, tElu noise of the thuuder and the rain, attempted to
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r ~ i s hthc d5th Silrhs. They wcrc met, however, with the aamc pcrfcctly
cool and steady resistance which1 this gallant regiment had opposed to
then1 night after night since the fight began, and were bayoneted in
considerable numbers. The enemy withdrew a t about 3 A.M.; our
casualties being only 2 sepoys wounded.
The next day, Saturday, July 31st, the 35th Sikhs and 38th Dogras
arrived in c a n ~ pafter a most trying march, the heat on the road being
intenso, and they were a most welcome reinforcen~rntto the garrison.
All was quiet during the day and nothing but sniping into camp occurred that night, so the troops had comparative rest.
On Sunday, the 1st of August, Colonel Meiklejohn decided to
take with him 1,000 infantry, one squadron of cavalry and 2 guns, and
also 50 Sappers and t r y to relieve Chalidara. A t 11 A.M. the cavalry
went down to the plain by the short road to the Korth Camp. This
move was a t once discovered by the enemy, who turned up in swarllls
from every direction. The cavalry, conlposed of the Guides Cavalry
under Colonel Adams and one squadron 11th Bcngal Lancers under Major
Beatson, charged them in grand style, and got well into them once, but
the difficult nature of the p o u n d and the skill wit11 which the enemy
availed themselves of it prevented their going far, and they had to fall
back, having accounted for nearly 100 of the enemy. They returned into
camp under cover of the fire from tlle infantry and guns, their casualties
being : British 0Bcers:-Captain
Balfiin, Guides, severely wounded,
and Lieutenant Keyes, Guides, slightly wounded. Native sanlis :-I
killed, lZ wounded. Colonel Adams had his horse shot under him. It
wasnow so late in the day and the enemy were evidently in such
numbers, that i t was thougilt impossible to get to Clrakdara that night,
with the probability of having to fight three fights on the way, one in
getting out of the lrotal, another a t But!rela and the third a t Arnandara
Pass. The attempt was accordingly put 08till the next day.
A t Chakdara itself, the attaclrs upon the fort had been aImost continuous, and i t looked as if the assailznts intended to wear out the
garrison, and, if possible, cause then1 to exhaust their ammunition.
Practically, i t was impossible for the enemy to capture thefort until
the troops holding it had no cartridges left, and even then storming
parties n~iglltbe beaten back with the bayonct, as the fort stands on a
scarped, rocky eminence of great natural strength. A heliograph message
had however been receivcd at Malakand from Glialrdara with the two

words "Help us" and great anxiety was consequently felt f o r the
little force. A heliograph had been sent in reply 6 6 Expect us tomorrow morning. Is t.he bridge standing?" But no reply to the question had come back. It was imperative therefore to relieve the post a t
all costs. How this relief was carried out at a critical moment will
presently be related.
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THE MALAKAND FIELD FORCE.

OwrNa t o the serious aspect of a6aira in the Swat Valley orders weye
issucd from Army Head-Quarters for the troops a t Malalrand, together
with those moving up, to be fornled into a Division for field service,
the command of which was given to Brigadier-General Sir Bindon
Blood (then cotamanding the Bundelkhand District), with a complete
staff. The 1st Brigade, under Colonel Meilrlejohn, was to be composed
of the %yal We& Kent Regiment, the 24th Punjttb Infantry, the 31st
Punjab Infantry and the 45th Sikhs. The 2nd Brigade, under Colonel
Jeffreys, then officiating in command of the Sirhind District, was to be
conlposed of the Buffs, the 35th Sikha, the 38th Dogras and the Guides
Infantry. The Divisional corps were t o be No. 1 and No. 7 British and
No. 8 Bengal Mountain Batteries, No. 5 Company Madras, and No. 4
Company Bengal Sappers and Miners, the Guides Cavalry and one
squadron of the l l t h Bengal Lancers. Colonel Aitlrin was given the
command of the Royal Artillery. Lieutenant-Colonel Schalcli, l l t h
Bsngal Infantry, was made Base Commandant a t Nowshera.
The following was the full staff of the new Malakand Field
Force ;Commaading, Brigadier-General Sir B. Blood ; Assistant AdjutantGeneral, Major H. H. Burney, Gordon Highlanders ; Assistant Quarter.
master-General, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Masters, Central India Horse ;
Deputy Assistant Quartemaster-Ger~eral,Intelligence Department, Captain H. E. Stanton, R.A. ; Field lutelligenoe Officer, Captain H. F.
Walters, 24th Bonlbay Infantry ; Signalling Officer, Captain E. W. M.
Norie, Middlesex Regiment ; Principal Meclical Officer, Surgeon-Colonel
G. Thomson ; Commanding Royal Artillery, Colonel W. Aitkin ; Adjutant, Royal Artillery, Captain H. D. Grier ; Field Engineer, Major
E. Blunt ; Assistant Field Engineers, Lieatenants C. &I.3'. Watkins
and H. 0.Lathbury; Ordnance Oficer, Captain W. W. Cookson,
R.A. ; Chief Cummissariat Officer, Major H. Wharry ; Assistant Cornmissariat Officer, Lieutenant A. S. Cobbe, 32nd Pioneers; Divisional
Transport Officer, Captain C. G. R. Thaclrwell ; Assistant Transport
Qflicer, Captain F. H. Hancock, 26th Punjab Infantry 1 Veterinary

Officer, Captain H. T. W. M n l ~ u; Provost Marsl~al, Captain C. G.
Edwarcls, 5th Pulljab Cavalry.

P.

1 s t B~.igadeSfoff:-Commanding, Colonel W. I-I. Meiklejohn ;Dcputy
Assist~ntAdjutant-General, Major E. A. P. Hobday, R.A. ; Depnty
Assistant Quarternlaster-General, Captain G. F. H. Dillon, 40tl1 Patllans;
Commissariat Officer, Captain C. H. Deville ; Erigade Transport Oficer,
Captain J.M. Ca~uillery; Begilnental Transport OEcer, Lieutenant R.
Harman, 4th Sikhs ; Veterinary O&cer, Captain W. R. Walker.
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2nd Brigade 8fnf:-Commanding,
Colonel P. D. Jeffreys ; Deputy
Assistant Adjutant-General, Major E. 0. F. Hamilton, Queen:s Royal
West Surrey Regiment ; Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General,
Major C. H. Powell, 1st Guslrhas ; Commissasiltt OEcer, Captain G. A.
Eawltins ; Brigade Transport Otticer, Captain D. Baker, Gombny
Grenadiers ; Regimental Transport Officer, Lieuteriant G. C. Brooke,
Border Regiment; Veterinary Ofiicer, Lieutenant T. W. Rudd.
Bare and Line of Cornm.unication :-Ease
Commandant, Colonel
V. A. Schalch, 11th Bengal Infantry ; Stnif Officer a t Base, Captain IT.
Scott, Royal Susses Regiment ; Section Conimandant, Captain 0.B. S. F.
Shore, 18th Bengal Lancers ; Coniniissariat Officer, Ct~ptainS. W.
Lincoln ; Assistant Comn~issariatOfficer, lieutenant E. G. Vaugha11 ;
Transport Officers, Lieutenants R. S. Weston, Manchester Regiment,
and E. F. Macnagliten, 16th (Queen's) Lancers.

I

Brigadier-General Sir Bindon Blood was given the temporary rank
of Major-General while conlnlanding the Malakand Field Force, and
Colonel W. H. Meiklejohn and Colonel P. D. Jefieys were given the
temporary rank of Brigadier-General wliile commanding the 1st and B~ld
Brigades respectively under Sir Bindon Blood.
Orders mere also issued for the immediate formation of a Reserve
Brigade for the Malakand Field Force. This was composed as follows :-Commanding, Brigadier-General J. Wodehouse, R.A. Troops :The Highland Light Infantry from Cawnpore, the Gordon Highlanders from Rawalpindi, the 2nd Battalion 1st Gurkhas from D h a r ~ u sala, the 10th Field Battery from Rawalpindi, and NO. 3 Colxpany
Bontb,zy Sappers from Kirlree.
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The formation of this Beserve Brigade was clue to further information received as to the attitude of thc tribesmen in the Swat Valley.
I t was by this time clear that four sections of the Bunel wa1s Were in the
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field, and though tllc Malnkmld position was no longer in danger tl~erc
were ten or tmelve thousand of the enemy on tkic hills to the nortll, the
north-cast and the south-west, as well as in the Swat Valley itself.
Sir Dindon Blood arrived a t Malakand in advance of some of his
troops on Sunday, August 1st (the day when Colonel Meilrlejohn marle his
ineffectual attempt to relieve Chalrdara~,and at once assumed comnland.
After inspecting the Malalrand defences and the garrison, he reported
to Army Head-Quarters that all the arrangements made by Colonel
Meilrlejohn were admirable in every way, and the position absolutely
secure. H e described the spirit of the troops as excellent, all showing
eagerness to be led against the enemy. H e warmly praised ''their
soldierly bearing and keenness after the almost continuous fighting of the
week, with little rest a t night and exposure to sun during tlie day."
With such troops there could no lonqer be ally lack of confidence in
assuming the offensive and in relieving Cllalrdara, as the Malakana
garrison now comprised more than four thousand infantry, five or six
hundred cavalry, one company of Sappers and a mountain battery.
The heliograph, i t will be remembered, had already told the Malakand garrison that help was urgently needed a t Chalrdara. On the
evening of Monday, July 26th, almost simultaneously with the first
assa111ton the Malakand, Chakdara had been invested by a large force
of Pathans, who attacked from all sides. The garrison of four British
Officers, two companies of the 45th Sikhs, and 25 sowars of the 11th.
Bengal Lancers, was augmented on the Tuesday, under circumstances
already described, by two Officers and 40 sowars of the l l t h Bengal
bancers from Malakand. Communications in the fort mere commanded
from nearly all sides by the enemy, who sniped from cover at from 100
t o 200 yards distance. Frequent attacks were made on the Tuesday and
;Wednesday, the enemy bringing ladders and bundles of grass to get
over the wire entanglement. All this time the garrison could get no
rest, not being able to tell when or where the enemy's attack would
next take place. On the Thursday night a desperate assault was made
on the isolated signal tower, garrisoned by 16 men, but was repulsecl
with great loss. On the Friday, the strength of the enemy in men and
Martini-Henry rifles was very much increased, and they so closely surrounded the fort that no one could leave cover. This critical condition
of ,~fl~hirs
continued till the Sunday. night when the tribesmen made another fierce onslaught, wliich was still in progress the following morning
ivhen tlic lelieving force from thc Malalrand dashed victoriously upon
*tllcscene.
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TIIE RELIEF O F CEAKDARA.
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THE relief of Chakdara was carried out by Colonel hleilzlejolln in brilliant style on Monday morning, August 2nd. I n order to clear the way
for the relieving column, it was necessary a t the outset to disperse the
enemy on the hills to the east and north-east, as they commanded the road
leading into the Swat Valley. This task was assigned to Colonel Goldney, who took with him two mountain guns,the 35th Sikhs and the 38th
Dogras, these two regiments being quite fresh, as they had had two days'
rest after arrival at Malakand. A t the verg. first streak of dawn Colonel
Goldriey silently advanced from the position his troops had held a t
night to within rushing distance of the enemy's position without firing
a shot. He charged the position with the bayonet, taking the enemy
by surprise. They fired a few wild shots and then fled i n
every direction, disappearing like rabbits among the huge rocks and
boulders with which the whole side of the hill down to the foot of the
graded road is covered. Their exact casualties were never ascertained,
but seven dead bodies were found and one prisoner was taken. A t the
same time that Colonel Golclney started, Colonel Meiklejohn also moved
off with his force, and lie got three-fourths of the way down the graded
road before a shot was fired a t him. Those of the enemy, however, who
had fled from Colonel Goldney's attack had carried the alarm down t o
thevillages and encanlpments a t the foot of the hill, and Colonel Meiklejohn soon saw swarms of men with many banners running out of the
villages and down the hillsides to prepare to oppose him. They took u p
a position across the road ; their right being strongly posted on a conical
hill west of the graded road, their left resting on a high spur running
from the main mountainand completely commanding the road. Colonel
Meiklejohn immediately deployed t o his left, sending a party to seize
the levy post, which was about 600 yards in advance of the enemy's
position. I t was grand to see the way the troops advanced. They had.
longed for this opportunity, and they went a t i t with a determination
that the enemy doubtless appreciated.
The fire was brisk on both sides, but there was no delaying our
troops. They rushed the hill occupied by the enemy's right and &ove
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them from it. The enemy fled up the hills t o tlw east, and in the direetions of Rhar and Butlrela, where they mere met by a friendly stream
drawn from 13utkelaby the noise of the firing. The fleeing and advancing
portions of the enenly met where the road crosses the saddle of the Dogras
Hill, and here they re-formed, taking up a position on Dogra Hill.
Colonel Meilrlejohn, without wasting a moment, advanced on this second position, covered by the fire of his guns, sending his cavalry round
the north point of the hill, so as to be in a position to cut off the
enemy from Khar and Butkela. The enemy, however, would not wait
to be attacked. Many of then1 probably had a reniembrance of the
Guides' charge over the same plain in 1895, and they fled. They
were too Inte, however, for in a few minutes the cavalry were on
them, through them, and beyond them to the villages of Khar and
Butkela, leaving our polo groulnd and the whole plain dotted over
with what appeared to the garrison left behind in Nalakancl Fort only
little black heaps, but were in reality Swatis, B ~ n e ~ w a l sand
, others
who would fight no more. The cavalry scoured the m~holeplain, and only
tllose escaped from them who took to the broad stretch of rice-fields
on the banks of the river.
This sudden dart from the Malakand spread terror in the valley
and people could be seen hurrying in every direction from the village to
the river bank, carrying away what they could. Colonel Meiklejohn's
force, however, had another and more pressing object in view than in
cutting these men off, and so the cavalry resumecl their direction straight
for Chakdara, having first dismounted a third of a squadron, and given
the gathering on the banks a few rousing volleys. Colonel Meiklejohn,
having taken Dogras Hill, resumed his march, and disappeared from
the view of those who had watched with admiration. the brilliant and
dashing manner i n which the previons week's score was being wiped
out.
Covered by the cavalry, Colonel Meiklejohn's force advanced on
Butkela, which mas occupied by the enemy. The cavalry pt beyond
the village without a shot being fired a t them, and galloped on to the
Amandara Pass, holding it with dismounted men, and then cut off the
enemy's retreat. The infantry came u p rapidly and attacked Butkela.
The enemy made next to no resistance and fled across the rice-fields
to the river, where the cavalry could not pursue them. AS soon
as the infantry came up to the h a n d a r a Pass, tlie c&valry dashed
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on toval-da CYlnkdara, where, from the noise and smoke, i t vas evicle1lt
that severe fighting was going on. The cavalry reached Cllakdara a t
9 A.M. The bridge was intact, b u t the enen~ywere occupying the Civil
Hospital and the terraces of the hill on which the signalling tower is
and also innumerable sungars all over the level gronnd and rice-fields
1:ound the north and east sides of the fort, from whi~11they lcept up a
heavy fire. The czzvalry a t once crossed tlie bridge, part of tlie gallrison
moving out to cover their crossing, and on reaching the north bank.
they a t once moved uut &gainst t h e enemy in the open, getting anlong
those on the litlrd ground and attacking those in the SUllgUT8 in the
rice-fields with dismounted fire, while the fort supported tllenl with fire
froni their 9-pounder guns and Maxims. They killed a, gl.est niany of tlle

enenly, who began to retire a t once, some towards Ucll, otllers up tlie
valley to Upper Swat. I n many of the sungars light scaling-la~dders
were found, with which the enemy had evideaily intended to get over
the wstllv of the fort.
The Chalidara garrison were in good spirits and holding iheir own
tower were suffering most,
magnificently. The party in the 3igr~%lling
not having had any ~vaterfor two days. The only casualty that niorning
among Officerswas Lieutenant Rattray, severely wounded in the neck,
who was hit in coming out to coPiar $Ire passage of t h e cavalry to
cross the bridge. Other msu,~ltiesamoag the garrison were very slight.
The fort had proved itself practically impregnable and t h e garrison
had behaved gallantly. They had been fighting with hardly any sleep
for seven days.
ColnnelMeiklejohn arrived with the infantry a t 10, b y which time
the fighting had ceased. It may be added here that in addition t o
the troops already spoken of the Chakdara Relieving Column included
No. 5 Queen's Own Bappers and Miners. The casualties in Colonel
Meiklejohn's force in the morning's operations were :-Native ranks, 4
killed and 26 wounded. No British Officers were hit.
As for the enemy, their losses had all along been enormous. The
following were sent in as relkble estimates for the week's fighting a t
Malakand and Chakdara :-At Nalalcand, 700 ; a t the figliting with
Colonel Meiklejohn's force on its way to Chalrdara, over2 500 ; a t
Chakdara, 2,000. The Maxinls and 9-pounder guns at Chakdarn did
great execution. One discharge of grape from the 9-pounder sn~oothbore i s s,upgosed to have accounted for 80 men. Ailotllcr sliot, wl~ieli
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Eiapperlecl t o land iu the mosquc at Oliakdara \r.liilc the enemy mere
a t prayer, killed a considerable nuuiber. Several stories are told of
tlie iridividual courage of tlie P,~tllnns,and the follo~vingis : ~ instance
n
of tlieil. extraordinary vitality, as recorded by an eye-witness. One of
tlie Bengal Lancers ran a Pnthan through with his lance, and being
unable to extract tlie lance left it and passed on. The Pi~thnnpnllecl
tlie lance out, thl.ew i t awsy, and attaclced the nest nlnn who ranie up
t o him, wounding h i s horse wit11 his swol-d. IIe tl~eilattacked an
ORicer of the 11th Bengal Lmcers, who s11c1tllirn through the he,~d.

FURTHER EVENTS IN THE ,SWAT COUNTRY.

So completely was the aspect of affairs changed by the relief of
Chakdara that the lately beleaguered troops had now actually to move
out and search for the enemy, who had vanished as quickly as they had
appeared. Sir Bindon Blood was determined not to give his demoralised foe any breathing time to rally, and to this end, after doubling the
Chakdara garrison and replenishing its stores, he arranged, in concert
with Major Deane, a plan of action under which flying columns were
t o be sent out to sweep the whole of the disturbed country and enforce
submission. The fulI strength of the field force, on the completion of
the concentration a t Malakand, was : two regiments of cavalry, three
mountain batteries, two companies of sappers, and ten regiments of
infantry (not counting the garrison of Jellala) ;in all between 8,000 and
9,000 men. This was quite sufficient for immediate purposes, more especially as the Bunerwals, who lay on the flank of any force moving into
Upper Swat by the river route, seemed inclined to disown the hostile
action taken by the Salarzai* section of their tribe during the recent
fighting. I t was known that the Utman Khels, the Kanazai, the Lower
Swatis and a certain number of ITpper Swatis were implicated ; not to
mention the Dushi Khels, the Adinzai, the Showazai, the Shomizee, the
Nekbe Khels and other sub-sections, whose names are onIy worth repeating by way of showing how general was the rising ; but the whole
strength of the enemy actually in the field a t that time was not believed to be much more than twice as numerous as the full field force.
Sir Bindon Blood accordingly issued the following orders on the 4th
August regarding the disposition of the t ~ o o p s:-The 1st Brigade, consisting of the Royal West Kent Regiment, the 24th and 31st Punjab
Infantry, the 45th Sikhs, with a proportion of sappers and artillery, to
concentrate a t Aluandara ;the 2nd Brigade, consisting of the Buffs, the
Guides Infantry, the 35th Sikhs, the 38th Dogras, with the Divisional
troops, to be placed on the Malakand and a t Iihar. These orders
were quickly carried out and the two brigades then stood ready to move
in any direction a t the shortest notice, equipped with ten days' supplies.
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T l ~ erising of tlle tribes about the Malaliand did not seem to have
infected those further to the north with any excitemellt or
Communication between Gilgit and Chitral was still open, and the last
letters received from Chitral, dated the 17th July, spoke of llothing
unusual, though this was of course long antecedent to the Swat outbreak.
Again, Major Rundle, D.S.O., and Captain Walker, 4th Gurkhas, had just
arrived in Gilgit, hizving come up by way of tlze Babusar Fass and a i l a s
with an escort of police levies of the Agency, and had found all quiei on
the route ; and the Chilas revenue had been duly paid in to Captain
Godfrey, the Agent a t Gilgit. Nor were there as yet (August 6th)
any signs of further outbreaks elsewhere along the frontier. Tl;e Indue
Kohistan, the Mohmand country, the Khyber, Kohat and Kurranl all
seemed to b e undisturbed. With regard to Bajour satisfactory news was
received from the Nawab of Dir that the Bajouris had remained quiet.
The tribes on the border of Peshawar district-with the exception of the
Utnlan Khel, who are always ready to turn out wl~ena prospect of loot
offers--had also renlsined quiet. The Mohmand headmen sent in word
that their clans had not participated in the rising. The Buner frontier
on the Hazara side continued undisturbed, while no signs of unrest were
apparent on the Black Mountain border. The quickness ~vitliwhich
Malakand was reinforced had doubtless exercised a strong effect upon all
the tribes who might have been inclined to join the Swatis. It was t h e
Lower Swatis, who had generally been despised as fighting men, who
really formed the bulk of the recent attacking force. Thus the Khan
of Aladand, whose conduct bad been exemplary since the Chitral Campaign, and who had provided a portion of the levies, receiving a subsicly
in return, Was among the enemy killed in one of the attacks. Villagers
who llad been in the habit of furnislling supplies for the past two years,
aIld who were perfectly well know11 to the garrison, shared in the ghazn,
fighting well too.
The only disquietillg frontier news was to the effect that a number
of mullahs wit11 a following of fanatical tribesmen had left Ningrilhar,
Tagao and otlicr districts about Jcllalr~badto join either the Mull& of
fi~dcla" or the "Mad Fakir."
Ji~gnhsnow began to come in to Major Deane from the offending
country beyond the Swat River, and these subruissions were expedited
wllcn Sir Cindon Blood wit11 the 1st Crigadc under Crigadier-General

*

I'bde Part 111, Chapter 1.

3feiklejolin ~llovedn p tlie left bank of tlie Swat River into Upper Swat.
The Lower Svatis generally submitted unconditionally and were allowed
to return to t h e i ~villages.
The strength of the 1st Erigacle was increased for tlie purpose of tlie
advance by one field and t ~ niou~ltain
o
batteries, the Guides C!a\7alry and
a detachment of the 11th Bengal Lancels, as well as by No. 5 Company
Queen's Own Sappers and Miners ; and as the tribesmen always dread
both artillery and cavalry, especially tile former, i t was not expected
tllat the progress of this formidable force moiild be seriously resisted.
The BunerwaIs who were on the riglit flank of the advancing force
were not expected to nlake any driiionstration ; but to guard against
possible trouble with them, the 1st Reserve Brigade a t Mardan under
Bl,igndier-General J. H. Wcdel~ousen7as raised to the full strength by
the addition of the HighLi~d Light Infantry and the 2nd Queen's
Regiment from Iiaffrtlpindi. General \\rodellouse then rnoved out in
force to Rustam, 20 llliles nortli-exst of Rfardan, to w;~tch bile southern
border of the Euner country, haring with hi111 one scluadron of tlie 1O1,11
B e n ~ a lLancers, tile I-Iighla~ldLight Infantry, and tlie 39th Garhwalia.
The appearance of this force a t Rustani was very timely as i t reminded
the Bunerwals that they could be attacked both in front and i n rear.
The Musa Iihel, holclittg the country between Landaki and Barikot, had
already subnlitted in haste before the 1st Brigade started marching.
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Wlaile Sir Bindon Blood was preparing for his advance, orders
were issued from Simla on the 13th August for the concentration a t
Rawalpindi of two additional Xeuerve Brigades to be known as the
2nd and 3rd Reserve Brigades of the Mslakand Field Force. The new
brigades were constituted as follows :2nd Reservo Brigude :-2nd OxfordshireLight Infantry fromFeiozepore ; 2nd Royal Irisli Regiment from Jubbulpore and Saugor ; 1st
Battalion 3rd Gul*kliaRifles from Almora ; 13th Bengal Infantry from
Bareilly ;No. 3 Xountxain Battery fro111 Jutogh ;18th Bengal Lancers a t
Rawalpindi ; No. 4 Company Bombay Sappers from Kirkee.
3rd Reserve Brigade :-kt Northamptonshire Regiment from Secunderalad ; 1st Dorsetshire Regiment from Gangalore ; 9th Gurkha, Rifles
from Lansdowlle ; 1st Battalion elld Qurklla Rifles from Uehra Dun ;
3rd Field Battery from Saugor ; 3rd Beugal Cavalry from Fyzabad ;
30.
1 C o n ~ p a ~lnladras
y
Sappers from Bangalore.
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M~JOR-GESERAL
SIX BINDONBLOODmoved out from Thana on the left
balllr of the Swat River a t 6-30 on Tuesday morning, August 17th.
As already forewarned by a reconnoitring party, he found some three
thousand tribesmen gatliered near Landalti to oppose his advance up
the valley, and to clear these away an actioil became necessary. The
10th Field Battery got to work without delay, its twelve-pounder guns
nlaliing excellent practice, and the Hoyal West Kent Regiment attacked on the left, while Brigadier-General hleiklejoha, with two regiments and six conlpanies of native infantry and a n~ountainbattery,
advt~ncedon the right, to make a turning rnovenlent and so cut off the
enemy's line of retreat to the hills on the right. The advancing force
also included No. 5 Company Queen's Own Sappers and Miners. Tho
tribesmen would not wait urltil this moven~ent-\xmas
developed, about two
thousanc\ retiring rapidly over the Moral1 Pass into Enner. These were
apparently a conbingent of the Salarzai Bunerwals. The remainder stood
their ground for some time, but were driven from their position, and by
11 ax. the action was over, tlie enemy being in full r e t r e ~ t .
The following are the details of the figliting :On the enemy being sighted at 8 o'clock the force moved steadlly u p
to the foot of the long spur which runs down to-wards the Swat Eiver
from the range on tho right, and the attack was conlmenced by the West
Kents driving back skirmishers from the snlall spur in front, where they
were presently reinforced by No. 7 Mountain Battery under Major F e p n ,
who kept up a galling fire on the main body of the enemy, assisted by N N ~ ,
10 Field Eattery from the plain below. The guns lnad come up to their
position over ground which was velg difficult for wheeled artillery.
Meanwhile the main attack under Brigadier-General Meiklejohn was
developed on the right. The 24th Punjab Infantry, supported by the 31st
Punjab Infantry, with the 45th Silrhs in reserve, worked their way u p
thc hill to within 500 yards of the crest line, where they opened a heavy
fire on the position. By this time No. 8 Bombay MountainBattery, comn~andedby Captain Birch, had joined the firing line and came into action
a t a range of about 500 yards. The resistance offered here was slight,

rind the troops soon won their way to the summit of the ridge. They
now ivvi~eeledto the left, 2nd swept the crest of the hill before them for
a short distance, when they a e r e joined by the West Kent Regiment.
The battery (No. 8) opened fire on a small stone fort a t arange of 600
p r d s :tnd after sllelling i t for about ten niinntes i t was rushed by the
7ricst Kents. Resistance had practically ceased, and the enemy were
see11 stl-earning awal- across the plain below in the direction of Butkel;~
3ncl
were llarrassed by shrapnel from NO. 8 a t a longish range.
All this t i ~ n ethe Guides had been anxiously awaiting their opportunity. i~ narro17 causeway conunanded by the enemy's fire prevented
thew. fronl passing rouud the end of the riclge into the plain beyond, but
\yllen at last the Snppers had cleared the may both of the enemy and of
the obstacles placed in the road, they a t once advanced and were seen
from above ruoving rapidly towards the village of Kotal. T l ~ eretreating tribeslnen had reached a point about a mile beyond this village and
ware already close under the hills. Passing the village the Guides
broke into a gallop; but to those vatching from the hills i t became plain
that the fugitives could reach shelter before it was possible for the
cavalry to overtake them. The heavy rice-fields soon told on the troop
horses, and a fev, better mounted tlrsn the rest, singled themselves out
fro111the nclvancing line of horsemen and bravely forged ahead nlany
yards ill front of their corps. Then occurred a most regrettable incident. The two leaders, Lieutenant Greaves and Captain Palmer, were
met by n heaTy volley-the former mzs shot dead and Captain Palmer's
horse was killed and he himself shot through $he right wrist. Colonel
Adams and Lord Fincastle, who were close behind, a t once dashed up to
rescue their fallen conlrades, who mere now surrounded by a crowd
of ghnzia-both their horses were shot under then1 and they found
thenlselves on foot under fire a t a distance of about 20 yards. By
this time Lieutenant MaeLean with a few sowars had arrived on
the scene and the little party dashed in most gallantly to the rescue
of the Officers. Lieutenant Greaves' body was safely removed, but
meanwhile Lieutenant NacLean was shot through both thighs and
Ned to death almost immediately. Colonel Adrtms and some of his
men again charged into the hornets' nest a t the risk of their lives and
bore away his body. The cavalry now took up their position in a
neighbouring clump of trees, which they defended until relieved b y
some infantry and No. 8 Mountain Battery. This closed the operations
of the &zy, and the enemy retreated over the hills Other casualties
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were Colonel Adams, Gliides, slightly wounded ; three sepoys, 24tll Punjab Infantry, wounded; one sepoy, 3lst Punjab Infantry, wounded; one
sepoy, 45th Sikhs, wounded ;two foll~wers,wounded. As some of the
~ u n e r m a l who
s
had been engaged in the fight were retreating into their
own country over the Morah Pass, they were pursued and routed by
Major Delamain with two squadrons of the 11th Bengal Lancers who had
been left behind a t Thana, and who now accounted for some 20 or 30 of
these tribesmen.
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As must almost necessarily happen after a desperate fight, some
rather conflicting accounts were subsequently received as to the details
of the Guides' charge. TOpublish all these would not perhaps make the
story any clearer, but room may be found for an extract from a, private
letter of an Officer with the 1st Brigade, the publication of which set a t
rest the controversy as to the exact manner in which Lieutenants Greaves
and MacLean met their deaths :-" When the 1st squadron of the Guides
Cavalry debouched from the causeway, the enemy were alreadJ- taking
a position on a hill about 19 miles away up the valley. Colonel Adams
thereupon directed the squadron to move across the plain to a tope of
trees, about 150 yards from the enemy's position. Captain Palmer
meanwhile had got separated from his men, owing to the ground being
intersected by n d a h s , and Colonel Adams was unable to make him understand his intended movements. Shortly afterwards Captain Palmer,
looking round and seeing Colonel Adams with the squadron folowing,
thought he meant to charge the enemy's position. H e therefore kept
ahead, followed by Greaves who seemed to have a difficulty in holding his horse. Lord Fincastle meanwhile had been following the
cavalry on one flank, but hearing Colonel Adams shouting t o Palmer
he closed up towards the former and rode towards the tope with him.
On nearing the tope Palmer and Giveaves made a dash for some standards a t the foot of the hill which was now occupied by some four or five
hundred ghazis. They were at once attacked, Greaves falling a t the foot
of the hill, and Palmer's horse being shot down. The latter, on being
dismounted, a t once engaged in a hand-to-hand conflict. Colonel Adams
called out ' Follow me,' and he and Fincastle went straight for Greaves
who was now surrounded b y ghasis. Fincastle's horse was killed a few
yards off, and he ran up on foot, Colonel Adams having already got up.
The latter dismounted, but Fincastle shouted to him to get up again,
which he did, while Fincastle tried to get Greaves, who was still alive,
on to Adarns' horse. The ghazis poured in a heavy fire, and Adams'
horse was wounded, while Greaves wita $hot dead in Fincastle's arms a s
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s
by a bullet'.
Two sowars nleanwhile h a d ridden out to Palnier's assistance, who was
severely mounded, and g o t him back to the tope. These two sowars
then came on t o help Adams and Fincastle-on whom the ghnzis were
closing-and one had his horse killed. Lieutenant MacLean came out a
minute later, having dismounted the remainder of the squadron in the
tope, whence they kept u p a heavy fire on the enemy ; he arrived just
in time to check the enemy as they were preparing to rush these two
Officers. MacLean brought t,hree soxars out with him, two of who111
had their horses shot under them. ;Meanwhile Adanls and Fincastle
had been carrying Greaves nearer the tope. hlacLeail was shot through
both thighs as he was helping Fincast!e to lift Greaves' body on to his
horse. Adams and Fincastle then pot back safely to the tope with the
dismounted sowars who supported the bodies of MacLean and Greaves
on MacLean's horse. This tope was held for about a quarter of an 'hour
until the infantry arrived, the enemy's fire being exceedingly hot as
our troops were practically attacked on three sides."
Lieutenant H . T. Greaves belonged to the Lancasl~ireFusiliers and,
being on leave from his regiment, was acting as special correspondent of
the Times of Indin. Lieutenant H.
L. S.MacLean belonged to the Guides :
he had been ~vounded i n the previous fighting a t Alalakand but had
rejoined hisregiment. Lord Fincastle belonged to the 16th Lailcers and
was acting as the special correspondellt of the Times with the Malaltand
Field Force : in recognitic~n of his heroism General Blood a t once
attached him to the Guides Cavalry for duty.
On November 9th Lientenant-Co!onel R. E. Adams and Lord Fincast,le were gazetted for t h e Victoria Cross.
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CHAPTBR VIII.
CONCLUDING OPERATIONS I N THE SWAT

VALLEY.

THEf o x e continued its rt~azarch into Upper Swat on the 18th Sugust,
leaving Landaki a t snnrise. No opposition was encountered on the
way, and the troops camped near the village of Ghalajai. Bere
Major Dearne received a letter from the Mian Guls and other tribes in
general terms of subnlission to the Government. This included all the
tribes of Upper. Swat. The " Mad Fakir " was said to have rnovcd off
in the direction of Burner. The next day, August 19th, the force moved
u p the valley to Mingaoi-a, a large village on a tributary of the Swat
River, and camped there for five days. The Swatis appeared to have
completely settled down, and were sending in every day their submivsions
and their arms, some of them even assisting Major Deane in forwarding
dalcs to and from Chakdara. Over 800 guns and rifles were collected,
including some Government rifles stolen froru the Malskand Fort.
The Guides Cavalry made a number of peaceful reconnaissances, and
survey parties did some work in perfect securitj-. I n short, the object
of khe advance up the Swat Valley seenlecl alreedy to have been fully
accomplished, and on the 25th August Brigadier-Genera1 Meiltlejohn's
Brigade starhed to retrace its steps.
W e may pause here for a moment to describe in greater detail
this laurch of the Field Force under General Sir Bindon Blood up the
Swat Balley, as i t llad been one of grertt interest $0 all who had taliell
part in it. The greater part of thc country travelled over was previously
quite unknown to Europeans except from the reports of natives ; and
the map colnpiled from various sources by the Intelligence Branch,
although in the main correct as to names and iilterniediate distances,
proved to be considerably out as regards the general direction of the
valley, which keeps a more easterly bearing than had been estimated.
From Chakdara the valley runs straight, general clirectionE.-N.-E.,
a s far as Barikot, a distance of sonae 12 mihs, whence it turns sharply
almost due north for a short way, and then again resumes its easterly
bearing, running about N.-E. for some 20 miles. Numerous side streams
join the SwatEiver a t various points, and the whole valley is of wonderful
fertilitj -at t l ~ a tilae
t
of the year i t was green with luxuriant crops of
growing rice and Incliasl corn. Villages are thiclil~scetbered along each

side of the main stream, and around them are the invariable graveyards,
shaded by groves of trees, which form such a characteristic feature i n
the scenery of this part of the world. Numerous remains of Buddhist
"stupas, " monasteries and other buildings are passed, which woulcl afford
a n interesting field for investigation to the archreologist. Most of
these remains are of great antiquity, as is proved b y the writings
of the Chinese traveller Hiuen-Tsiang, who ascended this valley some
1,4W years ago, and whose remarks upon prominent features and
objects of religious interest were verified in numerous instances b y
Major Deane, Political Agent, who took a number of interesting
inlpressions of Pali inscriptions, and also of tlie footprints of Buddha,
which latter and their exact location are accurately described in the
manuscript above referred to. Even a t this early date Hieun-Tsiang
speaks of the remilins as " old and ruined. "
As one advances up the valley the scenery becomes wilder and more
mountainous. The hills, which rise to heights of 3,000 or 4,000 feet
above the river bed, beco~riemore rugged and bolder in outline, while
the snowy peaks of the Kohistan are seen towering in the far distance.
These rise to altitudes of 16,000 or 17,000 feet and form a fine background to the vista of the river winding sluggishly along through its
green level valley bounded on either side by bare rocky hills on which
the pines begin to show themselves a t elevations of 4,000 to 5,000 feet.
The furthest point reached by the cavalry reconnaissance on the
2lst August from Mingaora (the present capital) was Gutibagh, about
1%miles higher up, where a halt was made on the summit of a small
eminence opposite to the junction of the Arnawai River with the Swat.
From here the view extended some 5 or 6 miles further, beyond which
point the river appears to trend i n a more northerly direction towards
the Kohistan or hill-country proper-the valley itself still fertile and
thickly populated. Between Mingaora and this point the village of
Manglaor was passed : this was the former capital and is surrounded by
numerous Buddhist remains. Here, and for a few miles higher up, the
valley widens, instead of narrowing as was expected, and broad stretches
of cultivation are found on both sides of the Swat.
The reconnaissance to the Karakar Pass on the 25th August lifted
the " purdah " of another hitherto unexplored country. This pass leads
from Barikot in the Swat Valley into the Salarzai portioli of Buner;
and is one which is much used for the export of grain from Upper
Swat southwards to Busta111 and other Inclian marts.
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easy one, some 4,500 feet in height above the sea level, and finom its
summit a fine view is obtained of this portion of Buner. The general
character of the country appeared to be similar to Swat, that is to say,
mountainous country with wide, level river beds which are fertile and
highly cultivated. Immediately below the pass is an open valley, now
green with growing crops, drained by a stream which makes its -way
through a break in the hills into a larger valley beyond. Mountains rise
in the background, beyond which lies the Indus, and on the nether side
a river of considerable size (the Barundu) is seen winding its way south
and east through a broad fertile valley.
Thus the expedition had served to reveal some 40 miles of new
country of a highly interesting character. The Swat Valley is of great
fertility throughout. The principal crops are Indian corn, wheat, barley
and rice : fruit trees are scarce, although doubtless they would flourish
if once planted and cared for. Vines, tomatoes and water-melons are
grown and ripen well. The villages are of the usual Pathall type, flatroofed, built of stone and rubble, the household utensils few and rude,
with grain stored in bins made of earth and straw, or else buried in the
ground. The old Buddhist road, flagged in places, is still the principal
means of communication up and down the valley, and is good enough
except atthose places where spurs run down from the hills and dip steeply to the river. Here the roadway is generally very bad, being rough,
stony and uneven, and it was such a, place that delayed the Guides in
their pursuit of the enemy after the action a t Landaki.
As regards the Swatis themselves both Upper and Lower are of
pronouncedly Semitic type with aquiline noses, thin lips, and sharp
gleaming eyes. Most of the elder men are bearded, and many of the
faces show signs of strong individuality arid character. They are powerfully built, and wonderfully active on the hillside. As regards the
women few or none (except old hags and quite young girls) were seen,
as they had all been removed to safe retreats among the hills during Sir
Bindon Blood's occupatioil of the valley.
On the 27th August the 2nd Brigade, under Brigadier-General
Jeffreys, marched out to Thana, to relieve the returning 1st Brigade
which was ordered to rest at Khar, Sir Bindon Blood and his staff and
the Royal West Kent Reginlent proceeding to Malakand. This move
was thought a t first to prelude an advance into Buner-a measure by no
means uncalled for in view of the fact that the Salarzai section of the
Bunerwals retained some twenty rifles and a large amount of Martini

ainninnition captured a t the JIalakand. But the idea, if i t was ever
eutertaiued, was ~.eIinquished,greatly to the disappointment of the now
idle Pielcl Force ; and the following moves were ordered :--"The 2nd
Brigade, wit11 divisional troops, will march back past Khar to Golagrnrn
to await orders ; the 1st Erigade remaining a t Khar. A small force of
all arms will proceed to Uch to support the Khan of Dir in settling the
right bank of the Swat. The 1st Reserve Brigade, henceforth styled the
3rd Brigade of the Malakand Field Force, will withdraw from Rustani
and concentrate a t Mardim.
Colonel Reid was given command of tile force moving to Uch, which
mas conlposed of the 10th Field Battery, all the 11th Bengal Lancers
available except one squadron, the 38th Dogms, and the BBnd Punjab
Infantry. Ucll is situated about six niiles from Chakclara on the Dir
Bo:td. On tlie -29th August the troops conlposing the Uch force coneelitrated at ChakdiLra, and nloved off to Ucll the following day, when
tliey were joined by iUajor Deane. The work of disarmament there was
at once bezuri, and large quantities of firearms were readily brought in,
showing that the spirit of theSwatis to the north was thoroughly broken.
These mere the clans which suffered such severe losses a t Chakdara.
The Khan of Dir was then a t Uch, and he was well pleased to see the
policy of disarnia~uentbeing carried out so thoroughly.
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The 2nd Brigade under Brigadier-General Jeffreys, which had been
marclied back to Golagram to await orders, was now directed t o move
out against the Utman Khels, starting on tlle 30th August ;and Captain
Walters with one tl*oopof tlie 11th Bengal Lancers was sent on in front,
two days aliead of the brigade, to reconnoitre the passes. Tlie Inzari
Pass, 12 miles from Ehar (which is not to be confused with the pass of
the same name in the Mohmand country), was reached by General
Jeffreys without opposition, but there the advance came to an abrupt
end, the brigade beint: a t once recalled to Kliar
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There were two reasons for this sndclen cancellation of tlle movement against the Utman Khels. I n the first place, the Mohmands on the
Peshawar frontier had risen in force in front of Shabkadr (under
circumstances which will presently be related) ; and the whole of Sir
BindonB!ood'sDirision-that is to say, General Jeffreysl Brigade moving
against the Utlxan Khels, General Meiklejohn's Brigade resting a t Khar,
and General Wodehouse's Brigade watching the Euner frontier a t RUStam-was required to be available a t Rhar to co-operate a t any
moment with General Elles's Division a t Peshawar, in case i t should b e
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decided to advance into the heart of tlie illohmand country and deal
a knock-out blow a t the new rising. The second reasoil for recalling
General Jeffreys' Brigade from tlie Utman Khel passes was connected
with events transpiring or a t least impending in the direction of Uch.
The Hadda Mullah, of whom much will have to be told in subsequent
pages, and whose Mohma.nd army just alluded to had already beell
severely chastised by General Elles's troops, was apparently bent on retrieving his fortunes in a new direction ; in other words, he was reported
to be preparing an attack upon the Khan of Dir. News was brought in
that the niullah had succeeded in collecting a large force of Western
Mohmands for this purpose, and that he was trying to persuade the
Utrnan Khels and Bajouris to join him. I t was therefore considered
advisable to keep General Jeffreys' Brigade in hand a t Khar, instead of
losing i t for a time in trivial operations against a comparatively small
clan like the Utrnan Khels, so thatin the event of the Khan of Dir
being seriously threatened the brigade could be promptly despatched
to join Colonel Reid's Column a t Uch. From Uch to Sado on the Panjkora River is one march only, and a force placed there could check any
hostile movement against Dir.

It has been mentioned that the 3rd Brigade under BrigadierGeneral Wodehouse was withdrawn from the Bunerfrontier to Mardan in
order to be a t hand for possible employment with General Elles's Division
against the Mohmands. The move was no sooner carried out than the
brigade was further ordered to Uch (instead of General Jeffreys' Brigade) to join Colonel Reid's force. The march was quickly accomplished,
and on assuming command of the united forces a t Uch, General Wodehouse at once sent out a sn~allforce to take possession of the Panjkora
bridge from the Dir levies which was effected without oppositioi~,
though only just in time to forestall the Mohmands.
On the 5th September orders were issued for the 2nd and 3rd
Brigades of Sir Bindon ~ l o o d ' sField Force to move to Nawagai on the
northern confines of the Mohmand country and then turn southwards
right through the heart of the Mohmand country according to circumstances, with the view to eventually effecting a junction with the force
under General Elles which would advance from Shabkadr on the southern
side of the Mohmand country to meet Sir Bindon Blood.

*
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And now it will be convenient to leave the Malakand Field Force
tenlporarily and to turn to those events a t Shabkadr which added tlie
Mohmand country to the "disturbed area" on our frontier.
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CHAPTER I.
THE LAID ON SHABKADR FORT.

WHILE in the early part of August Sir Bindon Blood was preparing
for the advance u p the Swat Valley which led to the fight a t Landaki
and to the subsequent subjugation of the Swat tribes, another grave
outbreak of tribal fanaticism was disturbing that portion of our border
which faces the Mohmand territory.
The facts are briefly these. About four o'clock in the afternoon of
Saturday, August 7th, some four or five thousand Mohmands made a
sudden incursion into British territory near Shabkadr Fort, 18 miles
north of Peshawar. They moved upon the Hindu village of Shankargarh, which is the bazar of Shabkadr, and burnt it, killing two men
who had remained there. The rest of the villagers, having been warned
of the approach of the raiders, had already sought refuge in the Fort,
held by a detachment of the Border Police. Shabkadr itself was not
very fiercely assailed, but some sort of an assault upon i t did take place,
and the Border Police fired on the raiders, killing and wounding a
number of them.
On the news of this outbreak reaching Peshawar, the same evening,
Brigadier-General E. R. Elles, comn~andingthe Peshawar District,
took out a reinforcing column consisting of four guns of the 51st
Field Battery, two squadrons of the 13th Bengal Lancers, four companies of the Somersetshire Light Infautry, and the whole of the 20th
Punjab Infantry. The cav:tlry went on ahead, and arrived at Shabkadr
a t 6 A.M. The guns and infantry were a good deal delayed in crossing
the Kabul River, having to be ferried over. By this time the raiders
had disappeared and were reported to have hurriedly retired acrosa
the border on the approach of the reinforcing troops.

SllaGkadr Furt

was

has walls iifty feet high, SO is practically impregnable to any force without artillery. Shankargnrh was :tn old Sikh Cantonlllent bazar,
inhabited chiefly by rich Hindu money-lenders, who had very profitable
dealings with the tribesnlen on botfl sides of the border, which is only
three milesdistant. A t the time of the raidshabkadr was held bg- forty
or fifty Border Police, and the atbck lasted from about 4 P.M. to 5 A.M.,
the little garrison accounting for some forty of the tribesmen without
1 0 s to themselves.
This raid, it may be said a t once, though the fact was not learnt till
afterwards, was the direct work of tlie notorious Mullah of Hadda, Najibud-din, who has alretady been alluded to in these pages, and who was a t
that time a great power among the more fanatical tribesmen in the
3fultmand country, as well as in Eajour and the Utnlan Khel districts,
I t was this mullah who tried so hard to create trouble for us during the
C'hitral Campaign, and i t was he again beyond all doubt whose plotting
had indirectly hepled to bring about the recent rising in the s w a t
T':tlley. H e lived a t the supposed village of Jarobi* at the head of
the Bohai Valley, in that part of the Mohmand country which is
unlder the Aniir of Kabul, and was known to have intimate relations
will1 the Sipah Salar, General Ghulam Hyder Kllant K a r k i (corn~u:tnding the troops in Eastern Afghanistan, with head-quarters a t
Jellalabad). Wl~ilethe recent attack on the Malakand was proceediiig
the Had& Mullah had collected a body of men and sent them to help
the Swatis. A few days before the present raid on Sllabkadr t h e mullah
had succeeded in stirring up the fanaticism of the Northern and Western
Mahmands, and had gathered a considerable body of men about him.
This force advanced dourn the Bohai Valley, crossed the Nahaki Pass,
and then entered the Gandab Valley, and so into Bvitish territory a t
Sllabksdr. The raid was doubtless designed to effect a diversion in
favour of the Swatis, still suffering from their failure to capture the
Witlakand or Chakdara. If the Hadda Mullah had timed llis effort so
that Shabkadr should be attacked on the same day as the Malakand, he would have done a clever stroke of business, and widespread
rnleasiness would have been caused all along OUI* Peshawar frontier. As
it was, our troops (as already shown) had swept the Lower Swat clear of
tribesmen, and two full brigades in the Malakand were now readv L~
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operate in any direction, while a reserve brigade had been forn~edat
Mardan which could move a t a few 11ours'notice into the PesllawarV,zlley,
As for tlte Mohlnnnd tribes, a few words will suffice to tell all that
needs to be stated here about them. They hold the cou!ltry bounded
on the south by the Kabul River from Jellalabnd to its entrance into
British territory, and on the north by Eajour. They extend westwards to the hill country above the Kunar River, and in the east they
touch the Peshawar border and the Utman Khel country lying about
the junction of the Swat and Panjliora Rivers. Under the Durand
Treaty they came partly under the political influence of the Indian
Government and partly under that of the Amir of Eabul. The actual
den~arcationof the zones of influence has never been carried out, the
attempt to form a Boundary Comn~issionhaving come to nought a few
months previously. The following is an official description of the
blohmand territory : "The country of the Mohmands is divided naturally
into two parts, the rich alluvial lands along the bank of the Kabul
River from Jellalabnd to Lalpura, and the country to the east of Lalpura,
consisting of a network of hills and valleys. The principsl of the latter
are the valleys of Shilman, Gandab and Pandiali. They are, as a rule,
dry and arid water-courses, raging torrents in heavy rain, but usually
presenting a stony and shingly bed, from which slopes of barren ground
lead to the rocky spurs and ranges that flank them." As the Durand
boundary runs from Landi Kotal eastwards of Lalpura and then along
the watershed separating the basins of the Kunar and Panjkora Rivers,
the most considerable portions of the country are within the British
zone. The fighting strength of the whole tribe is put a t between 17,000
and 18,000, the Baizai accounting for one-half of the total. These hold
the eastern part of the countivyadjacent to Eajour and the Utman Khel
border. ~ h :Mohmands had never been accounted an enemy of much
importance in previous conflicts with our troops. I n 1880 they made
but a poor resistance, when some 5,000 of them, who had crossed the
Kabul River near Dakka, were attacked by a column 850 strong under
Colonel Boisragon. On an earlier occasion, in 1879, a small detachment of 170 men of the Merwara Battalion, under Captain O'Moore
Creagh, successfully held a position near Kane Dakka against several
thousand Mohmands who attacked for six hours. As a tribe, tlte
Mohmands are split up into six clans :the Baizai, already mentioned,
good fighting men ;the Tarakzai, (including the I s Khel and Barhac
Khel), 2,800 ; the Halimzai, 2,600 ;the Khwaizai, 1,800 ; the Dawezai,

800 ; and the Gtmanzsi, 400.

There is a comparatively easy route illto
their country fro111 Matts, a few miles north of Shabkadr, over the
Inzari Pass ' This is known s s the Alikandi route, and i t might have
been used by the Chitid Relief Force in 1895 in preference to that over
the Malakand, but it was thought desirable not to enter the Mohmand
country a t that time.
*.Another pass bearirlg this uame, situate in the Mridi country, comes iuto the
narrntlre later.
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reparding the retirement of the Mohmand raiders after
the arrival a t Shabkadr of strong reinforcements from Peshawar was
true only in part. They withdrew to the low hills which run from the
main ranges to within a mile of the Fort, which is three rniles from the
border line. Here they remained out of gu~lshotrange. Their numbers
increased on Sunday night, August Sth, the presence of the Hadda
Mullah serving to attract contingents from all the Mohmand clans, with
the exception of the Tarakzai.

TH*

On Monday morning, August Sth, a t daybreak, Lieutenant-Colonel
Woon, 20th Punjab Infantry, who had been left in comn~anda t Shabkadr by Brigadier-General Elles, nloved out his troops to the attack.
H e had a t his disposal four guns of the 51st Field Battery, two squadrons of the 13th Bengal Lancers, two companies of the Somersetshire
Light Infantry, and the whole of the 90th Punjab Iufantry 600 strong,
or a total of between 1,100 and 1,200 men. The enemy's line was about
two miles in length, some 6,000 men, a t least, being assembled. Their
right rested on the high hills, their centre extended across the low hills,
while their left stretched into the cultivated ground in the plain itself.
Colonel Woon began his attack with the infantry, shortly after 6 o'clock,
but could make no impression on the position, and his small force was
outflanked by the Mohmands, who streamed out into the plain on either
hand. To guard against the infantry being completely enveloped,
Colonel Woon began to withdraw towards the Fort.
A t this period of the action Brigadier-General Elles arrived on the
scene and took command. H e had had to return t o Pashawar on the
previous day to arrange the disposition of the garrison there (weakened
by the sudden call upon it) and to report by telegraph to Army HeadQuarters the state of affairs on the border. H e left Peshawar again
early that morning, taking with him two companies of the 30th Punjab
Infantry. On arrival a t the ferry over the Kabul River, he heard the
sound of heavy firing a t Shabkadr and a t once pushed on, leaving the
infantry to follow.

(ierlc.rnl Ellcs ~.e:~ched
the scene of action at 8-40 A.M., by~yvhichtime
were en~ n o , t crf the enemy l~aclsmar~ueddown frolll the low llills
g;rqrd with uar infitritry in the open, and he at once saw the favourable
~,pp)rtunityoffered for using his cavalry. He first concentrated the Ere
of the four guns upon the enemy's left, and then directed the two squaclmns of the 13th Bengal Lancers to charge from right t o left along
the sl.lo8e line of tribesmen. This charge was brilliantly carried out
under the leadership of Major Atkinson, commanding. The two squadronsof Lancers swept right along from end to end of the line, rallying
and re-forming on the left of the infantry. Their losses were few, b u t
Major Atkinson and Lieutenant Cheyne had their horses shot. By this
tinie the two con~paniesof the 30th Punjab Infantry had come up, and
nn infantry attack was ordered againat the enemy before they could recorer fronl the effects of the cavalry charge. The Mohmands were driven
bxk, and pursued to the foot of the high hills, on which they took refuge. Bad an additional cavalry regiment been present they would, i n
Cirneiltl Elles's opinion, have been almost completely cut off, but as it
a:w, their losses were very heavy, as the dead they left on the ground
sllowed. The action was over by 10-30 A.H. ; Genera1 Elles not considering it desirable, with the small infantry force a t his command, t o
prlnll further into the hills, pardcularly as his merl had been hotly
enq~ged for four hours. The Mohmands, however, had received a
suiticicntly sharp lesson, and they began to retire over the hills when
the troops returned to Shabkadr, and by two o'clock not a man was
be seen. The Hadda Mullah, who was present during the fight, had
evidently seen that his defeat could not be retrieved.
t
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Our casualties in this affair were 12 killed and 52 wounded ; not
heavy Iosres considering how sharp was the fighting, and the number of
the enemy. Se~erelywounded :Major Lumb, Somersetshire Light I n fantry, bullet wound in the neck ;Captain Blacker, 51st Field Battery,
bullet wound in the leg. 82khtly wounded : Lieutenant Cheyne, 13th
Bengal Lancers. The details of the casualties were as follows :-Somerset~hire Light Infantry : 4 men killed, 8 wounded severely, 1
sliglitly; 20th Punjab Infantry, 7 killed, 20 wounded severely, I
slightly; 13th Bengal Lancers, 1 killed, 8 wounded severely, 6
slightly.
Another account of the fight gave the folloming additional details :Our infantry attacked in front, the cavalry and artillery on the right
being thrown forward for the advantage of the ground, and t o threaten
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the enemy's line of retreat. The enenly changed front to meet this, and
swarmed on both f i a ~ k under
s
heavy rifle fire from our left, and they
pressed hard to cut us off from the Fort, distant about 2 miles. Most
of our casualties occurred a t this t h e , but the artillery kept the
enemy off on our right. General Elles with his Staff arrived a t this
moment, about 9 A.M., and took over command. H e lengthened
and threw back our left and ordered the cavalry out to the right
front. Captain Blacker of the Artillery here received his wouud. The
cavalry charged down the enemy's line, rolling i t up, and in spite of
the heavy ground and bad going, the charge was brilliantly executed by
Major F. C. Atkinson, Lieutenant A. G. B. Turner, and Lieutenant
Cheyne and two squadrons of the 13th Bengal Lancers, supported
by the artillery fire directed ahead of the cavalry line. The enemy
immediately fled to the tops of the foot hills, and remained watching
in groups. Shells dispersed the groups, but our force was too small to
enter t h e hills in pursuit. On our side the total number engaged was
just 800, and with these were only 15 British Officers, including General
Elles a n d Staff, and four of these were wounded in addilion to the Medical
Officer. The latter was struck by a stone knocked up by a bullet, and
incapacitated for a short while, but he insisted on returning to duty.
Certainly first aid to the wounded was efficiently performed, and in this
case saved many lives. None of the wounded have yet died, and none
apparently are in bad case. Seventy-seven were killed or wounded,
a loss of about 10 per cent." A curious fact worth mentioning is that
the ground on which the action was fought was practically the same as
that on which Sir Colin Campbell in 1852 with 600 men met and
defeated 6,000 Mohmands, and where again in January 1864 Colonel
A. Macdonnel, of the Rifle Brigade, with 1,750 men, defeated a body of
5,000, who held the low hills facing Shabkadr. The success of the latter,
like that of General Elles, was due to the cavalry, the Mohmands being
tempted into the plain and then charged. A squ;ldron of the 7th
Hussars on that occasion made three successive charges which enabled
the infantry to act with decisive eKect against the enemy's broken line.
Hrtving withdrawn the troops to the neighbourhood of the Fort,
General Elles returned to Peshawar, and immediately ordered up to
Shabkadr the remainder of the Somersetshire Light Infantry and 250
of the 37th Dogras, so as to be ready to assume the offensive if the
Mohmands should reappear. At 9 o'clock, however., a heliographic
message was received from Slldbliacll stating that no enemy co111dbe seen
even on the distanl hills.

8 s i t was impossible to say how far the excitement extended
alongthe border, General Elles called up three companies of the 8th
Bengal Infantry from Nowshera, and a t the same time asked for one
battery of artillery, a regiment of native cavalry and one of native
infantry, it being important to have a garrison a t Peshawar. The
Gordon Highlanders, under orders from Army Head-Quarters, had been
despatched from Rawalpindi by train a t midnight on Sunday, August
8th, and reachedPeshawar on the Monday afternoon; the 2nd Queen's
from Jullundur replacing them a t Rawalpindi as part of the Heserve Brigade of the M:~lakandDivision. Tlle arrival of the Gordon
Highlanders filled the gap at Peshawar caused by sending the Somersetshire Light Infantry to Shabkadr. The troops now watching the
Mohmand Frontier were the 51st Field Battery (four puns), two
squadrons 13th Bengal Lancers, the Somersjtshire Light Infantry
(740 strong), the 20th Punjab Infantry (600 strong), the 30th Punjab
Infantry (300), and the 37th Dogras (250); a handy force of about
2,200 men.

A reconnaissance was made on Tuesday, Aueust loth, five miles
into the llills from Shabkadr without any enemy being seen. The
Mohmands, however, were reported as int,ending to return to the attack
after replenishing their ammunition and food supplies. They were said
to have lost between three and four hundred killed and several
hundred wounded in the action on the 9th August.
The reinforcement of the Peshawar garrison was most pronlptly
carried out. I n addition to the Gordon Highlanders h-on1 Rawalpindi
and the three companies of the 8th Bengal Infantry, the 2nd Battalion
1st Gurkhi~sarrived on the scene. The Gurkhas had been intended for
the Reserve Brigade a t Mardan, but on arrival by train a t Nowshera they
were sent straight on. The 9th Bengal Lancers and the 57th Field
Battery from Campbellpore were also ordered up. These reinforcements enabled General Elles to send the whole of the 13th Bengal
Lancers to Shabkadr, thus raising the strength of the force there to
about 2,500 men. Apart from this detached column General Elles
eventually had the following troops in Peshawar itself : one section of
the 5lst Field Battery and the whole of No. 57 Field Battery, No. 5
Company Bengnl Sappers, 9th Bengal Lancers, the Devonshire Regiment,
the Gordon Higblanders, the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Gurkhas, five
companies of the 30th Punjab Infantry, six companies of the 37th Dogras,
and three companies of the 8th Bengal Infantry
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As tllc gencral situaLion on the North-\Vest Frontier now presented
itself, however, itwas obviously wise to still further strengthen the
garrison of Peshawar so as to have a second column ready to take the
field in case the tribal excitement should spread. The Government of
India therefore ordered up the following troops :-4th Dragoon Guiards
and '' K " Battery Royal Horse Artillery, from Rawalpindi; tlie 26th
Punjab Infantry from Jullundur, and No. 3 (British) Mountain Battery
fro111Jutogh, Simla Hills.
For the next five days or so phenomenally heavy rains calne down
and made matters extremely uncomfortable for the Peshawar and Shabkadr garrisons. The fair vale of Peshawar almost disappeared under
water, and the roads were turned into bogs, the one to Shabkadr being
a veritable slough of despond to Transport Oficers. The new bridge
over the Kabul River, which runs midway between Peshawar and
Shablradr, was a triunlph of engineering skill. The current a t that time
was coming down with a roar a t a speed of from ten to twelve knots an
lioui; and was generally level with and sometimes overflowing the
banlts ; but the bridge, which was held by wire hawsers, splendidly
withstood the flood : it consisted of country boats, pontoon system, and
its length was about two hundred yards.
Fortunately the floods did not interfere with any urgent military
operations, fur the reason that no immediate operations were possible
without an enemy ; and the Mohmand warriors, imitating the beaten
Swatis a t Chskdara, had completely disappeared. The Mullah of
IIadda was so discredited that he had retired temporarily to his haunt
in the BohaiValley. The " M i ~ dFakir" in Swat, in replying to a message from the Hadda Mullah asking for congratulations, was reported
to have sent the answer-" Dog, you have done nothing ! " which indeed
was the plaiil truth. On August the Bnd, however, about a fortnight
after theaction a t Sllabkadr, i t was reported a t Peshawar that the
Hadda, Mullah had again worbed up the Mohniands, aud that he intended to attack both Shabkadr and Michni, one tribal column coming
down the Garidab Valley and another by the more northerly Alikandi
~ o u t e . This demonstration was announced as arranged for Monday,
August 33rd. If i t had actually taken place the Mohmallds would have
had a warm reception, as more cavalry were now on the scene with
General Elles than were available on the 9th of tlie month ; but the
still snlarting tribesmen were apparently not to be thus easily inflamed
a seconcl time, As a matter of fact many of them were attending

peacefully to their fields, the recent heavy rains having rendered agricultural work a necessity ; added to which the war council of the tribe
was for t h e moment hopelessly torn by internal dissensions.
*
*

*

While General Elles was awaiting permission from head-quarters to
press home retaliation upon the Mohmands, signs of restlessness were
being reported day by day from t h e Afridi and Orakzai country, and a t
length on Tuesday, August 24th, the smouldering embers of fanaticism
in this new direction burst suddenly into flames, and a fierce attack v a s
made upon our Forts in the Khyber Pass. This new rising, however,
and the grave events which succeeded it, require separate narration,
and are only mentioned here for the sake of chronology, and because
they influenced the Government of India in deciding upon the further
exemplary operations against the Mohmands now to be described.
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CHAPTER I I L
THE MOHMAND EXPEDITION.

Dunraa the .first week in September the welcome announcement
was received in Peshawar that the Government of India had sanctioned
extensive punitive measures against the various tribes on t h e Peshawar
border, and that the Mohmands would be the first tribe to be taken in
hand. Definite orders followed for the immediate concentration a t Shabkadr of two brigades under the command of General Elles, t h e troops to
be drawn from the force already in and about Peshawar. The Peshawar
force a t that time numbered something like 9,000 men, although i t had
just been depleted by the despatch to the disturbed Afridi a n d Orakzai
frontier of the 6th Benqal Cavalry, the 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas, and
the 30th Bengal Infantry.
The proposed movement against the Mohmands was well timed, as
the Raclda Mullah was once again reported to be on the war-path, this
time with 4,000 Baizai Mohmands, his intention being to re-visit $habIradr. His other ambitious plan (already described) for attacking Dir and
cutting round to Chitral had come to nought, owing to the rapid rnovement across the Panjkora River of the Uch force under Brigadier-General
Wodehouse, and owing also to Sir Bindon Blood's promptness in recalling Brigadier-General Jeffreys' Brigade from the Utman Khel Expedition. Everything pointed to the operations of our troops being short
and decisive, as two powerful forces were about to move upon the condemned country from opposite directions. Sir Bindon Blood, with the
two brigades of the Malalrand Field Force under Brigadier-General
Wodehouse and Brigadier-General Jeffreys, was acting from the north
and east, while General Elles, with two brigades (commanded by Bri.
gadier-General Westnlacott and Brigadier-General Macgregor), would
move forward from Shabkadr on the southern side.
The composition and staff of the Mohluand expeditionary force
from Peshawar were as follows :Commanding : Brigadier-General Elles with the rank of MajorGeneral; A,-D.-U., Lieutenant E. Elles ; A. &.-M.-G., Major P. Sulivan,
B.E. ; Conimanding Royal Artillery, Colonel A. E. Duthy ; Adjutant,
R. A., Caplain W. B. McLeod ;D. A. &.-M..G. for Intelligence, Captain

A. Hoghton, 1st Bomb- Grenadiers ; Field Intelligence Officer?
Lieutenant C. E.E. F. I<. &lvmcq,loid, Hyderabad Contingent ; principal
RIedical Oficer, Surgeon-Colonel E. Townsend ;Field Engineer, M a j o r
Kelly ; Assistant Field Engineers, Lieutenants W. A. Stokes a n d c. BL. areenstreet; Ordnance Olficer, Major F. E. Rowan; Chief Commismriat Oficer, Captain G. R. C. Westropp ;Divisional Transport Officer,
Caph~ir~
F.C. IT. Rideout; Commissariat Officerfor the Baseat Shabkadr,
Lieutenant E. G. Vaughnn ; Veterinary Officer, Veterinarj--Captain FW. Forsdyke ; Provost Marshal, Riajor H. S. Massy, 19th Bengal
Lancers.
f;.

1st Brigade :-Con~manding, Brigadier-General Westmacott. Troops :
Somerset Light Infantry, 20th Punjab Infantry, 2nd Battalion 1st
Gurkhas.

Erigadier-General C. R,nlacgregor.
Troops: Oxfordshire Light Infantry, 9th Gurkhas, six companies 37t;h
Dogrss.
2nd Brigade :-Commanding,

Diuisional Troops :-13th Bengal Lancers, No. 3 British a n d N o 5
Bombay Mountain Iratteries 28th Bombay Pioneers, and one regiment
of Imperial Service Infantry.

The Maharaja of Patiala and Sir Partab Singh of Jodhpur joined
General Elles's personal staff as extra Aides-de-Camp ; Ma.jor W. J.
Bythell, X.E., accompanied t h e Nohmand Expedition in cliarge of the
survey.

It will be noticed that certain Imperial Service Troops were included in the expeditionary force, and the following notification on the s u b ject, which was iss~tedfrom the Foreign Department on September 5 t h ,
affords all the explanation that is necessary :-"The tribal disturbances
on the frontier have pronlpted the ruling Chiefs in all parts of India to
come forward with their wonted loyalty to press upon the GovernorGeneral in Council the services of their Imperial Service Troops. The
G~vernor-Generalin Council has resolved that the time has come when
the assistsnce of the troops so loyally prepared and maintained may be
accepted from the Chiefs of the Punjab, and when they may b e allowed
to co-operate in punishing those who have made and are making p e r sistent effortsto disturb the pe~weof that Province. It is impossible
to employ cavalry to any great extent in the expeditions which have
now to be underkzken ;t h e Governor-Geacral in Council has therefore
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clecided to accept from the States i n t h e P u n j a b the service of four battalions of infantry and of two companies of sappers and Miners. Tliese
troops will irnn~ediately~ r o c e e dt o t h e front. I t has also been deternlined to utilise the services of t h e Q w a l i o r and Jaipurtransport trains
did such good work in t h e C h i t r a l Expedition, and which the patriotic action of His Highness t h e M a h a r a j a Sindhia and His Highness
the Maharaja of Jaipur places again at t h e disposnl of the Government
of India. Orders have been given t h a t t h e thanks of the Government
of India should be conveyed t o a l l t h e Chiefs from whom oflers of
troops have been received. The u r g e n c y and unanimity \vhich characterise the action in this respect of r u l e r s of States in India emphaticall y testify to the spirit of loyalty w h i c h animates them."
The plan of campaign, already outlined, may now be more fully
unfolded. During previous border w a r s t h e custom in attacking hostile
tribes had been to march st,raight i n t o their country on one line of
advance. This had always enabled t h e tribesmen to p t l i e r a t a single
point, generally a pass, offering a g o o d defensive position, thus compelling our troops to storm breastworks b e f o r e making good their entrance
into the country. I n some instances h e a v y losses had been incurred by
our troops i n this way, and progress had necesmrily been slow. The
present expedition was being c o n d u c t e d on very different lines. Our
possession of Lower Swat and t h e o p e n i n g out of the road to C11itralC
through Dir permitted of a stroog flank movement being made against
the Mohmands, pending the development sf which General Elles
would not move out from Shabkadr. Sir Bindon Blood had crossed
the Panjlrora River a t 8ad0, a n d was marching rapidly due west up
the Ushiri Valley to Mandia, t h e r o u t e followed by Sir Robert Low
i n the Chitral Campaign. From B l a n d i a a raad leads south-we& up the
Khaluzi Valley to the high r a n g e w h i c h separates Bajour pager from
the Mohmand country. This r a n g e Sir Bindon Blood intended to crosB
by a pass overlooking Nawagai, t h e head-quarters of the Khan of that
nitme, who had assumed a particularly friendly attitude towards the
British Rci. This Chief is a n o l d r i v a l of Umra K h d s and his
territory i n the south touches t h e M i t t a i Valley, a tract a b u t which
there had been a dispute between t h e Governnlent and the Amir of
Kabul. From Sado to Mawagai is a b o u t 50 miles. When our troops
reached Nawagai, they would b e in r e a r of the Mohmands and could
niarch to ally point in their country. A caravan route leads due south t o
the Peshawar border and this would perhaps be the best to follow 3s iB,

pRases througl1 Lokerni in the Bohai Valley, wllerc tlie Mohmands have
1n:inj- vil1:tges. The >1ohn~ands, on the appearance of Sir Bindon
Gloorl's Division a t Sawagai, mould be obliged to gather their fightingInen to oppose his advance southw:~rds. They had never been attacked
from t h e north before, and would clearly be taken a t a disadvantage.
B u t a t the rery time a t which their attention would be turned to
Naxagi~i,their scouts would bring in news that another big force had
entered the country froin Shabkadr and ~vsspressing forward through
the C+andab defile upon Lol;erai. This place is 30 miles from Nahvagai
and about 50 from Si~abkadr.I s each division was 5,000 strong, and as
tlle total atsength of tlie 3Iohmands was only 17,000, of which one-half
llad to be furnished by the Bdizai clans to the extreme west, the
tribe \\-ss llot likely to n ~ s k emuch of a fight against t h e two forces.
Tile 31uhnlands nre n povert~--stricken race, and, unlike the Afridis,
wcre badly armed, as they had never been able to purchase breechloading iuibes. I n the r ~ i don Sht~bkadrthey were assisted by the
clans which owe allegiance to the Amir, but help could not, i t was
believed, reach theru froxu this direction now, as Abdur Rahrnan*
had sllolvn that he would not permit his subjects to join in the
iighting on the borcler. As our two divisions nloved to meet each
otlier in the Bollai TLIley, the tribesmen would probably flee to the
Ilills, tllougll they nlight make some show of resistance a t the outset.
Tlieir villages x~ould lie open to the troops, and columns could be
sent out in various directions. Jwrobi, the head-quarters of the
Hadda SIullah, would doubtless be visited, as it lies a t the head
of the valley and could readily be reached. This then was the plan
of operations, and predictions were not wanting that within a week
the Mohmand operations would be over, the four brigades being
then free to move against the Afridi and Orakzai cornhination. A s a
matter of fact, the expedition (as mill be shown) occupied more than
a month, and to a t least a portion of the troops engaged afforded quite
a s much fighting as even a keen soldier could desire.
No proclamation was issued to the Mohmands before our troops
moved into their country. Our Political Officers, however, made known
that t h e visit was not made in order to deprive any tribe of its independence, b u t becanse the British Government were determined to "take such
measures as would illsure its border against being attacked in the
future.:' Further, the S1olim.znds were informed that if any opposition
The attit,ude of tllc Amir tolvards the various tribes breaking the peace on our fron.
tier is alluded to more iuI1y in a Inter chapter.
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was offered, those who engaged in hostilities would be followed up and
punished.
On Saturday, the 11th of September, Major-General Elles and the
Divisional Staff nloved out from Peshawar to Shabkadr, and CoIorlel
A. Gaselee, then conmanding Cawnpore station, took over the command
of the Peshawar District with the temporary rauk of Brigadier-General.
On Monday, the 13th September, the whole force was concentrated on the
shabl~adr-Michiniroad, and after a delay of two daysmarrhed off. This
short delay, it is worth explbining, was due to causes affecting General
Blood's further advance upon Nawagai. Major Deane, before leaving
General Blood and returning to Swat, desired to secure the conlplete
submission of the Utman Khels, who had apparently been wholesonlely
alarmed by t h e march of onr troops. All their jzrghas were anxious to
come in, and General Blood a t Major Deane's request halted his
division for two days for that purpose. Hence the date of General Elles's
advance was changed from the 13th to the 15th September, as it was
most important that the combined advance of the two divisions should
be so timed t h a t the enemy could be caught between the two armies approaching simultaneously from north and south. It was now expected
t h a t General Blood and General Elles would join hands a t Lokerai
on the 18th September : whereupon Sir Bindon Blood would assume
supreme command of both divisions with full political power.
The advance from the Shabkadr side was uneventful enough. On
Wednesday, September 15th, General Westmacott's Brigade marched
through tlle KhornppaXdefile into the Gandab Valley. Half of General
Macgregor's Brigade followed in support. The Eadda Mullah was
reported t o be in the Gandab Valley just ahead with a gathering of
tribesman belonging to the Khwazai and Utman Khel sections, the
numbers being unknown. No enemy, however, was seen on the march,
which proved to be a difficult one. The remaining troops of the division followed i n due course, and General Elles soon found himself in an
advanced position in the enemy's country, practically unchallanged.
C

C

*

Leaving the Shabkadr Division thus marching on unopposed, tlza
narrative has now to follow the more chequered fortunes of the two
brigades under Sir Bindon Blood on the opposite borders of the Mohmand country.
*Another place bearing this name i s mentioned in later pages cleal~ngwiththe
Oralt~Jjrisiug.

CHAPTEH IV.

I

VITLI G E S E R . ~ JEPFREYS' BRIOlIDE.

GEXERAL
WODEHOL'SIZ'S
Brigade, accompanied b y Sir Bindon Blood,
reached Nawagai on Monday, September 13th, the canlp having been
sniped a t the previous night a t a place called Lhamshak. NO jirgahs
had come in, and evidently the natives were hostlle, as snlall parties
itrmed will1 Xartinis had fired the previous day on two squadrolls of the
11th RengalLancers reconnoitring the MohrnandV~~lley.But the Khan
of Nawapi wss friendly, and while the troops remained in his territory,
collected grain nnd supplies for them. No large body of the enunly
being in sight, instructions were issued to the Survey Officers with the
force to examine the SIittai Valley closely, with a view t o the settlement of its boundaries. This was an important step to take, as t h e
A n ~ i rof liabul, when he claimed the valley the yesr before, had
sent troops to occupy it. The country could now be surveyed without
interruption (ss it seemed), up to the Dulmand Border, after which
the brigade could. swing round and march due south v i i Lolrerai
up011 STakhdand, in order to unite with General Jeffreys' Brigade
entering the Xohn~andcountry by the route east of Nawagai which
leads direct upon Yakhdand. But neither General Wodehouse nor
General Jeffreys was able to adhere strictly to these plans, owing t o
the difficult positictn of the one and the resolute opposition ellcountered
by the other.
Wiile in the neighbourEiood of Inayat Kili on the 14th September a
determined attack was made a t night on General Jeffreys' camp and t h e
firing lasted for nearly six hours, two British Officers being killed, a n d
one dangerously wounded, while nine men in the rank-and-file were hit,
andabout 80 horses and transport animals lost. The tribesmen attacking mere Mamunds*and Salarzai, who inhabit the valleys of south
Eajour west of Munda. It has just been mentioned that a day or two
previously a cavalry reconnaissance in the MoEmand Valley was iilbed
upon by tribesmen, but Sir Bindon Blood did not stop to punish them as
there was no large gathering to be found. These tribesmen were
Mamunds, and seeing one brigade thus pass on harmlessly to Kawagai
* A clan of the Bnjouci tribes,uot to be confused with the Mohmands.
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they seen1 to have thought they could harass the troops which still remained south of the mnge of hills separating Bajour from the Mohmand
country. Generitl JeRreys had intended crossing this range the following day, September 15t11, and had sent the Buffs and Sappers to hold the
crest for the night. His camp, with the transport animals, was in the
best position available, and i t was guarded by shelter trenches, whicl~the
35th Sikhs and the 38th Dogras lined when the enemy opened fire. The
tribesmen must have got the range accurately, judging by the results
of their fire, but they made no attempt to rush the entrenchments.
Firing began a t 8-15 P.X. on the face of the camp occupied by the
Guides Infantry. A t 10 o'clock there was a lull, but a t 10-30 heavy
firing recommenced on the face occupied by the 38th Dogms and the
35th Silrhs, and Brigadier-General JeEreys proceeded thither to direct
the fire. The attack was continued until 2-15 A.M., when the enemy
retired carrying their dead with them. The disproportionate loss
anlong the British Officers was due to the fact that they waked about
without cover, condacting the defence;. while the men weFe protected
by shelter trenches Tfre enemy were extremely well armed, and
creeping along various nullahs, gained positions whence a most galling
fire was delivered. The troops were directed to avail themselves of
cover, but the necessity of sending messages involved exposure,
principally of Officers, resulting in the losses already mentioned. All
lights were extinguished, yet such tents as stood were pierced by
bullets. Tlie enemy were everywhere repulsed. Our casualties in
detail were :-British Officers-killed: Captain W. E. Tomkins and
Lieutenant A. W. Bailey, 38th Dogras ; dangerously wounded :Lieutenant H. A. Harrington,* 26th Punjab Infantry, attached to the 38th
Dogras. Natives-killed: one havildar, No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery,
one sepoy, 38th Dogras, and two followers ; voounded, 5. Seventy-six
horses and mules were hit. Captain Tomkins and Lieutenant Bailey
were buried the next morning with military honours. Lieutenant
Harrington's condition was hopeless from the first, the bullet having
penetrated the brain,
That same morning, as soon as light allowed,.a squadron of the 11th
Bengal Lancers, under Captain E. H. Cole, went out and overtook the
Mamunds a t the foot of the hill, killing 21, with the loss of one
horse killed and one wounded.
"Died of his wounck a fortnEght later.

'

The enemy, homevet., did not appear to be ~Tish~art~ner?,
and though
they mere quiet t h e nest night, they had boldly cleclared their intention
of returning zftcr resting. Clearly they had not been punished sufficiently. General Jeffreys accordingly reealled the Euffs and Sappers
from the crest of the Rambat Pass, and proceeded to visit the
oalleys whence t h e enemy had come. The idea of joining General
Wodehoase's Brigade a t Yakhdand was given up in favour of punitive
operations in the Blanlund (or Watelai) Valley. How far these operations
would delay the movement of the b r i ~ a d einto the 1CIohnrand country
was not yet plain ; but in a n y case Sir Binclon Blood with General
Woc.lehonse couId carry out the plan of joining hands with General
Elles. The incident shoved the wisdom of having sent large forces
forwarcl from the Swat Valley. If there had been only one brigade on
the northern Mohmand borders, the plan of the Mohmand Camptxign
would have fallen through. Now, however, General Jeffreys could
conifortably devote his attention to the two sections of the Bajouris
which had thus unexpectedly assumed a hostile attitude, and in the
event of this task occupying a considerable time he could return to
the Swat Vnlley uid Sado, as t h e troops aIready in the Mohmand count r y would be sufficient to deal with any possible Mohmand combination.
Sir Bindon Blood, on hearing what had happened, ordered anotlier
squadron of the 11th Lancers a t Nawagai to join General Jeffreys,
seeing that the cavalry already in the Watelai Valley had been used
against the Mamunds to such good purpose.
The Mamunds and Salarzai were plainly in a sullen temper, but
whether they wouJd be able t o gather in any great strength seemed
doubtful, as the Bajour clans as a whole had not m.1' cle common cause
with them. I n oyder, however, to be prepared for possibIe complications, the 1st Brigade under Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, which
since its return from subjugating the Swat Valley had been awaiting
developments, was moved from Sarai t o the Panjkora River, a depGL;
being established a t Sado on t h e river bank.
On Thursday, September 16th, General Jeffreys' Brigade fought the
important and in some respects memorable action of t h e Mamund Valley, which b e g w a t 7-30 in the morning, continued throughout the day,
and did not finally cease till after midnight. In this severe engagement nine OEcers, including t h e Bripdier himself, and 140 men were
either killed or wounded. This was the greatest loss that had occurred
in froaLier wafiare in a single day since the Ambela Campaign. The
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f a c h aye tllesc : After t l ~ euight attack onGcllera1 JefrreYs' chrljp on the
14th September. the brigade lnoved f ~ o mInayat Kili to the head of the
Watelai Valley, t o punish the Mamunds by burning severalof tllcir villages near a t hand. To expedite Lhe work of destruction Gcneral
Jeffreys divided his attwlting force into three columns, each of wlliclt
was to operate independently of the other two. The right column unllerq
Lieutenant-Colonel F. G. Vivian consisted of the 38th Dogras, a section
of Sappers and two guns. Tlie centre colunln under Colonel P. H.
Goldley co~lsistedof one squadron 11th Bengal Lancers, four guns, the
35th Siltlls and the Bugs. The left column ~znderMajor F. Canlpbell
illcluded the Guides and was instructed to operate in the neighboudlood
of the camp. A t 7-30 the cavalry with the centre column came in contact with tlie enerny, and firing began. The tribesmen rctired slowly,
taking advantage of cover, alad slzooting accurately. Five companies of
the 35th Sikhs belonging to the same column now arrived and cleared
the enerny from the hillside, reaching a village, which they partially
burned, Che tribesmen ascending the hills. A t 12 o'clock only a few
snipers were visible, and tlie retirement of the colurun was ordered. As
soon a s this had begun, large numbers of the enemy appesred showing
great couriqe, and being armed generally with Martinis they pressed the
retreat severely. The p o u n d favoured the tribesmen, who succeeded i u
out-flanking the 35th Sikhs. Their swordsmen and snipers frequently
csnle to within 40 yards, and the Caficers had to use their revolvers freely.
Tliere was also stone-throwing. The rear conlpany was encumbered
with the wounded. Here Lieutenant Heplles was killed and Lieutenant
Cassels wounded. The enerny showed the greatest daring, and firing
was maintained at under 100 yards for 15 minutes. As soon as the
ground adn~itted,the charge was sounded, and the men responded well.
Fixing bayonets they drove the tribesmen back up the hills. Some of
the Buffs forming part of the same column under Lieutenant J. Hasler
came up, and the enemy in retiring across the open suffered considerable
lossfrom their fire. Allthis fighting was confined to Colonel Goldney's
column. Colonel Vivian l a d found the villages alIotted to him too
strongly held to be attacked by so small a force and had returned to
ca,np. Major Campbell's colunln had also avoided an action for the
same reason, 2nd after destroying some small hamlets had retired.
As soon as the enemy's resistance to Colonel Goldney's column
was found to be vigorous, orders had been sent to the two other
columns to concentsdte, and reinforcements were ordered fro111 the

of rock. Ca

camp. Brigadier-General Jef&eys, who now arrived fronl the camp,
ordered the Buffs again to occupy the village, to complete its destruction9
and recover the bodies of the killed. Covered by the fire of the eth
Bengal Mountain Battery, the Buffs and the 35th Sikhs re-occupied t h e
hill again, the tribesmen retiring and inflicting slight loss b y sniping. At
2-30 the village was completely destroyed, and the force began nlarching
back to camp again. The enemy once more attacked the columns, a n d
the Buffs and Guides covered the retirement with great steadiness, b u t
still the enemy, displaying a standard, advanced recklessly, and t h o u g h
suffering severe loss from carefully-aimed volleys, followed the troops to
the camp, frequently firing a t close range. Night had now come on, a n d
the darkness was intensified by rain, but vivid lightning. enabled t h e
enemy to continue firing a t the marching columns. The steadiness a n d l

endurance of the troops were admirable, and the camp was reached by
the main body of the troops in perfect order a t 8 o'clock.
Meanwhile, in addition to the main attnck, the hills to the r i g h t of
the enemy's position h i d been crowned by one strong company of t h e
35th Silrhs under Captain Ryder. This company was a t 5 o'clock a t t a c k e d
by large numbers of Mz~munds,and desperate fighting ensued. It was
here that Captain Eyder and Lieutenant Gunning were wounded. To
extricate these troops two conlpanies of the Guides were detached f r o m
the main body, and in spite of severe fighting, darkness and rain, t h e y
were relieved and reached t h e canlp safely. Their losses were, however,
severe.
I n the darkness and the pelting rain, which made i t impossible a t
times for one company to hear or see anything of its nearest neighbour,
four guns of hro. 8 Mountain Battery and a half comparly of Sappers
who had been covering the Guides's retreat found themselves s e p a r a t e d
from the main body, together with a few men of the Buffs. BrigadierGeneral Jeffreys, himself belated, and literally in the dark as to t h e exact
whereabouts of the remainder of his brigade, joined these stragglers and
assumed command. On reaching the village of Thana he decided to give
up the idea of reaching camp that night, and halted the force, and t h e y
took up a n entrenched position. The enemy, however, occupied half the
village, and severe fighting a t close quarters ensued. The guns fired
case-shot through the walls, and eventually the enemy were expelled
with the bayonet. Here Lieutenants Wynter and Watson were
wounded, and the Brigadier himself had his head cutopen by a fragment
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of rock. Captain Birch, R.A., had his left side cut by a bullet, and
other Officers had bullets through their helmets. As soon as nloonlight
allowed, the cavalry, the 38th Uogras, and four companies of the 35th
Sikhs proceeded from the camp and relieved the place. Our casualties
for the day were :-British Officers-killed :Lieutenant V. Hughes, 35th
Sikhs, and Lieutenant A. T. Crawford, Royal Artillery. Woundrd:
Lieutenant G. R. Cassels and Lieutenant 0. G. Gunning, 35th Sikhs ;
Captain W. I. Rydw, 1st Gurkhas (attached to the 35th Silths) ; Lieutenant F. A. Wynter, Royal Artillery ; Lieutenant T. C. Watson, Royal
Engineers. 8lightly wounded :Brigadier-General Jeffreys and Captain
A. H. C. Birch, Royal Artillery. British soldiers-killed, 2 ;:danqeruusly
wounded, 1; severely wouwded, 3 ; slightly zuounded, 6 ; (all of the Buffs).
Native soldiers-No. 8 Mountain Battery-kzlled, 6 : zuuunded, 92.
Guides-kzlled,
2 ; wounded, 1 Subadar, 2 Havildars, and 7 men. 35th
Sikhs-kilkd, 22 ; mounded, 44. 11th Bengal Lancers-zoounded, 2. Sappers and Miners-lcrlled, 4 ; mounded, 16.
Another account of this action, which gave rise to much criticism,
was published some time later. The followiilg extract from it is worth
adding :"The idea of the punitive operations in the early morning was it let
loose nearly the whole brigade in the valley, to punish every village of
importance i n a single day, and then march back again t o Inayat Eili.
The brigade was already due in the Mohmand country to co-operate with
General Elles's Division : its Commander and the troops composing i t
had the further prospect of Tirah before them ; and there was every
inducement therefore to polish off ' quickly the Manlunds who had been
%old enough to fire into the camp below the Rambat Pass. To each
Commandant was allotted a village, or group of villages, and he was
directed to deal with i t independently. Thus the Buffs, the 35th Sikhs,
the 38th Dogras and the Guides Infantry, each six companies strong,
moved off to acconlplish their respective tasks : a detachment of the
11th Bengal Lancers, the Mountain guns and the Sappers being held
ready for emergenzies in case of any particularly strong opposition.
The 38th Dogras on the right found the village of Damodolah far
too strong t o attack without artillery, and Colonel Vivian very
sensibly returned to camp, instead of knocking the heads of his
.men against mud walls. On the left the Guides were successful in
sweeping through some small hamlets, but hild they pushed on to Agrah
and Gat, theywould probably have had to withdraw, as the 38th Dugras

had clone. F u r t l ~ c rup t11c valley the BufEs liad lIisposed of one vill<<~;t.
ztisu. I t \\'is in the centre tlrxt 111ntters~velltwrong. Tlle 33tll Silills
puslwd on well into tltc hills at the far end of the valley, a n d as tile furt l ~ e rrtristake was ~uacteof splitting t11r six c o r ~ ~ ~ a i iinto
i e s t h r e e parties,
the 3I~inn1ldsyaw their cIi;tnce and got to close quarters. T h r e e conlptnies which Ilad begun tu burn the \illage of Sllalri Tangi w e r e forced
back, and the? had t o abanclou tlie body of Lieutenant Hughes, w h o l ~ u d
been killed. Word was seut b;tck for the Buffs and Guides t o come up
with all speed, and chr 1 Itlil Ezng;tl Lancers lutacle a cllarge wl~icll,though
i t could riot be driven llonle owing to broken ground, prevented t h e Siklls
from bri11g su~rlrurkded.ITiien the reinforcenlents arrived the Maillu~lds
were driven b.~ek,and Lieutenant Huylles's body was recoserecl. Tlleri
canre a long h:tlt of sowe three llours, which enabled tlie enenly t o coll w t i n full stlength ;and when t h e retireiucnt was eventudlly ordered,
t h e trqibtisnlnn pttrsrled their usual tactics with considerable success.
TWLI
C I J I U I J ~ I ~of
~ ~Sikhs,
S
Iiuiding a hill over 9,000 feet high, w e r e l e f t to
fight their I V : L ~ dltwn :tlorie : a n order, i t is said, was sent t o therrt to
retire, but i t never reached Ct~ptain32vder. There mas some desperate
fighting, aud the Gtiiiles 1nf:~ntlyl i d to double back to save t h e Siklls
\vho were attacked b j o\-eru.llrluling r~unlbcrs. I t was here t h a t t h e hetlvy
losses vcsurl.ed. The ~~ctrrement
don-rl the Watelai Valley w a s weary
wotk fur t l ~ etroups, fur CL tlu~nderstorn~
G C L I Don,
~ and as the enerlly closed
in, it b e c ~ ~ l pi ei t ~ dark.
i~
Tile guns, nit11 ,L half c o n i p ~ n yof S ~ ~ p p eand
rs
15 nieii of the Uutf;, gut separated f l o ~ ntlle~rescort of four. companies of
the Siklls, and in tile tLick dar1;ness General Jeffrrys f u u ~ I~imself
~d
belaLrd with this srurrll party. Tile valley is intersected with raviiies, and
niarching a t night was no easy matter, as the Guides, wlio f o r m e d the
rear-guilrd, dibcorered. The General erentually decided t o t a k e up a
position under the walls of a. *illage, aud here for four or. 6ve h o u r s the
linndful of British soldiers, gunnels, .and Snppers had to defend tllerllselves i~,gainstthe enemy a t very close quarters indeed. There w e r e no
means of sending off to camp for assistance, and it was not u n t i l the
moon rose that the party were extricated, abdut a n hour after iuidniqhb.
The details of the fight under the village walls go t o show t h a t Oficers
and men behaved with the finest courage. Lieutenant Wynter f o ~ l g l illis
t
guns after he was mounded, until through faintness from loss of blood 1le
could no longer give orders.
Then a sepoy took him in his a m r s , alld
for hours shielding lliln with his own body against the
fil.e.
It was an heroic action, and the sepoy was severely wounded, w h i l e thus
protecting hi8 Officer. Another man coolly beat out with his coat tile
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bundles of burninji straw ml~icllthe Mamnnds threw fronl t l ~ eh o ~ ~ s e tops to light np the ground and enable ?hem to aim. The morlr was
perilous in the extreme, but the sepoy went allout it caIn11~-,and repeatedly extinguished the flaming straw. A Sapper was sent out into
the open to watch a door in the walls from which i t was feared the
enemy might rush : his figure was outlined clearly ~vit11every flash of
lightning and he was repeatedly shot at, but he stuck to his post, c;1lling
out from time to time to show thilt all was well. Again, hfajor
Worlledge, with the relief party from the camp, finding that he could not
reach the spot whence the noise of firing came, sent out a sowar to open
communication with General Jerreys. Tllis man passed safely througlI
the tribesmen who were on the move across the valley, reached the villase, only to qet a volley from his own friends, delivered his message
ancl carried back another to Major Worlledge. Other instances of devotion and gallantry could be given, but enough has heen said to show
that, as at M;~icar,the Malalakalld, Chakdara, and tlre Sarnana* our troops
acquitted themselves in splendid fashion."
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General Jeffreys in his oficial despatch afterwards repsrted several
C o l l ~ p i ~ Lacts
l ~ ~of
s gallantry during the fighbing on the 16th September,
and amongst them, as most remarkable, the hehaviour of tlie Guides
under Major Campbell, Captain Hodson and Lieutenant Codrington
when they relieved the company of the 35th Sikhs which had got
isolated, a t wllich time llavildtlr Ali Cful of the Guides perticularly
distinguished himself. Captain Ryder and Lieuteuant Gunning with the
relieved company of tlie 35th Sikhs and Captain Cole mith one squadron
of the 11th Bengal Lancers did valuable service. Other Officers specially
mentioned were Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw, 35th Sikhs, and Captain
F. Duncan, 23rd Pioneers (distinguished himself .ivhen Lieutenant
Huglies was killed), Captain Birch, Z.A., and the men of No. 8 Bengal
Mountain Battery, Lieutenant Watson, R.E. (wounded three times),
Lieutenant J. M. C. Colvin of the Sappers, and Major Hamilton,
D.A.A.-G.
I n subsequently reporting the Mamund V a l l g action t o Bsmy
Head-Quarters, Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, to whom General
Jeffreys had reported events, entered into a full and detailed exarnination of all the facts. As this day's fighting has been much discussed
and in some quarters severely criticised, we give in an appendix virtually
* Not yet related.
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tlie wl~oleof Sir Eindon Blood%deepitches, these being the 0111~ofFicial
data :~vailablefrom which an opinion as to the tactics of the day can
fairly be formed.
All was quiet in the camp a t Inaj*at Kili on the night of the 17th
Septe~nber.A t six the foilowing morning, the available strength of the
2nd Brigitde moved to attack the fortified village of Damodolah. The
tribesmen appeared in considerable numbers, and firing began a t 8-45.
The 35th Sikhs crowned the spurs to the right of the village, and the
38th Dogras and the Battery occupied poaitions on the left, t h e Guides
Infantry in the centre, and tlle Buffs in reserve. The village was
carried and conlpletely deutroped. The retirement was brilliantly executed by the Guides, and the enemy had no chance of rushing. The
BnEs corered the homeward march of the brigade, inflicting loss oil the
tribesmen, m-ho pursued. ;\luch grain mas captured. The casualties
were :-35th Sikhs-killed, 1; 7uoundeol, 8. 38th Dogras-killed, 1; zoounded, 2. Guides-tcounded, 1, Firing ceased a t 3-30.
Sunday, the 19th of September, was free from fighting, b u t some
further punitive work was carried out, owing to the fact that the
~Iamuncls, who had by this time sent in their jirpahs, nevertheless refused to coniply with the terms in~posed b y General Jeffreys.
This clan, which nurubers only about 1,500 figh Ling men, was showing much determination, and though now suing for mercy, still
refused to surrender its own rifles and those captured in the
attack on September 16th. I t mas desirable, therefore, to demolish the fortifications of the villages in the centre of the Malziund
'L'alley, and on the nlorning in cluestion the force rnoved out against the
village of Zagadirai, four or five miles from Inayat Kili, and destroyed
it. No opposition was encountered, and later in the day jirgohs began
to come in again. These jirgnhs were informed by General JeRreys that
no propomls would be entertained unless their arms were surrendered.
One day's grace was given to allow of this being made l~nown. Much
indignation was excited in the force by the news that the tribesmen
had disinterred the bodies of the &Iahomedan native soldiers killed
in the recent fighting and had insulted their remains.
The following day (September 20th) Sir Bindon Blood, who had
been kept well informed of events by means of the heliograph, was able
to report from Nawagai to Army Head-Quarters that he had not found
i t necessary to reinforce General Jeffreys' Brigade, which had proved
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itself quite equal to dealing with the Mamunds, "in fact (he telegraphed),
since Thursday night when the tribesmen inflicted such heavy losses
upon the brigade, the operations in the Mamund Valley seem to have
been completely successful!'
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Successful they had undoubtedly been, but hostilities were farfrola
being over. A t the very time when Sir Bindon BIood a t Nawagai was
telegraphing that the end of the fighting in the Watelai Valley was now in
view, General Jeffreys' Brigade was obliged to nlarch out to attack the
fortified village of Zagai (once owned by Umra Khan). Sharp fighting
ensued, chiefly with the Buffs on the right, and severe loss was inflicted
upon the tribesmen.' The village was taken and the retirement cleverly
executed. Firing began at 8-50 A.M. and ceased a t 12-30. A reconnaissance by a squadron of the 11th Bengi~lLancers had revealed th:
fact that the village was strongly held. The Buffs were on the right,
t h e 38th Dogras in the centre, the Guides Infantry on the left., and the
35th Sikhs in reserve. Firing began on the left a t 8-50, and the guns
came into action near the centre about 9-15. The Buffs, who had further to go, were engaged about 9-20. The enemy as usual retired, sniping ; the village was occupied, and all the fortifications were destroyed.
A t 11 A.M. the retirement began, and immediately afterwards
the tribesmen gathered on the flanks. On the left, the Guides
Infantry were threatened by about 600 tribesmen displaying standards.
These were dispersed by long range fire. On the right, the Buffs retired
with admirable discipline, in spite of very sharp iire. Excellent practice was made with the Lee-Metfords ; Lieutenant F. S. Reeves's section
killed five men a t one valley. The Dum-Durn bullet was most effective.
Lieutenant R. E. Power was slightly wounded in the right arm, but
after the wound was dressed he returned to his company. Lieutenant
Keen was shot through the left arm and in the body. After the Buffs
were clear of difficult ground, the line of the regiment lay across the
open fields, and the enemy from cover fired with effect, several men being wounded. Firing ceased when the troops got clear, as the enemy
did not dare to follow into the open. On the extrenle left, considerable
numbers of the enemy appeared. Captain E. H. Cole's squadron trotted
forward, causing the tribesmen, ever in terror of cavalry, to bunch
together. The Battery immediately exploded two shells with great
effect, and this ended the acbion. The brunt of the fighting fell to the
Buffs. The casualties were : two Officers wounded (Second-Lieutenant
G, N, 8, Keene, Unattached List, and Lieutenant R. E. Power of the

Buffs) ; British soldiers-wounded :Buffs, 9 ; 9;ative troops-38th
ribs, 2. Total casualties, 13,

Dog-
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On the night of the 2lst September, firing into camp took place,
and several animals and one native orderly were wounded, and on the
22nd the important village of Dag was captured-together
with great
stores of g r a i n w i t h the loss of one hilled and two wounded.

1
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In the 2nd Brigade alone the losses of a sinlgle week anlounted to
24 British Ofiicers and 153 men, besides nearly 150 transport a~liruals,
s
now
cavalry horses, and OEcers' ponies. But General J e f f r e ~ had
demonstrated the ability of his troops, vhen not divided iuto a number
of weak parties, t o sweep the valley from end to end.
General Jeffreys and his Brigade may now be left, settling accounts
with the Mamunds, while the movements of General Wodehouse's
Brigade with Sir Bindon Blood at Nawagai are brouglltu up to date.
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CHAPTER Y.
WITH GENERAL WODEAOUSE'S BRICtdDZ:

,WHILEGeneral J e f f r e ~ swas countermarching his Brigade in order to
deal with the aggressive Mamunds and Salarzai, the punishment of the
Mohmands was steadily proceeding. Sir Bindon Blood was at Nawagai,
and the Mohmand tribes to the south of this position had tendered
their submission and agreed to surrender the arms demanded of them.
The Hadda Dcullah, however, was reported to have assembled a large
gathering on $he Bedmanai Pass, twelve miles from Nawagai, and it
became evident after the arrival of this news that Sir Bindon Blood's
position was b y no means an easy one and might in certain contingencies become even critical. General Elles was still a t or close to
Shabkadr and could not therefore be looked to for prompt help, should
help be required. The IFadda Mullah, with a large gathering, occupied a
strong position in the Bedmanai Pass. The Mamund and Salarzai tracts
were either in a blaze or a t the combustion point. Between these two
hostile forces lay Nawagai. The Khan, a man of great influence in
those pa&., might, by throwing his influence against the British have
seriously increased the difkulties of the campaign. The pass of
Nawagai would have been closed, and General Elles, arriving with
his Brigade from Shabkadr, would have had to stand on the defensive or even to fall back without attacking the Mohmands a t all.
I t is i n fact easy to realise how serious the effects of such a development might have been.
Bold measures were necessary. Sir Bindon Blood decided to
remain a t Nawagai, to keep the Khan loyal and the pass clear at all
costs. This action kept the tribesmen in two sections-the Mohmand
on one side andthe Mamunds on the other. I t also paralysed the Khan,
supposing his friendship were weak, though subsequent events proved
his loyalty to be sincere. It maintained the communications. But it
was not unattended with difficulty and danger.

.

Sir Bindon Blood considered himself strong enough to holdhis position in spite of any attack that might be made, and he judged rightly.
_On Friclay, September 17th, between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon,
some 800 tribesmen were seen aesr the n~outliof the Eedmanai Pass.
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The greater part of General Wodellouse's Briqade turned out, but the
enemy re~nainedamong the rarines and only the cavalry could get near
them. A few rounds were fired by dismounted men, and the Mountain
Battery fired some shells. The force returned to camp i n the evening.
Evidently the Hadda Mullah was feeling his way.
A t midnight, September 19th-20th, the Hadda Slullah, venturing out
from his rarines, made a half-hearted attack upon General Blood's camp.
Some 150 of the enemy, chiefly swordsmen, were in the first line, a n d
about 1,000 in the second line. The first line crept u p unperceived t o
~vitllinabout 30 or 40 yards of the parapet held by the Queen's Regiment,
and began firing, but being met by steady volleys, dispersed in a few
minutes, after trjing other faces of the eamp in a half-hearted way.
The tribesmen then turned their attention with much shouting to t h e
picket held by the Khan of Nawagai7snlen on the low hills a mile t o
the west. After half-an-hour's sniping a t this picket they made off.
Our casualties were one man of the Queen's Regiment killed and one
wound~d. The enemy left no dead or wounded on the ground.
On the following night (September 20th-21st) another attack was
made in force, the Hadda Mullah having been joined by the Saffi Mullahs
and a contingent of Shin~varisfrom Afghan territory. The total strength
was estimated a t 3,000. Tactically the assault showed considerable skill,
regular rushes being made, covered by rifle fire. It began abouh
9 P.M. and firing continued till 1 P.M. Constant charges were made from
all directions more or less simultaneously. The troops on their p a r t
behaved with the utmost steadiness, and the fire discipline was perfect.
The safety of the camp was never for. a moment in doubt, though some
of the tribesmen must have advanced to within ten yards of the parapet,
as their bodies were afterwards found a t that distance. The enemy must
have suffered heavily, as they came under a cross-fire, and our men could
see them plainly as they stood up. No. 1 British Mountain Battery fired
four star shells very successfully. General Blood had been warned a t 8 P.M.
by the Political Officer that the attack was intended, so everything w a s
ready when t h e enemy appeared. The Mountain Battery was of t h e
greatest value, firing shrapnel as well as star shells. The casualties
were :-In the British ranks, one man killed and four wounded ; in t h e
Native ranks, fourteen wounded, most of these slightly. BrigadierGeneral Wodehouse was shot through the leg. Some horses and mules
were shot. The enemy had breech-loading rifles, some of which were
Lee-Metfords, as the bullets picked u p in the eamp showed.
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General Blood illoved out the troops next morning to find the enemy,
but they had disappeared. H e tl~ereuponinarclied without fllrther delay
right on to Lokerai, where he knew, from heliographic signals, that he
should nieet General Elles, who had successfully carried out on his side
the advance from Shabkadr.
On the night of the 21st September, after tlie meeting between Sir
Bindon Blood and General Elles, there was considerable picket firing a t
individual tribesmen who endeavoured to approach the camp, also some
sniping on the part of the enemy. Three star shells were fired. On the
morning of the 22nd September the village of Das, west of Agrah, was
attacked. The tribesmen, as usual, after the destruction of the village,
followed and harassed the returning troops, and tlie following casualties
I ; dang~~ously
wounded, 1 ; 35th
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And now to trace briefly the less exciting movements of MajorGeneral Elles's Division up to the time of his meeting Sir Bindon Blood's
troops a t Lokerai.
General Elles with his two Brigades under Brigadier-Generals
Westmacott and Macgregor marched out from Shablradr, as has been
stated, early on the 15th September. Five miles out, the 20th Punjab
Infantry, forming the advance-guard, were fired on. The Ellorappa defile
,was found impassable for camels, ana the General sent back orders for the
2nd Brigade t o haltand camp, and left the 5th Company Bengal Sappers
and the 28th Rombay Pioneers to improve the road. The six miles of
very bad road were turned into one passable for camels by the evening
of the 18th September, a very creditable piece of work for both Sappers
-and Pioneers, and General EIles continued his marched with a proportion
of mule transport on September 15th to Galanai, 16 miles from
Xhabkadr.
On September 17th, news of General Jeffreys' fight a t Rambat
arrived. General Westrnacott and the 1st ~ r i g a d e , with the 20th
PunjabInfantry, No. 3 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery, and two
squadrons of the 13th Bengal Lancers, moved on six miles to Esuj Khel,
t l ~ r e emiles south of the Nahaki Pass. Plenty of forage was fou~ldin
the valley between the top of Khorappa Jangi and Nahaki, but little
supplies for the troops. Helio conlmunication was established a t
"Nahakiwith General Sir Bindon Blood's force.
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Tb e Lower Mohluands, or IIalimzais in the valley between Rhorappa
and Naha%i, accepted General Elles's terms, i.~., Rs.500, 300 jezails and
2,500 maunds of grain ; all breach-loading rifles to be given up, and free
forage to be provided for the force while in the district for seven days
commencing September 19th. The 13th Bengal Lancers, after a reconnaissance towards Lokerai, reported very barren country beyond Nahaki
with very little water. General Macgregor with the Oxford Light
Infantry, the Patiala Regiment, and the Bombay Mountain Battery
marched from Dand to Galani on September 19th.
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The Saffi Mullah with 2,000 men was reported to be a t Kung, 9
miles from Nahaki, and Major F. G. Atkinson with 100 men of the l a t h
Bengal Lancers, was sent to investigate the truth of the report. The
Lancers were fired on from two sides, but they advanced in line, and the
villagers fled. The Lancers held the village, and soon some villagers
returned and spoke to Major Atkinson. H e found two Sikh bunnias,
who said they had bought up all the grain to sell to the flirkar.
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On the 21st September General Elles with General Westmacott
arrived a t Lokerai and met General Blood as already stated. General
Macgregor had been left behind with two and a half battalions and two
guns to hold a Nahaki Pass, which dominates the whole Mohmand

Having seen t h e completion of the first p a r t of the plan of campaign Sir Bindon Blood left General Elles on September 23rd and rode
down to Innyat Kili to see how the operations a g i n s t the Mamunds
were progressing. E e had previously made over General Wodehouse's
Brigade to General Elles, who united it with General Westmacott's
Brigade for the purpose of making what was intended to be a n overwhelming descent upon the Hadda Mullah's gathering reported to be
still holding the Bedmanai Pass. Unfortunately General Wodehouse
himself was not able to continue in command of his brigade being
obliged, owing to the wound i n his leg, to proceed by sick convoy to
India. This was hard luck on a brave Officer, as much fighting had
yet to take place. Colonel B. C. Graves of the 39th Garhwalis was given
the command of the 3rd Brigade of the Malakand Field Force, with
the t e n ~ p o l a ~
rank
y of Brigadier-General, and hereafter in the narrative
of the Mohnland Campaign the brigade which has been known all along
% General Wodehouse's Brigade will be styled General Graves's Brigade.
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CHAPTER VI.

ON

September 2912d,t h e day before Sir Bindon 131ood left Nawagai to
join Brigadier-General Jeffreys in the Mamund countl-J, General ElleM
concentrated General Graves's Brigade and General Westmncott7s.Ekigade
at Kuz Chinarai, his camp being four miles north of the Bedn~nnaiPass,
held by the Hadda Rltullah and his supporters. The Mullal~l ~ a doutposts
at the foot of the Pass, and our cavalry were Gred upon when reconnoitring the position. Little parties of the enernywere also apparently proml.
ing about the camp, as two followers were cut up and two wounded.
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On the morning of the 24th September, the troops moved forward
and, after some opposition, carried the Bedmanai Pass. The got11 Punjab
Infantry, with Maxim detachments, particularly distinguished themselves in clearing the heights. The capture of the Pass, contrary to all
expectation, proved easy uf accon~plishment,as only 500 of the enemy
faced Genera1 westmacott's Brigade, when it moved formard to the
attack a t 6-30 A.M. As to the actual assault, the 20th Punjab Infantry
and the Maxim gun detachments led, and were opposed on every ridge,
but the Maxim fire and the spirited manner in which the 20th Punjab
Infantry moved forward were too much for the tribesmen. They were
driven back until a t last our troops crowned the peak 2,500 feet above
the Pass. General Graves's Brigade was meanwhile moving in support of
General Westmacott's up the centre, and guarding the right flank ; but
i t was not actually engaged. Our casualties were only one sepoy killed
and four wounded. No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, made
excellent practice. The hills are most precipitous, making the pelbformance of the infantry more creditable than would at first sight appear.
General Graves's Brigade returned to E u z Chinarai, General Westmacott's Brigade holding the villages round Bedmanai. Several forts
and towers were destroyed.
This easy victory over the Badda Mullah's forces was attrihted to
the previous want of success on their part in the night attack on Geueral
Blood's camp already described. They had made their real effort then,
and failed, and when General Elles7stwo Brigtdes faced them tlle!. 1l:td
very little heart for further fighting. The contiugeut of hfglrdn
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tribesmen also, who had been expected to help, no doubt considered
it more advisable to retire across the frontier while their line of retreat
was still open.

a wing of the 28t

General Elles determined to advance from the Eedmanai Pass on t o
the much-talked-of Jnrobi, where the Hadda Mullah had his headquarters, uncertain whether that fanatical leader would be able to rally
his men for another stand. The Afghan border is only a mile away,
and once beyond this the Mullah and his followers would be safe, f o r
British troops cannot cross the Durand line.
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I t is of no great i~nportanceto describe in detail how General Elles
advanced from Beclmanai through the Eohai Valley breaking into t h e
innermost seclusion of this hidden country, and sweeping away in t h e
general destruction the very nest and hiding-place of the Hadda Mullah.
As i t turned out, the only spot bearing the name of Jarobi was a small
glen, very picturesque to look a t but quite devoid of mystery and signi,ficance. As for the often-mentioned " head-quarter buildings " of t h e
Hadda Mullah, these were found to consist of nothing more than a few
wretched mud huts. The troops had to pass through a difficult defile,
but no real opposition mas offered to their march. They, however, were
fired a t repeatedly by small parties of tribesmen, and some thirteen o r
fourteen casualties occurred during the advance. They returned t o
Bedmanai, having satisfactorily punished the various villages visited.
The plan of operations had been admirably conceived and carried out.
General Elles moved his force i n two culumns parallel with each other,
sweeping the valley, thoroughly destroying all the forts, and punishing
villages which declined to submit. Such opposition as was offered was
easily broken a w n , and General Westmacott's Brigade pushed quite
close up to the Durand boundary line. A t Manzari Chena our troops
were a t the foot of the Sibala Pass, over*which a road leads to Jellalabad. They skirted the range of hills which forms the boundary of
Afghanistan in this direction, and worked southwsrd, punishing t h e
Khoda Khels, who would not accept the terms offered them. These
operations must have convinced the Baizai, who had been hostile all
through, that the force opposed to them was too strong to be faceit
Their neighbours in the east, the Khwazai, submitted.
With regard to the punishmelit of Khoda Ehels just n~entioned,a
few details may be given, as these villagers alone of all the otllers offered
re*istance. On September 26tb, General Westmacott, with 4 guns of
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Mountain Battery, the 20th Punjab Infalltry, 1st GurklIas,
a willg of t h e 58th 130mbay Pioneers, half of No. 6 Conlpany Bengal
Sa~J?ersand the Devons' Maxim, joined by the Oxfords, who witll
four squadrons of the 13th Bengal Lancers liad marched from ~ ~ lto ~ ~ k i
Kung, started to dest,l'og. the forts and towers of the Khoda Khels, all in
a sort of amphitheatre about two miles from camp. The advance-gl;ard
of the Gurkhas was met with a heavy fire from the villages and heights
around, which were held for nearly a mile. The guns were immediately
brought into action and soon cleared the villages, while four companies
of Gurlrhas on the left crowned the heights, their advance being covered
by the guns and Maxims. This cron-ning of the heights was a dilticult
job, but s n l a r t l ~done. Meauwhile the Sapper3 thorougl~lydistroyed
tlie forts and towers, and when this was completed the retirement
was most deliberately carried out, covered by the guns and Maxims
and the Oxfords. The casualties were : five Gurkhas wounded, Captain
Knapp, commanding the guns, had his horse bit on coining into action.
The Khwazai jfrgah canle in to General CVestmacott during the fight
so their forts and towers, which were to have been destroyed on the
xvizy back, were spared. The Khorla Khels were the best armed clan of
the Mol~mands,which no doubt explains why they refused to surrender
their breech-loaders.
There was now no prospect of further fighting, as the Dawazai,
Utuianzai and Khwazai had all made submission ; and the troops
were permitted to enjoy a well-eirned rest. On September 28th, the
Sonkersets, with the Maharaja of Patiala (who had accompanied
General Elles from Shabkadr) returned to the Divisional Head-Quarters
a t Pesha\var. His Highness liad been heated all along like any other
soldier and had sharecl all the hardships of service. H e had faced
in a true nlilitary spirlt, taking the greatest interest in
what was going oa and showing the real Sikh lceerl~lessto see fighting.
The Patlala lleginlent, it ruay be added, was used uuder General
(:raves in cllsstisiug the N ~ t t a and
i Sara Valley, and can~rtinto contact
wiL1i the ei*elr>y.
The nlilitnry part of this short but very successfu1 expedition
now over, and the troops under General Ellev moved back in
separutc columns to Perihawar, e ~ c hfo~cetaking its own route- BY
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The cfrect of these short but conlpletely successflll operations
hxd heen very great. The utter rout and ~recipitateflight of the Hadda
5IulI:~h Iind made a deep inlpression on the tribes, who were paying
111)fines and surrenderin,rr arms in all directions. The campaign, concirictcd in ctn unexplored and mountainous councry, with very bad loads,
over ditiicult passes, and with a great scarcity of water-the enemy
l~ihvingbreached tlie tanks, which are the chief sources of supply-had
been virtually conrpleted within a little more than three weeks of crossing the frr,lltier*. The rapid advance and attack on the Bedmanai Pass
orle ~ I LIK'fure
V
it ~ ~ i ' nexpected,
s
and a t the moment when everything led
the etieruy to anticipate an attack on Mittai, and the subsequent sudden
appearance uf C4enen~1Etles's furce in Jarobi, the Mullah's stronghold,
had utterly upset itny ~rgnnisedresistance and prevented any further
tribal cut~ibi~iations.Tlie attacks on Sliabkedr and other villages
werw now avenged and the tribes, if appearances go for anything
will be quiet fur rnitny years to come, while the prestige of t h e
Elitis11 Guvernrnrnt is cotnpletely re-established throughout the length
i~11<1
breadth of tlie LIohniand country. The Mohmand count1.y was
t~,i~ver.seil
in every direction for three weeks, the troops lived free
up~,n tlle country, ~vliich was equivalent to a fine of four thousand
Inpcrs a day, seventy-two tovers and forty forts were destroyed,
iuid t l ~ etroops petiet~atedto the farthest recesses of the mountain fastrlexbes deerned by the clansmen inaccessible to British arms : 800 swords
and 100 guns, including breach-loaders and Enfields, were collected b y
tlle tinlr tlie troops left the country, as well as fines aggregating thirteen
t l ~ o ~ ~ s irupees
t n d in cash. A remarkable feature of the expedition was
t h i ~ after
t
the demolition of the l a ~ Bnizai
t
forts the troops were in no
way nlolestecl, and marched about the country in perfect peace a n d
wcurity, and not a single offence was committed on the line of communication. Prom these symptoms it is fair to conclude the Mohmands
had taken to heart the lessons taught them. General Elles was fortunate in having as Chief Politicnl Officer Mr. Merk, whose intimate
kllowIedge of the people and country and great experience of frontier
lllatters generally conduced not a little to the rapid progress and
pletiun of the upe~*atiots.
We have ow to follow the adventures of Sir Bindon Blood with
General Jeffreys' Brigade in the Namund country.
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CEAPTER VII.
F'LTRT~EROPERATIONS AGAINST TBE MAXUNDS.

IT has been stated that on September 23rd, Sir Bindon Blood, after
sending off General Elles with two brigades to capture the Bedmanai
Pass, left Nawagai with his staff and divisional troops for Inayat Kili
to see how the operations under General Jeffreys against the Mamundv
wereprogressing. The situation a t Inayat Eili a t this period was
somewhat peculiar, as for two reasons the 2nd Brigade mas for the
moment compelled to stand fast. I n the first place i t had lost a large
number of transport mules, and in an undeveloped country of this kind
the tnobility of a large force must always depend on its pack animals.
Secondly, the memorable fight of the 16th September, the attempt to
clear the Watelai TTalley in one day, had resulted in 150 wounded men
being thrown on the field hospitals, and these could not now be carried
nor could they be left behind, because deducting an adequate guard for
them the rest of the brigade would not have been strong enough for the
figlltiog which was to follow. Hence up to the time of Sir Bindon
Blood's arrival on the scene with reinforcements only those villages
within striking distance of the camp had been visited and the
more remote villages of the valley remained untouched. Sir Bindon
Blood's first step was to restore the mobiiity of the force. The wounded
were sent to Panjkora where General Meiklejohn's Brigade was
awaiting employment, and the transport animals killed were now
replaced.
The last fight recorded in the previous chapter dealing with the
Mahnlund Campaign was the taking of the village of Dag on September
a n d . Early the following morning the brigade marched to visit the
fortified village of Tangi, the inhabitants of which had been concerned in
the recent fighting. The enemy appeared a t first in small numbers, and
the guns came into action a t 8 o'clock. Firing continued until 11-45 ;
the village was taken, the Guides first seizing the hills to the left The
38th Dogras were in the centre, the 35th Sikhs on the right, and the Buffs
i n reserve. As usual, on the troops returning considerable numbers
of tribesmen appeared, b u t not many cared ta face our t r ~ ~ p si%.

file of the Buffs now advanced f r o m cover, and the Lee-Metford fire
a ~ z i nchecked the enemy. O u r casnalties were : the But'is, Major
R. S. H. Moody, slightly wounded ;38th Dogras, severely wounded, one.
Lieutenant F. S. Reeves of t h e Buffs had a curious escape, the bullet
striking his revolver and glancing thence through his case.
Here i t may be mentioned t h a t as the Mamnnds live partly in
Bttjuur and partly in Afghan territory, cultivating lands on either
side of the frontier, they w e r e always able during these punitive
ope~ationsto retire in safety w h e n hard pressed and then return
again when our troops withdrew. They are notoriously turbulent,
and tlie Afghan authorities have h a d much trouble with then^ since
Asnlar was occupied a few years ago. ]luring the Chitral Exped~tlon
they caused us constant annoyance. They were among tho tribesnlen
who opposed our troops in t h e advance beyond the Panjkora, and they
were up in arms the whole time, tlie 'Lsniping" into camp in the
Jhandoul Valley being laid a t t h e i r door. Again and again Sir Robert
Low and Brigadier-General Waterfield wished to punish them but this
step was forbidden from head-quarters. Our troops remained inactive
for months, though the M a m u n d Valley lay only one march from
Mandia; and the Field Force returned to India leaving the clan
l~ntouched. I t would have been a simple matter to have sent a stronq
brigade to Inayat Kili and thence t o have visited every village held by
the tribesmen, for none are more then ten or twelve miles d i ~ t a n ;t but
the Government would not sanction any punitive measures. The result
was that the Mamunds, a n d t h e i r friends the Salarzai, believed that
our troops were afraid to approach them; and thus, three years later,
they were now harassing a force marching past the mouth of their
valley and not intended to interfere with them in any way. That
a grave disaster did not occur o n the 16th September when General
Jeffreys' Brigade weakened by division began reprisals, was due solely
to the staunchnessof our troops. However, the present punitive operat
and already t h e Marnunds
tions were going far t o retrieve p ~ s omissions
were beginning to send in t h e i r jiryahs. For a whole week after the
capture of Dag and Tangi hostilities were stayed whiIe negotiations
with reference t o the surrender of arms proceeded. Meanwhile, on
September 25tl.1, the Buffs marched off to Nowshera to join the
Tirall Field Force and w c e~ relieved by the Royal West Kent Regirnent
frorn Panjkora. Their departnye was nluch regretted, as in tlle recent
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At this stage of affairs i t did not seem to be advisable to hasten
unduly the evacuation of the Mamund country. Apart from the fact,
t h a t no arms had actually been surrendered, there were other and
wider consider~tionsto be seriously weighed. General Elles was about
to return to Shabkadr, and it was doubtful in Sir Bindon- Bloocl's
view what course the Mohmands intended to pursue. True all the
large Mohmand gatlierings had been dispersed; the Boliai, Mittai and
SuranValleys, south-west of Nawagai, had been visited, and the Hadda
Mollah. chased into Afghan territory, while in the central parts of
the Mohmand country our troops had effectually overawed the people.
But there were probably some thousands of tribesmen just over the
Afghan border who would return as General Elles's Brigades moved bacli
to British territory. Nawagai might beconie their objective, as tlie
Khan 1i;~dcast in his lot with the British authorities. Inayat Kili is only
one march from Nawagai, and General Blood would thus if required bc
able to extend a helping hand to the Khan until the excitement caused
by the expedition had subsided. A t the same time the reality of the
submission of the Manlunds and the Salarzai would be assured.
On the 27th September Mr. Davis, Political Officer, in an interview
with the Mamund jivyah found them determined not to give the 50
breech-loaders originally demanded as a punishment for their share in
the attack on Chakdara, or the 22 Martinis captured from our troops
on the 16th September. They admitted having taken part in the Chakdarn attack without provocation, and coolly offered the excuse tllat all the
world was doingghazn and they went too. They further admitted going
five miles from their valley to attack General Jeffreys' camp a t Markanai
on the 14th September. They stated that therifles taken on the 16th September were in the hands of trans-frontier tribesmen from the Kunar
Valley, who had shared in the fight, and that they could not be recovered.
The jir,gnA flately refused either to give up breech-loaders or surrender
hostages, but offered a sum of money and a number of useless old matchlocks. Eventually they left to consult the tribesmen, promising to
return. The promise was not kept, and on the 30th September, as no
further reply had been received and as this amounted to a refusal of
the Government terms, General Jeffreys, in the absence of Sir Bindon
Blood who, anticipating a peaceful subnlission, had moved off with a

sn1:~11escort to Ysmi, resumed pnnitive operations. All the villages in
the centre of tlis, valley were dealt with, and there was no opposition, t h e
tribesnien declining t o conie into the open ground.
On the morning of the 1st Odober the brigade uilder General
Jeffreys attacked the village of Xgrah and very severe fighting ensued,
resulting in the folIowing casualties:--British OfEicers-kzlted: Lieutenant-Colonel O'Bryen, 31st Punjab Infantry, and Second-Lieutenant
Browneb CIi~yton, Royal West Kent Regiment ; severely zuoun~ed:
Lieutenant Isacke, Royal V e s t Kent, and Lieutenant Peacoclc, 31st
Punjab 1nf:rntt-y: slight(y wounded : Captain N. Styles. British soldiers
-%pa1
%-cut Kent, killed, 3 ; wounded, 15. Native ranks-Guides
Caval~y,tcoundrd 4 ; 3lst Punjab Infantry, 7iitlcd, 7 ; mounded, 15 ;
38th Ilogras, tuounded, 4. Total c.asualties : British Officers, 5 ;soldiers,
45. The eneniyJs losses were also heavy.
Some itexription of this severe action is called for. The Guides
Cavalry reconnoitred the ground, and reported that the village w a s
occupied and that the adjacent heights mere strongly heId. The e n e m y
appeared in considerable numbers both on the hills where they displayed
standards and aniong the scrub in broken ground to the left. The
action mas opened by the cavalry who at 8-20 A.M. were fired on f r o m
the scrub and hills. Disnlounted fire was a t once ordered by LieutenantColonel Adams, and desultory skirmishing ensued. Meanwhile, t h e
infantry were advancing, and a t 9-19 A.M. the battery came iuto action
shellingthe enenly on the heights. The Guides Infantry then advanced
to clear the hills to the left. The enemy, who occupied mortures
and sanqars, maintained a sharp fire, but on Major Campbell ordering
t h e Guides to charge, the hills were splendidly carried. The Royal
West Keut had now advanced in t h e centre and the 31st Punjab Infantry on the right, and very severe fighting ensued. The British Infant r y cleared the village and attacked the triribesmen in the sangars behind
it. Second-Lieutenant Chyton was killed by a volley a t close range, a n d
theenerny a t once charged, causingatemporary check ;but MajorWestern
advanced with Lieutenant Jackson and one and-a-half companies of t h e
Royal West Kent, and drove h c k the enemy and captured the sangars
a t the point of the bayonet. The losses had already been severe, a n d
t h e 31st Punjab Infantry who had ascended the rocks on the r i g h t
of the village, with a long spur on their flank occupied by the enemy,
became exposed to a close and deadly cross-fire. I t was here that Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. O'Cq-en was killed. Moving swiftly from point t o
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point he directed the fire and animated the spilsit of t l ~ emen,
were devoted to Iiin~. I t was not long before tlie cnenly's nlarksmen
began to take ainl a t this pronlinent figure. But fc,r a consideri~ble
period although bullets fell everywhere around him, lie renlained nnhurt.
A t last 1iowevp.r he was shot through the body a l ~ dcarried mortally
wounded from the action. The fact that Colonel O ' E r ~ e nhad beell
specially selected-while still a young man-to tlle conlnlanrl of a
battalion, goes to show what a loss tlle army in I ~ l d i ssusbined by
his death. Already he had passed through the drudgery of the lower
ranks of the service and had reached a point when all the bigger prizes
of the profession appeared in clear view. Arid though tlle deatll in
action of a Colonel a t the heacl of llis regiment is perlleps the finest end
that a soldier can hope for, everyone a t the front deeply regretted the
premature dose of an honourable and brilliant militarj- career. All the
positions were held until the Sappers had completely destroyed the
whole of the village. The return to camp was then ordered. The 38th
Dogras under Lieutenant-Colonel Vivian now advanced to supporb
the 31st Punjab Infantry on the right. The enemy, however, did not
press the retirement as vigorously as usual, and the display of the
cavalry prevented any advance into the open ground, but rnucll firing
was maintained from the hills with sonie effect. No. 7 British
Mountain Battery fired sharpnel a t close range and kept tlie nearest
spurs clear. A11 firing ceased at, 2 10 P.M., and the homeward march was
not further molested, which was a tolerably sure sign that the enerny
llad suffered heavy losses. The OEcers displayed great gallantry, most of
the Royal West Kent having bullet holes in their clothes and helmets,
and nearly all having strange escapes. The Guides Cavalry were of t h e
greatest service during the action. They held a large foree of the enenly
in check on the left for five hours by dismounted fire and by threatening
to charge whenever the tribesmen pressed heavily or advanced frona
the broken ground. No. 7 Battery Royal Artillery fired 140 sharpnel
shells during the action, and when i t was apparent that the Ro~w1
West Kent and 31st Punjab Infantry were severely engaged Major
Fegan advanced his guns within 800 yards of the e n e v and by
constant fire kept many spurs clean. Though the guns came under
sharp fire only one mule was killed. The want of more troops was.
severely left; three additional battalions could have been fully employed ; and only the great skill with which the Guides ~ v a 1 u . yon the
left were handlecl checked the eneniy's advance from that direction.
The 31st Puujab Infantry also suffered from having no battalion or?,

theirs right fl:lnk. The difficulty and danger of attacking fortified villages
in broken ground aud high crops are always great, and i t should be
renlerubrred that after all adequate c a m ~ - ~ u a raud
d the details were
deducted Cie~le~xlJeffi*eyd Brigade could only parade for fighting
sunle 1,300 btroug. Of tlds small number the loss in a fortnight of 245
\\'as severe.
On the 2nd of OctoberSir BindonBlood and Head-quarters with four
guns of X o . 8 Brtttery and four con~paniea26th Punjab Infantrsyarrived.
nt 1nay:~t Iiili, the 1Vth Field Battery and the Highland Light Infantry fulluwing on behind ; and it was hoped that this formidable
cuncentr;~tionof artillery would prodrice decisive effects. I n his report
to h r l t ~ yHead-Quarters Sir Bindon Blood telegraphed :-"I am crowdill::
every nyaxi and gun on the decisive point and expect there will
be an eud of the 3iamund business in a few days." H e was right.
On the 3rd October a t 6 o'clock in the morning, t h e 2nd Brigade
with two btttteries of artillery, under ~rigadier-GeneralJeffrteys, attacked the village of Badilai. Very little opposition was encountered until
the return ruarch of the troops commenced. Firing began a t 8-45. Tlie
31st Punjab Infantry clesred and occupied a spur on t h e right, while
the West Iient moved against t11e village, and the 38th Uogras cleared
the hills to the left, the Guides Infantry covering the left flank, on which
the cavillrj were also posted. The guns came into action a t nine o'clock,
shelling the village, which was captured and completely destroyed. U p
to tliis time only two casualties had occurred, but as soon as the withdrawal of the troops began the enemy appeared in great numbers, as
rnany as three thousand being roughly counted. Firing now became
brisk and all the corps were involved, but the 31st Punjab Infantry were
l~losteeverely pressed. The cavalry covered the retirement with great
skill, but though the enemy showed much boldness, they did not advance
in to ground which reudered charging possible, and took refuge in nulluhs
whenever threatelled. Firing ceased a t 2-30, and the force reached camp
safely. The whole affair was extremely successful, but the loss was not
small. Sir BindonBlood and theHead-quarters Staff watched the operations and reconnoitred the valley. The casualties were as follows :R o ~ a lWest Kent-danyerously wounded, 1; 3lst Punjab lnfantrykilled, 1 ;wounded, 5 ; Guides Infautry-zoounded, 3; Guides Cavalrywuun(ied, 2 ; 39th Dogas-killed, 1 ; wounded, 3 ; total-kzlled,
2 ;
wourided, 1.1. During the day General Meililejohn ancl Staff' arrived,
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ABOUTthe middle of August, while Sir Bindon Blood was moving nut
'

from Chakdara to subjugate the Swat Valley, and while General
Elles on t h e Mohmand border was awaiting permission to follonr up lliw
initial success against the Hadda Mullah's forces a t Shabkadr, there
came news of restlessness among the Orakzai, a tribe found in the hill
country to t h e west of the Eobat district. A mullah had been trying to
induce them t o rise and attack our frontier posts, and had met with
some success, though the tribesmen were urging that they had 110
representative leader to conduct the operations. The Oraklai country
a t that time was watched mainly from Fort Lockhart, our chief outp~ut
on the Samnna Range, a strong defensible position where six con1p;tnies
of the 36th Sikhs were stationed. A couple of days later another report
came in that the restlessness was spreading westwards and that
Parachinar, o u r last post in tlie Kurram Valley, was threatened bp s
large lashkar. As there seemed to be good foundation for both reports
i t was promptly decided to reinforce the Head-quarters garrison at Kohat
(tl~ispost being the support of both Fort Lockhart and Paracllinar)
with the following troops :-The 9th Field Battely frorn Mian hlir, a
wing of t h e Scots Fusiliers from Sialkote, the 18th Bengal Lzncem fru)rn
Rnwalpindi, and the 15th Sikhs from Ferozepore. On inquiry it v:u
ascertained t h a t the mullah who was trying to brew mischief for 11s in
tllis llew direction was one Saiad Akbar, belonging to the Aka Khelu,
a poverty-stricken section of the Afridi tribe.
Further disquieting news was received shortly afterwards regarding the Afridis, who were said to have entered into a war alliance with
the 01-akzai tribe, the compact being that two simultaneous attacks
should be delivered on British territory-one on our Kohat border, by
the Orakzai ; and the other on Jamrud and the mouth of tho Khq-ber
by the Afridi*. The Aka Khel Mullah, Saiad Akbar, &aftersuficiently

inflaming tlie Orakzai, llad passed from their country to Tirah, the
summer hertd-quarters of the Afridis. Apparently this fanatic was
bent on doing in these two tracts of country what the "Mad Fakir "
had done in Swat and what the
Mullah was at that time doing in
tile country of the Molmands.
The Orakzai are numerically a ~owerfultribe, mustering some
25,000 fighting wen, and of no mean martial qualities. They hold the

hills to the north-west of the Kollat district; the Afridi country lying
to the north, while westward the Oralczai borders touch the Zeinlukhts
"and extend to the foot of the Safed Koh Range. I t is to the south that
our own border faces them, and previous expeditions into the M3anzai
Valley had been undertaken in order that the Samana Range might be
held by a chain of pasts, locking the tribe from raiding into British
territory. Since Fort Zockhrzrt and its posts had been held the tribesmen had not ventured on ally hostile den~onstration,but they bad
been sullenly defiant and miglit now, while the whole frontier was in
a ferment, be expected to give trouble if undeterred By the strengthening of the Kohat garrison. But no unanimity seemed probable. Of
the six divisions of the tribe Ule Daulatzai ancl one sub-section of the
Mahomed Khels were receiving allowances for keeping open the Kohat
Pass, and these i t was reasonably conjectured wo~ildin any event remain
on their good behaviour. Moreover, the Oralszsi are split up into two
grcat factions, Samil and Gar, so that R general. combination seemed
difficult of attainment. The mass of tlle tribesmen are Sunis, but there
are some Shiah sub-sections, and sectarian quarrels are not uncommon,
Moreover as the whole tribe are a good deal dependent on the Kollat
district for supplies, and especially for salt, i t mas believed that some
sort of pressure could be brought to Bear upon them ; but i t was nevertheless recognisecl as possible that they might listen to evil counsels
and try conclusious with our troops.
The Afridis hold the country to the south and west of the Khyber,
and their settlements touch the west of the Peshawar district. They
are divided into eight clans, of which six, the Kuki, Malikdin, Earnbar,
Eamar and Zakl;a Khels and the Sipah are known collectively as ithe
Khyber Afridis. The Alra IChels are founcl furtl~erto tlle soiitli, beyond
$lie right banls of the Bara River ; while the Adam Khels hold the hills
between the Peshawar z r ~ dKohat districts and are regarded as a separate
community, their interests not being identical with those of tlie ckns.to
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the north-vest. Tllc wliole tribe covers an area of abolrt 900 nquaro
nliles. I n the summer months tlle majority of tlie Afridis move t o
~ i r a l l a, lligll pkteau inhabited chiefly by the Orahzai. The Rajgul a n d
Maidan Valleys are studded with their mat huts during the hot weather,
and their flocks and herds find good pasturage. The Kuki Khels always
resort to Rajgul, while Maidan is left for the other clans. I n the winter
the whole population swarm down into the Bara and Bazar Valleys, a n d
also into the low hills bordering the Jnmrud plain. Tirah had never been
visited by our troops, and was regarded as the Afridi stronghold. In t h e
Afg11:m W i ~of
r 1878-80 two expeditions were sent into the Bazw Valley,
1)ut i t was not then con~ideredexpedient to enter the Rajgul and Maidan
Valleys, as this woulcl have involved the employment of a t least 10,000
men. Tlic Afridis muster in all some 26,000 or 27,000 fighting men, of
wllorn about 6,000 beIong to the Adam Khels, 4,500 to the Zalcl~aI<hels ;
xrlcl 4,000 each to the Kuki, Maliltdin and Kambar Rhels. The Kulci
Khels under Alnin Rllan were the clan which had sent levies i n t o t h e
JCllyl~cr,and tlieir stnnding feud against the Malilcdin Rhels as well as
their profcssion~iof friendliness towards the Government of India prevented a t least a portion of tliern joining in the contemplated rising.
Tlic Afridis are men of fine physique and grand fighting qualities, b u t
their general cllaracter is of the worst. It is thus described by one
antllority : '' Rutliless, cowarclly, robbery, cold-blooded, treacherous
niurder, nro to an Afridi the salt of life. Brought u p from his earIiest
cllildl~ooclm i d scenes of appalling treachery ancl nierciless revenge,
nothing can change 11in1; as he has lived, a shameless, cruel savage,
uo he dies. And i t mould seem. that notwitlistanding their long
intcrcourse wit11 the Eritish, and that very large numbers are, o r have
h e n , in our ~lervice,and must have learned in some poor way what faith
x~icln~crcyand jnsticc are, yet the Afridi character is no better t h a n
i t Tvns itr tllc d;~yuof his fatl~ers." :Fronl sucll material as tllis, however,
g-oo~lriolilieiw llavc been mide of the men enlisted in certain native
scginlontx, ancl the tr:tined Afridi fights wit11 splendid dlan. Tlle blood
f(rutls aiirl clu;rrrcls bctwe.cn the various clans lead to n ~ u c hinternal
jig11tiug, 1)r~titily colll~~lorl
~nenacc to tlieir country unites them,
Alrcli~dy in tbe prcscnf: in~tnnccthey seemed to have sunk their
cliifi41*cncc~
;~riclto 11:~vc baxlclcd togctller in their hostile preparations
i~g:lillxt &lie Uritixll Uovcmment. Tliey mere posing as something
o r I L Ll i o f ~ n t i c . Tlieir leaders liad intimated t o t h e
:~lltIl()lbiti(:sat, I.~~HIM,w;L~
tlli~t certain 'concessions wcre desired from
tlic Ciuvmnmetit of India. Tllesc wcrc t l ~ ewil;l~drswal of all troops

from the Swat Valley and the Samana Range, the rectification of t h e
salt- tax, and the rendition of all AAidi women living in British
territory. Given these terms their fighting men would return to their
homes.
For some days after the first rumours, Orakzai gatherings continued
t o be reported, but they were apparently waiting for the Afridis t o
move before carrying out their threatened attack on the Samana. Their
attitude had caused some alarm among the friendly Turis of the lower
I(usran1, but reassuring news came presently from Parachinar. The
garrison there was so confident of holding its own that one hundred
men llad been sent to reinforce the smaller post of Sadda held by 25
of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry as a, link with Thall, which lies near the
junction of the Kurram and Miranzai Valleys. The hostile tribesmen
had gone to the length of cutting the telegraph wire, but messages were
being sent through daily by somztrs without hindrance. Apparently
the tribes in the Kurram Valley, like the Orakzai of the Samana,
were waiting in some doubt to see how matters developed in the
Iillyber direction.
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Brigadier-General A . G. Y eatman-Biggs, then Commanding t h e
Presidency District, was ordered up from Calcutta to take command of
the troops at Kohat, and by the 22nd of August he was able to have a
strong brigade ready to move out either to the Samana Range or to
Eurram. No more striking instance of the want of union among the
congeries of tribes on the North-West frontier had ever occnrred than
this vaciIlation of the Afridis and Orakzai. Instead of descending upon
us swiftly and suddenly as the Smatis and the Mohmands had done,
they were by their hesitancy giving us an opportunity to make better
defensive preparations.
On the Peshawar side, owing t o the intelligence that 10,000Afridis
were marching on the Khyber Pass from the Bozai Valley, Captain
SF. 5.H. Barton, Assistant Political Officer a t Lancli Eotal, was withdrnwn from that post, but the garrison remained in occupation. It was
said that the Afridis, after capturing the Ehyber Pass, meant to take
Jamrnd, our post a t the Peshamar end of the pass. Jamrnd was ordinarily held by detachments of native cavalry and infantry from Peshawar, while the Khyber Rifles, who were garrisoning the Kllyber, had
their hesd-quarters there. General Elles, who had not yet moved out
from Peshawar against the Mohmands, now despatched No. 3 (British)
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Mountain Bgttery from Peshawar to Jamrud Fort, together with strollg
detachments of British and native infantry and some cavalry. Mahomed
Aslam Khan, Comnlandant of the Khyber Rifles, also concentrated four
of his companies there. The remainder of the Khyber Rifles were distributed between the fortified sarai a t Landi Kotal, the strong Fort at Ali
Musjid, and the minor posts along the pass. These minor posts, it was
already foreseen, might have to be given up if the Afridia should sweep
down the Khyber, but Landi Kotal and Ali Musjid, if held with determination, could not, it was believed, be captured by any tribal force without artillery. The tactics of the Afridis would no doubt be to close tllo
I W b e r , and then appear in strengtll about the low hills which are
found near the mouth of the pass. They were scarcely likely to venture
far into the Jarnrud plain, where they would lay themselves open to
attack by cavalry, unless their numbers sllould indeed embolden them
to make a demonstration againat Jamrud Fort itself. Their raiding
parties might also be expected to appear to the south, where Forts Bsra
ttnd Maclreson, garrisoned by the Border Militia, guard our frontier
between Janlrud and Kohat.
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I n a very short time General Elles had a coIumn at Jamrud composed of " K " Battery, R. H. A., No. 3 (British) Mountain Battery,
the 4th Dragoon Guards, a wing of the Gordon Higl~landers,seven companies of the 1st Gurkhas, and a wing of the 26th Punjab Infantry.
Bara Fort was held by detachments of native cavalry and infantry. By
way of reserve there was the Shabkadr column, watching the Mol~mand
country, and a big garrison of 5,000 or 6,000 men in the Peshawar
Cantonments.
On the 21st of August the Afridis really began to move, the Slta
Khels, the Malikdin Khels, and the Zakka Khels having collected their
fighting-men and started out from Tirah. Eventually six out of the eight
clans into
the Afridis are divided joined in the hostile dernonstraFive
of
these,
the Malikdin, Kambar, Kamar, Zakl~aRhels, and
tion.
tile Sipah have already been mentioned as forming with the Kuki Klrels
the Rllyber Afrirlis : the sixth were the Aka Khels, south of the Bara,
River, to wllich the Mullah Saiad Akbar belonged. Tlle Kuki Xhels
would not join, and their astute malik, Amin Khan, actually sent some
of llie followers to assist in the defence of Ali Bfusjid and Landi Kotal.
TIlc Adurn Khel~cthe last of the eight Afridi clans, holding the hills
bcl;ween Pesh~warand ~ o l l a tare
, in a sense a distinct community, and
were far-aightcd enaugli t o aee thst any tempornry success wcurea

4

by a h i d mould have t o be dearly paid for in the long run. They are
subsidised to maintain the road through the Kohat Pass and they doA
dined to close the pass when urged t o do so by the mullal~s. Their $'goh
went into Kohat when summoned, and the clan afterwards remained
quiet. Some tribesmen bearing the name of Adaln Khels did as a matter
of fact join the Afridi lashkar, but these were a, sub-section of quite a
different clan inhabiting Tinth. This duplicatioll of trans-frontier names
is of frequent occurrence and is apt to be confusing.
I n order to be un the safe-side, General Elles despatched a flying
column of all three arms to Bar& to watch for any hostile demonstration in that quartel; while the Jamrud column was kept even more
on the alert than usual. The Commander-in-Clzief, seeing the advisability of having a Iargc Force of cavalry in and abont Pesliawar, ordered up tlle 6th Bengal Cavalry from Rawalpindi, and these arrived a t
their destination on August 22nd. This gave General Elles 18 squadrons of cavalry in all, appareutly quite enough to smash up a, tribal
force 10,000 strong if i t should venture from tlie hills.
Information reached Peshawnr about this time which shed a curious
side-liglit upon the tribal r sings on the frontier. It appeared t h a t
both tlle Hadcla Mullah and tJ-e 'L Mad Fakir " wrote to Saiad Alcbar,
Aka Kliel Mullall, urging him to incite the Afridis and Oralrzai to take
up arms against the British. 5, iad Alrbar hesitated at first to respond
to the appeal, but eve~tuallyon the 13th August he managed to assemble
a number of Afridi maliks in Musjid Bagh in Tirah the summer headquarters of the tribe. Here there was a great divcusaion as to t h e
propriety of attacking British territory. The headmen were divided i n
opinion, many of them taking the sensible view that such a n atcaclc
could not be successful and might bring reprisals upon tbe Afridis as
a whole. Saiad ahbar then left for the Orakzai country, a n d here he
succeeded in exciting the tribesmen to such an extent by worlrirlg u p o n
their fanaticism that they agreed to attack the Eohat border if t h e
Afridis woulcl move against the Khyber and Jamrud. The mullall
hurried back to Tirah with this news and i t was sufficient to excite t h e
Aka Khels and Zakka Khels, who gathered their fighting-men at once.
But, as has been seen, the delay in bringing about the tribal combination had given the Government of India ar-iple time i n which to reinforce the garrisons of Pe~hawarand Kohat, and it was now clear t h a t

%hebellicose Afridis and Orakzai would s.110rtly~receivea severe lesson,
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AFTER twelve days of doubt as to the real intentions of the Afridis,
tile question was finally settled on the 23rd August: by a sudden and
overwhelming attack on Ali Musjid and on Fort Maude, the latter a
small fort about three miles from Jamrud' and just within the mouth
of the Kl~yberPass. The tribesmen hacl'apparently advanced from the
Bozai Valley by the Alachi route, which brought them into the pass quite
close to Ali Musjid. This fort washeld by a detzchment of the Ehyber
Rifles and some Kuki Khel levies who, either because they mistakenly
thought they could not possibity pprevent it from falling into the hands
of the enemy, or because they did not care to shoot down their own
countrymen, abandoned it and retired to Jamrud ; and the Afridis a t
once burned the building to the ground. Advancing further along the
pass the raiders came upon Fort Maude, which though small mas strongly
built and well placed on an eminence overlooking the road. I t s little
~
behaved staunchly, but
garrison, some 40 or 50 of the R h y b e ~Rifles,
could not save the situation, for the Ehyber was now swaming with
Afridis, whose line extended 14 miles.
A t three o'clock in the afternoon, the news reached Jamrud that
Fort Maude was being attaclced, and '(K " Battery, with an escort
consisting of the 4th Drag-oon Guards and four companies of British
infantry, was ordered out towards the mouth of the Khyber Pass with
a view to render assistance if tliis should prove practicable. As t l ~ efort,
however, was some distance up the pass itself, this force could not with
safety move far into the hills, where it would have been liable to flank
attacks. The battery eventually opened fire a t 3,200 yards on a number
of tribesmen who were sighted, These retired a t once, but it was not
found possible for the guns to proceed up the pass, and the would-be
relieving force was obliged to return to Jamrud. A t night Fort Maude
was seen to be in flames. The post was one of no great importance in
itself, but there was no telling how far its capture might encourage the
Afridis to press forward.
Though the Afridis took Fort Maude they did not take the garrison.
When " I(" Battery wiath its escort came into action a t 3,200 yards, i t

temporarily scared off the assailing horclc, and the gt~rrison,sccing tlrc
llopelessness of t{lrc.position, took aclvantage of tlre brief but welcomc!
divel.sion t o withdraw in safety, joilliilg thc lmttcry and returning wiLh
it to Jnmrlzcl. During t h a t night Jamrucl itself was sniped, but tllrre
mere no casualties, and nest nnorning all the enemy had ili~rn~pearcd.
There was a reason for the disappenl-nnce. An attack was to be
maclo that day on Landi IIotal, the fortifiecl snrni already mentioned,
further up the Khyber. This attael; b e p n about noonday and the
garrison, as a whole (for there were defections), offered n steady resistance, keeping the eneniy outside cluring thc afternoon ancl evening,
and continuing t o stand to the defe~lceright through the night. Noh
until 10 o'clock the nest morning-ancl then only by means of treachery
on the part of certain Africliu within the stronghold-did the cnemy
get inside. As i n the other instances, the lxlilcling was set on fire, after
which the raiders withclrew and soon afterwards dispersed quietly b u t
exultingly to their homes.
Sonle of the details of the t:tlii11g of Lanai I<nt:~lare interesting.
The garrison of the sarni consistecl of five Native Oficers ancI 370 men
of t h e Kliyber Rifles, including 25 recruits ,zncl ~nunshis, Of tllese 1.20
belonged t o miscellaneous clans ; thus 40 were Shilnlani 3%011msncls,and
a siniilar number were fi-om the Peslin\~-nrVdley, while the rest were
Adam Khela and men from the neighboul.hood of the ICohat Pass. Of the
remaining 250, '10 were Lnwargai Sllinnlaris, within whose limits Lancli
Kotal lies, while 180 were true Afridis, their numbers being pretty
equally divided among the 3fullagol~is, Zakka ancl Malilrdin Ichels.
These 250 rifles formed the bulk of the garrison, and they seen1 to have
behaved steadily enough on the 24th August, firing volleys a t any groups
of tribesmen who tried t a approach the walls of the sarot. On themorning of the 25th w Shinwari jemadar named Jhawas Khan was mounded,
ancl the Shinwari sepoys then concluded they had done sufficient Gghting. They accordingly jumped down from the north wall of the snrni
and bolted away t o their villages. 'If we are to believe the story of some
of t h e Khyber Rifles who afterwards came into Jemrud, the Afridi portion of t h e garrison were so disgusted with these deserters that a volley
was fired upon them as they fled, three or four men being hit. A little
later some Shinwaris and Zalrka Khels among the attaclring force managed
to scale the wall on the north-east face near the Officers' bungalow, but
they were promptly dlaiven bdck. Then c e r t a i ~of~ the Afridis lzlallning

tlie wall began exchanging greetings the reverse of hostile with their
fellow-tribesmen outside, and tlle sequel was that some traitors within
opened the gate and the tribal mob poured in. It is not clear, and it
probably never will be what exact proportioil of the besieged gxve
friendly adnnittance to the besiegers rand what proportion remained loyal
to tlieir salt. But there were uncloubtedly many true-hearted soldiers
among the garrison, as tlie protracted resistance would itself suffice to
prove.
The MuLlagori and Shilmani sepoys escaped over the wall wit11 their
rifles, while tlie Zalcka and Malilrdin Kliel men took refuge under 'tlie
flags of their clans~uenin the nttaclcillg force, and joined in looting the
post. The Adam Kllel sepoys liad joined tlle besieging lashkar at the very
outset. Of the 40 Peshawnris, six were c&rriecloff as prisoners, while the
remainder were allowed to escape after tlieir rifles lrad been seized.
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A Subadar who was killed just before the enemy eflected an
entrance into the sarai, and who conducted the defence, lmd t ~ sons
o
in the attaclcing force, and one son with him in the Khyber Bifles.
The Subadar commanding the Mullagori company, when the enemy
tllrough treacllery effected an enhrance into tlie Fort, collected his
company and fought his way tbrough, losing several men in cloing so.
I I e tlien took his company through the Shilmani country, back to
Jamruii, witliout the loss of a rifle.
When the Landi ICotal sarai had been looted and the quarters for
tlie troops set on fire tlie Afridis began to b1,er-llc up, making for tlieir
homes in the Bazar Valley, and carrying their dead and woullded with
tliem. This was done in spite of the protestations of the mullahs, who
llad organised the raid, and wlio wished to keep the 1 nshlcar together.
There was apparently llot enough fanaticism a t work to induce the
tribesmell to rernaia, and moreover they were runnillg short of supplies.
Tlle most they were equal to was a promise to gather again on September 15th.
Coming now to consider the loss which the Khyber Rifles suffered
t;hrougliout the whole raid upon tlie Khyber, ColoneI Aslam Khan,
their old commandnnt, who was acting as Political Officer in the Khyber,
put i t a t 10 only, killed and ~vouncled. The losses of the Africli tiailesInen T V C ~ Cput a t 3-1 a t Fort &It~uclc,12 a t Ali Musjicl, and 200 a t Laucli
3t<olal.

It may be worth recalling here that in the agreement of 1881
between the Government of India and the Afridis the following
paragraph was subscribed to by the headmen of the tribe : " w e
understand we are exclusively responsible for the future management of the Khyber, and that Government in no way shares in this
responsibility, and this position we accept." Under the same agreement a corps of Thezailchis was raised among the tribes to garriso~lAli
Musjid ancl Landi Kotal, and this during the succeeding sixteen years
had expanded into the corps of the Ehyber Rifles, about 1,000 strong',
the cost of which had been defrayed by the Government of India, the
annual charge being roughly two lakl~s. Yet another lakh yearly had
been paid in tribal allo~vances. As an offset againt this the tolls levied
on caravans had been collected by Government, The Afridis, therefore, in
their raid not only attacked their fellow-clansmen enlisted i n the Rifles,
but broke the agreement which had beec in force since 1881 and had
worked till then without a hitch.
Before leaving the Kliyber i t has to be lllentioned that one of tlie
most serious results of the capture of Landi Eotal was that a n immense
quantity of ammunition fell into the hands of the enemy. When intelligence came in that 10,000 tribesmen were marching on t h e Khyber,
Captain Barton, strong in the belief a t the time that the pass would be
held, sentup fifty thousand rounds to that place, and when h e was
peremptorily recalled by Sir Richard Udny he had of course to leave
this reserve behind him. No effort was made by the authorities at
Pesllawar to secure the ammunition, tliough three days elapsed before
the Africlis entered the pass.

THE RISINQ O F TEE ORhKZriI.

A

example of the extraordinary want of tactical combination anlong the frontier tribes was supplied by the ioilctivity of the
PURTRER

Orakzai while their allies the Afridis were raiding the Khyber. TIle
Orakzai, i t will be remembered, had bound tllemselvzs by a conlpiict
with the Afridis to rise as soon as the latter made a demo~lstration,yet
they waited until tlie Afridis had withdrawn frolu the Khybrr aud
entirely dispersed before themselves comw encing hostilities, thus losing
a great opportunity. Now that the attention of our Pcsllawar and
Kohat troops was no longer anxiously engaged, the Oralczai a t last made
a tardy advance upon our border and on the 26th of August imitated
the Afridis by capturing the Ublan Pass. But their success was
short-lived, for the very next day, as will presently be related, General
Yeatman-Biggs recaptured the pass and completely routed the Oralrzai
Eashkar.

The Ublan Pass, some six miles north-west of Kohat, lies on the
boundary line separating the Bizoti section of the Oralczai from British
territory. I t was obviously a matter of very considerable importance,
looked a t from every point of view, that no disturbance sllould be
allowed to ferment unchecked in the neighbourhood of a pass tvllich
overlooks the high-road of our communications to Uurram and is within
so short a distance of a comparatively small cantonment like Kohat.
Before narrating in detsil the events which occurred during the recapture of this supposed impregnable position by the then small force
under General Yeatman-Biggs, on t h e 27th August, it may be
interesting to glance briefly a t previous operations directed against the
Bizotis. I n March 1868, various offences against life and property committed by this section of the Daulrttzai clan culminated in the occupation
by them of the Ublan Kotal with a threat to attack the towers and
village a t the foot of the pass. Accordingly on the morning of the 11th
March, a small force moved out from Kobat collsisting of two guns of a
light field battery and some 500 men of the 3rd and 6th Punjab Iofantry.
Tlle position was assaulted and the eneluy gradually driven back into a
strong breastwork situated on the summit of a perpendicular crag on
the right of the pass. Three attelnpts were made to storm this position,
all of which failed, rzncl the troops retired at sunset, having suffered the

bcavy loss of 11 killed and 44 mounded, incl~ldillg1 OEcor killcd ;llld
pass was crossed secretly
2 wuuuded. Again i n tile following. yea'
a t night by a force sent out from g o h a t . This movelllent being totally
unexpected no resistance was encouutere$ alld the force moved clawll to
the village of Gora on the other side. Having destroyed this village tile
troops returned a t once over t h e pass, ~loselyfollowed by the enemy,
who had by now taken the alarm and Tvere up in a m s . The losses oil
this occasion were 3 killed and 33 wounded, most of the casualties occurring on the way clown from the sunlmit of the pass, where the troops
were exposed i ~every
t
turn of the pat11 to a galling fire fro111 above.
This short resum& of operations i n t h e neigllbourhood of the U b l a ~ l
may suffice to show that the position is one of great n a t u r ~ ~strength,
1
justifying the Bizatis to a certain e x t e n t in their boast t h a t when properly clefoilded i t was impregnable. L e t US now turn to actual events.
On the 25th August news was b r o u g h t in from Mahomedzai, the fort
wliich is situated near the foot of t h e p:tss, that some sniping l~aclbeen
going on a t night and that the enemy had occupied the sungars wllicli
had been the scene of the defeat of o u r troops 29 years ago. The same
day Major Ee~viclie-Copley,Intelligence Officer, and Captain Walre,
Orderly Officer to General Yeatman-Biggs, rode out from K o l ~ a and
t
reconnoitl*ed the ground. Tlle next nigllt O U ~ 'levy post was rushed by
sollie Bizotis and Utirzan Khels,* and one m:%nwas killed, one llavildsr
and one man wounded, and the remaining levies fled for refuge ho Mallon~edzai. A t dusk on tlle 26t11, Mahomedzai had been rei~lforcedby one
conipally of tlle 2nd Punjab I n f a n t r y under Captain Cooper.
A t 4 A.M. on t l ~ e27th August a force consisting of one scluadron 3rd
Punjab Cavalry, six guns No. 9 Field Battery, two companies Royal Scots
Pusiliers, and tlle 2nd Punjab I n f a i l t r y moved out from Kohat to attack
tile pass. General Yeatman-Biggs arrived on the scene a t daybreul; alld
the guns took up a position near a t a n k on the plaii~a t the foot of tllc
pass, and opened fire a t 2,200 yards. After some very prel;ty sllooting,
Major Weclderburn succeeded in a l m o s t co-mpletely silencing the enen~y's
frontal fire and also that on the crags t o our left, but tlle latter afterwards
broke out again during the advance. Dispositions were t l ~ e nnu~clcfur, tllc
attack, the 2nd Punjab Infantry l e a d i n g and the Royal Scots Fiisilicl'~
lying in reserve, with the squadron of the 3rd Puujub C~ivnlryas escort
to the guns. The troops advanced up the centre of the pass, ;md wliau
about half-way found tllelllselves exposecl to a galling arld ve1.y ;~ccu~.nte
Frolri a previous explatlt~tiorlit will be u~ldertitoodthat this clan ha:; no aonncctio~l
wit11 the U t ~ n a nILhels lying Bctweerl Swat anti Ht~,jo~u..
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f i e , coming chiefly from tlle left flank, where a number of sharpshooters
were concealed amongst some steep crags overloolri~lgthe pass. These
crags were a serious difficulty during the whole progress of the
enpgcment : they are perpenclicular and quite inaccessible, and i t is
in~possibleeither to scale or to outfli~nkthem. Here a number of the
enemy renxtined concealed, keeping up a galling fire, ancl no counter-fire
coulcl dislodge them. About 8 n.nf. the Kotal was gained-Lieutenant
Elsmie, Adjutant of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, milo hacl led his company
most gallantly froni first to last, being the first to arrive at the summit.
a t close clurtrters, but were
The enemy did not wait to try coacl~~sious
seen rapidly retreating in a fairly compact body down the other side of
the pass, where they crossed the Bara River and enbered the village
beyond. Volleys were fired after them, both from the main attack and
also by the men of tlle 2nd Punjab Infantry on the rlght. Meanwhile
the right attack had been having somc sharp work : after fighting their
way from ridge to ridge they gained the crest and swept the enemy before thein, the two conlpanies being well lead by Lieutenant Eales and
Subadap Blluta Ram respectively. Tlie troops had to fight their way up
a rocky and alrnofit precipitous hill with little or no available cover,
ullder a burlling sun and exposecl to a heavy fire. The heat indeed was
terrible, and the European troops suffered a good deal, one man dying of
heat-apoplexy. No water was procurable, and the groruld was too bacl
to allow of mules being brought up. The casualties cluring tlle aclvance
were : 1 sepoy, 2nd Pun jab Infantry, killed, and Subadttr Akhbar Khau
and to aepoys, 2nd Pun jab Infantry, wounded.
The retirement began about 10-30 A.N. and was carried out
in echelon, the main body moving off first down the centre of the pass,
follomred in turn by the Royal Scots Fusiliers and the two companies of
the 2nd Punjab Infalltry who hacl originally advanced on the right.
The enemy promptly followed up, and it was now that most of the
casualties occurred. During a11 this time the snipers concealed anlong
the crags on the left had maintained s galling fire, and thcy now kept
n~ovingdown and liarassing our rear-guarrl. About. half-way down
Captain Baird Smith ancl Lieutenant L. A . North, both of the Royal
Scots Fusiliers, were severely wounded, the former in the ankle, and the
latter in the stomach, the bullet by a fortunate chance running round
under the ribs and coming out without having penetrated very deeply.
Sr~rgcons-C:~ptain
Beyts and B;~miield, A.&I.S., rendered protnpt and
11lYiciont aid t o the wonnclccl ;thc forlncr with the aid of n sepoy carrying

.

n ~--c~iincltltl
Officer for some distance down the hill under a heavy fire

~vl~ea
tlrc ground was too bscl for Loliea to be used. The r e t i r e m e n t
wag well end steadily carried out, but the troops on reaching the foot
of the p s s r e r e alirlost completely exhausted, 16 men of the ~ o y a l
Sct)ts Flisiliers lrxvirl~been kllocked over b y the sun, However t o n g a s
1r:lcl b e ~ usent out from Kohst for these and the wounded, and a f t e r a
t;llr,rt rest tlre reorainder- marched back to cantonments going well and
strong. Tlie total casn:tlties were : 1 private, Royal Scots Fusiliers,
n~lcl1 sepoy, 2nd Punjab Infantry, killed; 2 Officers, Royal Scots Fusilieras,
3 IVsrrt~ntOtficei~s,2nd Ptinjab Infantry, and 8 sepoys wounded, of w l l o m
two afterwi~rile(lied. Several of the enemy were dressed in khaki and
~ p p e ~ r etod be old sepoys, botli from t h e steadiness and accuracy of
t h t ~ i rfire and fro111 the manner in which they a t once distinguished
the C)R.',curs. They were i~~tl.med
chiefly wit11 Sniders.
TThilc the action on the Ublnn Pass was in progress other hostilities
of lew rrlngllitude were occurrit~g to the west, on the Ssmana Range.
the e v e n i ~ ~ofgthe 20th August, pressing news having been
a t Kohat frc.rnl both the Kurram Valley and the Samana posts, a f l y i n g
et,lumn started a t 7 P.I~.fop Hitngu, under the commandof Colonel Richitrdson and consisting of the 18th Bengal Lancers, four guns No. 2 D e r a j a t
Jluuatain Buttery, the 6th Punjnb Infantry and one squadron 3rd
l'unjab C'tkralry. Tlre 26 miles mere covered by 5 A.M. the following
~norniug,and the force encmlped a t Hnngu facing t h e Samana Range.
1Zutrlours of the enrnly's movements and intentions being most conflicting, a a~ecoirrlnissancewas lnade by the cavalry the following d a y to
Nrtrai, about. 7 miles from Eangu, and a t the eastern end of the K h a n l r i
Valley in rear of the Samana; but ~vvitlroutencountering any hostile
force. The following days mere spent in reconnaissance in various directions, but nothing definite could be ascertained regarding the enemy's
position. JTariouu dates were giro11 for intended tribal attacks, Friday
heiap the ~uostlikely day of the week, a s the one nlost favoured by
the PrupI~et.. The mullahs were said to have given out t h a t all Silclls
were to be wipeclout, but special attention was to be paid t o the 5th
~ u u j t t bInfa~rtry,this regiment being apparently singled out for t r i b a l
revenge urvi~igto their occupation of the Samana for a year previously.
Oil the 2211d -4ug11st a convoy of ammunition to replenish Forta
Lnck1i;lrtand~ulistanIt
u s n was sent up to the Samilna from Bangu
under Colonel Jnmeson, tlie escort consisting of tile 5th Punjab
Infimtry and % guns, and being accompanieiJ
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and his flying column. No opposition was met with, alhhough i t wad
ascerbained afterwards that a thousand of the enemy had been watching
the force the whole way, but had tliought i t more prudent not to attack.
For tlie next few days nothing happened of much interest except that
the usual rumours of a n intended attack on the camp were more
frequent than ever.
On the morning of the 27th August a t 7 A.M., the troops at Hangu
were aroused l)y three loud reports coming from the border police posts
of Lakha just above Hangu on the Samana ridge. As this was the prearranged signal of distress, a colunin was a t once ordered out, consisting
of the 16th Silrhs and two guns, under Colonel Abbott. This column left
a t 9 A.M., and comniencecl the ascent up the graded road to Lakha. The
enemy never appeared in large numbers, but contended themselves with
firing from behind every possible bit of cover, and managed to enfilade
tile road so successfully that the infantry were forced to leave it when
about half-way up and make a direct ascent up the lihuil. The ground
was most diacult and steep, bnt the regiment went straight ahead,
sweeping all opposition away and reaching the crest in a marvellously
short time everything considered. The enemy melted away on the
northern slopes of the Samana and also away to the east where they
could find excellent cover. During this advance the 15th Sikhs lost one
follower killed, one follower wounded and one sepoy wounded. Meanwhile a wing of the 5th Punjab Infantry had moved out from
Eaugu under Major F. P. L. White in support, and on reaching the
crest this wing managed most successfully to keep the enemy in check,
while Colonel dbbott with the 15th and his two guns moved further
west to carry out the taslr assigned to him, viz.,to relieve Lakha and bring
away the garrison with their. rifles and ammunition. This movement
was followed up by small parties of the enemy iucessantly : they did not,
however, venture to anything like close quarters, Having relieved the
Lxkha Post, Cvlonel Abbott halted, after firing a few sliells a t the
enemy dispersing down tlle northern slope of the Samana. Then hearing that tlie post of Saifaldara, still further to the west, was also hard
pressed, Colonel Abbott pushed on as rapidly its possible, this movement
being sinlilarly covered by the 5th Punjab Infantry. Whilst all this
was being done, the remainder of the 5th Punjab Infantry under Colonel
Jameson had moved out from Hangu up to the foot of the hills, ready to
cover Colonel Abbott's retirement. It was, however, found ilnpossible
.to signal successfully so as to ascertain Colonel Abbott's intention, and
eventually this w iag, \vhich was accompanied by Colonel Richardson and

Stn$ movcd along the foot of the llills to the Snifi~lldararoad wllere i t
Culonel A b b o t t would eventually descend. G r e a t a l l s i e t y
WikS for some time felt regarding his force, as liesvy firing Was co11tinue'1~ lieard and nothing could be seen of the force. At 7 P.M., llowever, the
remaining wing was much relieved to see some guns about half-way d o w n
tlie Snifaldara road from the Saniana, and this proved t o be Colonel
Abbott's force retiring covered by the first-mentioned w i n g of t h e Bth
Ptlnjitb Infanti-y. The remailling wing now halted, and moved s t r a i g h t
up tlie s p m s covering t h e zig-zag road, for some thousand feet. T h e
ascent was estre~iielydifficult overlluge volcanic jagged rocks w i t h large
cr*evicesintervening, and the men were quite exhausted when t h e y
r~irclirdtlie last position to be held. Jfealiwhile it wilg getting q u i t e
clitrli, :%lidt h e enemy grew bolder, yelling ancl firing a s t h e y c a n l c
alo~lg clo~-ritlle rocky spurs and even venturing 011 t h e road. O n e
sl~li~11
budy of some 50 iu nttenipting a kind of clrarge m e t wit11 a
severe check, six of them falling from a volley fired by t h e 5 t h Punjab
Infit~ltry. The retireriient Iiitcl now to be finitlly made, f o r when the ziga;Lg:.s]lac1 beell 11it~~ccl
t h e road debouched into a small basin behind t h e
lnw hills, and then passecl tllroug1:h the latter in a very narrow defile.
When the 1:~strmuainiug companies reached tllis place, t h e enemy were
still furtllcr eriibolclel~eda i d 2iovered all round, &outing a n d firing c o n tiuuuusly. Still, fortunately, tliey did not charge home as t h e y m i g h t
alld it was perhaps the darkness alone vhich prevented t h e regimenti
1i;~vingn very bail time. As it was; three nien were lost, t w o of w1lorn
11owever turned up during tlie night, the other being c u t up. It was a
great relief t o reacli tlie open countiy beyond. After f o r ~ l i i n gup, t l i e
vhole coluuln movecl off and 1~cacheclthe camp a t IIangu, unuuolested, b y
11 F.M. ; niost of tlie t.roops Iiaving had no foocl and very little water
for 14 hours.
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Tbe following night the troops werc aroused by a t r a m p of f e e t in
the distance and the familiar sliouts of B gllazi rush. T h e men f e l l i n
cliiitc quietly a t their posts, ancl n few scattered shots were fired by t l i e
enemy, but notliing more occurred. Tliat same niglit the Royal I r i s h
:md the 9 t h Field Battery arrived in camp from IColltlt, wliich perllaps
explained why the expected attack mas not made.
There was now a fairly strong force concentrated a t Eangu, ready
to move anywhere a t t h e shortest notice. A t the same time t h e r e were
persistent ruruours t h a t Hangu itself ancl the vicinity would s h o r t l y IJI:
atk~cked,ancl this prevented Colonel Rich,zrdsJsflying ccolurnll from n l o v ing on to the ICurram Valley. A-force was llelcl in rqiltliuess tqmovc O L L ~
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ancl assist Gulistan, but they helio'd that there was no urgency. On the
night of the 29th August, just as the me11 were retiring for the night,
fairly heavy and continuous firing began from the overlooking hills,
aeveilal bullets falling i n ~ n ad b o ~the
~ t camp one grazing a sepoy's puggari
and one falling near the field hospital. The troops fell in, as usual, perfectly cluietly and witl~outthe slightest confusion, and refrained from
returning a single shot, and the enemy a t last left the camp in peace.
Transpolat, field hospitals, and other accessories had now been rapidly
coming up, and the force received a useful addition in the Bombay
Sappers and Miners.
Meanwhile news hacl been received that the border police post at
Shinawari had been attacked and burnt, and that the Orakzai, emboldened by their success, had attaclred and pillaged the adjacent villages of
Icahi and Nariah, looting the Hindu bunniahs. The following morning
the Field Battery and the 18th Bellgal Lancers moved out to Shinawari,
hoping to catch the enemy returning to the hills with their spoil. No
sign however was seen of them, and the little force returned to camp
on the evening of the 30th August much fatigued, having covered 40
miles. This movement was carried out under Colonel Mansel, 3rd
Punjab Cavalry. That same evening i t was noticed that several men
were lurking about on the near hills above the camp, whence the firing
had come, and some few weFe seen to make for a cave, evidently a refuge
whence to safely snipe into camp. Accordingly one of the 12-pounders
was trained on to the cave during daylight, and about 9 P.M. a shrapnel shell was fired into it. As may be easily imagined, no more sniping occurred, and five or six bodies were being buried the following day.

On the 31st August General Yeatruan-Biggs with his Staff rode
into Hangu from Kohat, bringing in news of the arrival of his brigade
safely through the Icohat Pass. When about six miles from Hangu, the
General's baggage was attacked by a, small raiding party of the enemy.
The drirer was wounded, and Major Bemicke-Copley's servant was hit
three times, without however being seriously hurt. The Major's baggage was riddled by bullets. Some of the baggage w.as carried off, but
the escort to a large convoy then arriving, assisted by a small party sent
out from' Hangu, managed to recover everything and drive off the enemy.
The Maharajah of E u c h Behar joined General Yeatman-Biggs a t
Hangu on the 8th September. His Highness had volunteered for
active service on four previous occasions, but this was the first time he
had been allowed to proceed to the front.

THE RELTBF OF THE KURRAN VATATJET FORTS.

THEnight before the arrival of General Yeatrnan-Biggs, t h e 15th
Sikhs, two lmouutain guns, two squadrolls of the 18th Bengal Lancers
and the Bombay Sappers and Miners, the whole under Colonel Abbot%
moved out from Hangu towi~rdsT11.1, serious news having been received
t h a t a general and sirllultatleous attack waa intended on Thal and Sadda
and various other points in the Kuryam Valley. The C O I Uwas
~ ~ ~
followed a t rnidday on the 1st September by the 5th Punjab Infantry,
two other mourl tain guns, and two other squadrons, lathBengal Lancers,
the whole beirlg accolllpanied by Colonel Richardson, who hadnow beell
appointed to the comnland of all the troops composing the Kurranl
relieving force as well as of the troops already in the Kurrarn. This
proved a most tiring ruarch, for the troops had been ou half rations for
some time. The heat was terrific, the sun blazing down on t h e men's
faces. The trailsport column, having been nlade up in a great hurry,
consisted of carts, donkeys, bullocks, ekkas, besides the regulation canlels
and mules. Doaba was safely reached by the second half of the relieving
colunln a t about 11 P.M., but the rear-guard did not arrive until 2 A.M.,
]laving been fired into. Two of the snipers were captured and brought
into Thal, where they were incarcerated. The troops bivouacked a t
Doaba inside a thorn zareba which a little while previously h a d been
occupied by the 1st half of the colunin under Colonel Abbott.
I t was ascertained that Captain Chesney of the 18th Bengal Lancers,
who was with the 1st half of the column, after reconnoitring towards
Shinawari had obtained a guide to show him a good camping ground
a t Doaba. This guide made a deliberate attempt to lead the cavalry
into a n ambush, for when nearing the large nullah which r u n s to the
west of Doaba, i t was seen to contain some 1,500 of the enemy, the
ground moreover being unsuitable for cavalry work, and the enemy being
in great strength. Captain Chesney dismounted some men andfired a t the
ambuscaders, retiring gradually so as to allow the 15th Sikhs to come up.
H e managed thus to kill three or four of the enemy, who disappeared
in all directions on the approach of the 15th Sikhs ancl the battery.
The guns completed their rout with a few well-directed shells, aiid the
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colunln inarclled into Doabn. Tlle second nig1:t they +ere fired into
heavily, good aim being talcen at the mess table mllere the Officers were
dining and where x lnnlp was burning, Colonel Abbotk I l a v i ~ a,i ~very
narrow escape. Some con~pnnieswere sent out, and a few volleys managed to keep the camp free from sniping for the rest of the night. Just
before the arrival of the 2nd half of the column Colonel Abbott had left
for Thal, intending to push on to Sadda in theEurram Valley as soon as
possible.
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The camp of the 2nd half of the column was somewhat confused,
and in the pitch darkiless it was aln~ostimpossible to find one's way about
the zareba, amid the jl~nlbleof transport animals. The troops were completely exhausted aftertheir 23 miles in the heat, and had scarcely energy
left to cook their food. A t 6 A.M.the following morning, Colonel Richardson pushed on with the cavalry in the tracks of Colonel Abbott, to Th;tl,
followed by the 5th Purljab Infantry and two guns under Colonel
Jsmeson. This was again a very trying march, and the troops had
comparatively little 1.est to prepare them for it. A t 1 P.M., however,
Thal was safely reached, and the march of 36 miles completed in 36
hours : no great record in itself but for the fact of the heat and want of
food. The men, however, were rewarded here, for supplies were
plentiful, and they could rest till the following morning. The cavalry
meanwhile hacl hada small engagement. Whilst camping near Thnl, some
of the 18th Bengazl Lancers had gone into the village, and the last of them,
who, by the way, was a Sikh, was shot dead just as he entered. T l ~ e
alarm was cluickly sounded, and the men, who were about to water their
horses, mounted as they were, turned out and pursued some 20 or 30
arn~edmen, who fled across the surrounding fields towards the hills,
firing as they went. Six were killed and 14 taken prisoners, but unfortunately the man who had shot the sowar escaped. His property, however, was confiscated and destroyed, and the occurrence evidently had
a good general effect on the people. Apparently that same night lmd
been fixed upon for a big attack on Thal fort. The troops lined the
rampai3ts all night, but the force was evidently too impossing for the
enemy, and the following day the Kabul Khel Waziris, who were breeding this trouble, had dispersed. The march to Sadda was resumed
in the same order on the 3rd September, Colonel Richardson pushing
on wit11 the cavalry in support of Colonel Abbott, and the remainder
following a few hours later. Everything looked wonderfully peaceful
and fertile all along the Kurram Valley.

Alizai on the morning of
Colonel Abbott's hzlf 6f the colunln
.the 3rd September, and Sadda a t 3-30 P.M. 011 tile 4th, thus corrlplcti~lg
very fine march under exceptionally difficult circumstauces, t h e men
being without tents. The 2nd half of the column halted a t Manduri, 13
miles beyond Thnl, rnarcl1t.d the next day to Alizai, 9 miles, and
reaclled Sadcla on the 5th September a t about 2 p . ~ . , in pelting rain3rd Gurlillas arrived shortly afterwards, wlzereupon the ICnlq~anl
Valley Brigade under Colonel Richardson became con~plete,consisti~lg
of the 16th Bengal Lancers, No. 2 Darajat Mountain Batte1.y (4 guns),
m e conlpaay Bombay Sappera and Miners, the 15th Sikhs, and the 5 t h
Punjab Infantry.
No doubt when Colonel Abbott with the advance troops reaclled
Sadda, after marcliing 49 miles in 40 hours, a little disappointmellt was
felt a t finding all quiet instead of a hardly-pressed garrison sellillg
their lives dearly. Hut as a matter of fact the arrival of the troops was
most opportune and prob,zbly saved the situation in t h e valley. A
gathering of some 3,000 to 4,000 Oralizai was threatening Saddu village
seriously, aiid the militia post a t Balesh Khel still more closely, a n d
their advance-guard of 500 men had actually comlnitted tllerrlselves t o
a n attack, the remainder waiting to see how things would go. So Bard
did the enemy press, that one mullal~was killed at the very door of t h e
.fort. The moment the troops neared the place, however, t h e whole
gatliering melted as if by n~agic,and everything was now perfectly
peaceful again. A t Parachinnr, beyond Sadda, the garrison could no
doubt have held out against immense odds. Sadda, with its garrison of
50 Sikhs, 100 Kurram militia, and 300 or 400 Turis, would also have
been a hard nut to crack. Yet the position mas critical, especially i n
view of the scarcity of ammunition. Worse than all, the slightest advantage gained by the tribes would probably have doubled bheir nunibers, and part of the Lower Kurram might also have risen, while t h e
rest of the valley would have been given over to fire and sword. T h e
political effect of such a reverse would have been serious. All this was
saved by Colonel Abbott's promptness. Opening a telegram, a s i t af terwards transpired, from the Political Officer in the Karram Valley t o
the Commissioner (which was also addressed to the Officer colnmanding
the troops on the road), he saw that troops were urgently required, ancl
instead of waiting for orders determined to advance a t once. Colonel
Richaidson arrived in time to approve of the plan. Meanwhile tile
troops, consisting of two guns No. 2 Derajat Mountain Battery, t h e 15t11

lc n - i o l - r ~ i r l g
of
i

c-,11113leti11g iL

the men
fi%:~nd
ul-i, 13
CJ n ~ i l c s , and
, p e l t i n g rain.
tllc -KI 1 ri-art1
,he, c z o z ~ s i s t i n g
,tc1-S' ( 4 g
, LLLI

~114,

d tile 5 t h

~ O O P R 1-eaclled
. , i r ~ t l x l e 1 1t; was
Lq-iso~l
selli11g
llc troops was
,c vztlley. A
~ ; ~ d Cvliil ,l a~g e
; elc->.scly,
and
t l l c r x l s e l v e s to

go,

50 liar-d

y iIc~c)r*
of t h e
r, t l x e w l l o l e
o w perfectly
i o r l c o u l c f no

ga~~riso
of n
I d also have
a?speciaIly in
d i g l r t e s t ; ad-

1t.l

id f , l l t + i ~1*111111,n, w l ~ i l ct h e
swormii,
The
A l l L l l i s was
n, its tt afkf3r'I1 Valley
to
CCJE~X
ra3a.LI-l:cling
r l t l l t Zr-ecZ, a n d
1
~
- Col one1
'an while t h e
box*&-, .t;lle I 5 t h

SiliIls and llaIf of NO. 4 Company Bnnlbay Sappers, Elad begun tllrir
trying ~usrcllto Sadda. The heat, as alreacly described, was intellse
clity wliileat night heavy rain adcled to tlie discomfort of tile ~ 1 ~ 1 1 .
Owing to sc;rrcity of mule transport only one blanket per rn:Ln could be
taken, and owing to the hoelility of t l ~ e~ i l l i l g e r ~supplies
,
could
scarcely be obtained. Once in tlie Iiurram, ]lowever, tllc friendly Turis
readily brought out supplies.
I t has been said that the arrival of ColoneI Richardson's flying
column altered the situation in the Rurranl V;tlley. Tllnt situation, so
f i ~ ras i t I-lad developed before the appearance of the relieving troops,
111aynow be described a t a little greater length. On tlle 20th of August
it was reported that the Mussazai, blamozai, and Alisherztti, three powern d
LO attack Sadda in
ful sectioils of the Oralrzai, had risen ~ ~ detern~inecl
force. The wire was worlting RS f a r as Tlial, but news was received
thatrtn important telegram, wllicll sllollld llave been taken on fronl
'l'hi~lto Hangu by sowars, I ~ n dbeen brought back to Thal : tllc sowar
carryinr it, instead of fincling a relief a t the first police post, had
found the post quite deserted. The rrlail had brought news of fighting
on the Satuana, ancl i t seemecl as if the distul-bances on tlle Samann
were spreacling to the country between T l ~ a liind EEangu. As a
matter of fact raiders were out in Upper &1iranzai, and even Xurrani villagers were turning against tlle garrisons. Under the circumstances, it seemed as if the Kurram Valley mould be left to look after
itself. The Sikh garrison of Ssdda therefore wiis increased by 25 irilles.
and 200 Kurram militia mere ciespntched under G~ptaill hlaconcl~y,
District Staff o s c e r , to the village of I3uasl~n Ali, 7 miles east
of Sadda. His orders were to endeavour by making a show of
strength to postpone the attack of the tribes as long as possible, arid t o
help the neiglibouriug villages as for as possible, but not to engage any
overwhelming force of the enemy; in the event of the tribes attacking
in force, a retreat was to be made to the Iiurrnitna River, G miles f r o ~ u
Paraclzinar,where troops would be ready to cover the retirement. For t h e
above purpose a movable column was orgauised, consisting- of 20 sabres,
3rd Punjab Cav~rlry,two guns No. 2 Derajat Mountain Battery, 100 riiles
36th Silibs and 309 rifles 1-5th Gurkha Rifles, the whole under the cowmand of Major Vansittart, the Oficer cornmancling the Kurram garrison.
As little transpolat as possible accompanied the column, pl.actically
nothing but reserve anlmunitian ancl one day's cooked rntions were
- re~rrrfed
carried on mules. On tlie. 31st AugusL, Captain- &ll~ajmch~-

that tllere had heen slight, firing during tlie night ill the d i ~ ~ ~ t iofo n
h d a l l l ~;~Mussszni
,
rillage about 3 miles from Sndda ; and 6lla-t although
tlie Manlozai and Aliuher>zai liad gone off to the Samana, they had
left 700 o r 800 Musuazai tlirelttening Saclcla. A later report improved
upon tliis by stating that 2,000 tribesnleri mere collected 5 rniles from
Sadda. Still graver news was received in the eve~iing, when t h e
Political Oficei*received a telegl-am saying that tlie advance of reinforcenleats I~adbeen postponed for tlie present. This, however, was
capped at 10 P.X. by infoi*rnlttion arriving that 3,000 A h i d i s a n d
Omkzai llad now collected a t Badttmit ; that they had brought their
woxllen-folk a n d rations, and that they intended to make a combined
;ittack on Srtclcla on tlle ilight of the 31.~1September. Tlie wire was still
working as far as Thal, and a, message asking for troops was seut off i n
the middle of the night. Almost immediately afterwards the line was
broke11 up in three separate places, and damaged to such an extent t h a t
no ttttempt was made for the tinle being to repair it. On the morning of
the 1st Septenlber the Intelligence Officer heard that the Afridis ancl
Orakzai liad been waiting for con tingents to arrive from the Chamkannis
and Alishel.zni, amo~lgstwhom niullalls had beell sent to stir u p afeeliilg
of fanaticism and hostility against tlie Government. But these two
sections weiwedisinclined to join the tribal gathering, so the Afridis
had voted to attack without them. This they did the same night.
About 2,000 nien marched straight for Sadda, halting in the jungle
about a mile off. The remainder proceeded to attack Balish Khel, a n
isolated nlilitia post, about 3 miles froni Sadda, which was built so as to
enable raiders to be cut ofT, when returning to the hills. The Afridis
apparently did not relish the idea of leaving this small post in their
real; and so determined to take i t first, ancl then, uniting their forces, t o
attack Sadda. Tlie firing began in broad daylight, and increased
as twilight deepened into darkness, when a continuous fusillade was
kept up on every side till midnight. The BaIish Khel Post consists of
a small tower with a courtyard on the south side, in which are the lluts
inhabited by the garrison, which amounted a t the time of a t b c k to 20
men of tlie Kurram militia, under a havildar, No doubt the Afridis
expected to make short work of this mere handful of men. But the fire
kept up from the ramparts was so severe that for a long time none of t h e
attackers dared venture near tlie walls. About midnight ammunition
began to run short; the Afridis crept up to the courtyard gate, ancl began
t o hew it to pieces with axes. This they soon succeeded in doillg, b u t
the fire from the tower still kept them, ah~lostliterally, at arn17s lenglh.
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They tried, hut fnilcrl t o sct the huts on fire. Matters weye getting
sta~*inils
for the little gai~isnn,;tnd they mncle signals of distress by tlu-owing UP bundles of burning grass frolri the top of the tower. Tlie enemy
mere now closillg in; ~ v l i e ~help
i
a t Inst arrived from two directions.
Fifty illell (Mt~lilcI<llels) i t l ~ ~ i ~from
e c l S;tclila, and charged right up to
the fort walls, losing two of their number in doing so. The Africlis
drew off, leaving two bodies in tlie gatevray of the courtyarcL Fifty
Kun+arnmilitia also arrived from Hassan Ali, b u t they were just too late
to get inl;o toucli with the eneniy. Only oi:e of our men in the fort was
woniicled. How many of tlie attaclrers were killed, it is impossible to
say, but the Koran and standard of the ~iiullaliwho led the attack were
fonnd on tlle gsouncl in the morning, and blood staiiis were found here
and there. Tlle darkness of the night, however,. and the good cover
atI'ordecl by nullalis mere a great advantage in favour of the attaclring
l)ar(;y. The Afridi liavildar in cornlnand of Baliuh IKliel had been
called to by name, and asked to surrender ; but lie remained faithful to his sitlt, and repliecl to these overtures b y volleys of Snider
bullets. Both he and his men fouglit as well as men co.uld, and the
pasty of villagers from Ssdcla (only ti0 strong) sho~veilgreat pluck in
goiiig out to lielp tlie post, knowing as they did tllrtt the Afridis were
attacking in force. It was 1~1ckyfor them that they did not stumble in
tlie clarlrness on the 2,000 men who were only waiting for the post to
fall to aclvallce and make an attack on Sadda. The 2nd September
passed away quietly, so far as tlie tribes were concerned, except that some
sowars m7erefired a t close t o Paracliinar, when returning from patrol,
about 11 P.M. B u t a passengey in the mail elcka brought in the pleasantly
t
were on the road between Tllal ancl
astonishing inforniation t l ~ troops
Sadda, and that they would probably reach the latter place by the eveni l ~ gof the 3rd September. No official intimation of any nlove of troops
liacl been received since the telegram came stating t h a t tlie advance
had been postponed; but next morning U r . Hastings and Major
Vansittart, who had proceeded to Si~dda,got a letter saying that troops
would arrive a t Sadda by 6 P.M. The arrival of reinforcements was of
course a still greater surprise to tlie Afridis tlian t o the garrison ; and
instead of attempting a further attack the tribal gathering broke up.
The road into Sadda, on the 3rd and 4th September, presented a
most extraordinary sight. On the 3rd, before the news of tlie advance
of reinforcements had been confirmed by letter, bands upon bands of
friendly Turis, horse and foot, could be s.een making tlieir way from

Trill ,pr T<on.anl to Sacl& and o t,llcr point3 li1iei)- t o he attacked

Lower

I<anlrr~l. Tllr big att:~ck~vasexpected on tlie night of the 3rd
Lei.; all these llletl were going down to help t o beat off t h e common
erlellly; tlley all gladly responclod t o the call of the Political Officer? and
erelayrillage s p n t s contingent, just as they rvould have done in t h e old
di~ys,11ef01.e rvc touk over the safe custody of t h e valley. Many aT1 old
raider's heart lanst hare bent qnieker as he thought of t h e past, when
lit*lli~drirlclen fort11 in jwt the saine 1v.z). on some foray f a r across t h e
I~order. Ercec.llloade~~s
were very scarce, b u t two-tllircls of t h e men had
je:nils, arlcl all of t l ~ e n had
l
the long Pntllnn knife stuclr througT1 their
kr~lnmerhu,tds, ~vllile11ere:tnd there was a revoluer or pistol, the l a t t e r
gthn~rallyof n:ttire ~vorkmansl~ip.To look at their merry faces, one
1vo111~1
l~nvcinlngincd they were off to some wedding or other + a n z ~ ~ ? ) n
:uld not going to fight against odds for hearth and home. The
Turi car:~lry especially took things with evident lightness of heart.
f IPIYand t,hel.e a grass chnpli woulcl be stuck up in t h e middle of the
rontl, and the next xuiilute i t was t o be seen a t the end of a lance
in the sir. The way tliey g,zlloped along the hard high road was
wonclerful to see. Tlle following day they were t.o be seen returning
t u their llonles : the ar~t~ivnl
of reinforcements in the very nick of time
llit~lrllncle tlieir presence no longer necessary in Lower Kurram. The
Turiw, the reader may be reminded, are Shiah Mahomedanr, ; whilst
their tribal neishbours are almost witllout exception Sunnis, hence t h e
division mid inveterate animosity between t h e two.
But llostilitics mere not yet a t an end in t h e Kurram Valley, despite
tlle arrival a t Suddn of Colonel Richardson's flying column ; indeed t h e
very presence of so large a force i n reinTseemed to incite t h e now outflanked Orakzai tribes in the neigllbourhood t o renewed aggression. On
t h e 16th September a t 10-30 P.M., t h e Sadda, camp was attnclred f r o m the
dil'ection of t h e Karmana defile. Tlle advanced picket of t h e 5th P u n j:~b f nfan try was driven in by a sudden rush of the enemy, assistecl by
villagers living three miles east of Sadda,. T h e retirement was admirably covered b y tlle steady company volleys of t h e lit11 Gurlzllns,
under L i e ~ t ~ e n a nKitchen
ts
and Browne, a n d t h e section volleys of the
5 t h P u n j a b Infantry. The portion of the camp attacked was t h e east
face, held ~ a r t l yby the wing of t h e 5th Gurkhas, under Major Vansittart, mllicll had just arrived after a trying march from Parachinar, w i t h
two mountain glxn~,and partly by a wing of t h e 5th Punjal, Infantry.
T h e plan of tlle attack had evidently been carefully thought out, t h e
force held by t h e Gurkhas being kept engaged by several hundred of

i~n~ver
the enemy, whilst tile main attack
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forwerly held by the 5th Purljab Infantry picket, lent itself sdrllirahly to the tzctics subsequently ac'lupted by tlle enenly, who, fincling
the garrison on the alert, abanclolled the idea of rushing t h e camp,
and settled clo.vvlz to a muslretry attack, pouring a steady and fai1'l.y
well directed fire into the ctlnlp for about 32 I~ours,exceptfor Z~reaku
of five minutes. The defence of the east face was vulutibly stre~lgthened
b y a company of the 15th Silrlls, sent up by Colonel Abbott wit11 adniirable foretllought. All the troops actively ellgaged .v.vTel*e
i n positicrn in
tlle shortest possible time, and the first two steady and precise volleys
of the gallant Gurkhas disabused the enemy's mind as to the possibility
of effecting a11 entrarlce in that quartel-, altllough their rrlailitsiilirlg a,
position on broken ground 500 yards from the Gur.lihss, coupled with
tlle ul~certaiulight, which conceslecl their numbers, prevented a, counterattack. Two con~pariiesof the 5th Punjab Infantry under. Lieutenant
A. Q. Ames, and one company of tlle 15th Siklls, the whole under
Colonel Jameson's imulediate command, consequently bore t h e ruain
b r u u t of the enemy's attack. Colonel Richnrclson, comnlalicling t h e
flying column, and his Staff Oficer, Captain Rennecly, were qnickly
on the spot, arranging f o r a reinforceruent, a n d were assisted by
Captain Eardley-Wilmot, and Lieutenallts liickets and Norman, of t h e
18th Bengal Lancers. The discipline of all ranks was excellent, and
although the casualties amongst the horses and transport were heavy,
t h e order that prevailed throughout the attack of tliree hour*s spolre
highly for the arraugenlents of the column and for the q ~ r i e tenergy of
all the British and Native Olficers whell exposed to a fire to wllicll there
was no opportunity of xsponse. The enemy was estirllated at 2,000
sti*ong; their casualties were unknown, b u t fronl a visit t o Badhura
village i t was apparent that lmge numbers were wounded, tlle dead
having already been buried. Our total casualties were : 1 nlau killed,
5 wounded, and 5 followers mounded ; 2 llorses killed and 9 wounded ; 3
mules killed and 2 wouncied ; 2 camels killed and 5 wounded.

A ~ v e e klater the Chamkanni tribe, of about 1,700 fighting men, i n
north Rurram, joined the ranks of the enem.. ;a fact of no great importance except so far a s i t illustrated the unusual extent to which excileanent on the borcler hacl now sprcad, for accorclillg to Bellew's Hares qf
fy,$ani8tan tl.1~
Cllsmltaniiis al-e '' a, quiet, inoi2"eusivc%and industrious
g
of f c t ~ d ~ ~ l
people, and distinguished by the nou-existeilcc ~ ~ m o ntllulu
iigllls and highway robbe~ies."

1

TRIBAL ATTACK ON OUR

sauax;ra

-slinsaIIERI

AND

QULISTAN.

OX September 10tl1, infol.mation rencl,ecl General Y e a t m a n - B i g s o n
t h e Sarliana t h a t rt combined Ol.a,kz:~i alld Afieicli lnshknr h a d b e g ~ r l l
t o 1 ~ v cdown t h e R h a n k i Valley. A reconna,issance confirnled t h e
news, as severill thousnnd ruen were seen nlarching eastwards. I t W;LS
surruisrd that Shnhu Kllel was their first objective, and that tlie l i t r g e
villi~geof I b ~ r t h i ~ ~ zoni t ithe Koll~t-H,ang:.ulwad might a l s o be t l l r e ~ ~ t eneil. Slialiu Kllel is only three ~ n i l e s north of Ibrahimzai, w l i i c h
agitin is five lniles east of H s n g u . General Yeatn1;~n-Biggs a c c o ~ d i n g l y
s e t his colurun in niotion, and rnal*ched along the Sanlazltl, ridge to\ v a ~ d sLaklia and Sllitli u IChel i n orcleib to intercept t h e enemy a n d c o v e l '
1brahi:uzai. The colurun consisted of ,z detucliluent of t h e R o y a l Irish
Reginlent, tlie I s t Bitttnlions of the Bricl ancl 3 r d Gurlrllas and t h e 2n ci
P u n j i ~ bInf;lntry. The enelny, wlio ciime in touch witli t h e realQuf t h e
columu at dusk, nulubered from 3,000 to 4,000, all Sheilrhan, Misllti ancl
IYIalit KIiel clatls of the Ol.alizai, ci~rrying11 stsnclsrds. T h e y a t t a c k e d
t h e rear-gu:~rcl,colisisting of a htlf battalion of t h e 3rd G u r k l ~ a saild
five corllpanies of t h e 2nd Gurkllas, about 4 miles from t l l e b i v o u a c
by Gogrrt Hill. Tlie rear-guitrd kept the enemy i n clieck b y s t e a c l y
volleys, in spite of ruslies nlacle up to 20 yards from the xuuzzles, ~ ~ i l d
escorted id1 the lllule transport in safety. Tlie snrwans l e f t t h e c s m c l s
ancl bolted, with one exception, a u d the camels tlirew off their loads a u c l
w a d e r e d off tile road, several being h i t by bullets. Two compsnies of
t h e 2nd Y unjab Infsutry, unclel* Lie uteliallt Elsmie, a c c o ~ u p a i ~ i eb
c ly
Captain Scudamore, Deputy Assistaut Quartermaster-General, went 0x1 t
and cover'ed the retirement of tlie Gurkhas very smartly, Of t h e enell ly
Y a r -UuI~amed,a leading Cliief of tlie Sheilihan, five lesser chiefs of t l l c
Mala Kllel, and 25 others were killed, and e very Irzrge number of
mvuncled were carried off. Our castlalties were 4
killecl and 9
wouuded. Captain J. G. Robinson, 2nd Gurlilias, was s l i g h t l y wounclucl.
The bodies of our k i l l e ~ wert
l
recove~*edthe next morning b y Col.uiief
Lawrence's column.
Having checked t h e enemy's nclvance, General Yeatman-Biggs w ; ~ s
obliged, owing to t h e want of water, to retul-n to I-Iangu, where I l i s
column halted on t h e 12th ancl13th Septiembcr, rer~clyto move out a g a i r ~
in any direction shoulcl t h e encmy reappear.

As for the Oralrzai, finding they were bltrckcil 011 tile cast of tllc
S a r u a n a they turned tlieir sttentiuli to tlie ~11lilllposts on tIlc rilngc?
i t s e l f , a Inshkn?. moving up from ICh~mppitso its t o place itself betJlrcen
F o r t s Loclrliitrt and Gulistsn.*
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After repeated assaults, the tribesmen succeeded in capturing on
t h e 12th September, under circumstances t h a t will long be 1*e1ilcnibcl.e;l,
t h e small post of Saraghel-i on the
bet\vecrl the tnlo follts. Tllc
~ ~ r i s o which
n,
consisted of only 21 men of the 36th Sil;lls, mxtle ,z
g s ~ l l ~ i idefence,
t
holding out from 9 o'clock in t h e morning till 4-:3(1
i n tlie afteriloon against odds which from the first mere clcarly over~ v h e l m i n g . Two ~let~ernlined
assaults n7ere brilliaa tl y repulsed, but : ~ t
tlle third rush tlie eiielily succeeded i n brcalring down tlie door, a1111
w h e n the plucky Sikhs maliiiiilg the witlls ruslied down fro111 tlleir posts
t o defend t h e doorway tlle slvarrniug tribesmen scaled the I\-alls anrl it11
was over. B u t not a sepoy even then thongllt of sulsrenclel.ing while
l i f e l*emained, and eventually the whole of t h e gnlli~ntdefellclcrs fell
v i c t i m s to their heroism. One stout-hearted soldier in the guartlroonl
lrillecl twenty of the eneniy without h u r t t o himself, and lost liis life
b y refusing to budge when the Afi5dis, un:~ble to get a t hiw, firally set;
t h e room on fire. The signaller, as bmve as the rest, coolly kept up
coillmunication with Foyt Lockhart up till the very last ~uonient. Tile
eiltil-e g a ~ r i s o nin fact beliaved with splendid courage, slid t1lcr.e is
perhaps no more touchirlg i~lslitnceof illflexible clevotiorl to duty tlmn
t l l i s i n t h e whole narrative of frontier fighting. Tlie details of tlle
f i g h t will never be laown, fol- not a soldier crme out t~fS ; ~ r a g h c ~
itlive,
i
b u t if tlie story could be told it would beyoild doubt be one of the
no st tllrilling t h a t Sikh valour 11th~ever ful~iiished. 'l'lle f x t s reltttecl
h e r e calve mainly from tlie eileuly, and may i10t be nbsulutely corrcct,
b u t a t all evelits no more reliable account of the fall uf Sa~agLeriwill
ever be obtaillable.

A fund was subsequently openecl b y the pi once^ with the object of
benefitting the widows and fauilies of tlle 21 fallen Xilclis slid of
erecting some suitul~le monument i n tlle f'unjab to perpetuate tlle
memory of the defence of Saragheri. Cefore the elld of the year over
l%a.20,000 had been subscribed.
,*

'lggs was
"her-e h i s
ti agttin

It has been mentionecl that the signaller a t Saragheri kept u p
c o ~ ~ l n ~ u i ~ i e l wit11
t t i o nF o r t Luckllnrt while the Afridis were storrui~lgtlle
walls. On tlie rcccil~bof the news of the attack, t h e garrison a t E u ~ t

Locklial-t attemptecl a cliversion by sending out 100 rifles, but this
little force wits threatened on its rigllt flank and foroecl to fall back.
The capture of Saragheri and the sluugllter of its brave little gaypison served to clirect attention sonie time later to the systeni under wllicll
small posts are held along the fronlier. '' Son~eof them," wrote the
Pioneer in an indignan t ar ticle, " are certain death- traps in case of attack by large bodies uf tribesnien, and in the interests of those wlio have
t o clefend tlleiu sonietliing should be done to give tlie garrisons some
cllance of holding out until help call reach them. In more than one instance we read of wooden-dooi-s having been forced open: iu there ally
good reason why those doors should n ~ bet so placed as to be out of the
reach of iLny one who has not a scaling ladder 1 Cannot thick sheet-irou
be substituted for wood All along the borderland and in Afghanistan
a r e towers wllicll nlight well be taken as patterns for our very small posts.
Tlle lower portions of these are of rocks and stones; the door is 10 or 15
feet above the ground ; and access to tlie tower is gdined by a lt~dder
which is puslieci up m2ien there is an alarm of an enemy approachiiig.
A t Saragheri, and a t Sadda also, the doors seem to have beell flush wit11
t h e grouiid, and the tribeemen could thus get a t the111 with pickaxes, and,
in the case of Saragberi, force an entrance. Tlie fact seems to be tllrlt our
a~llallerposts are built for occupation by levies, and the men ordinarily
occupying them cau generally arrange to make terms with their assailaiits
'and so escape with their lives. But when war breaks out and there is a'
great rush of hostile bodies across our frontier, some of the posts have t o
be tnken over by regular troops and held a t all costs. They are hastily
provisioned, a scanty supply of water is given to tbe garrison, and only
in t h e matter of abundant ammunition are our sepoys made l~appy.
They cheerfully face the danger illto which tlisy are thus t h ~ u s ta n d
they die fighting t o the last. There nlust be something very wrong ill a
system
thns makes the fate of a small pxrty of soldiers a foregone
conclusion. We are told that i t was essential to hold Saragheri in older
t o ~naiiltaincolvmunicatioll by signalling between Forts Lockhart a n d
Gulistan. I f that were so the little post sllould have been originally
made so strong that it could llold out for a t least three or four days,''
The opinion may also be quoted here of an Officer who inspected
w h a t was left of Snraglieri after it had been re-captured by our troops.*
H e cleclared that the post was situated in a hopeless pli~ceand that an
attacliiiig force coulcl get up czll round, uncler cover, quite close to t h e

*

The re-uityturo of Sarngheri hits yet ta be related.
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walls. To hnvr clrfencled it successfully 'LOO n1t.n at lcxst woulil llnrc
bee11 ~*equired,and tlle door slionld have been I ~ ~ l l c l , - ~ r o oThe
f , 21
~ i l & had no chance of holding their orrn. The discorcry rrrnsalso llladc
that tlie br~stionsof all the forts on the Sanlana lii~vea '' dencl corner,"
so that if s few men can manage to creep up uucliscorered they can tlig
away a t the walls in perfect safety from ride-fire. This mas ~vllat
actually llappened a t Saragheri.

On the 12th of September, a t the time that Sn~aghcrimas attacl<ed,
Fort Gulistau was closely invested by a large Orakzai Inshicar. On the fiL1l
of Saragheri, at ahout 4 P.M., the investment of Gulistan became n regular
ntltack, the enelliy tliere being joined by a co~lsiclerablepart of the force
wlllch liad been at Saraglleri. During the night of the 12tl1-13tl1, the
enemy, who were in great force behind Picket Hill, about 350 ynrds from
pushed their advanced parties close
the western end of the llornmo~*k,
np to the hornwork, especially on the west and north. On tlie ~l~oriiing
of the 13th September, the qituation was decidedly serious ; in ilddition
t o the force attaclring Fort Gulistan all corninunicstion
cut off by
Inshka~*sof the eneny holdillg Saragheri heights, t l ~ eGogra heights and
the Saillaus Suk. The niost adv:tncecl post of the enemy, with several
standards, was witliin 20 yards of tlie south-west corner of the horn work,
under cover of banks improved by xa~rgarserected d u ~ i n gthe clnrk night.
The enemy, elated by their success at Saragheri, were very bold, ancl i t was
Iea1.ecl that they might, RS they had done st Sitr~gheri,breiacli the fort
wnll a t tile dead angle of a bastion. Under these ci~.cumstance~
BEajor
Des T T ~ u x approved of the suggestion of Colour-Hilvildar Kala Singl~,
36th Sikhs, who volunteered to take his section and attempt to drive
the enemy out of their advanced post. The responsibility was very
great : on the one hand, should the sortie be successful, the moral effect
would he very great, both in dispiriting tlie enemy and in raising the
spirits of the garrison; on the other hand failure would mean sometl~ing
very nearly akin to disaster ; and in any case it was certain that the
snlall garrison, origiilally numbering 166 of all mnks, but already much
reduced by casualties, would suffer still greater losses a t a time when
a single man could ill be spared.
Havildar Rala Singll's section numbered only IG men in addition t o
their gallant leader, but they were men indeed. The enemy a t tlle
immediate point to be attacked n u n ~ b e ~ ea dt least 200. Tlie little party,
wit11 bayonets fixed, crept out of the soutll-east gateway and along the
south wall of the hornworlr; then when within 20 yards o r so

OF t 1 1 ~F D P I ~ I P 1lli111~B 1.11~11. They wclae met with such a fire

tllilt tliey caul n o t get 11p to the enemy ; but, tl~ollgll sadly rechccd
t l l ~ ~lincl
j - nt) tllouglit of rctrcnt, b u t lay clown a t a distance of only
s i r IXICCS Rwn tlie enemy's sangnr and returned the fire. A t tliis
junrt1n.e Colaur-H:~vildarSuuder Singh a ~ i d19 men posted in t h e hornn.l,i-k ;rt ttie lienrest poilit t o tlie songat*, \ ~ i t h o u t waitilig for 01-del-s
iltill of their own initi:itive, scl-arnLlecI over tlie wall and joilled ICala,
Si1i:h.s s ~ ~ t i , rnnrl
~ l ; the coilibinecl pnrtjr then clia.~ged the enemy,
killthtl and \\~uunrlccl;L grent numbe~*,drove the remaiudel* out a n d capt11l.t.d tlll-ec ctf tlieir stnncl;tl~cls,which they brought back to t h e f o r t
:~iuitlst~'iliyi~ifi
~ 1 i e ~ fro111
' r s tlleir comrndes. It mas then discovered that
t,\\.o \vc,nntletl llierl 1l:ld lwei1 left beliincl. Three sepoys, two of wlionl
11:111 t i l l ~ e npart in tlie sortie, a t ollce of t h e i own
~ iritiative again g o t over
t l ~ eall :u~ill~muglitthe two n~oundedmen in.
Tlnring t11e s o ~ t i ea hot fire was kept up from every effective riff e in
tllc f,1r.t :uiil llnl-~lworlr,:incZ tlia~llrs partly to this tlie casualties were
ll4d g,rlscntur,tliougll 12 of the first party and four of the second were
~v4,rltltleclnrld sevei:tl afterwards died.
Tlic eifect of tlie sortie was great, the gnrrison xvei-e in tlie highest
s~iirits,mliilst, i t is snid, the tliree sections.of the M;trnuzai represented
Ily tlie three stanclnrds capturecl, returned to their homes, and Fort
I iulistntl saw tlieill no niore."
ILavililar Ii:tln Sing11 \vas so seriously wounded that he clicd shortly
nftcrivrti~cls. Tlie so-cczllecl hornwork i ~Fort
t
Gulistan, is a n enclosure
x l ~ ~ SO
u tyards long by 30 broi~d,linviilg tlie fort on one side and being
stirruunded by a, wall of loose stolles-a meye stln.yar-on t h e qtller
tlirrc sides. Tliis wall littd been tempo~arilyimproved in places by
logs of firewood, and atta bags and kerosine tins filled with earth alld
stones, to give a little head cover t o the defenders.
3Tajor Des Vwux now got through a letter for help t o F o r t
Lock1i:~rton the pretence of asking leave to surrender, the Afridis
having ofrered to spare the lives of British Officers if all the forts mere
given up. By evening the enemy closed all round, and kept up a
Iieavy fire. Tllere were several casualties anlong the Oficers ancl
Inen, who had now been a t their posts for 30 hours continuously. The
enemy kept up t h e fire all night again, but a t 7 P.M. the g a ~ r i s o nsaw a
field battery in t h e hliranzai Valley firing on the enemy, and were rnucll

-

* Till here the story of

the seige of GuIistan is given in the exact words of Colonel
Haughton's official report,
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encouraged. All the next day and right through the nigh t-the third
night of the attack-the fatigued garrison were forced to stand to the
defence, but a t 8 o'clock on the morning of the 15th September they
again heard firing in the distance, indicating the approach of help from
Hangti, and felt cheered, though the enemy now closed in more fiercely
than ever. A t noon the trihleforce then occupying the captured Saragheri post was shelled out by General Yeatman-Biggs'a relieving force and
soon afterwtrds Gulistan itself was rescued and the enemy completely
drivenoff. The strength of the Gulistan garrison was as follows :-Major
C. H. Des Voeux, Commanding. ; Lieutenant H. R. E. Pl*att, Surgeon,
Captain C. B. Pratt, and 165 rifles, 36th Sikhs ; besides Mrs. Des Veux,
four children and two nurses. The Major had conducted the defencq
with untiring couragt: and cheerfulness, and was well backed up by Lieutenant Pratt. The Medical Officer, assisted by Miss McGratll (Mrs. Des
Vceux's nurse) attended and nursed the wounded under continuous heavy
fire; Miss Teresa McGrath's heroism was spoken of by Major Des V e u x
in the witrnlest terms. The total loss was : 2 killed, 8 dangerously wounded, 8 seriously and 24 slightly wounded, of whom M i d not report themselves wounded till the fort was relieved. There is no doubt that this fort,
as well as the small posts of Snngnr and Dhar, would have fallen but for
the timely arrival of the relieving column. The following is an extract
fro111 a private letter, dated 18th September, received in Australia, from
Major Des V ceux, and published in the Queenslander :-'' My men here
fought like tigers, but we lost heavily-44 out of 166, lrilled, wounded,
a n d missing. Things were very serious ' indeed, but m y men pulled me
through. The enemy were all round, within twenty yards, well under
cover and firins! like mad. I ordered a sortie a t 8 A.M. on the 13tl.1, as
the enemy were getting too close, and it was carried out with the most
splendid gallantry, and we ~ a p t u r e dthree staudt~rds. Teresa (Miss
McGrath) surpkssed herself attending to the sick and wounded. Her
name has gone forward for reward and I hope she will get it. She will
certainly get the medal, and probably an order. I have recommended
thirty of my men for the Order of Merit: (The Indian Victoria (-;'ross),
A good many of illy poor wounded are deiLd or dying ; the rest
have been sent to Port Lockhart. I had 10,000 tribesmen all round me
for three days, and we heldout ; they could have taken the fort easily
if they had had the pluck. We lrillecl. and wounded 200 of the enemy."
It afterwards transpired that Mrs. Des Vceux, who gave birtli to a
daughter during the fighting, Bail done noble service pr.eviously in
attending to the wouaded.

. . .

We have now to relate how it came about that Generiil 'YeatmarfBiggs's relieving colarun arrived on the scene a t such an opportune
moment. I t is necessary to go back to the 10th September, when General Yeatman-Biggs, hearing of the advance of the Orakzai and Afridi
Inahkar, had marched his column along the Samana ridge and after s o m e
rear-guard fighting had driven the enemy back up the Khanki ValleyI t will be remembered that the absence of water on the Semana had
compelled tlie General to hurry back wit11 all speed to Hungu, and
it mas while he was making this return marc11 that we left him, in
order to follow tlie further movements of the enemy. Prom this
point the Special Correspondent of the Pioneer a t Hangu may be allowed
to take up the narrative :" At 3-30 P.M. (he wrote) just as we had started on our return t o
Hangu, we received news by helio that the greater part of the lashkar
we had been hunting had doubled on its tracks, and was a t that
~ ~ i o m einvesting
nt
the posts wt: had left the day before ; Saragheri and
Gulistaxi being hard pressed. ,There was not a drop of water to d r i n k
nearer than Hangu, and to fight our way back in the dark witllout i t was,
in view of the condition of men and animals, a physical impossibility.
Very reluctantly the General, not daring to leave Hangu unprotected,
followed the convoy, and we toiled painfully down the path, nirich
harassed by the tribesmen, and a t 6-30 P.M. arrived in camp dead beat.
A11 nest day we rested as well as we could, after receiving the news of
the fall of Saraglieri, which reached us that evening, haunted by the f e a r
that me should be too late to relieve Qulistan, which, be i t remenlbered, contained English women and children. As a diversion, five
sq~iadronsand four field guns were sent offunder Major Middleton,
3rd Bengal Cavalry, to get as near as possible under Gulistxn and do
what they could. As it turned out, this was a good deal, for t h o u g h
their fire at that range could not be very effective, their appearance not
only greatly cheered the beleagured garrison, but misled the e n e m y
by suggesting to then1 that our advance would be made by Doabzt. This
they showed by breaking up the roads and planting aangars against us.
cc At midnight the relieving force started from Bangu, carrying o n l y
great coats, waterproof sheets, blankets and one day's provisions, w i t h
every pakhal we could muster. The whole force was concentrated at
Lakha by 4-30 A.M.,and a t daybreak we advanced t o Gogra Hill. A s w e
anticipated, the enemy, though taken by surprise, soon took possession
of an ideal position on the hill with advanced posts at Tsalai, with 11,
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standards and ZLIJOI~~
4,000 n~en. They ope.ned a Ilbt and fairly accurate
fire on our advance, but the guns which were brought up quickly into
,the front line soon produced an effect, and the 3rd Gurkhas,supported by
the 2nd Gurkhas, stormed the hill. The enemy's retreat was pounded by
the guns and l~n,a-~ang.e
fire of the Royal Irish, and Colonel naughton
on the west, hurrying down from Lockhart Fort with all of t l ~ e36th
Sikhs and signallers and sick of the Itoyal Irish that could be spared,
materially quickened their pace.
iL Our force rapidly pushed on for Fort Lockhart, passing on its way
the little post of Ssngar, besieged for the last 24 hours ; its garrison
of 41 men of the 36th Sikhs, were drawn up, as we passed, proudly
displaying a standard they had captured in a smart little sortie the night
before. On we pushed to Fort Lockhart, and the General, mounting
the Fort tower, could see Saragheri Hill onwhich the captured post stood,
covered"withmasses of the enemy. A t last we believed in the oft-reported
'thousands' of the lashka~., for there must have been a t the lowest
computation 8,000 tribesmen in battle array. Still there was no nems of
Fort Gulistan, so the General ordering up the guns, soon had the hill
so swept by shrapnel that on the advance of the infantry not a soul was
found. It was a thousand pities, for hadwe but known it, Gulistan was
safe for some hours yet, and had we but had the tinle we might have
inflicted heavy loss on an enemy whose line of retreat would have been
open to oiir fire. However, so far as we knew, no time was to be lost, so
limbering up we pushed on another two miles, and there, on the opposite hill, stood Gulistan Port still bravelyholding out. The slopes above
and beyond were literally packed with swarms of the enemy,now warned
.by the sound of our guns that the time for their departure was a t hand.
A t the sight of our skirmishers on the skyline every manof thebeleaguered garrison who could stand, wounded or whole, sprang to the parapets
and opened a heavy fire on the now wavering foe. Our guns hurried
up and, unlimbering, poured in their shrapnel, while the infantry, racing
down the steep hillside, did their best with long-range volleys to persuade some at least of the tribesmen to stay behind. The guns under
Captain Parker made beautiful practice, even at extreme ranges, across
the wide valley, searching out and dispersing every group we could 8ee
and putting shell after shell into a village where the tribesmen had
imagined themselves a t least secure.

" Saragheri was a piteous sight; the fort, which only two days before
we had deemed impregnable unless reduced by want of ammunition,

.,ate* o r food, was nlnlost let-elled to tlie glvou11d,while the bodies of its
galant gt;ll.dsonlily stril2ped and horribly mutilated amid the ruins of
tile post they had so bravely held. Tlie whole attacl: had been clearly
visible to the garrisons a t Gulistan and Lockhart, who were however
powerless t o render effective aid. After the second assault on Saragberi
tn-o of the enemy hzd been left behind in a dead angle of the
Flanking Tower. These, working with some instrument, l x ~ dspeedily
removed a atone and then mass after mass of masonry fell. Soon a practicable breach was made, and in leas time than i t takes to write all
was over. Eundreds swarmed in through the breach and over t h e
tv~lls. The little garrison, 21 rifles only in all, before tlie fight began,
retreated to their sleeping quxrters and fought i t out grimly t o the
bitter end.* Tales have come from the very enemy, how one man in t h e
gu;trd-room slew 20 before they burnt him inside, and how one wounded
man on his chnrpoy shot down four before they could gain admittance.
Their comrades looked on silently as me drew out corpse after corpse,
hut tl~er-ewill be, I ween, a bitter day of retribution t o come. Sil:hs
Gur'kll;~~
have now seen their mutilated dead.
''Homeve~; Fort Gulistan was safe, and with lightened hearts, s o m e
of ns pushed on. By 2 P.M., we were within its walls. Blackened w i t h
gunpowder, worn out wit11 36 hours of continuous toil and stress, m a n y
bandaged and blood-stained, the garrison still presented a brave front.
Drawn up a t the gate were the survivors of the sortie with t h e tliree
standards they had captut.ecl. Out of the original garrison of I65
rifles two had been killed, 8 dangerously and some, I fear, mortally
wounded ; 8 aeverely and 24 slightly wounded. Of these latter, 9 did
not report themselves mounded till relief had come. Major Des VEUX,
who had his anxieties doubly intensified by the presence of his family,
had been the life and soul of the defence, guarding against every d a n g e r
and showing a fine example of cheerfulness and steadfastness to all.
Lieutenant Pratt, an Officer of a year's standing had ably seconded
him, though suffering from dysentery : Surgeon-Captain Yratt bad
untiringly tended t h e wounded under heavy fire, helped by M i s s
Teresa McGrath, Mrs. Des Vceux's maid, who amid the flying bullets
could be seen here bathing a wounded sepoy's head and there tying up
another's arm till the doctor could come. Lasb, but not least, every
sepoy of this gallant band did his duty, and st times almost more t h a n
his duty, in a way wortlly of the proud name of Sikh. The state of
* This account, it will be noticed, differs slightly in detail from what may be called
the enemy's version of

the affair, already given.
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be better iinsgined tlinil described. Bearing in mind the
number of dead ancl wounded in tliitt small space and the impossibility
of any but the most primitive conservancy arrangements, it is due only
to the wonderful purity of this mountain air that the place was in
any way endurable.)'
Leaving the fort with two mountain gulls and the 2nd Punjab
Infantry to guard it, the main colunln returned to Fort Loclthart and
there bivonncked, having marched since miclnight 24 miles without
food and conie into action three times. From " friendly " Rabia Rhels
it mas afterwards ascertained that the losses of the enemy, all told,
during these several operations, exceeded 400, incllxding some 180 killed
in the taking of Saragheri. The next day General Seatman-Biggs
visited Qulistan and issued a stirring Force Order extolling the heroic
defence of these two posts and promising to forward the names of the
most distinguished for valonr. Major Des Vceux presented to him his
Offlcers and, last bnt not least, Miss McGrath, and he then visited the
wounded, marly of whom wore gliastly signs of what they had gone
through, and gLve orders for the remedying of the most obvious
defects of the post.
For the time being hostilities had ceased, but there was every prospect
of this kincl of desriltory fighting being resumed. The difficulty which
General Yeatman-Biggs hncl to face was one not easily overcome. Each
time his troops advanced on to the Samana Rsnge the ti7ibesnlen a t once
drew off in to the Klianki Valley, and then began nlarching eastwards
so as to threaten our border north-east of Hangu. But i t was impossible for any large body of troops to ren~ainon the range for more than
two days a t a time, as the water-supply was limited and the springs only
yielded a certain quantity. This quantity was ample for t h e normal
garrison of six conipanies of infantry, but not for a wlrole brigade with
followers and transport anilllals. Hence the marching and countermarching that h t d to be done. I f the Omkzkzai had only advanced well
beyond the $amsna there would have been some chance of punishing
them severely, b u t large as their numbers were they were not bold
enough to do this. The operations therefore became a game of hide
and seel<, wit11 the 2dvantw.e on the side of the Orakzai that they c011ld
move rapidly from point to point, a s they Vera not incommoded b y
any transport train and each man carried his own supplies. Our forts
were strong enough to resist auy ordinary attack, but they could not
be left to be beleaguered for dsys togetl~er.

,

After tlie fighting nf the 15th September, cuInlinatingin the relief df
Gulishn, the tribal g:ttIlerings on the &m;~nadisappeared, a n d the A f r i d i
loshkar, separating itself from its Orakzai allies, returned dispirited to
Tirnh. The Oritkzsi villages in the nei.ghbonrhood of the Samana forts
were completely abandoned, the enemy betaking themselvea wit11 a l l t h e i r
cattle into temporary secuility up the Khanki Valley. A reconnaissance
aIong this valley as far as Khornppct showed that all was quiet, a n d
advantage was taken by Genellal Yeatman-Uiggs of the suspension
of hostilities to improve the very defective water-supply of the S a r n a n a
by digging fresh titnks, and to repair the roads and the telegraph lines.
On the 18th of Septelilber a representative jirgah of tlie Aka Khels came
i n professing their loyalty and pleading that they were; in fear of the
more powerful clans of the Afridis. They received orders r e g a r d i n g
t h e making of a road through their country, a n d departed promising
compliance.
Several plans for assuming the offensive against the Orakzai were n o w
considere'3, but the time was not deemed ripe for any general a d v a n c e
into the Khanki Valley. The plan most favoured was to move f o u r
reginlents with nlountain guns down to Khorbappa, where water was
plentiful, and take up a strong position within a mile or so of the
Xhanki River. This movement, i t was thought, would cover the f r o n t of
tlle Samana, and would a t the same time permit of the Sappers and
nvorki~igparties improving the two routes from Shinawari, which a n y
punitive force advancing into the Afridi country later on ~ ~ o u lhave
d
t o follow. The Orakzai would then hesitate to move down the Ehanki
Valley, as their rear would be threatened. In order, however, t o
guard against possible raids east of the Samana, more troops were sent
to Kohat, no as to permit of a flying column operating i n the neighbourhood of Ibrahimzai and Hango: the Northamptonshire Regiment
the 2nd Battalion 2nd Gurkhas were railed from Rawalpindi to Kuahalgarh, whence they marched to Kohat.
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C'HAPTER V.T.
TIIE TIRAH PUNITIVE EXPEDITION.

EARLY
i n September the Government of India announced their determination t o institute punitive ope~stionson a n extensive scale against;
both t h e Afridis and the Oralrzai : t h e can~paignto be under the supreme
control of Lieutenant-General Sir William Locltl~ai~t,Commanding
t h e Forces in the Punjab and Comnlander-in-Chief-Elect of the Army
in India. Sir Mrilliam Lockhart was then a t Home, but he left Brindisi
.on the 3 r d Septen~bera t almost a dayJs notice, accompanied by MajorGenerd Lord Methuen, who desired to have au opportunity of seeing
how a big frontier expeditio~iis carried out.
W e publish a t t h e end of this volunle full details of the composition a n d staff of the Tiratl Field Force, as f i n ~ ~ l selected
ly
after several
necessary revisions. A s will be seen, i t was a magnificent force, and
indeed was quite correctly described as " the flower of our A r n ~ j rin
India." It comprised, firstly and most importantly, two divisions, each
consisting of two brigades and divisional troops, the whole forming
what was officially styled the "Main Column.:' This colu~nnwas
,to be under Sir William Lockhart's personal direction, being ctlarged
with the foremost task of advancing over t h e Samana into the heart of
t h e Orakzai and Afridi coul~tryand sweeping away all opposition en route.
The column a s a whole was composed of eight reginlents of British Infantry a u d twelve regiments of Native lufarltry, with six Mountain Batteries, one regiment of Native Cavalry and five companies of Sappers.
Three subsidiary colurnns were also formed, oue to move from Peshawar
inLo the Bsra Valley, another to stand reitdy for action in the Kurram
Valley, a n d t h e third a reserve brigade n~acleup of four regiments of
infantry a n d t h e Jodhpur Lancers placed a t Rawalpindi. The following
corps constitued the several columas of the Tirah Field Force :MAIN COLUMN.

First Division. - Commanding : Brigadier-General W. P. ~ ~ r n o n s , '
C.B., (Commanding one of t h e Tochi Valley Brigades), with tihe local rank
of Maj or-General._
. .

1st Brig.zde.-Comnlanding :* Brigadier-General R. C. Hart, V.C.,
C.B., (Conmanding Belgaum District). Troops: 2nd Derbyshire
Regiment, 1st Devonslzire Reginlent, 2nd Battalion 1st Gurkhas, 30th
Punjals Iuft~ntry.
2nd Brigade.-Cornrnatlding : Brigadier-General A. Gnselee, .C.B.,
(Comnianding Cawnpore Station). Troop : 2nd Yurksliire Ragimenc,
1st Royal West Surrey Regiment, 2nd Battalion 4th Gurltllt~s,3rd Sikhs.

Divisional Troops.-No. 1 (British), No. 2 (Del-ajat), No. 1 (Icohat)
M o u i l t ~ i nBatteries, two scluadrons 18th Bengal Lnrlcers, 28 tli Bombay
Pioneers, Nos. 3 and 4 Conlpanies Bombay Sappers, Nrtbl~aItilperial Service Infantry, Mrzler liotla Imperial Service Sappers.
271d Bi11ision.-Comulandi~~g : Major-Generi~lA. G. Yesttnan-Bigs,
C.B., (then Co1nnl:tnding tlie troops already on the Sami~nn).

3rd Brigade.-Con~mandi~~g: Colonel F. J. Icenlps ter, D.S.O.,
(Assistant Adjutant-General, Maclras Conl&and) with tlie telrlpornry
sank of Brigadier-General. Troops : 1st Gordon Higlllanders, 1st "Uorsetshire Regiment, 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas, 15th Siltl~u.
4th Brigade.-Commanding :Brigadier-General R. Westmacott, C.B.,
D.S.O., (Commanding Nagpur District). Troops : 2nd ICing's Own
Scottish Borderers, 1st Northsmptonsllire Regiment, 1st Battalion 3rd
Gurlzhas, 36 th Sikhs.
Divisional Troops.-Nos. 8 and 9 (British) and No. 5 (Borubay)
Mountain Batteries, Machine -gun, 16t h Lancers, two scluadrons 18th
Bengal Lancers, 21st Madras Pioneers, No. 4 Cornpany Madras Sappers,
J h i n d Imperial Service Infantry, Sirmur Imperial Service Sitppers.
Line of Comnzunicasion.-Commanding : Lieutenant-Genestbl Sir A.
'Power Palmer, KC
. Y B., (Oomruanding Punjab Frontier. Force). Troops :
No. 1 (Rashmir') Mountain Battery, 22ad P u n j ab Infantry, 2nd Bsttalion
2nd G u r k t l ; ~39th
~ , Garliwal Rifles, 2nd Punjab Infantry, 3rd Bengal
Cavalry, No. 1 Compa~ly(Bengal) Sappers.
PESHAWAR COLUMN.

Comnlandillg : Brigadier-General A. G. Hamnlond, C , B , I>.S.O.,
(Commrtudiug Rawalpindi Station). Troops : 2nd lioyal I~l~li~ltillillg
--* The comrna~~d
of this brigade was origianlly g i v e ~to~ O o l o ~ ~far~
e l Efalnilton, V,C.,
from his horse betore the iightrng had begurl and his iojurics placed hFm hors dc conbat.

i ) . ~ . ~ . , . ~Qqilrlerinyter-9euer.l
r~ut~
in India, bub h o l?c~cltho alinlorttrau t o be llkro\n~

Fusiliers, 2nd Oxfordslzire Light Infantry, 9th Gnrkhas, 34th Pioneers,
45th Sikhs, 57th Field Battery, R.A., No. 3 British Mountain B a t t e r y ,
9th Bengal Lancers, No. 5 Company Bengal Sappers.
KURRXM MOVABLE COLUMN.

Commanding :Colonel W. Hill (Assistant Adjutant-General for Musketry). Troops : 12th Bengal Infantry, Kapurthala Imperial Service
Infantry, four guns 3rd Field Battery, R.A., GthBengal, Cavalry, one
Regiment Central India Horse.
*

RBWALPINDX RESERVE BRIGADE.
I

Commanding: Colonel C. R. Macgregor, D.S.O., (Commanding 42ud
Gurkhas and oftieiating in command of Fyzabad Station), with temporary rank of Brigadier-General. Troops : 2nd King's Own Yorkshire
Light Infantry, 1st Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, 27th Bombay
Light Infantry, 2nd Regiment Hyderabad Contingent, Jodhpur Imperial
Service Lancers.
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The approximate strength of the Field Force, including tihe Reserve
Brigade, was as follows : British Officers, 1,010; Native Officers, 491 ;hospital assistants, 197 ;British troops, 10,182: native troops, 22,123 ;grand
total, 34,203. Excludiilg the Reserve Brigade the totn.1 was just under
31,040, with 18,250 followers, 966 ordnance mules, 13,000 pack mules
and 2,200 camels. The strength of the 1st Division was about 9,460 ;
2nd Division, 9,268 ; Line of Communication troops, 5,000; Peshawar
Column, 4,500; Kurmm Movable Column, 2,600 ; Rawalpindi Reserve
Brigade, 3,200. The British infantry regiments were shown as h a v i n g
each 29 Officers and 103 rank and file : tlie native infantry regiments
each 9 British Officers and 16 Native Officers and 721 rank and file.
Major-General Sir Bindon Blood and Brigadier-Generals Jeffreys
and Meilrlejohn were to have been given commands, the former of a
Division and the two latter of Brigades, in the Tirah Field Force, but
this arrangement mas prevented owing to the necessity of retainiug a,
full Division at and beyond the Malakand to watch Nrtmagai and Bajour,
the Mamunds being th,en still in arms.

A question arose at t l ~ i juncture
s
whether i t would be quite wise to
strain the loyalty of the Afridi sepoys in the Indian Army by employing
.them against their kinsfolk in the forthcoming Tiral.1 Expedition ; and

w11ile the point \Ifas still being pubIicly discussed, a G o v e r n m e n t Order
was issued on the 7th of October, whicli set tlle question a t rest. T h e
order read as follows:" T l ~ eGovernment of India lived at peace with the Afridi t A b e , and
made an aggreeme~ltwitli them under wilicli British forts in the K h y b e r
were entrusted to their care. Allowances were paid t o the t r i b e , and
arrns issued, so that they might be strong in the allialice of f r i e n d s h i p
with the Government of India and liave the means of forcing t u r b u l e n t
Ixrsons to keep the peace. Without ally provocatioli tlie A f r i d i v , i n
conj~uictionwibli other tribes, have broken their slliallee wit11 t h e B r i t i s h
(Povernlnent, and lmve attacked and clestroyed forts which their tribe
had engaged to gw~rd. Furtlier, they have waged war a g a i n s t o u r
garrisons on the Sanlana and elsewhere, killing some of the s o l d i e r s in
the Britiali service and causing great loss of property. The B r i t i s h
Ciovernment, collficlent in its power, cannot sit down quietly u n d e r such
defiance and outrages, and lias been forced by the wanton acts of t h e
Afridiu the~nselvesto inflict punislilneilt on them in their o w n c ~ u n t r y ,
and to send a force into Tirah to exact reparation for what has l a t e l y taken
place. The Africli soldiers in the service of the Governnlent h a v e g i v e n
proofs of their loyalty, devotion and courage on nlaiiy a hard-fought field,
and tlie value of their services has been fully appreciated by the Government of India. After a most careful consideration cf t h e circurnstar~ces
connected with the Tiri%hExpedition, t l ~ eGovernment have d e c i d e d to
sIiow consideration to tliose Afridi soldiers who wish to be l o y a l t o t h e i r
engnge~nents,arid to excuse them from gervice i n the campaign which t h e
Governrrlent has been forced to wage against their fellow tribesmen.
On tllese grounds ztlone i t lias been determil~eclthat Afridi s o l d i e r s who
are serving in regiments detailed for service on the Pesbawar-Kohat
border, are not to be employed near the Tirlth frou tier a t tlle present
time, but their services will be utilised elsewhere. Tbe n e c e s a a q orders
to tliis efl'ect will a t once issue. As far as possible care will be taken
that 110 property belonging to the Afridi soldiers in the s e r v i c e of t h e
Government who have not talren part in the raids on British territo1.y is
either confiscated or destroyed during the time our troops a r e engaged
i n Orakzai or Afridi territory."
Tlie Afridi soldiers in the ranks of the native army had done s u c h
.splendid service that every effort was made t o spare t l t e n ~ally reproach
in con~ruu~licating
tlia foregoing Order to ~egirnenlscornposed i n whole or
part of Pathaus. At the Ysme t h e the Itct that desertions had occurred,
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not only on t,he Kohnt-Prsllsivar bordcr but furtrlicr afield, sllnmeii t.liat;
t h e action of the Govenlment ivas quite justified. As to the ~ i u r u b e ~
of trans-frontier tribesmen enlisted in infantry bnttaliuns it ~iiay be.
interesting to state here that these nunlbered about 4,000 in all, of
wllonl 1,907 were Afridis, 309 Orakzai, 283 Bunerwals, and 234 Gllilzsi ;
while Bajouris, Duranis, Swatis, Shinmal-is, Hazards, and Mohmands
mustered less tllsn 200 each ; and Waziris, Utmttn Khels, alicl other clans
contributed between them only a total of 226.
Sir Richard Uclny received orders to accompany the Tirah Field
Force as Civil Political Officer, but to General Sir TVilliani Lockhart was
comnlitted the supreme political as well as military control of the expedition. Colonel R. Waburton, C.S.P., who hacl recently retired frmn the
political charge of the Ehyher, and whose Itnowledge of the Afridis and
their country is probably unrivalled, wns also askecl b y the Government
to return temporarily t o the scene of his former labours, and to accolrlpany
tile expedition. Mr. Lorimer, Mr. King, Mr. Donald and Mr. Blakeway,
were appointed Assistant Political Officers v i t h the force.
T l ~ e r ewas a good deal of survey work to he done during the
operations in Afridi land, for no European llad been in the country since
Captain L. H. E. Ti~clter,in 1872, made a hurried trip /)idthe Bara Vi~llcy
to the eastern portioll of the plateau. Colonel Sir T. H II~)ldich,li.E.,
was given charge of the survey parties, tlle Departn~entalOfficers with
'him being Major Bythell and Captain C!. L. Robertson. Sir Pertal,
Singh was permitted to join General Lockhart's Staff as Aide-decamp.
Sir William Loelchart arrived a t Simla on t h e 20th September, arid
after visiting Rawalpiladi ancl Murree, reached Kohst on the 5th Octobel;
accompanied by his Chief of Staff, Brigadier-General W. G. Nicholson,
C.B., and Lord Methueu. H e had t h e great advantage of being abIe to
bring to bear on t h e task before him not only exceptional ability but
exceptional kilowledge ; for the 35iranzai Canpaigns of 1891 and 1592
had made the Sanvana Range and the Khanki Valley familiar ground l;o
him. I t was quite expected that the Afridis would give our troops plenty
of fighting, particularly as a mischievous notice in Urdu had been
circulated among them by their m u l l a h stating that a war of extermination was to be waged against them. To counter'act as far as possible the
Gffects of tlgg fdse aunou~lce.mentarid t o present tlle T i r a l ~E x p e d i t i u ~

in its true light in the eyes of the whole of the north-west border,
Sir William Lockhart issued tile followillg proclamation to the Afridis
and Orlakzai preparatory to advancing against them:-

,
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i
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'' In the year 1881 the A fridis of the Khyber Pass entered into treaty
engagements with the British Government, undertaking, in cansideration of certain allowances, to maintain order throughout the Pass, t o dea!
with offences on the road, to furnish levies for the above purposes, and
t o abstain from conlnlitting outrages in British territory. U p t o the
month of August 1897, these engagements have been, on the whole,
faithfully observed, But during that and the succeeding month t h e
Afridis have broken their engagements, attacked, ~ l u n d e r e d and
burnt the posts in the Khyber Pass, which were garrisoned by the levies
furnished for the pl~rposeby the Afridis themselves, and have joined
the Orakzni in an attack on British posts and villages on the Kohat
border. For these offences all tribal and service allowances hitherto
granted by the British Government to the Afridis and Orakzai a r e declared to be forfeit, and entirely a t the disposal of the British Government to withhold or to renew, wholly or in part, as they may think fit.
The British Government has also determined to despatch a force under
my comnland to march through the country of the Orakzai and thg
Afridis, and to announce from the heart of their country the final terms
of the British Government. This advance is made to mark the fact that
these tribes took part in the attacks above mentioned, and t h a t the
British Government have power t o advance if and when they choose.
The Government have neither the intention nor the wish to inflict
unnecessary damage on the tribes, provided they immediately make submission and reparation. The terms and conclitions on which such
submission will be accepted will he announced to the jirgahs of the tribes
when I have arrived in Tirah, and I am authorised to enforce the fulfilment of these terms and conditions, and of any further terms and con-.
ditions which opposition by any tribe, or section or illdividuals thereof,
may render i t necessary to impose. It is therefore notified that all who
wish to live in peace with the Sirkar and desire to possess their own
'country and to see it no more in the power of and occupied by the &!irkar,
should assist to the utmost of their abilities in the work of enforcing
compliance with my orders and with the said terms and conditions, by
which means they will save the tribes from the further punishment which
any opposition to the advance of the British troops will infallibly bring
upon them, and the tribal country from further ,~ccupntion~~
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Some time afterwards the Musuazai clan in tlle R~zrranlValley sent
back to Fort Locltllart the copy of the Qovelmment proclanlation wllich
had bee11 sent to thenl, and on the back of i t they had scribbled tEleir
views. They had four grievances : one was that the British Government
had occupied tlie Khyber ; another that the salt tax was too high (their
desire being to buy four maunds for a rupee) ; the third was a protest
against the occupation of the Sumana Range ; the fourth also related t~
this subject, their colllplaint apparently being that our forts prevented
free passage over the range. Tlze Kham Khel Chamkannis replied
t o Sir William Lockhart's proclamation, saying that they had no option
b u t to fight, as they were under the orders of the Ealrir of Swat and the
Hadda and Aka Kliel Mullahs. The proclamation also drew forth a
reply from another clan of the Orakzai, the Daulatzai, near Kohat.
They ulleged they had s e ~ ~ i o grievances
us
against the Government in the
matter of the salt tax, while they complairled that unfaithful wives who
leave their huslsz~ndsand take refuge in British territory, were no longer
surrendered, as was the case formerly.
Before proceeding to describe the advance of the Tirah Field Force
i t is necessary t o make a digression in order to explain a t some length
the attitude of the Amir of Afghanistan towards the frontier risings
and the relations which came into evidence between His Highness and
the fanatical tribes tlien in arms against us.

C H A PT23IZ Jf1L
THE ATTITUDE O F THE AMIR.

WHEN,on enq~liriesbeing made regarding the &fohnland attack
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Shabkadr on August 7th, it nrasascertained that the H*~dda
Mullah llad
with him on that occasion a consiclernble number of men r n h o ~ v e ~ e s u b j e ~ t ~
of the Amir, hailing from Eastern Afghanistan, public attentibn became
directed to the policy of our ally of Eabul with reference to the hostile
frontier tribes generitlly, and the Government of India were not slow to
recognise the extreme iinportarlce of this factor in planning operations.
Various rumours was cilvu1:xted connecting Abdur R.dlman more or
less intimately with the earlier rising in Swat, and when, afterwards,
the Afridis captured the Iihpber, there was some ~v11o thought they
perceived the hiznd of the Durani Cllief in this new outbreak also. To
clear the air, a strong expression of the Governor-General's opinion
regarding General Ghulam Hyder's relations with the Hadda Mullah
and the part taken by Afgllans from Jellalabad district in the Mohnland
disturbi~nce,was forwarded to the Amir, together with an admonition
that something more than a mere formal disclaimer of responsibility
was expected from him. The response to this communicntion was satis.
factory enough, especially as His Highness had forestalled i t by previously despatchiug a firman to Jellalabad forbidding his sabjects to
engage in hostilities on the border. The reply to the Governor-General
was couched in very explicit terms. The Amir denied that any Afghan
soldiers had shared in the Mohruand fighting, and at the same t i u e
solemnly and personttlly engaged on behalf of the Sipah Salar and
the regular army that no such hostility should ever be comillitted by
them. As regards non-military Afglrin subjects, he alleged that if any
of them had joined the Mohmands at all they must have done so secretly,
for they would not dare to take up arms openly for fear of him. He
attributed all the border distui~banceu to the action of the mullahs,
especially the Ha& Mullah, who he said had in former years excited
risings against the g a d i of Kabul, and he denounced t h e i ~conduct.

The Amir had certainly known in years gone by what i t was to be
plagued by fanatical mullahs, but he had made short work of these when
they became dangerous to his authority. His sincerity in disappr*oving
of the present tribal risings
~ h u w nby the careful manner in which

he arranged for the forwarding of his reply t d t h r Viceroy.

3

So anxious
was he that his answer should be safely delivered a t its destination that
he took the precaution of sending a duplicate cia^ Kanilahnr. His postal
runners always use the Shilman route to Peshawar in preference to the
K h y b e r route, but bnowing that the Mohmand country was disturbed,
H i s Highness sent mounted niessengers from Kabul through Ghazni
and Kandallar. The duplicate letter reached New Chaman towards the
e n d of August, whence it was forwarded to the Gobernor-General's
A g e n t a t Quatta.
About the same time the British Agent i n Kabul reported that the
A m i r read in public durbar on the 17th August the Viceroy's letter
which called upon His Highness to restrain his subjects from taking
p a r t i n the frontier disturbances. Ilis Highness solemnly swore that
h e had always maintained friendly relations with the E~.itish Government, and had never induced his subjects or sepoys t o take hostile action
against the British. The Amir alsoread the draft of his reply to the
durbar, which was very largely attended, as i t ujas held on the anniverzoa ud-din.
sary of his assumption of the title of Zin-ul-iMzllat

A few days after this durbar the British Agent addressed a letter
t o His Higliness on the subject of rumours which had reached him that
people froxi1 Lughnlan and other places in Afghanistan were still joining
t h e Hadda Mullah, and that supplies were being sent from Lalpura for
the support of the Mullah's gathering. The Anlir a t once replied in a n
autograph letter, reminding the Agent of what had taken place a t the
du~but;and adding that thong11 the Mullah's disciples had helped the
Mullah secretly they certainly had not done so openly because of their
fear of His Highness. The Amir also informed the British Agent that
h e had issued instructions to all officials in Ningrahar, and they were
now secretly keeping a watch; that he would us far as possible watch
t h e clisciples of the H < ~ d dMullah
a
in Afghanistan; and that the Governor of Lughman had recently attacked and dispersed a gathering of
500 men collected by one of the Mullall's disciples who were about to
prboceeil from Luahn~anto join the Mullal?. The Governor had also
arrested 40 of them, and was taking steps to capture the leader of the
gathering, who Elad escaped. This last statement was quite true, and i t
was also true that some Sangu Khel Shinwaris, who had coIlected near
Pesh Bolak and who probably intended midiiug for the Kllyber a t t h e
invitation of the Mullah Saiad Altbar, had been dispersed by Afglqsn
crLvalry. Fuxther, under orders from Kabul, the Afghttu troaps were

witlldmnn from the outlying posts because of the possibility t h a t t h e y
might be tempted to slip away temporarily to join some tribal gathering. A t the same time the Amir issued orders that no bodies of a r m e d
tribesmen fleeing before the Government of India's troops in a n y of t h e
operations about t o be undertaken, should be allowed to enter Afghanistan. I n return for Abdur Rahman's frankness t h e Government of I n d i a
were no less open with him and in further correspondence i n f o r m e d
His Highness that the expeditior~ against the Mohmands h a d b e e n
undertaken p~incipallyto punish the Hadda Mullah and his g a t h e r i n g
and to disperse all who opposed our troops, and that there was no intention of remaining in the country.
After the attack on the Khyber and the subsequent spontaneous
dispersioll of the Afridi force, the mullahs, in order to induce the tribesmen to renew hostilities played the bold game of pretending t h a t t h e
Andr was a t their back, and even paraded mule loads of ammunition
which they asserted had been sent from Afghanistan, but which h a d
actually been captured from the Khyber Rifles a t Ali Musjid a n d L u n d i
Kohl. A s a, ruatter of fact they knew very well that the Amir, so f a r
from sympathisitlg with the Afridis in their rising, was extremely a n g r y
with them for having closed the Khyber, as this caused heavy loss to
him owing to the stoppage of the caravan trade, besides preventing a
consignment of arms and stores imported by him from Europe b e i n g
sent up from Peshawar.
About the middle of September the Afridis began to realise t h e
danger which menaced them, as definite preparations for invading Tirah
had by that time been begun. They held a big jirgah and decided to
send a deputation to Kabul to ask the Amir to help them in the coming
struggle. The members of this deputation got as far as Jellelabad, w h e r e
they were stopped by the local Afghan officials and turned back, in
obedience to orders received from Kabul. A request was preferred
for ammunition but this was refused. Thereafter, to remove all possible
doubt the Amir caused to be posted in Kabul a public reply to the A f r i d i
deputations. The notification, which was dated September 2&d, was as
follows :-

"The Afridis of Tirah have sent me now eighteen of their men,
consisting of Maliks, Ulama and Elders, each sect sending a separate
petition and asking for help. I n accordance with my orders they w e r e
detained in Jellalabad, their petitions were sent, t o me and I have ref u s e d
them. I have written and sent them replies to their petitions to

Jellalabad, that they may receive them and go back. The particulars of
their petitions are as follo~vs:-

" ' The British Government have been from olden times gradually
encroaching upon our couutry, and even upon Afghan territory, and
they have erected forts a t various spots and places. We complained
of this to the Afghan Government on numerous occasions, but Your
Highness paid no attention to our complaints. Therefore, being helpless and llaving regard to Islam and our constancy in religion, we have,
under the guidance of God, opened the door of jehad in the face of the
said a o ~ e ~ n m e nand
t , we have severed our connection with them in
every way. W e have plrundered and destroyed five forts on the Samana
above Hangu, one fort a t Shinawari a t the foot of the Samana in British
territory, one fort a t the Ublan Pass near Kohat, one thana at Tora
Wadi, a second thana a t Kahi, one thana a t Ghalo China, one lhana a t
Shams-ud-din, one t7tana at Chardi, one lhnnn a t Ear Killa near Khatak,
one lhnnn a t Namak, one thanaat Narai A b and the Hindu bazaar at
Narai Ab. There are three big forts on the top of the said mountain
which have not been taken yet. By the grace of God we will destroy
a n d burn these also. All the people of Tirah have taken up their position
on the top of the mountain ;and at its base, from Kohat to Rud-i-Knrman
i n the district of Kurram, the frontier of the Orakzai runs, and the
tribesmen have been mdking jehnd from time to time within their respective limits. We will never consent to tender our allegiance to the British
Government and become their subjects. We will nevar give up the reins
of authority of our country to the hands of the Government. On the
contrary, me are willing to tender our allegiance to the Government of
the King of Islam. It is incumbent on the Government of Islamnot only
t o loolr after our interests and to consider our position, but that of the
whole of Afghanistan. We therefore send these eighteen persons from
among our SFaliks, Ulama and Elders, with our petitions to Your Highness' presence. We are a t present engaged in a jehad on the Samana
Range, and FF-erequest that Your Highness will be pleased to do what
is for our good and benefit ;and by the grace of God we will act up to
Your Highness' instructions, because we leave the conduct and management of our affairs in the hands of Your Highness in every respect.
W e have used our endeavours with our tribesmen to do service to Your
Highness. This i q the time to gain the object of Your Highness. A11
t h e Moslems are now a t the disposal of Your Highness in the shape of
regular troops, artillery and money. I f the British prove victorious,

they will ruin the Moslen~s. Tlte services t,o be done on this side may
be left t o us Your T-Iighness. W e hope th:tt after the perllsnl of our
petition Your IIi,nhness will favour us with a rel~ly. Dated 7th Ral~i11s-Sani, 1315.'

I have perused your petitions, all of which were founded on one
ohject. I now write to you in reply that i t is eighteen years since 1
that I went to Rt~walpinclil ~ y
came to Kabul, and you know
t l ~ eKhyber route. I n consideration of my friendship wit11 the Britisll
Government I had gone to their country as their guest, and 011 my way
I found many of your tribesmen on both sides of the Pass who m:~de
salaams to me. I f what you now state is true why did go11not tell me
a t that time about the matter, so that I might have conferred with x i s
Escellency the Viceroy i~bouti t ? Some years after this, when the boundary was being laid down, Sir Mortimer 1)urand passed througll tlie
Khyber and came to Kabul. All the frontier tribesmen knew of this
and saw the Mission with their own eyes. Wily did not then your
Mullahs, Maliks and Elders come to me when Sir Mortinler Durand canie
with authority to settle the boundary, so that I could have di.;cassed
the matter with Ilin~? A t that time you all reniained silent, and silence
indicates consent I do not know on what account a brertch lias now
taken place between you and the English. Now, after you havc f o u g l ~ t
with them and displeased them you inform me.

"I have entered into a n alliance with the British Governn~ent in
regard to matters of State, and up to the present time no breach of the
agreement has occurred from the side of the British, notmitllstancling
that they are Christians. We are Moslenls and followers of the ~eligion
of the Prophet and also of the four Khalifas of the Prophet. How c:tn
we then commit a breach of an agreement O What do you my about t h e
verse in the R ~ r a n - Fulfil
~
your promise: to fulfil s pronlise is the first
duty of a Moqlem. God, on the day when the first promise mas taken,
aslied all the creatures whether he was their God or not. They said: Yes,
you are our God and our Creator. Therefore on tlie di~yofthe resrrrrection t h e first question will be about the observance of ag~~eerucntx.111fidelu and Moslenls will thus be distinguished by tl~ixtest.' You will thuu
see t h a t the matter of the agreement is of grezt importance. I will
never, without cause or occasioli, swerve from an agreclllcrit, because the
English up to t h e present time llave in on way departed fruril tlle liue
of boundary laid down in the rnap they have agreed upon with rile. Tllc.11
why sliould I d o 80 1 To do ao will be far from ju~tice. 1 allrlot a t the

instance of a few self-interested persons bring ignon~inyon myself and
nly people.
"What you have done with your own hands you niust now carry
on your own necks. I have nothing to do with you. You are the besb
judge of your affairs. Now that you have got into trouble-(ltte r.al!y,
spoiled the matter)-you want me to help you. You have allowed the
time when nlatters might have been ameliorated to slip- by.
Now I can"
pot say or do anything. I have sent back from Jellalabad the blaliks
you had deputed to me. I gave them each a lunoi and Re.10 for their
road expenses, and I did not trouble them to come to Kabul?'
The A n ~ ialso
r issued in Eastern Afghanistan a proclamation by way
of warning to Afghans. I t began :-
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"This proclamation is from Amir Zia-ull Millat wa ud-din"-(i.e.,
Light of Union and Faith). Let i t be know11 to the learned men of
Afghanistan, whether in the Aulir's territory or the hill tracts, that I
hive come to know of pour circumstances by your petitions as well as
through my informants, and am fully aware that you talk in your houses
and meetings that I (the Amir-) have sold you to the Britisll Goverume~lt
for money, and that in these days when fighting is going on between
you and the British Government I have held myself aloof and am sitting
in ease and comfort. Under these circumstances I think it advisable
to explain to you all the facts in detail, and mention the intent and purport of your talk."
His Highness then proceeded to explain a t length the policy of the
13ritish Government towards Afghanistan in Shere Ali's time. "Shere
Ali," he said, "was a fool, and his son, Yakub, also a fool; the former fur
intriguing mith Russia, the latter for making hi~nselfresponsible for
Blajor Cavagnari'a safety when he himself had not nlacll control over
the Afghan troops and tribesmen." He pointed out that the English had
pever any intention of annexing Afghanistan in those dhys, but wished
only to avenge Major Cavagnari's murder and find a ruler in the place
of Yakub Klmn. He (Abdur Ral~lman)recugnised these things and
satisfied himself that the British Government ouly wished to defend
Afghanistan from any enemy that might t~rise. H e explained how he
had had to exercise full authorily, as he had failed to make the Afghan
people wise and moral. Turning then to the tribesmen he dho.rved how
they "tendeled their allegiance to the Blitish Uovernnlent, accepted the

allowances, made agreements, and then, without any cause, raised disturbances and rebellion a t the instance of a fakir mrbose parentage is
not even known to the King of Islam." As they did not consult hinl
when they raised the revolt, they were not justified in throwing t h e
blame up011 him. They had frequently declared to the British Government that they were independent of the Amir, and had set thenlselves
u p as kings. That being so, they should settle their affairs themselves.
H e added:-" Why do you call these disturbances.jehad or g 7 m a 4
The time will come for jehad, and, when i t does come, i t will be announced
to you. If you behave yourselves courageonsly on that occasion, I
shall be glad to call you religious.1eaders. But the first condition of
jeiad is the co-operation of the King of Tslam. I t is curious t h a t t h e
King is on friendly terms with the English and yet you are making a
fuss about jehad. It appears that you yourselves are independent kings,
and do not require a king over you. A similar instance occurred in
France thirty years ago, when the people there revolted against their
king, dethroned him and sent him to London, where he died. I will
never interfere with you in religious matters, nor prevent you fro111
prosecuting your own object provided these be in accordance with t h e
principles of religion; but the present disturbances have nothing t o do
with religion, because all Mnssnlmans and most of the Khans and tribesnien are taking sides with the English and helping then]. When you
yourselves are rendering them assistance how can I be to blaine ?"-(It
should here be noted that the proclamation, though issued late i u September, was dated August 13th, that is to say, before the Afridi soldiers
fighting on the British side had been withdrawn from the front.)-After
noticing that the tribesmen in talking among themselves, were ascribing
the rising as due to the British occupation of Chitral and Swat, tile
Auuir said :-Ic I tell you that in taking possession of Uhitral the object
of the British Government is not to assess revenue, or tax theni. Tllc~ir
only desire is to increase the population of the country and strcngtllcll
their own position, so that it may serve as a barrier againrt any futrlr-l:
invasion by Russia. They have remitted the revenue of villages in SwaL
of which they have taken actual possessiun."
His Highness conclrlded :-" I n short, I have nothing to do .rvit,ll
your affairs, and no concern with you because I have no trust i r l you.
Do not be led to thinlr that, like Sl~ereAli, I an1 suclk a. foul as tu ~ 1 1 1 1 0 ~
and oXe-nd other8 for your sake. Your real c!bject ih to r~li~lte
rue figlit

( I57
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with the British Govex-nn~ent,and if I Tvere to (lo such a foolisll thi~lg,
I am sure you would assume the positioll of simple spectators."
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I n the foregoing proclanlation there was an echo of the Anlir's former utterances so far as the unruly and troublesome character of his
people u-as concerned. I n his letters to the Indian Government in 1880-81
when he had just become Amir, he frequently referred to his difficulties
in dealing with his subjects. Thus he wrote : "The people of Afghanistan are of such a nature that they step beyond the bounds of subjection
and aspire to the position of rulers." And again : "The ignorance of
evil-minded persons, the un\visdom of the principal persons in Afghanistan, and the short-sightedness of this nation, are manifest. They incite
the people to tumult and commotion, and drive tliem out of the path of
humanity. A wise man is unwise in their sight. They leitd people astray,
and for the sake of a trifling gain they prefer disorder and tumult. For
their own selfish ends they wish to see the whole world desolate and
ruined. From their ignorance they do not know and see what vould
tend to their lasting comfort." In other letters he abused his unruly
subjects i n unlneasured terms, and appealed to the Government to give
him rifles and ammunition in order that his regular army nlight be
equal to keeping the peace.
After this nothing farther was heard of the A n ~ i rin connection
with the frontier operations, and it may be said a t once that tllruugllout the remainder of the fighting the A n ~ i adher-ed
r
honourably to the
to be said thereattitude he had taken up. Nothing further rerl~t~ins
fore on this head except a word aboiit the Sipah Salar. Beyond all
reasonable doubt General Ghula~n Hyder continued secretly to urge
the 01-akzai end Afridis to remain ill a ~ ~ mbut
s , his action was clearly
contrary to the line of policy taken by his wester, and the Sipah Salar
would no doubt have beell called to account hid lle not been in a position to defy the A ~ n i rowing to his illfluellce over the troops and tribesme11 in the Jelldabad distlict.

CROSSING THE BAMANA--THE

CAPTURE AND ABANDOWMENT

OF

DARGAI.

BYthe beginning of October the concentrdtion of the troops composing
the Tirah Field Force was in full swing, and the tribesmen now began
to realise to the full the meaning of the ~ r e ~ a r a t i o menacing
ns
them.
A n urgent,jirgah of the Orakzai and Afridis was held a t Bagh, in Tirah,
a t which i t was decided that unless a n arrangement could be nlade
with tlie Government of India to include all sections of the two main
tribes in a n amnesty, attacks should be made concurrently on t h e
Kurranl, the Samana and Jamrud. The Chanlkannis, Zaimukhts a n d
Alisherzai of the Kurram country were not represented a t the jirgah,
b u t the Tirall Alisherzai attended. An oath was taken on the Koran
that if any individual tribe or section should come to a n understanding with the Government that did not include all the others, that clan
should he publicly a~lathenlatisedas enemies of Islam. A11 t h e same
the Khanki Valley Oralczai, who had been giving us so much trouble
on the Sanrana, became considerably less pugnacious, and before very
long all of them were asking to be allowed to ruitke their- submission,
promising to surrender all loot and Government rifles. The Mislltis
also made humble salaartcs and offered our. troops a free passage
Ohrough their territory. But a t this late stage the tiibes had too
much to answer for : no reply was returned to their overtufes, Genersl
Yeatman-Biggs especially declining to treat with tlie enemy w l ~ i l e
they still had raiding parties oat on the Samana, hapassing our outposts.
13ut the Kohat Pdss tribesmen had behaved well, and they now cvnti~lued
impassive, causing us no annoyance during the march of the several brigades from Kl~ushalgarh to join Sir Willianl Lockhart. The Adu~rl
Khels on the one hand and the Jowakis on tlie other refused to obey t h e
exhortations of the Mullall Saiad Akbar to join in the so-called jshad, arid
carefully refrained from molesting tlle a d v a n a ~ noolurl~ns.
~
Tile lant
march into Kohat, through the pass, was indeed suflicie~ltl~
trying wit,llout the addition of hostilities ; as no proper road existed, and there was
only a rough pebbly track, about 19 miles long from Airus1 (Jra)Jutlu,
tlie last hdting-place before Kol~at.
On the 10th October Brigadier-General Hart's columl~ arrived ; ~ t
Kohst; next day Brigadier-General Kempster's column lllarched ill;

2nd tile day a f t e ~that Bripsdier-General Westrnacottls colhnln emepged from the long pass. F I - o ~Rollat
~ ~ the troops marched to Sllinawari,
where they stood with their faces to the north ready to marc11 up011
t h e Samana as so011 as the Sappers and Pioneers should I~aveprepared
t h e way.
On the 7th October a.ji,:sah was held a t Kandi Mishti in the Khanki
Valley of the irresolute Mishtis, Sheikans, Abkhels and Mulla KlieIs
who had come across the Sampagha Pass for the purpose. The Abkhels
upbraided the Mishtis for having given in to the Sirlrar, and the Mishtis
denied this, but admitted they did not want to fight. A bigger jbgah of
t h e Oralrzai tribes was held on the 10th Octc~bera t which i t was decided
t o hold the Sampagha Pass against General Lockhart's advance.
On the 19th of the month the Mullah Saiad Akbar again issued his
war orders, in which something like a tactical disposition of his available
forces was apparent. Thus the Kuki and Zakka Khels of the Bazar and
Khyber districts were to hold Ali Musjid road ; the Zakka Khels of thb
Cara Valley, the Sipah, Kamar, Aka and the Usturi KheIs were given the
Bara route ;while the Kambar, Malikdin, Zskka and Adam Khels of the
Maidan were to co-operate with the Orakzai in defending the Tirah passes
facing the Saniana Range. Thc clans were also to give mutual aid whenever necessity might arise. I t was thus plain thab Sir William Lockhart's advance wonld be opposed a t the Sanlpagha and other passes
leading into the Rajglil and Maidan Valleys. The Sampagha Pass, i t
may be explained, leads direct from the Khanki Valley, and the approach to it is fairly easy. The late Colonel Mason reconnoitred almost
to the top of the pass during the Miranzai Expeditions of 1891, so
that our troops would march over ground which have been mapped out
to a certain extent aud would present no great difficulties. The pass
can be turned on either flank, and it was clear that many thousands of
tribesmen would be required to hold it even for a short time against
the fol-ce which Sir William Lockhnrt would be able to bring to bear
when once he liad concentraited his two divisions in the Khanki valley.
The Sampagha is allnost dlie north of our line of forts on the Samana,
and i t was apparently intended to form the left of the enemy's line of
defence, the right resting oh the Arhanga Pass, seven or eight miles
away. This latter pass again was said to be an easy one for packanimals, but i t had never been reconnoitred. Once our troops crossed it
t h e southern valleys of Tirah, the summer quarters of the Afridis,
would lie beneath them, and almost il-mediately Sir WiIliam Lockhart
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mould be in the Ireart of the tribaI country, if a11 went well ; for the
distances t o be traversed from the Khanki Valley are short, the ranges
of hills guarding Tirah on the south being within one march fi80111t h e
left bank of the Khanki River.

TO follow the actual operations. On the 11th October a working
party on t h e Chagru Kotal road over the Samana consisting of Pioneers,
Sappers and 1,000 Punjab coolies was fired on by the enemy, of whom
very large nulnbers were disclosed near the village of Dargai. Fortunately General Yeatman-Biggs, who had gone down a spur from
Gulistan i n force t h a t morning on a reconnaissance, was close a t hand,
and he quickly brought his guns t o bear on the assailants who thereupon retired, and t h e force returned to Fort Lockhart that evening with
no casualties. Reports were afterwards brought in that the losses of
t h e tribesmen in this little brush were very heavy. One of the surest
tests of the success of an action was whether the troops were followed u p
during the return to camp, and in this instance the rear-guards were
t enemy were for the
left quite unmolested, which went to prove t l ~ a the
nonce thoroughly beaten off.
On t h e 12th of October a covering party of a half-battalion of the
15th Sikhs and the Jhind Inftlntry on the north side of the ICotal was
fired on and compelled to withdraw by a force of Gar Orakzai who pressed
the retirement vigorously. No. 2 Uerajat Mountain Battery however
successfullj- covered the withdrawal, and the only casualties were one
Jhind sepoy severely and one slightly wounded. After this the enemy
continued almost daily to annoy our working parties on the Chagru
Rota1 road, the completion of which was essential to a rapid advance of
t h e expeditionary force.
Finally on the 17th October Sir William Lockhart issued orders for
t h e forward movement, as follows:-"On
the 20th October the 3rd
'Brigade, under Brigadier-General Kempster, with No. 8 Mountsin Battery Royal Artillery, No. 5 Bonlbay Mountain Battery, the machine
gun detachment and signallers of the 16th Lancers, one squadron and
head-quarters of the 18th Bengal Lancers, the 21st Madras Pioneers,
No. 4 Company Madras Sappers, the Sirruur Sappers, and Gurkha
scouts will advance on Khorappa in the Khanki Valley under General
peatman-Biggs ; a n d on the 21st October a column, under Colonel
Fhaytor, composed of the Northamptoil Regiment, tlie 36th Sikhs and
No. 9-ltountain Battery Royal Artillery, will move-from Samana t@
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the T:~lnispur, to protect the right flank of the 3rd Brigade mov:
ing in the t'hxgr'u Valley. The troops named above, under aenera)
Ye;ttman-l),igjis, will stand fast a t Khorappa, and in1prove the road above
and 1 1 ~ 1tllat
0 ~ place, ColonelChaytorls column advancing from Talai
t o 1iliornl)pn; and o n the same day the remainder of the ebd Division,
i.e., tlrc .it11 Brigade and remaining Divisional troops, under Brigadier.
Gener~ttlWcstrnacott, will advance from Shinawali to Khorappa, as also
a wing of the Line of Con~municationtroops for the'pern~anentgarrison
of Iihalappa. On the 22nd October the 2nd Division wiIl cross the
Khanki Rivcl- and move t o Khangirhar and entrench for the night,
the 1 s t Division will march from Shinawari to Ehorappa. On
tho 23rd Octc,her the 2nd D~vision will advance to the vicinity of
[ilinndnki and entrench for the night, and the 1st Division advance t o
JChangirl)al*. A wing of the Line of Communication troops will advance
fi'oll~Sllir~awa~*i
to Rhosappa on the same date, as permanent garrison.
4;1-eneritlYeatman-Biggs accompanies the 3rd Brigade on the 25th."
I t has been mentioned that the working party on the Chagru Kotal
r o d llad been repeatedly interfered with by parties of tribesmen coming
from the direction of Da~gai,a village on the Samana Range west of
Gllagru Koti~l. I't was now determined to puuish these tribes, and it w t
arranged t h a t Sir Power Palmer, who commanded all the troops on the
Line of Communications, should for this purpose have the troops of the
2nd Divifiinn temporitrily under his orders to co-operate with the troops
he already had a t Shinawari. It is necessary here to attempt to explain, though it is difficult to do so clearly, the military geography of the
grorind wliich was destined to be the venue of the most important action
fought during the whole campaign. The village of l h r g a i lies on the
surtl~ernside of a plateau: and from this plateau a very steep and narrow
f;pur,gradually growing less steep, runs down to a village on Chagru
I i c ~ h ~ l This
.
village is situated on a narrow neck or saddle from which
the roiid vuns south to Shin;bwari, 6 miles distant, and in a more or less
~~ortlierly
direction into the Khanki Valley to Khorapp. This saddle,
tltc~nglrn:br~.ow,is a long one, and a t the other end, after the road falls
*ito the ( : ~ I ; L ~Valley,
I~u
on the northern side, is another v*e
called
&fill,l;~
I<lli~ll. From Mama Khan to Dargai a very steep, stony and
g1:u.rl,w ~iloltrititintnboli runs up the spur to Dargai ridge, mostly on the
IlaJrihr~rn
side of the spurr~ndwell under view and fire from the tribesmen
of the plateau, wl-lich 011 the Cllagru Kotal side is
iliIltli!lgtllc.
yreciilibur hialvas gently away on the western or further fiid@~

South of the Dargai plateau a very liigll and broken spur trends circuitollsly down towards Shinawari, the summit of this spur commanding
the Dargrti ridge and plateau.
Thegeneral idea of the operations ordered by Sir William ~ o c k h a r ~
was that Brigadier-General Kempster's Brigade and some of t h e Divisional troops of the 2nd Division, and also the 3rd Sikhs of the 1st
Division, 2nd Brigade, the whole under the command of Sir P o w e r
Palnler, shoald start at 4 a M., ascend this long spur and a p p e a r
on the right flank and rear of the Dargai position. This ~ o s i t i o n
had been artifici:tlly strengthened by sanga~s or stoneworks, a n d
to take it in front by the one narrow ~ i l t happroaching i t would h a v e
been an aln~ostinlpossible task if i t had been strongly and resolutely
held. If, on the other hand, a frontal a t b c k by another column
from the direction of Chagru Eotal and Mama Khan u n d e r t h e
conlmand of Brigadier-Genearl Westmacott were threatened a n d m a d e
strongly demonstratire, there r a s every chance that t h e enemy's
kttention might be distracted and General Kempster's Brigade allowed to execute its advance to some extent unperceived, a n d c u t
in on the tribesmen either in flank or when retreating. P r e s u m a b l y
it was intended that the frontal attack should, if it was t o be
merely demonstrative, at all events wait for the flank a t t a c k to
develope, but so difficult was the country which Brigadier-General
Kempster's Brigade advancing to make this turning m o v e m e n t
had to traverse, that a t 12 noon, though the column had s t a r t e d
a t 4 A.M., there were no signs of it apparent from the Samana Suk,
whence Sir William Lockhart and his Staff were watching the operations.
Nor indeed is this to be wondered at, for the c ~ e s tof the hill a l o n g
which General Kempster had to advance was a series of precipitous
spurs, to cromn which was almost an impossibility, and many baggage
animals carrying ammullition were lost owing to their falling o v e r t h e
clis. So razor-like in shape were the crests of these hills t h a t it was
quite impossible for even a mountain battery to come into action.
As very few of the enemy were in evidence about the Dargiti ridge,
Brigadier-General Westmacott (commanding the column which was
to create the diversion in front for the benefit of General Kempster)
decided on making his attack without waiting for Brigadier-General
Kempster's flank attack to develope. Brigadier-General Westmacott had
under his orders two mountain batteries, No. 9 Mountain Battery ~~~~l
Artillery (Major Rowdy) and No. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery under

Captain de Butts, also the King's Own Scottish Borderers, the North,
empton Regiment and the 1-3rd Gurkha Rifles. The remaining regiment of Brigadier-General Westmacott's Brigade, the 36th Sikhs (who
had recently come prominently under notice for their gallant defence of
Fort Gulistam under Major DeaVceux and their equally gallant though
~insucceusfuldefence of Fort Saragheri) were retained for the day a t Fort
Lockhart, for the contingency might arise that Fort Lockhart itself
would b e attacked if all the garrison except the half-battalion 2-2nd
Gurkhas were withdrawn. For this reason then the 36th Sikhs were
not able either on the 18th or again on the 20th to take part in the
operations against Dargai. Thus with three battalions and two Mountain Batteries Royal Artillery at his disposal the task lay before General
Westmacott of capturingtlie Dsrgai ridge, with the possible, butin these
precipitous regions far from certain, assistance of the flanking column
cornrnanded by General Kempster.
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About 9 A.M. the two mountain batteries opened fire on the
Dargai ridge and on the point more especially where the precipitous
path is seen to cross the ridge, a t a range of about 1,800 pards ; whilst
the infnntry, with the exception of two conlpaniev Northampton
Regiment, .who remained as escort to the guns, pressed forward to the
village of Manla Khan. The enemy meanwhile appeared in small numbers gradually increasing from the direction of Dargai village, and fired a
few shots a t 9-30 on the infantry now in and behind Mama Khan village.
The infantry, covered by the ground and avoiding the path which
lay on t h e enemy's side of the spur, advanced slowly along the precipitous hillside, the 1-3rd Gurkhas leading, the King's Own Scottish Borderers in second line, and the six con~paniesNorthampton Regiment in
thircl line, till they reached a saddle with a few fir trees on it about halfway between Mama Khan and Dargai, and in advancing beyond which
they rmrst come under the enemy's fire. About 11 A.M. the infantry
operied fire from here, aud the guns, which had temporarily ceased fire,
joinecl in again. Thence the Gurkhas, led b y their Colonel forty yards
ahonrl of everybody else, advancecl by rushes from one coigrl of vantage
t o xnotliler, covered frcm the redr by infantry fire and forming up whereevi2rarly cleid ground gave them breathing tirile for a fresh advance,
Tkle King's Own Sccrttish Borderem ~lieanwhile, in the second line,
l.apitlly clccrea~irly t l ~ edistance between themselves and the
styainil~,nevery nerve to reach the aurrlnlit simultaaeq;,ll+kbit.q
exdye~ h 800
c yar& start fLe Gurkhas had, llowever, was not, on
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such ground and with soldiers so accustomed to hill warfare a s the
Gurkhas, easily regained; and before they could quite catch them
u p the leading Gurkha company, 1-3rd Gurkhas, with Liuetenant
Beynon, District Staff Officer, a t their head, revolver in hand, were
s e n to be rapidly ascending in single file the rough staircase (rnther
than path) leading u p over the crest, while the remainder of the
regiment and the King's Own Scottish Borderem followed close behind.
This Indian file assault was magnificently carried out, a n d altliougll as
a matter of fact the enemy offered little or no resistance a t t h e last
moment, they might for all the troops below knew have been a ~ ~ e m b l e d
in large numbers behind the crest, and as soon as the artillery fire
ceased, which it would necessarily do as the infantry approached the
crest, they might have poured in such a fire as t o render any approad1
i n single file a n absolute impossibility. B u t no such fear daunted
the Gurkhas and the position was gallantly carried. Dargai village
was so011 in flames, and its fortifications destroyed, and t h e N a r i k Suk
hill, which dominates the D a ~ g avillage
i
and ridge, crowned. It
about 12 noon when the Dargai crest was crowned; and t h e enerny, not
awaiting t h e assault, had just begun to clear off when Brigadier-General
Kempster's Column with Sir Power Palmer, was seen slowly advancing
with enormous diEculty. The losses sustained by General Westniacott's Column in the direct attack were 2 killed and 1 4 wounded in the
1-3rd Gurkhas, and 1killed and 5 wounded in the King's Own Xcottish
Borderers.
So difficult was the country over which General KernpstePe force
had had to advance, that it had been found necessary t o send b h l r to
Shinawari every mule and retain only dhaoly-bearers a n d stretclrers.
General Kempster's Column joined General Westn~acott'sUolunir~c~n
Dargai height about 3-10 P.M., having had i n the meantime t o k t t t off
A n attack of several thousands of the enemy. The advance i n the
face of this opposition was splendidly carried ont, and undoubtedly it
was this turning movement which, though hidden by intervening heigl~ts
from the view of General Westmacott, nevertl~eless made the? w;~y
easy for the charge of his 3rd Gurkhas, the enemy having lost I~tfi~1.t
~LK
General Kempster swept slowly but irresistibly onwards. This tti~riirtg
movement in the teeth of a powerful foe nloreover was so clcvt.1-ly
executed that only two or three casualties (among the 1-211d (:llrkll:~s)
occurred throughout the whole march to Dargai. B u t Gcneri~l lie nil^
ater's force had more work cut out for it before thg d;ty w w ovcl;
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w a r i via Chagru Kotal, the retreating enemy receved reinforcements
of about 8,000 Afridis from the Khanki Valley and thereupon balted
a n d faced aboat. The return to Shinawari wid Chagru Kotal in the
face of such overwhelming nambers, with darkness growing rapidly,
was a most difficult a n d dangerous operation: but so well conceived
w e r e General Kempster's dispostions, so admirable the manner in
which the troops, both British and native, carried them out, and so great
t h e assistance afforded b y the mountain artillery both from Chagru
K o t a l and the Samana Suk, that the enemy did not dare to press an
a t t a c k home, and after Chagru Kotal the return to Shinawari was practically unmolested. R u t unfortunately during the preceding stage in
t h e retirement-in coming down the hill between Dargai and Chagru
Kotal-the losses, with the enemy swarming on the heights above,
w e r e considerable: the Gordons had Major R. D. Jennings-Bramly
killed and Lieutenant M. L. Pears and 14 men wounded, while the 15th
S i k h s had 3 killed and 11 wounded. These two corps were covering
t h e retirement and hence their heavy losses. The 3rd Sikhs had
also 1 wounded and the 1-2nd Gurkhas 1 killed and 4 wounded.
B u t , on the other hand, as already stated, the enemy had been so
severely punished that they had not the courage to attempt' to follow
up the column when GeneralXemspter, following the lead of General
Westmacott, marched back to Head-quarters, and not a shot was
fired on the rear-guard, even in response to a farewell volley from
t h e troops.
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A s the abandonment of Dargai, after i t had once been captured,
h a s been severely colnruented upon by some military critics, it is as
well to give here, for what they may be worth, the reasons suggested
w h y Sir Power Palmer did cot deem it advisable to retain possession of
t h e position. Very large numbers of Afridis, attracted by the sound of
t h e firing, were hurrying up from the Khanki Valley; added to which
t h e troops were without water, without food and withoutwarm clothes,
a n d nlust have suffered severely if t l ~ e yhad bivouacked for the night
unfed and unprotected on the inclement heights. But seeing that to
abandon the position meant that i t would have to be taken all over
again two days later when the main advance of the expeditionary
force was to take place, i t was certainly very unfortunate that when
captured on the 18th October i t could not be retained. I t is but fair
however to quote, even a t the risk of repetition, tlie words of the

Pioneer's Special Correspondent a t Dargai :-cLGreat as the tactical
and strategical advantage of such a retention would have been, clothing,
firewood and supplies for tired troops a t a height of over 6,000 feet
are a n absolute necessity, and if this was true in regard to the EuropeaIl
troops, it applied with still greater force to the sepoys." Retirement
then on Shinawari ozd the Chagru Hotal was ordered, and the bravelywon heights of Darpai were abandoned for the time to the enemy
who, though thorougt-ily beaten, were clever enough t o perceive whitt
a splendid stroke it would be to return a t once to t,he occupation of t h i s
really impregnable position in stronger force than ever, and so re-impose
upon our troops the heavy task of once again scaling those awful slopes
i n the face of a deadly hailstorm of bullets.

CHAPTEE IS.
THE RE-CAPTURE O F DARGAI-GALLLIXTRY

OF THE OORDOKS.

ON the 20th October General Yeatman-Biggs was instructed afresh
by s i r William Lockhart to advance with the 2nd Division, consisting
of the 3rd Brigade under Brigadier-General Kenlpster and the 4th
Brigade under Brigadier-General Westmacott, vici Chagru Kotal to
Khorappa, in the Khanki Valley. I t wits in tlle executiotl of this order
that the memorable capture of the Dargai heights was carried out for
the second time. I n the calm and critical reflection which has succeeded the first outbursts of enthusiasm a t this fine.feat of arnls, it has
been questioned by some military men whether there was any real
necessity to take Dargai a t all ; or a t least whether the tactical disadvantage of allowing the enemy to remain in occupation of the crest
could possibly have led to such a sad crop of casualties as the Gordon
Highlanders, the Dorsetshires, the 2nd Gurkhas and the 3rd Sikhs
suffered in attacking an all but impregnable position." The road
from Shicnwari (Sir William Lockhnrt3sadvance base in the Miranzai
Valley) to Khorappa on the Khanki River runs through the valley of
Chagru Kotal, and this valley is " absolutely dominated lJ (as some contend) or "overlooked from e distance " (as others prefer to describe it)
on the west by the Dargai ridge and the Narik Suk. The musketry
range so far as tribal nlolestation was concerned was certainly a very
long one, varying from about 3,000 up to about 1,000 yards, and the
argument which has been raised is that with a well-posted flank defence
on the Samana Suk no mere musketry fire a t such a range upon
troops marching heedless of i t through the valley below could have
been so destructive as the point blank volleys which the enemy poured
out a t distances up to 300 yards when Dargai crest was assaulted.

It will be rtmembered that when Dargai was captured, two days
previously, the frontal attack by General Westmacott's Brigade had
been more or less combined with a turning movement by General
Kempster7sBrigade; but on the present occasion only n frontal attack
, that along ,zlmost the identical route
from Chagru Kotal was m ~ d e and
which General Westn~acotthad followed. Consequently the tribesmen
holding the ridge were enabled, though fortunately they did not know
* Sir William Lockhart's own opinion on this point will be found expressed in his
Despatches, published nu an Appendix.
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it, to give all their attention to this one slope which owing t o the IT$gedness of the ground could not be properly ascended i n regular
formation by assaulting parties, but had to be scrambled over as t h e
assailants best could. I n the result the action was the severest ever
fought on the north-west frontier since the Alvbela Campaign, nearly
200 Officers and men being either killed or wounded within six hours.*
Serious as the casualties were, they might have been s t i l l heavier if
the whole of the enemy had concentrated their undivided a t t e n tion on the holding of Dargai from the Chagru Kotal side. But by a
very fortunate circumstance it so happened that they h a d been led t o
apprehend a repetition of Sir Power Palme?'s tactics of the 18tl1 October,
and under this belief felt obliged to make preparations for a flank attack,
thus weakening their powers of resistance against the f r o n t a l attackthe only attack actually delivered. Major Bewicke-Copley and Mr.
Donald, Political Officer, had told some pretended friendlies, who were
really the enemy's spies, as a dead secret that an attack on t h e right flank
of Dargai village formed a certian part of General Yeatman-Biggs's
plan of operations, and this of course ensured the " secret " b e i n g carried
t o the tribal forces crowning Dargai. It was evident all t h r o u g h t h e
subsequent fighting that such a turning movement was seriousIy
apprehended, as large nu~nbersof the foe were visible from t h e Samana
Suk awaitinlr attack far away on the right flank, where two days
previously General Kempster's Brigade had appeared; and t h i s division
of forces greatly lightened the otherwise almost impossibIe task of
taking the crest direct from Chagru Eotal. The tribesmen, however,
were in a fine fighting mood and full of valour, for they h a d misconstrued the abandonment of Dargai after its capture on t h e 18th of
October: frontier men habitually regard any movement which is n o t
i n the nature of a direct advance as an acknowledgment of defeat.
They had additional reason to be pliicky, for their aggregate strengtll o n
this occasion was computed at 20,000, and they were almost entircIy
protected from our guns by rocks, which indeed was the reason wliy
the position could not be captured otherwise than by a hand-to-ha114
assault.
General Yeatman-Biggs marched out of Shinawari a t 4-30 A.M. om
the 20th October, and on finding the enemy in strength on D;trgi~iridge,
gave Brigadier-General Kempster the siruple but weiphtlv order t o
% I will
t beseen from the Official Despatches publistled at tile end of t llils V o l ~ ~ z r ~ o
that S I W
~ ~ l l ~ aLockl~nrt
m
crit~cisequnfnvo~lrahlythe l,~j:tiosnclopted by G.encr~1Y ~ . n t r ~ ~ ~ t , , .
Biggs, and moreover nffir1n~that.theywere not in accorance wlth his ttxprobecc~wisllea,

" t a k e the position." General Kenlpster a t once attacked the ridge
w i t h the 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas i n advance, the Dorsetshire Regim e n t in support, the Derbj shire Regiment (froru the First Division) in
reserve, and the Gordon Highlanders with the maxim guns in rear. It
w a s not originally intended that the Gordons should take a leading
p a r t in the assault, and the task a t first allotted to them was to
assist the assaulting party by long-range volleys froru Manla Khan.
F u r t l ~ e support
r
was accorded to the advance by No. 8 Mountain
Battery a t 1,800 yards, by the Northamptonshire Regiment, by No. 9
Mountain Battery well posted on the Samana Suk, ancl by No. 1 Kohat
Mountain Battery and the 3rd Sikhs (from the First Division).
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At 9-30 A.M. the enemy opened fire from the ridge, and at 10 A.M.
o u r guns responded, continuing a t work almost incessantly up to 2 P.M.
The guns on the Samana Suk had the exnct range, which was 3,300 yards,
a u d their shells were repeatedly seen bursting just over the Dargai
crest. A t 10-30 A.M. the infantry opened fire, and a few minutes
l a t e r the leading wing of the 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas succeeded in
reaching a wooded spur half-way between Mama Khan and Dargai.
Beyond this the enemy's fire was most deadly, and further advance
was impossible until the artillery could inflict greater damage upon the
enemy and shake their position. Attached to the 2nd Gurkhas and keeping pace with the foremost companies were Lieutenant Tillard and his
scouts of the 1st Battalion 3rd Giirkhas, and these men played a
prominent part a t this stage. The upward route beyond the wooded spur
sheltering the advanced wing of the 2nd Gurkhas ran across a bare
slope about 100 yards in extent, on which the watchful enemy was
prepared to direct an all-exterminating fire a t about 300 yards range.
Nothing daunted, however, Lieutenimt Tillard and his scouts and the
left wing of the 2nd Gurkhas, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Tmvers,
Qtptain Norie (Adjutant) and Captains Mi-~cintyreand Bower (attached)
das1led out froni shelter and made a desperate rush across the exposed
slope for the next bit of cover. Every rifle froni the crest above was
IKoIul~tly
aimed at the clitring I)aud and 30 men fell dead or wounded,
t,Ilei.r bodies of course l~avingto be left on the ground. Not to be
clutdoIle, tlie right wing of the 2nd Gurkhas followed suit sllortly
and it was here h a t Major Judge, was sllot dead. The
(;ur.kllas were llow protected by cover again; but for additional
tfipops to ~.eiuforcethem, now that the enemy realiued tlrat the advauce over what was wit11 utern truth termed the "death-ZO~O"

had seriously begun, waa doubly difficult and was for 10% vainly
attempted, both by the Do~setuhiresand the ~erbyshires. Capta~n
M. R. Arnold of the Dorsetshires was seen by the Gurkhas in
front suddenly to spring up, and calling out heroically "Come on
'El Company ! " he fell, dangerously wounded. Lieutenant Hew7itt
of the same regimeut, undismayed by the slaughter he had witnessed,
led a wllole coxnpnny forward and every man dropped in his tracks
dead or wounded, he alone of the whole company getting across $0
cover, his elbow being just grazed by a bullet. Occasionally after
that single men from both the Derbyshires and the Dorsetshires still
ran the terrible gauntlet ; but for either reginlent to advance in a
body for the purpose of helping the 2nd Gurkhas to deliver t h e
final assault mas an impossiblity until the guns hacl played with better
efict on the position, and until further strong reinforcements were
available. l\.leanwhile the situation mas becorning serious. For more than
two hours onlookers below and from the adjacent heights anxiously
conten~platedthe probability of a retirement, and all that such a n
event \~oulclmean ; and the later the hour grew the more urgent it
became to bring tlle action to s speedy end by a successful coup de main.
I t mas then tllat the Gordon Highlanders and the 3rd Silihv were
ordered up, and it was arranged that for three minutes before they
advanced over the exposed slope every gun-there were 24 in allshould pour a hot fire on to the ridge. A t the proper signal a terrible
fusillade was thundered out by the artillery, and when the mighty roar
had subsided the Conlnisndant of the Gordon Highlanders, Colonel H. H.
Mathias, turning with a glowing face to his regiment, addressed to them
in an in~passionedvoice, a speech that has since been echoed and re-echoed throughout the length and breadth of the British Empire, a speech
that thrilled every man who heard it :-"The General says the position
must be taken at all costs. THEGORDON
HI~HLANDERS
WILL TAKE 1T !"
Cheering wildly, and with the pipers lustily playing the slogan, t h e
brave Highlanders, hesitating not a single moment, dashed forward en
mnsae across the fatal slope, led with splendid energy by the Colonel, t h e
Adjutant and the Sergeant-Major at the head of the regiment, and Major
Downman a t the head of the leading company. A single example will
sufficeto show how terribly deadly was the enemy's fire. Lieutenant
Dingwall of the Oordons was hit on his revolver, the impact knocking
l~irndown. Springing to his feet again he was hit on his ammunition
pouch, the blow exploding the cartridges inside.. A third bullet

irnmecliately ~fterwardswent through his coat, and the next moment
he was twice hit on the knee. Lieutenant Lanlont was shot. dead;
Major Macbeaa was dangerously wounded, and Major Donovan was
twice hit on the helmet. TITOpipers were 1rGlled and three others
wounded. One hero, Piper Findlater, was knocked over by a. Durn Durn
bullet which shattered the bone of his leg, yet he sat, up on the ground
and played on until a second bullet came and he could play no longer.
For this fine exhibition of pluck the piper was subsequently awarded
the Vict0ri.a Cross.
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A t 3 P.W. the Gordons had gainecl a sheltered position a t the foot
of the last cliff, and after recovering them3elves were ready to combine
with the 2nd Gurkhas in climbing the precipitous path ahead' for the
purpose of delivering the final assault. Led by their Officers a ~ again.
~ d
loudly cheering, the two regiments, with the few daring soldiers of the
Derbyshire and Dorsetshire Regiments who had managed to get across
the exposed slope, advanced indiscriminately in a procession : the Iixrrov
path or saddle admitted of no other order. But the moral effect of the
earlier advance across tire death-zone had been too much for the enemy,
whose fire had already begun to slacken, arrd when a t 3-10P.N. this final
assault was made the beaten tribesmen would not face the onrushing
procession, but turned tsiI andfled precipitately down the hilI. For six
hours the enemy had offered a most stlibborn resistance, during the
latter half of the time nrnh7guo Marte, and tho relief a t this sudden and
br~llinnttermination was intense. Eat g e a t as is the honor due to
the Gordon Highhnders and the 2nd Gurkhas, ik hss t o be said i n
fairness to bhe other as~aulting troops that until a few m~nutes
before the Gordon Highlanders' advance the enemy's position had
not yet been sufficiently shaken by artillery fire. Moreover, a t the
precise moment when the Gosdons rushed forward an overwhelming
volley of shells was.poused on to the Dargai crest by the guns, which to
some extent nlust have interfered with the enemy's fire. The personal
gallantry of Colonel.Jhthias was subsequently rewardsd by the bestowal,
of the Victoria Cross.
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The casualty list was a sadly heavy one, the nyrnber of killed and
wounded aniounting altagether to 800, e.g., four Oficers and 34 men
killed, and five Officers and 157 men wounded. The Officers killed were
Captain C. B. Judge, 2nd Gurkhas; Lieutenant A. Lamont, Gordon
Highlanders ; and Captain W. E. C, Smith, Derbyshire Regiment. The

Officers wounded were : Captain J. (2. Robinson, 2nd Gurlrhas (dangerously)*; Captain H. T. Arnold, Dorsetshire Regiment ;Major F. Macbean
and Lieutenant E. Dingmall, Gordon Highlanders ; and Lieutenant
G. E.White, 3rd Sikhs (all seriously) ; Colonel H. H. Mathias, Captain
H. P.Uniacke, Lieutenant M. F. M. Meiklejohn, and Lieutenant G. S. aCrawford, Gordon Highlanders (all slightly). The distribution of t h e
casualties among thenon-commissioned officersand men was as follows :Dorsetshire Regiment, 8 killed, 38 wounded ; Gordon Highlanders, 2
killed and 35 wounded ; Derbyshire Regiment, 4 killed and 8 wounded ;
2nd Gurkhas, 16 killed and 49 wounded ; 3rd Sikhs, 2 killed and 16
wounded ; 3rd Gurkhas, 2 killed and 9 wounded.

It may be mentioned here that the late Captain Charles Bellew
Judge, of the 2nd (Prince of Wales's Own) Gurkha Regiment, was formerly attached to the Leinster Regiment and was appointed to the Indian
Staff Corps in 1881. H e was Brigade Transport Officer in the expedition
against the Hazaras in 1888, being present a t the battle of Eotkai, a n d
for his gaIlantry on that occasion was mentioned in despatches, H e also
served in the Manipur Expedition of 1891. The late Captain William
Edward Clifton Smith, of the Derbyshire Regiment, entered the army i n
1889. H e joined the 1st Battalion, and on his return from employnlent
with the Royal Niger Company was posted to the 2nd Battalion whicll
had already beell in India since 1882. The late Lieutenant Alexander
Lamont, of the Gordons, was born in 1872, and after being educated
a t Eton joined the Gordons three years and a half ago. H e was the
second son of Mr. James Lamont of Knockdow, Argyllshire, D. L.,
and formerly M. P. for the County of Bute. H e came of a warlike race,
many of his ancestors falling by land and sea, a t Seringapatam, Trafalgar,
and Waterloo. Major Forbes Macbean, who was wounded, served with
the 92nd through the Afghan War of 1879-80, and participated in L o r d
Roberts's march to Eandahar. H e also took part in the Boer War of
1881. Lieutenant Kenneth Dingwall (wounded) joined the 92nd in 1891,
and served with the Chitral Relief Force in 1895, and was among t h e
storming party who took the Malakand Pass in that year.
a medal and clasp for his services.

He received

AS for the enemy they mere completely driven from the hills, a n d
retired i n confusion down to the Khauki River, thus leaving the road
through the Chagru Kotal open for the further advance to Kilorappa.
C

* Died three days later.
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But i t was too late in the day for the 2nd Division with its baggage
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train to move forward, and General Yeatman-Biggs bivouacked for the
night on the captured position.

I

The next morning t h e Division marched on to Khorappa unopposed
together with the Northamptons, the 36th Sikhs and No. 9 Mountain
Battery Royal Artillery, and pitched camp abont a mile short of the
Ehanki River.
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C R A P T E R X.
L I F T I S G THE PURDAH FROM TIRAH.

AFTERthe re-capture of Dargai on the 20tlx October Sir William Lockhart lost no time in pushing forward, his aim being to give the Afridis
and Orakzai no breathing time. Accordingly on the morning following
the action, the 2nd Division continued its march across Chagru Eotal
i n the direction of Khowpps. The King's Own Scottish Borderers, t h e
Dorsetshires and the Shind Infantry were left behind a t Dargai and
about the kotnt in case of any further hostile demonstration frorn t h e
west. Sir William Lockhart himself, with the troops remaining on t h e
Saniana, followed the Zhd Division down to Rhorappa, there to establish
his heari-quarters within gunshot of the Khanki River, across which
the main body of the enemy had retired.
On the night of the 2lst October the new camp a t Ehorappa was
fired into from across the river by about 8,000 of the enemy, carrying 15
standards ; but a few rounds from the guns put an end to the fusillade,
which was rather fortunnte as there had not yet been time enough to
prepare proper cover. On the night of 22nd there was more firing into
camp, and again an the 23rd t o a smaller extent, but the damage was
principally among animals. The 25th was a very bad night. Firing
into camp began about 6 P.M., and continmed more or less without intermission till l o p M. Bullets were whistling everywhere, and there were
some extraordinary escapes, but unfortunately also a great many casualties. The 1st Division had sent a foraging party out tha&morning, a n d
though they obtained a good deal of forage, the enemy lined the heights
above them a s they returned, and sonle thirteea casualties occurred.
Later in the evening there were some 24 sniping casualties among t h e
1st Division, and 10 among the 2nd Division. Captain F. F. Badcock
(District Staff OfEcer, 56h Gurkhas), Field InteUigence QBcer, was h i t
on the left elbow while sitting a t dinner and his arm had unfortunately
to be amputated. Curiously enough, Captain Bad~oclrwas wounded on
the same arm at the storming of Nilt Fort in the Hunea Nagar Expedition where he sl~lawedgreat gallantry in leading a party of t l ~ e
5th Gurkhas after the gate of the fort had been blown in by Captain
Aylmer. Lieutenant Croker (Munster Fusiliers), Orderly Officer t n
BrigadierJ.2emt.d Eempster, was h i t on the right shouldec, also whell

at dinner, but not seriously injured. Sir William Lockhart himself had
a narrow escape, for barely had some gram bags been placed round his
t e n t as a protection, when two bullets whizzed through the canvas and
w e r e buried in the grain. On the morning of the 26th October a
B r i t i s h soldier and sixfollowers were found cut to pieces a few hundred
Y a r d s from the camp. They were so slashed about as to be quite unre'cognisable, but it was presumed they had been detained till late on the
C h a g r u Kotal road and had tried to get into camp after dark. The
approximate number of troops in camp was :-British 6,400, natives
31,200, followers 17,000, and the animals numbered 24,000.
Tribal attention was plainly concentrated now on the defence of
t h e Sanlpagha Pass, for contrary to expectation no attacks had been
m a d e on the long Line of Communication from Kohat to Shinawari,
t h e r e had been on hostile demonstration in the direction of the ~ u r r a k
V a l l e y , while on the Peshawar frontier General Hammond's Column had
n o t seen any great gathering beyond Bara. The Khyber also lay
heglected, and the Zakka Khel, who had been told off by the Afridi
l e a d e r s t o watch the road from Jalnrud t.o Ali Musjid, had not app a r e n t l y mustered in force. The flower of the Afridi fighting men
w e r e assembled with the Orakzai to defend Tirah against the main
a t t a c k , a t ~ dsmall contingents only could be spared to guard the Bara
a n d Bazar Valleys against possible flank attacks.
On the evening of the 27th October the order was issued for a
f u r t h e r advance from Khorappa, and a very welcome order it was, for
e v e r y o n e was tired of the long wait at that place, and the camp, with
its thousands of men and animals was not so salubrious a spot as t o
i n v i t e a longer stay. The water-supply wa& particularly bad: the
o n l y procurable water ran through a number of paddy-fields-through
w h a t in fact sooner or later promised to be a snipejheedand was
n ~ u d d and
y dirty in consequence. 13ut so great had been the difficulties
o f transport along the road from Shinawari to Khorappa, that it was
o n l y on the 27th that the Conlmissariat godowns were able to supply
t h e indents for three days' reserve rations for men and two day3 for
followers.
The move on the 28th was only a short one, some four miles or
less,to a place called Ghandaki, higher up the Khanlri Valley and iu the
d i r e c t i o n of the Sa~llpaghaPass. TOensure that this move should llot
b e molested from the right flank, the Nortlrampton Regiment and 36th

Sikhs, under C'olonel Chatyor, comnlanding the former regiment, w e r e
yelit to seize a high hill overlooking the route and the new camp,
on tlie top of which large numbers of the enemy had been visible
the day before and on previous days, and from which doubtless n i a n y
rnen had descended towards dusk to fire into the huge camp. Colonel
Chaytor's two regiments moved off a t 5 A.M. and found t h e hill unoccupied. The sudden start had very probably surprised the enemy, f o r
there was every indication that the hill had been recently occupied,
and the column as i t moved up was fired into from a n adjoining eminence. A reconniissance was made later in the day t o the foot of the
Sampagl~aPsss itself. The enemy were seen in large numbers o n the
surn~nitof the range and also on the spurs of the hills to the east and
west.
Colonel Sage, commanding the 1st Gurkhas, was s e v e r e l y
wounded during the reconnaissance, but there were no other casualties.
The troops were now in a position to deliver their attack upon the
Snlpagha, and only awaited daybreak. The Afridis and Orakzai had
natur.~llya strong position, and their favourite method of defence, fighting behind stone breast-works with a line of retreat open, was o n c e
adopted. They evidently feared a turning movement, and their disposition was mainly designed to guard against this as much as possible.
Hence they had aangared the spurs to the right and left, so a s t o
being outflanked a t the beginning of the action, in which case t h e
pass ~ o u l have
d
become untenable. The real plan of attack was, h o w ever, very different from anything the eneiny expected, and consisted i n
the 2nd Brigade (General Gaselee'e) followed by the 4th Brigade (General
Wrstmacott's) with the 3rd Brigade (General Eempster's) behind it
making a direct attack ; while the 1st Brigade (General Hart's) s e n t o n e
b&ttalion to cover the right flank, and another battalion to cover the
left flank. The 3rd and remaining battallon of General Hart's Brigade seized a hill opposite the pass as an artillery position, acted tts
escort to the guns, and held itself in readiness to support either of tile
two battalions on the flanks which might require assistance. Tile remaining battalion of this brigade (the 30th Punjab Infantry) w a s a t
Darpi.
The 1st Brigade, followed by the artillery of the 1st a n d 2nd
Divisions, left camp a t 5 A.M. on the 29th September and was followed
by the other brigades a t short intervals. The hill destined for t h e fir-tit
artillery position was seized without opposition by the Del-byshire
Regilnellt of Brigadier-General Hart's Brigade, while the Devonshire
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Regiment worked their way up by a village called Nazeno, guarding the
right flank, and the 2-1st Gurkhas on the left flank made for Kandi
Mishti. The two regiments on the flanks had very difficult ground to
work over, and though they thoroughly accomplished the protectioll of
the flanks of the main column, they necessarily took but little part in
whatever fighting there was. A portion of the artillery-the whole six
batteries of which were commanded by Brigadier-General Spraggecame into action about 7-30 AX., when the three batteries of the 1st
Division under Lieutenant-Colonel Duthy, fired on a large sangar covering the road to the pass, aud very effectually shelled it, while, as there
was neither sufficient room nor objective for the other three batteries
under Lieutenant-Colonel Purdy, they remained in temporary reserve.
The 2nd Erigade meanwhile began its advance in line of regiments :
the 3rd Sikhs on the right, the Yorkshire Regiment on the right centre,
the Queen's on the left centre, and the 2-4th Gurkhas on the left flank
of all. All these regiments had very precipitous ground to work over,
and perhaps some regiments encountered greater difficulty than others,
but the Queen's (commanded by Major Eanford-Flood who, despite
a wound in the arm received early in the advance, persisted in going on)
were the first to crown the crest. The two regiments on the right of
the line, uiz., the 3rd Sikhs and the Yorkshire Regiment, were then sent
off to crown a hill on the right of the pass, from which some of the
enemy were firing; while of the other two regiments the Queen's
remained about the summit of the pass (which was taken about 9-45),
and the 3-4th Gurkhas pressed up a hill to the left. This advance of
the 2nd Brigade of General Symon's Division had been well prepared
by the artillery. Brigadier-General Spragge, as soon as he saw that the
2nd Brigade were advancing against the hill on which the large sangar
was situated, and which formeda sort of " advanced post" to the enemy's
position, a t once sent on his other brigade of division of artillery, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Purdy, for the preparation of the infantry assault
already described. This brigade division of artillery made beautiful
practice against the main ridge, which the 2nd Brigade was assaulting.
Although owing to the steep reverse slopes on which the enemy could
shelter themselves, no great number of casualties resulted from the
artillery fire, the physical effect of the guns in the actual destruction
of rangarr, and the moral effect in that the enemy were prevented
from lining the crest to oppose the infantry advance, were both undnubtcdly great, and here, as at Dargai, very greatly facilitated the
infantry advance and diminished t,he infantry losses. As the 2nd
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Brigade was seen to be nearing the crest of the main position, Brigadier-General Spragge sent forward No. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery
to the top of the pass to assist i n finally clearing the sangara. In
rounding a corner in order to get this battery into action Captain
De Butts wss killed: he was struck by a bullet in the stomach, a n d
death was almost instantaneous. Captain De Butts was a very well
known nlountain battery officer;he commanded the same battery in
the late Suakim Expedition, and was invalided home from there very ill
indeed. H e made however a wonderful recovery, and had only lately
rejoined his battery. Two guns of this b a t t e r under Lieutenant Edlmann managed to get iato position near the top of the pass, and did
excellent service, whilst two guns of No. 9 Mountain Battery Royal
Artillery, which had also been pushed on came into action a t t h e
highest point of the road and managed to shell the last aangar held
b y the enemy a t a range of 900 yards. The 3rd Sikhs and the Yorkshire Regiment, when they reached the top of the pass, were sent off,
as already stated, to a hill on t h e right, commanding a road over t h e
pass; and the trained scouts of the 3rd and 5th Gurkhas, supported
b y two companies of the Queen's, worked up a spur between t h e
Yorkshire Regiment and the 3rd Sikhs, and "contained" or held back a
large number of the enemy who were trying to get down to the pass.
The 4th Brigade (Brigadier-General Westmacott's) had meanwhile been
supporting the 2nd Brigade, and arrived on the crest, and the 36th
Sikhs, assisted by long-range volleys from tEe Xing's Own Scottish
Borderers and by the very accurate fire of two guns of No. 1 Mountain
Battery Royal Artillery, crowned the crest. The losses in the 2nd
Brigade in the taking of the Sampagha Pass were 1 killed and 14
wounded, of which the Queen's lost 1 killed and 7 wounded. T h e
total casualties in the whole force were about 24. The enemy on t h e
whole had really offered but little resistancr, and whatever casualties
they had, the killed and wounded were successfully removed. The 3 r d
Brigade (Brigadier-General KempsteIjs) had pressed along hard a f t e r
the 2nd Brigade, but despite all efforts arrived too late to take any p a r t
in the action, and was now sent on almost immediately down into t h e
Mastura Valley. NO sooner had the troops reached the top of the pass
than fires were seen a t many of the villages down in the valley below
on the road to the Arhanga Pass : the enemy, with a view to hindering
the advance by creating difficulties of food supply, had fired the stock
of fodder a t many of the villages. So precipitate was their retreat,
however, that the destruction of the fodder was far from successfully

accomplished, and very ample quantities remained: The Afridis, except
t h e Kuki Hhels, did not assist a t all in the defence of the Sampagha
Pass; either because they deemed the attack on their own country so
imminent that they could spare no time to assist their allies, or because
they had quarrelled with the Orakzai as to the disposition of the force
i n the pass.
The Same evening, after the capture of the pass, both diVisiolls
of the Tipah Field Force moved down into the Mastura Valley where the
orakzai in times of peace have their permanent head-quarters. Unfortunately the baggage of the troops, even great-coats and blankets,
could not follow them in all cases thesame day, and many corps were
without these end had to spend a bitterly cold night, and in the case
of the Dorset Regiment and the Gordon Highlanders, not only without
a n y warmclothing but with nothing to eat, except what they had carried
with them in their havresacks. Of course to pass two divisions with
their obligatory mules even, i.e., without anything in the shape of tents
a n d heavier articles of equipment, along a bad mountain track on the
same day on which anaction had been fought in the morning (thus
delaying the start of the baggage) was a n obvious impossibility; and
t h e corps who were without their baggage were doubtless prepared for
t h a t eventuality. The two divisions remined the next day (the 30th)
a t t h e Mastura Camp. The MastiIra is a fine wide valley, with numerous homesteads of solidly built two or three storied houses, with good
outhouses, and with the usual towers and walled enclosures. A11 this
d a y the baggage began to slowly trickle i n from the Sampaghit Pass,
where t h e block on the narrow road was enonnous ; and in the evening.
t h e block being hopelessfor that day, orders Tere issued postponing
t h e further advance of the troops and the attack on the Arhanga Pass
until the next day.
The Arhanga Pass leads direct from the Mastura Valley into Maidan
t h e summer home of the Afridis. The order of adyance was: 4th, 3rd,
2nd and 1st Brigades in the sequence named, beginning at 6 A.M ; all
baggage animals, except pakhal mules, following in rear of tlhe cloumn.
Mr. Donald, the Political Officer with the 2nd Division, who has a mosf
intimate knowledge of these tribesmen and their ways, ~redictedthe
night before the attack that not more than about 500 men would hold
t h e pass, and his prediction proved absolutely correct. The enemy were
very few indeed in number, and offered little if any resistance. The
4 t h Brigade threw forward a regiment, the King's Own Scottish
Borderers, and seized a conical hill some 1,200 yards from the centre 0%

.

the pass, and on to this hill Brigadier-General Spragge brought to play
the three batteries of the 2nd Division, under ~ieutenant-ColonelPu1"dy.
The 3rd Brigade (Brigadier-General Kempsteis) then made a denlonstrative movement to the left; while the 2nd Brigade (~rigadier-General
C;aseleels), acconlpanied by General Symons, made a flank attack on the
right with a view to seizing a hill commanding the pass from the east.
The order of advance of this brigade-which practically took t h e P s i tion by itself, so weak was the resistance-was
that the Yorkshire
Regiment, with the trained scouts of the 3rd and 5th Gurkhas on their
right, and the 2-4th Gurkhas were in first line, with the 3rd Sikhs i n the
second line and the Queen's in the third line. There was a greatrace u p
the hillside between the Yorkshire Regiment and the 2-4th Gurkhas ;
the Ynrksllire Reginlent just winning on the post. The enemy fired
very few shots, and the total casualties were only five; amongst whom
was Captain Searle of the 36th Sikhs, wounded by a stray shot as his
regiment was supporting the King's Own Scottish Borderers in the 4th
Brigade.
After the Arhanga Pass had been crossed the valleys of Maidan and
Rajgul in Tirah, the summer quarters of the Afridis, lay before Sir
William I~oCkhart,and these he now proceeded to enter, having lifted
thep~crdnhfrom Tirah in four days from the time of leaving Khorappa
in the Khanki TTdlley. The ease with which the Afridis had been
ousted from positions vaunted as virtually impregnable, was the more
gratifying, as the experience a t the Chagru Eotal had been thought
by sonie to foreshadow stubborn resistance throughout the campaign.
Their impotence to bar the advance of such a force as the Qovernnient
of India had sent against them, was now probably as clear to the
tribesmen as to anybody else; and the only question was whether they
would frankly accept at once the terms soon to be announced by Sir
William Lockhart, or attempt to partially preserve their military prestige among the frontier tribes by avoiding a regular action and maintaining a guerilla warfare. The latter course they well knew could
only bring severe punishment upon their country; but as there were
at least 30,000 tribesmen in arms, the more fiery of the tribal leaders
could not be expected to see the necessity of submitting on t h e spot
without striking a further blow.
We may take advantage of the long delay which once again occurred
a t Maidan in bringing up stores from the Samana base, in order t o take
a view of the country in which Sir William Lockhart had now established

himself.
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Tirah or Maidan Valley, which the two divisions of the Tirah
Field Force reached on the night of the 31st October, lies in a wide basin
surrounded by steep hills, crowned in places on the nortll side with fir
trees, but there are no forests of tree.9 either in the wlley or on the
hills. The valley is quite open, with large areas of fairly flat ground
with deep ndlahs between them; the whole valley is well cultivated
and very fertile. There were numerous homesteads rather than villages
everywhere : these homesteads generally consisted of a tower and two
01' three double or three storied houses surrounded by smaller buildings
and outhouses and with many walnut, peach, apricot, cherry and other
trees round them. They were full of grain and fodder, though in
some cases the fodder had been burnt before the troops arrived. But
the numerous fowls, bowlsof aia, honey, walnuts and other comestibles
found i n the houses showed that the rapid advance of our troops had
rather taken the Afridis by surprise. The water-supply was good ; the
nights mere not so cold as in the Mastura Valley, just traversed, and
the whole situation of the troops was greatly improved, from the point
of view of camp comfort. Butumn was well advanced, but it was
easy to see that in the spring or summer the country must be very
beautiful. I n the hot weather the central valley is no doubt densely
populated: the banks of the streani were found to be honeycombed
with cave-dwellings. I t wits difficulty to ascertain how many Afridis
stay during the winter in Maidan, probably not more than one-fifth of
its sumnler inhabitants. I n a warm winter, or if troubles were apprehended towards Peshawar, no doubt more would remain. Regarded
geographically, Tirah is thus described in Hecords of 3'rontier Ezpeditzolrs (Paget
Mason) :-"Maidan is a circular valley or basin, about
ten miles in diameter, surrounded by forest-covered mountains rising
from 8,000 to 9,000 feet. The valley is well drained by three or four
large watercourses : that to the west, where the Malikdin Khel hamlets
stand, is known as the Shilober, which name is also applied to the entire
stream afterthe others have joined it, niz., the Sherdara, occupied by the
zakkH.Khels from the east : the Manakass, occupied by some fanlilies of
the Jownki and Ashu Khel sections of the Adam Khels; and the
KahudaLaa, occupied by the Kambar Khels. These converge from the
Shi]ober Toi, which, leaving Rilaidan, enters a narrow rocky gorge three
llliles long commanded by heights rising one thousand feet above i t on
eitller side. After emerging from this defile, the torrent flows through
open coulltry for two or three nliles, then joins the Rajgul stream a t
Dwatoi, after which the nilited stream receives the name of the

River." Beyond Maidan lies the Rajgul Valley, of which we read :" I t s length is about ten miles and the breadth of the open Country
lying on either side of the central stream about four t o five miles where
widest, i t s elevation being roba ably over 5,000 feet. Bajgul is inhabited
by Kuki Khel Afridis, and their hamlets lie near the stream in t h e
centre of the valley. Temporary sheds are erected by the shepherds
among the pine forests which clothe the surrounding mountains. On
the south Rajgul is separated from Maidan by a steep, rocky, wellwooded spur, 8,000 to 9,000 feet in elevation."
While reserve supplies were being slowly ~ u s h e dforward from
Ehorappa, through difficult country overrun with daring Afridi
skirmishers, a t the tedious rate of about two days' supplies in twentyfour hours, there was for a long time no occurrence iu Tirah to give to
t h e expedition the outward semblance of activity. The road from t h e
Arhanga Pass to the Tirah Valley was a t first very stony and precipitous, but the Bombay Sappers and Miners rapidly improved i t ; a n d
once down into the valley the path or paths were quite easy, and in
time the whole road from Khorappa was made ~racticablefor camels,
The ordinary baggage moved through the Arhanga Pass more quickly
than i t had done over the Sampagha Pass, and every British reginlent got
their great-coats and blankets on the night of the 31st October, that is,
the night of the arrival of the troops. Part of the baggage belonging t o
the 15th Sikhs, however, was caught by the enemy in the narrow defile
on the Maidan side of the pass after dark : the tribesmen fired from t h e
heights above, the mule drabies bolted, the escort of the 15th Sikhs with
great presence of mind closed round the ammunition mules and effectively protected them, but some 71 Jeypore ponies and some 200 k i t s
were carried off. Three drivers were shot dead in the dark, and t w o
wounded.
The next morning, November lst, Bagh, t h e place where the great
tribal jirgnhs are usually held, was reconnoitred. The enemy fired on
the reconnoitring party but were driven off by a few shells. Captain
MacLaren, King's Own Scottish Borderers, was elightly wounded, a n d
the 1-3rd Gurkhas lost one sepoy killed and two,severely and one slightly
wounded. The Afridis were seen a t 1 P.M. coming down in considerable
numbers from the hills to the east of the camp with bullocks to carry
off fodder and goods ; and the 2nd Brigade, with the Derajat &fountain
Battery, moved out to stop their operations, returning to camp a t 5 P.M.
Lieutenapt E. G . Caffin, Yorkshire Regiment, was aeverely wounded in

this affair. A picket of the 36th Sikhs moving out to their post a t
6 P.M. wereattacked, but they drove off the enemy: one sepoy wan

wounded. The transport from the Ai-hanga Pass coming into camp
about 7 P.M. was also attacked, and hand-to-hand fighting ensued ; and
our casualties were::-2nd
Royal West Surrey-killed 3; wounded 4 ;
Northamptons-mounded 1; transport followers-wounded 3 ; Jeypore
Transport Train ki2kd 1; wounded 3. Some baggage was lost.
The main body of the Afridis seemed chiefly concerned in getting
their families and flocks into a place of safety. For the moment the
upper part of the Bara Valley lay open to them, and although this could
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only be a temporary refuge itwas the best they had to turn to without
entering Afghanistan in unwelcome numbers. Excluding the Adam
Khels and a part of the Kuki Khels, who had not risen, there were probably not less than 20,000 Afridis bearing arms ; counting old men,
women and children, the whole Afridi population a t the lowest estimate
must number 50,000; winter was drawing near; and Sir William
Lockhart, who was playing a driving game, hoped by properly combining
the movements of his main column in Maidan with the movements of
the Peshawar Column then a t Bara Fort to make the position of the
tribe one that must compel complete submission. It was considered
quite unlikely that a huge tribal exodus into eastern Afghanistan would
take place, though doubtless many separate families would flee towards
this the only safe line of retreat left open. The conclusion generally
drawn was that the Mridis would rally their scattered forces in the
Bara Valley aod would then be driven esstvard, the scene of the operations gradually shifting nearer to the Peshawar frontier so as to play into
the hands of the Peshawar Column which would advance from Bara for
the purpose. There was a possible escape for the Afridis from the Bara
Valley into the Bazar Valley which runs north of and parallel to it;
indeed already the Bokar Pass coanecting the two valleys was thronged
with the families and flocks of the ZaBka Khels, the Aka Khels and the
Kambar Khels. But this evasion a t the best could only prolong the
&se, and i t was thought that the warlike Afridis, after having been
driven all the way from Chagru Xotal to Khorappa, from Khorappa to
the Sampagha and Arhanga Passes, and thence through Tirah into the
Bars Valley would a t last make an all-decisive stand.
For the moment the Afridis alone were engrossing attention, but
as may b e well supposed the Orakzai were not dropping out of the plan
of campaign, as heavy scores had yet to be settled with the beseigers of
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Gulistan and Saragheri. A reconnaissance in force was ordered down
the Mastura Valley, which runs south of the Bars Valley t o discover
what opposition the Orakzai were preparing to offer, and it was
intended later on to look up Lhe Khnnki Valley also, still further south.
But operations in these two directions could be deliberately undertaken
by Sir Power Palnier with the strong body of troops forming the Line
of Communication, a t a later stage, after the base of Sir William
Lockhart's main column had been transferred from Eohat (vid Shinawari
and Khorappa) to Pesliawar.
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GUERILLA WARFARE-A

FIEAVY CASUALTY LIST.

HAVING
removed their families to places beyond the inlrLzediatereach
of our troops, the Afridis now began to grow extrenlely bold, and
o n the 5th November they attacked the convoy with the headquarter
baggage from Kborappa as i t was approitclling the Arhauga Pass.
Tiley also atti~ckecla foraging party from the 2nd Division, killing a,
Jamadar and one nlan of thel5th Siklis and wounding five others severely,
besides carrying off about 40 mules. The same night there was heavy
firin< for three hours into Maidan Camp. Lieutenant C. L. Ciffard of
t h e Northanlptonshire Regiment was shot dead and Captain E. L.
Sulliva~lof the 36th Sikhs was severely wounded while walking about in
t h e mess tent Two nights later, Captain E. Y. Watson, Commissariat
Officer, 4th Brigade, was shot through the head by a stray bullet and
cliecl almost imnaediately. On the 7th N~vember,a Sunday, while the
2nd Brigade were a t church parade, a bullet was fired into the assembly
a n d nearly brought the service to an abrupt conclusion, as i t only just
missed the chaplain. Every tent and sleeping place in camp was now provided with shelter from bullets, either by excavation or by making stone
a n d mud walls, and the messes were similarly protected. The 2nd
Brigade went out foraging on the 8th, and owing to the precautions
talcen by Brigadier-Gewral Gaselee, the enemy were kept a t a distance
a n d there was only one casualty, in the 2 4 t h Gurkhas. Large quantities of grain were seized and mnch more had to be left behind. On tlm
9 t h November the 4tl1 Brigade destroyed niany of the towers and fortifiecl posts of the Zakka Khels, this tribe having defiantly refused to send
i n n jirgnh,
having moreover been mainly responsible f o r the heavy
firing night &fternight into mmp. Uesultory brushes with the enemy
c o r l t i a u e ~to occur while the Tirah Reld Force remained a t Maidan
awaiting the compIetion d its reserve supplies, but they Ied to nothing
of moment.

one unfortunate event vhiclr occurred in the Kurram Valley a t
this period canllot be left unnoticed here, though it had' no immediate
connection with anything then taking place in Tirah. Colonel
comma~ldingthe ILurrarn movable colu~un,taking advantage d

suspension -of hostilities i n the neiglibourllood of Sadda, made a
reconnaissance up the Rarrnana defile, which, though very successful in
itself, was incidentally marred by a heavy and quite unriecessary loss of
life. The reeonnaissa~lce,which was made in force, took place on the 6th
Xovember, and a good surrey was made of a ort ti on of the Massuzai
country. The defile is seven miles long, and, according to all appearances, could be held by a tilollsand tribesmen with proper defensive
preparations against almost any attacking force, a s the river bed is
commanded from both sides within easy rifle range throughout. The
enemy, however, were on this occasion conlpletely surprised, and did not
even hold a stockade across the defile. About six miles from Sadda the
road was found passable for cavalry, and the Ce,ntral India Horse went
through in force and reached the village of Esor a t 11 o'clock. Here a
lance belonging to a Duffadar of the 3rd Bengal Cavitlry, killed near camp
i n September xvas discovered, ancl also a quantity of arms, gunpowder
a n d grain. The arm9 mere confiscated, b u t nothing was destroyed.
The retirement began at 1 P.M., when the enemy collected in considerable force. The 5th Gurkhas, as year-guard. proceeded a nlile down the
defile without trouble, but here a stoppage occurred o ~ i n gt o some
delay in getting in a picket o i the Rapurtllala Infantry from the heights
above t h e right bank of t'he river. The Gurklias were detained a n
hour, and the enemy meanwhile advauced i n strength with standards
flying. A few casualties occurred, the Gurkhas losing one killed, one
severely and two slightly wounded, the Kapurthala Infantry one slightly wounded, and the liurram Militia one dangerously and one slightly
mounded. The enemy on their part lost heavily, a n d though the groilnd
-as suited for the peculiar following-up tactics of the Pathan, they
gradually fell back discomfited, the last five miles into camp being
covered witllout a shot being fired. The Maxims and long-range volleys
of the Royal Scots Fusiliers .iverbevery effective. So far tlie reconnaissance, which had been conducted i n a very able manner, had apparently
been a complete success, and what was very i n ~ p o r t a n it t had served to
reveal t h e true state of this shorter route from t h e Kurram to the
Khanki Valley. But, nnkno\-cn to everybody except the unfortunate
troops concerned, a sad disaster had befallen the Kapurthala picket already reSurred to. The picket consisted of thirty-five Silchs llnder
Silbadnr, and their position on tha heights above t h e right bank of
river had apparently been chosen as i t overlooked not only t h e road
along t h e river bed but also the Gao defile which joins the
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:defile a t Jani ?Lob. V h e n the picket mas first signalled to withdraw
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and join the main body, the message was acknowledged; but unfortunately the withdrawal was not begun forthwith, though the route by
which the picket had ascended was a perfectly safe one, as none of the
,enemy were near it, having in fact begun to retire up the defile. What
was worse, the delay made in executing the order of withdrawal entirely escaped attention, and indeed i t was eventually reported to Colonel
Hill that all units of his column were present. Thereafter the march of
t h e column to Stdda was resumed, and the five miles home were covered in ignorance of the absence of the picket. Stranger still,
present" was again reported to the OfIicer Commanding the Force in
camp the next morning, and it was actually not until late in the day
t h a t Colonel Hill was informed t k t t a Sub,~darand thirty-five men of
t h e K a p u r t h ~ l aInfantry were " missing." Search parties were sent out,
b u t no trace of the party could be found, and all too late i t was discovered that only a few members of it l ~ a dactually rejoined the colnmn
when i t started back from Jani Kot. What really happened to the illfated picket was only discovered later. The Subadar in command had
apparently watched the running fight in the Karmana defile with the
closest attention, and conceived the idea of sharing in it. The sepops
were equally keen, and i t is perhaps not to be wondered at that a body
of brave men, whose discipline is not of the hard-and-fast kind which
obtains in our own regiments, should have become excited when they
saw a n action taking place only a couple of miles or so alvay in which
they had no prospect of participating. When the signal to retire was
received, the last hope of the picket of even a chance skirmish disappeared. Very reluctantly they began to descend. Theroute by which
they had ascended was takenat first, but after it had been followed for
some distance the Subadar and the more irnpetuous spirits decided to
disobey the order signalled to them and to move down the ridge i n a
direction which would brit~gthem into the defile nt a point considerably
higher up than Jani Kot. The signallers and five men went on in the
original direction and reached the main coluron in safety. So far as.
could be madeoutthe Subadar's party soon got into very broken ground,
among cliffs aud nul~ahs,and eventually dropped into a narrowand difficult ravine. If they had been able to follow this toits junction with the
Karmana defile they would have come out abovethe Gurkha rear-guard,
and would even then have been in a highly dangerous position. But as
they moved down the ravine they discovered that the way was barred,
bhe jungle being on fire. Finding themqelves trapped they endeavoured
k retrace their steps and were observed bysome of thetribesmen. T.he "

-2asAkar thereupon halted in its retirement, and the enemy turning back
swarmed about the nu/lah, effectually cutting off all retreat. A s heavy

firing might have attracted the attention of the main body of the troops,
the Massuzai and Chaukallnis contented themselves bj sitting 011 guard,
and it was not until the moon rose that they made their attdclc, l'olling
Stones into the ravine and silooting down the whole party. Deplorable
as the result must be held to be, there could be little doubt that i t was
directly due to over-eagerness on the part of the little band of rnen and
their leader to give a good account of themselves. They wele brave to
a fault, and they paid the penalty which sometimes attaches to ras'lness
in the face of an enemy. After this aff<~ir,
the attitude of the tribesmen east of Sadda became more hostile than ever, and the Massuzni
were reinforced b j a11 the Chamkanni clans. But no actual fighting
ensued, and we may once again leave the Kuri%amValley, to follow
events in Maidan.
On the 9th November, by way of preparing for an early forward
movement, Sir William Lockhart ordered a reconnaissance in force from
Maidan t o the Saran Pass, which ledds into the Bara and Bazdr Valleys
through the Sipah Afridis' country; and ag;iin the day's operations
though in themselves entirely successful, were marred incidentally by
an unlooked-for. disaster. The force which made the reco~~naissance
to
Saran Sar was amixed brigade under the command of Brigadier-General
Westmacott. Sir William Lockhart followed the column to the Saran
Sar but returned in advance of i t and had reached camp some t,wo
hours before the disaster in question occurred. The regiments forming
, 15th Sikhs
the mixed brigade were the Northamptoas, the D o ~ e t s the
and the 36th Sikhs. After the cl est of the Saran Sar had been crowned
t h e troops started back with all speed, 11opi11gto corer the five miles to
can~pbeforesunset. All went wellulltil mithin about a mile of the canip ;
no sign of the enemy being visible. I t WAS then dusk, and one company
of the Northamptons, while marching alone down a nulloh, were
ambuscaded by a party of tribesmen. The enemy would seem to have
been lying close up t o the route taken, and their fire a t short range was
terribly effective, s s the regiment had 49 casualties, including t h r e e
British Officers. The three other regiments were only sliglltly enfi;~ge&
during the retirewent ; their losses being 3 killed and 15 wo:ln&d.
The list of casualties for the day was as follows: British 0ficer~-Trill J :
Lieutenant J. T. Waddell and 2nd-Lieutenant A. H. Mscintyre, North..
ayptonshire Begiment ;wounded :Lieutenants G. A. Trerkt (NorthmpJ.

tonshire Regiment), 0 P. S.Ingham and A. A. Mercer ( ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ l ~ i ~ e
Regiment .. ?dative OEicer-~c.ot;~,d+r :-otie S ~ l h n d ~l.;tkl
~ . , sikils. ~ , ~ ~ ~ l ;
a n d fiie : Pu'or.~;i~:~.olptonsllire
Kegillieut-17 b~iied uud 29 vvunllciec~
;
Dorsetshire Eegiment-2 killed and 6 wo~~r>cled
; 15 q.
~ l l i h 1~ liiiled
a n d t: wounded; 36th Sikhs-3 wounded. Total of ;tll l a n k s - k i ~ i ~ d 72
, ;
wol~izdeti', 45. The anibuscade nlust either have been most carefully
planned, or, as seenled more likely, the attacking party were lying concealed on the lookout for stragglers from camp, when they b e c ; ~ ~ u e
aware of the regiment moving down the ravine, a r ~ d c?ecidecl to pour in
a few rapid volleys a t close quarters before a c#~i~ntet--stt;tcic
could he
made. The tribesnlerl chiefly concerned in the ;tttsck were again the
Zakka Khels, a.midst whose villages in &laidan tlle Tirah Field Force
w a s then encamped.

It was not very plain a t first how the Northa~nptons came to find
theniselves alone in a nullah cut off from their main body; and the
l a t e r details never entirely cleared up this point. The facts w h ~ c h
ultirllately came to light are these. Ju clearing the way f o tlie
~ reconnaissance, i n the first instance, a commanding position mas captured
by the Northamptons, who as advance-guard euveloped the west

flank of the ridge which the enemy occupied. The position was t:,keU
a t 11 A.M. with only 5 casualties. Sir Willram Lockllart and staff
anivecl about 1-30 PM. and a t 2-15 the retirement was ordered.
H e r e the casualities began in earnest : for the enemy, follom7ing their
favourite tactics of witllholding their attack until the withdrannl of
o u r troops, eniergecl suddenly from the woods, and the Northamptons
who now formed the rear-guard ha? I man killed and 11 mourlded in
q u i t e a short time. The removal of the wounded became increasingly
difficult, and the ground was too precipitous for stretchers. The 36th
Sikhs were sent back up t h e hill to assist the Northamptons, who were
seen to be seriously encumbered by their numerous killed and wonnded,
and the foot of the hill was only reached a t 5 P.M. U p to tliis point the
Northamptons, though having m m y casualties, had rlie~elysuffered the
ordinary fortunes of rear-guard fighting. B u t being now belated, and
anxious (as one version suggested) t o make up for lost time, they took a,
~ h o r cut
t which, as it cl~anced,lay through a n u ~ l a h ambuscaded by the
enerny, feeling secure from further molestation by reason of their neara e s s to camp. The march through the nullah, under a deadly shower
of bullets, was conducted with wonderful coolness. Though powerless
to retort upon the concealed enemy, and losing strength a t every step,
unlucl<y band stuck bravely t o their wounded. -When caIlllj %'as ad
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last reached a t 8 P.M. Lieutenant Macintyre, a Sergeant and eleven men
of the regiment were reported missing, and were all found killed next
morning. Sir William Lockhart a t once ordered a nki1itnr.y court of
enquiry,to he held regarding this very unfortunate agair, and after
evidence had been recorded the papers were sent UP to Army HeadQuarters.
Two days later the 2nd Brigade under ~ e n e r a lGaselee, with two
mountain guns and one company of Sappers, paid a second visit to Sitl'an
Sar to cornplete the survey, bring in forage and destroy the fortifications of s l ~ c hZakka Itchel villages 8s could be reached. This was all
acconlplished satisfact,orily and without any serious misadventure; the
defences of about 40 villnges being destroyed. Our casualties were :
Second-Lieutenant Wright, 2nd Queen's, slightly wounded ; one man of
the 2nd Queen's killed, and one sepoy of t h e 1-3rd Gurkhas slightly
wounded. The enemy's loss was considerable, being a t least 13 killed
and 30 wounded by rifle fire, tvhile the artillery fire was also effective.
While all this gllerillii fighting was in progress the Political Officers
under Sir William Lockliart were endeavouring to arrange for the
submission of the tribesmen. Letters were sent out to all the sectiona of
the Afridis and Orakxai, intimating that if they would send in their j i r gahs and promise submission, the terms of the Government would be made
known to them. The Orakzai jirgaha. came in promptly itnd'were informed
t h a t they wou!d be required to make a formal declaration of subniission to
the Government, to restore all rifles and Governnlent property lo,,ted, t o
surrender 500 of their own riflea, to pay a fine of Rs 30,000 and t o give
hostages for the fulfilment of such terms a s were not required to be
carried out forthwith. They were further informed that can~pensation
for danlage done to their buildings would be taken into consideration
later on, when the relations of the Governnlent with the border tribes
would be re-arranged. A fortnight's grace wa.s allowed the111 to comply
with these terms, and the different clans departed severally to consider
their courses. Before leaving, the,jirgclhs asked that the Government
should apportion the fine among the various sections of the tribe, b u t
after consultation with the Political Officers Sir William Lockhart decided that the entire demand should be divided equally between the Gar
and Samil factions and that these should make all further internal dis:
tribution themselves without assistance frorn t h e Government. A s for
the Afridis, most of their .jL.paha also came in, some a t once and others
?t intervals, to hear ,what terms the Government intended to impose,
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+buttwo Afridi clans refused to come in or to heal- any terms a t all,
defied the Government to L L come on?' These were the Zakka Khels and
t h e Aka Khels. To the Afridij1fgcl.v which did come.in Sir X7illiam
Lockliart returned ,a stem answer, declining to listen to anytliiqg. they
had to say or to declare any terms to them until the two recalcitrant
clans of their tribe had come in also, and warping them that unless
.submission were voluntarily and quickly n l ~ d eit would be vigorously
enforced. The Zakka Khels, who alone of all the Afridi clans were
really responsible for keeping hostilities so vigorously alive, have their
settlements in the Baznr Valley and Khyber tracts during the winter,
and move t o Maidan and the upper part of the Bura Valley during the
.summer, and are tlie most powerful of all the Afridi clans, mustering
4,500 fighting men, mostly well armed. They are notoriously bloodthirsty
and treacherous, and are dreaded even by their fellow tribesmen. I t
was they who had planned and mainly c a r r i ~ dout the attack on the
Khyber posts, andin all the tribal councils during the past few weeks
they alone had formed the irreconcilable war party The Aka Khels
a r e found during the winter to the south-west of Peshawar, near Akhor.
Their fighting strength is 1,800 men, and their poverty prevents their
possessing many breechloaders. I n the summer they migrate to the
Waran Valley, which lies due north of the Mastura Valley, within
st.riking distance of the place where Sir William Lockhnrt's force
then lay. Hy nature the Aka Khels are not a very bloodthirsty clan,
but in this instance they were dragged in tlie wake of the Zakka
Khels, a n d the fact that the Mullah Saiad Akbar belonged to the clan
no doubt prompted them still more strongly to hold out a while for the
sake of their i z z f c t . The appearance of a brigade in the Wnran Valley,
where t h e Aka Khels were then strongly mustered, was therefore one
of the first measures called for, and Brigadier-General Kempster was
instructed to carry out this nlansuvre forthwith.
A t daybreak on the 13th November General Ke~upster's Brigade
with No. 8 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery and No. 5 Bombay
3fountain Battery, the 36th Sikhs and some companies of Sappers
started out for the Waran Valley by the Seri Kandao Pass. Contrary
t o expectation the troops entered the valley pritctically without any
opposition either during their advance or later in the day; the camp
was not fired into during the night ; forage was obtained in large
qualltities and without opposition, both on the 13th and 14tl1, and
all appeal'ed quiet.
Some very interesting letters were found
in Saiad Akbar'a house-which was visited and destroyed during the
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reconnaissance-amoilgst them one from the Had& Mullah, written in
July or August. It said that the Turks had completely defeated the
Greeks, that the English had b ~ e nturned out of Egypt and deprived of
the use of the Suez Canal, that the Mohmands had defeated us, that our
powerin Inclia was on the wane, and that now was the time torise against
us, as E n ~ l l s htroops could not stand campaigning in the hot weather. On
the 15th Noventber the force moved out to make a f ~ r t h e rreconnaissance towards t h e junction of the Waran and Mastura Valleys so as to
have t h ~ point
s
c~ccuratelyfixed in the survey of Tirah wliich was being
made under the gene~dlsupe~+~ntendence
of Colonel Sir Thomas Holdich.
Althollgh the Aka Khels on the previous two days had shown no active
hostillby to the free mo\rement of our troops, due mil~taryprecautions
had been taken throiighout, and the wisdom of this caut~ousnesuwas
we11 exemplified on the 15th. No sooner had the advanced guard
gut beyond the llmits of tbe camp, than a British flag of truce sent
out in the d~lectionof some -41ta Iiheln, who were seen coming out
of their houses, I ifles in hand, nas fired on by Zdkka Khel tlibesmen
posted on an z~djoininghe~gbt,a Gurklin I-lavildar belng killed, and a
sepoy wounded The reconnaiasAnce was plished furward, the tlibesrrlen
keeping up a continuous fire, more espec~allyon the return of t h e troops
to camp. The casualt~escluring t h i ~d ~ were
y
1 killed and 6 wounded ;
2 of the latter being Gordon Highlanders, who were shot as they
were golng to their picket post a t duslr I t appeared later on, from
irlformation received by Colonel W ~ r b u r t o n ,who acconlpanied General
Kerupster, that the Znkkd Khels had entered the Waran Valley during
the night of the 14th Novenlbrr and had tried to incite the Aka Khela
to fight, in the hope that General Kempster would retaltate by wholesale
destruction of villages, and so drive the Aka Ilhels into t h e ranks of
t h e rrri.concilables The Aka Khels, however, held aloof o n the lSth,
and consequently no damage was done to their houses, in spite of the
shots tired by Zakka Khels.
Orders had been sent to Brigadier-General Kempster t o return t o
Maidan on the IBth, Sir William Lockhart's inteiitlon belrig t h a t the first
move from Ma~dan-to B~gh-sliould b e g ~ non the 17th with the 2 n d
Bngade and tlie Divisional troops of the 1st D~vison. Brigad~rr-General
Kanipater. accnrdirlgly issued ordeis to the effect that the baggage wit11
sufficient escort was to move soon after daybreak ; and the road over tllc
pass and for a great why on each slde had been so improved by t h e
exertions of No. 4 Bombay and No. 4 Madras Sappers that nearly alk
&he baggage was safely in canlp a t Maidan by 3 P.X.

But as soon as the retirement of the troops bcgan, the enemy, Loth
Zalrka Kllels aud Alra Khels, pressed boldly f o r w i ~ ~and
d , there e~lsuecl
one of the severest rear-guard actions of the whole campaign. To
describe in the exact order of occurrence all that took place is to incur
some risk of confusing the narrative, for several bodies of troops, isolated
fronl the nlain body, met wit11 independent adventures in different parts
dnring different stages of the general action. But the
of the field
following extended account of the fighting, while faithful enough in
detail, will perhaps be found as little involved as any that could well be
prepared of such an affair.
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A t the outset the enemy were held back b y the I-2nd Gurlrhas,
admirably handled by Lieutenant-Colonel Travers, t o whom two con)panies of the Dorsets afforded great itssistance. The 36th Silrhs had
been sent oil to hold the pass for a time, and were eventually relieved
by the 15th Sikhs; the two conlpanies of the Dorsets and the 1-2nd
Gurkhas retiring over the pass, covered by the 15th Sikhs, who haiI
parties out holding heights 011 each side of the pass. The 36th Sikhs had
orders when relieved by the 15th Sikhs to take up a positisn further
down the road and nearer Maidan, and to hold various positions on the
high ground above the road, so as to cover the retirement of the 15th
Sikhs. The Gurkhas had some very heavy fighting before they reached
the pass-which they did not cross till 3 P.ar. or later-for the enemy's
marksmanship was as usual excellent, and 3 men were Billed and 5
mounded, despite the cleverness of the Gnrlrhas in availing themselves of
cover. S~irgeon-CaptainSelby, I.M.S., attached to the 1-2nd G ~ ~ r l i l ~ i ~ s ,
showed great courage in tending the mounded under fire, a perilous
duty unflinchingly performed. Lieutenant Wylie, a most popular Officer
with all who knew him, who had only very lately been transferred
for duty from the 2nd Battalion of his regiment a t Samana to the
.
1st Battalion with the Main Column, was shot through the head by a
stray bullet, Captain MacIntyre of his regiment carrying his dead
comrade's body himself till a litter could be obtained. The Gurkhas,
once they had crossed over the pass, nlet with no further casualties till
they reached camp. Eut the 15th Sikhs, who had covered the Gurkhas'
retirement and who were now in rear of every other regiment, had a
far more stirring adventure awaiting them. As they began to draw in
their pickets from the heights above the pass, the enemy pressed forward
anew in great nulr~bers,and many losses were suffered before Colonel
Abbott assembled most of his men (he had only five weak compaliiea) on
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the sungays on the spur preparatory to a retirement further down the
hill. The enemy had by this time collected in a wood within
40 yards of t h e nlain sungar, and while Captain Lewarne was taking a
company of t h e 15th Sikhs down from a post they had been occupyirlg
a position further down the hill, a large number of swordsmen
after him. Captain Lewarne very coolly halted and fronted t h e corupany, fixed bayonets, and waited before opening fire till the swords*len
were within 40 paces. A t the same time a second party, under Lieutenant Vivian, perceiving the enemy's mancenvre, dashed gallantly u p t o
Captain Lewarne to aid him in checking it. On this occasion the A f r i d i
losses were undoubted, for the charging tribesmen nlelted away before
the Sikh fire, and the company reached the poilit i t was making f o r
without further molestation. The fire on the main body of t h e 1 5 t h
Sikhs with Colonel Abbott in the large sungar west of the wood was v e r y
heavy indeed; and a t length Colonel Abbott deemed i t advisable t o
apprise Brigadier-General Kempster by signal that his retirement w a s
being greatly delayed by the presence of wounded Sikhs in t h e sungat.
whom it would be extremely difficult to carry away under a heavy fire.
Brigadier-General Kempster a t once issued orders for two companies of
the Dorsets and five companies of the 36th Sikhs to return towards t h e
15th Sikhs and assist the retirement. Lieutenant-Colonel Haughton,
Commanding the 36th Sikhs, was a t that time riding with one of his
companies nearest thd pass, while Captain Custance was in command of
another company of the 36th Sikhs holding a hill further away to t h e
right. Before receiving General Kempster's order Colonel Haughton, as
soon as h e was informed of the difficulty in which the 16th Sikhs were
immersed, a t once, and of his own initiative, started awaywith t11e single
company near him, and left Major Des Vmuu, his second-in-comnlarrd, t o
bring on the remaining three companies and the two companies of t h e
Dorset Regiment. Captain Custance with his isolated comparly however*
was the first to reinforce Colonel Abbott, the time being then about 4-15
P.M. The enemy were firingwithvery great precision from t h e wood, a n d
t o show one's head above the sungars was to risk having a bullet througll
it. Colonel Abbott had already been wounded bx a shot from a jhezai1,
apparently loaded with pieces of telegraph wire, which struck Iliru. in
the face, inflicting a serious though happily not a dangerous wound.
Captain Custance, while reconnoitring for a good positio~i f o r l ~ i x
company, received two bullets through the helmet and was tlicrl s I ~ ~ t
through the thigh, and both he and Colonel Abbott were LcillK
carried dowl. the hill in stretchers when Colonel Itaughton arrived 011

I

the Scene. Major Des VEUX,before following his Colonel, had awaited
the arrival of three other very weak companies of the 36th Sikhs,
a n d with these he had also brought a company of the Dorset Regiment under Captain Hi~mmond,with Lieutenant Cowie and Lieutenant
Crooke, Suffolk Regiment (attached to the Dorsets for duty), as his
subalterns. Soon afterwards Lieutenant Hales, East Yorkshire Regiment (attached to the Dorsets), also came up with half a company.
I n making his way to reinforce Colonel Haughton Major Des Vceux
decided to take the company of the Dorset Regiment under Captain
I3ammond on wit.11 him, and to leave the other half-company, of which
Lieutenant Crooke was in command, to hold a house close by above the
road, Lieutenant Hales also remaining on the spot with his half-company.
T h e object in leaving a company of the Dorset Regiment to hold the
houses was to give a point d'appui for the troops in rear further up the
' pass. Major Des Vceux then hurried on with the remaining companies
of the 36th Sikhs to catch up Lieutenant-Colonel Haughton, so that
eventually the latter had near him-though not all concentrated in the
same place, but in different positions on the spur west of the wood-10
companies Sikhs and half-company Dorsets. 11;should be remarked here
t h a t although for the sake of simplicity the narrative is forced to speak
of "companies" they were only companies in name, or the nucleus
of companies. The half company under Captain ~ a m m o n d ,Dorset
Regiment, for instance, had only 16 men, and the Sikh companies,
especially those of the 15.thSikhs, only numbered from 20 to 30 men
each, so that in all probability Lieutenant-Colonel Eaughton had not
more than 200 men in all under his command, especially after he had
sent on the wounded ahead. A s a matter of fact, most of the regiments
i n General Kempster's Brigade were very short of men a t that time, for
this brigade had borne the brunt of the losses, and many men had been
invalided. Moreover, there were men absent on baggage duty and
enlployed in conveying the wounded back to camp. Lieutenant-Colonel
Haughton's force was a t this stage in two portions, the greater part
holding the sungar close to the wood and a smaller part a sungar further
down the spur. Soon after Colonel Haughton's arrival the fire from the
wood, which had hitherto been intense, began to slacken. Apparently
tllis was due to the tribesmen leaving the wood and working round by
t h e north to try and cut in on the line of retreat further down the hillany case, as the fire had begun to slacken and it was rapidly getti]%
dal,k, 2nd as the wounded had all been sent on and the su??garsheld were
untenable for the night, Colonel Haughton ordered a gradual retirement.

The party in t h e westerlllllost sungar covered t l ~ retiremellb
e
of the other
party from the sungar nearest the wood, and the march was made to the
foot of the hill without furtlier loss. Heye in the darkness the troops
were reformed, each Officer calling to a certain company to rally
round him, a n d search had to be nlade for a path, as i t was considered
advisable t o remain on the spur on high ground rather than follow the
real road down the nullah. A t this monlent a heavy fire was opened
on the force from in front, in flank, and i n rear. To have continued
the march under this fire would have involved heavy loss and possibly
disaster. To have renlained stationary would have been to submit
hdplessly to being shot clown. I n this critical situation Colonel
Haughton did not for a lllolvenfJ!ose his presence of mind. H e observed,
as well as i t was possible i n the dwkness, that the fire came principally
from some houses about 300 yards distant, and with splendid decision
he ordered the troops to fix bayonets and turn the enemy out of
the houses. Equally decisive was the response of the troops. The
Dorsets with a cheer, and the Sikhs shouting their war-cry, advanced u p
the cultivated terraces against the houses, which by the way had been
set on fire that morning, the mud walls only remaining. The enemy
replied with defiant shouts, and waited till their assailants were mithin
10 paces before opening a very heavy fire. Luckily, and probably owing
to the ground being in steps, the Afridi fire was too high, and only one
man of the 15th Silrhs, a Subadar, was hit and badly wounded. Of three
principal houses the 15th Sikhs occupied the northernmost house, the
Dorsets the centre, and the 36th Sikhs under Colonel Haughton tlle
southern home. Lieutenant Munn, the Adjutant of the 36th Sikhs, ran
one tribesman through with his sword on reaching the pIateau or spur
on which the houses stood : and a few others were shot. E u t there was
now great danger of the separated parties firing on one another, and t h e
'<cease fire" was accordingly sounded. The 15th Silths and the Dorsets
then moved down to the building held by Colonel Haughton. All t h e
bnildings mere still too hot, after having been burnt, to allow of their
being entered, and the troops were placed in a sort of semi-circle with
t h e main building behind tliem. There were no nlaterials for malring
barricades and sunyurs, and before the troops could be got into position
and lie flat on the ground a very heavy fire was poured in on them,
killing Captain Lewarne, 15th Silrhs, wounding Lieutenant Munn,
36th Sikhs, and killing 3 sepoys and wounding 5 others.
After tllis a
desultory fire was kept up by the tlsibesn~enoutside till the moo11 begall
to rise.

Meanwhile major Des Vceux with Iris small force fo~mdhi'rnself
cut off from his Colonel. I n the attack on the villages he had taken two
con~psniesand selected for assault a house further to the south. Captain
Hammond, temporarily separated from his own company in tho
darkness, accompanied him. When the house had been seized, it was
found to be untenable and a move was made to another house. This
building, though it had been burnt, had cooled don~n,and the party of
about two weak companies a t once set to work to make a breastwork
with clods of burnt earth and pieces of timber. Major Des Vceux
was not attacked in force, t h m g h the enemy hovered rol~ndfor hours,
shouting that they would serve the defenders as they had served the
defenders of Saragheri, and even throwing stones over the walls of burnt
houses behind. Communication was established with Coloncl Haughton's force by whistle, and the sentry hadorders to fire an occasional shot
to show the enemy our troops were on the alert and not short of ammunition. The night was miserably cold, especially for Colonel Haughton's men, as they had not even a house to go into, and neither party had
great-coats or blankets. Colonel Haughton himself went out and reconnoitred under a heavy fire before daybreak, and finding that there
mas no very intricate ground between himself and Major Des Vceux,
started off to join him, the wounded being earried en charpoys found in
t h e houses. The enemy tired, but the dim light did not admit of
accurate aim, and the retirement was well covered by Lieutenant
Cowie with the Dorsets. When the w11oYe force had been concentrated
a move was made towards camp, and t h e troops seat out by General
Kelnpster to relieve Colonel Haughton were met about 8 A.M. Thus
ended one of the most exciting r e a r - p a r d actions in the whore Tirah
C a m p n i p But one painfuI episde renlains t o be related.

It had fared very badly with the two half-companies of the Do~sets
left behind by Major Des Wceux on the pass the previous night to cover
t h e intended retirement of Colonel Haughton's little force, especially
with the half-company under Lieutenant Crooke. A t the outset the
two half-conipanies, some 35 to 40 men in all, with Lieutenants Crookc
and Hales, occupied a house and some sungnrs, a strong position, a little
above the road. It will be remembered that Lieutellant Crooke had
been told by Major Des Vceux that he was to hold on to the houses whatever might happen in order to cover the retirelllent of the Sikhs from
t h e pass. It was dark, and men were heard moving down the road
in the nullah below. These were challenged and it is said they replied
tl1c.y were Sllzhs. This point will probably never be cleared up for both

Lieutenant Crooltc a n d Lieutcnnnt TIales are clead, and the mrn nrttl pnrBibly also the Nan-~onrllris~iuned Oficers, who all cotltc fro111h 1 , l d r i ~ ~
cantonnrents are urlacyuninted with Hiridusts~ii,i ~ ~the
i ~f:rct
l (pi tire c l ~ , d lenging is not clearly establislrrd. I n :illy case, Lieutcn;illt C~'c~c,lir,
a very
ci~pableOfficer and of great espcricnce, believed t h l ~ ttlrt. Illen l.wlow
lrim were tllc 15th a n d 36th Sikhs, and in t h a t e r r o ~ ~ c u ul ~sv l i i ~11e
f let'bnbly gave the order t o retire-his l ~ a l f - c o u r ~ ~oil
; ~ ~olio
l y ~ i i l eof tlrt. h l , u r
nearest t h e n u l l n h , t h e other lkalf-conryi~nyfurtiler a\traLy. As ;L 11r:~tteruf
f ~ c tthe nlen whom he had clritlleliged were Afridis, a n d tlrcy c,ullr 011
Lieutenant Croolie's half-con~pariy,killing lii111 and (3 111en.
U'UIIII~~II~
7 others. Private Vickery of this half-colrrpn~iy, who hat1 previuusly
distinguished h~lnselfby trying to save a wuuniled lrlau u11der:L heary
fire a t Dargai was one of the wounded. He was sliot tlhrougli the foot
a n d was then attacked by three swordsmen. Hle sliot t h e first, b;ljonotted the second, losing his bayonet i n tlle man's budy, and then clubbing Elis
rifle knocked the third man's brains out. Finally he returned to camp
brillging with him a wounded comrade. Lieuten#tnt Crookek lrl~lfcompany, which suti'ercd so severely, belonged to C'aptniri 11Iari111iond's
company of the Uorset Regiment whic11 trad atyorded souh great
assistance to tlie Nortliarnptu~lReyinrcnt on the 9th Uctol~rr,bj. llelpir~g
to cover tlieir retlreillent, and, assisted I J ~tlre 36th Sikhs, to carry it1
their wounded.
A few words reniain to be said about the main I)c~ityof Eriy;dierGeneral Iiempster's force. Tliese troops h:~dheld or1 ;LS1cl11gits ~ ~ t l \ s ~ l , l c
t o the foot of tlie hill the previous evening in tlrc Iiol~viuf I~cill; itlrle to
cover t h e retirement of tlre l5tl1 aiid 36th Sil;lis :~14dthe ~ E V U11;~lf-COIIIp n i e s of the Dorset Regirlrent; but as d;rrk~leuscit111eon, : L I I ( ~ it E V ~ S
impossible, for the artillery especially, t o see tu fire, LSrigi~(lir.r-!;r.~ru~rl
Kempster ordered tlie retisenlent to be contirriied, urlrl ci~1111)
was rt~:icI~e d about 8 P.M. Arrangements were a t ollce 111r~defor a. fi~lce to
be sent out a,t daybreak towards the 1~;iss. All tllrougl~tlrt. 1iig11t~ i ~ i g l ~ t
nlen of t h e Uorset Regiment, a great Inany of tl1t.111 wo~rutled,xt r.;~~gl+*tl
into carnp, but tlie half-company whicli LicuLc.n;~~~t
I i i l l c ~hiiti c.rr~~siriii~~tled was brought in.tact by tlrc Srrgci~nt. ?'Ire l)c~tliabs11f I,il'l~tl~liiblltH
Crooke and Hales and nine men were ~ C I I I I IC~ I ~ I S ~tlrg(ltli<~
*
i i ~i~ ?i1~1kz1'(,
and tlre funeral of the two Officers ;nlil nine 11rt.11 tc,ok ~ i l : b r . c f i (111 t l r c b
evening of tho l 7 t l ~Novclt~berill une 11:ti't of t110 G ~ I I I ~ "JI~~ i l , ' ( ' ; t ~ ~ t : t i ~ l
Lewarne and Lieuten:~nt Wylic wcrc buried tojit~tl~ts~.
ill irllctt2tr.t. pitrt.
It was a sad ending to what lrad otherwise. been n very h~trtc.r?xnfulc.rpc.tlition, but one and all wllo spent the riiyl~tin tlrc cnpturccl 11utldt:~WL.I,(:
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unanimous on one point-however niuch tlieir testimony on nlaili points
owing to tlie darkness was in conflict-that Lieutenant-Colonel Haugllton's coolness, excellent tactical arrangements, and presence of mind, from
t h e moment he arrived with his small reinforcements at the pass till the
relieving tloops were met next day, completely outmatched the enemy
and prevented what .migllt under the leadership of a less cool and able
conlnlander have been a n actual disaster. A s it was, every man of the
Dorsets, 15th or 36th Sikhs, who took part in tlie bayonet charge on the
houses, had good reason to be proud of his performance.
Our casualty list for the whole affair was a long one, and included
4 Officers killed and 3 wounded: the total for all ranks being 33
killed and 36 wounded. The full return is as follows:-Dorsets-killed:
Lieutenant G. D. Crooke (Suffolk Regiment), Lieutenant Hales (East
Yorkshire), both attached to the Dorsets, and 10 men; wounded: 8 men.
1 5 t h Sikhs-killed:
Captain Lewarne and 10 men ; zuounded: Colonel
Abbott (slightly) and 13 men. 36th Sikhs-killed : 6 men; zooonded:
Captain Custance, Lieutenant Munn and 7 men. 2nd Gurkhas-kzlled:
Lieutenant Wylie and 3 nien ; ~uounded:4 men. No. 5 ~ o n l b a yMountain Battery-zvou?zded :one man.

THE

PLdx

O F Cb31PAIOX FURTHER DEVELOPED.

0 s the 18th of Noven~ber Sir William Lockhart was a t last able t o
lllake a mol-e from Maidan, and he turned his face to the north-east i n
the direction of Bagll. There were several reasons why i t was considered desirable to move from Maidan: the troops had exhausted ~learlyall
tile grain and forage in the vicinity of the camp; a move to Bagh threatened other sections of the s f r i d i tribe, notably the Malikdin and K u k i
Ii11~ls(for from Eagh a path exists into the Rajgul valley by following
tllr Shalojba stream to Dwatoi); and the moral effect of our troops
encamping round Bagh which bears a sonlewhst sacred cl~aracter,would
also have a wholesome effect in convincing the enemy generally of our
pover to more and encamp anywhere. P a r t of the 1st Division (MajorGeneral Synlons') began the move on the 18th November, the force
consisting of the 2nd Brigade and tlie Divisional troops. The distance
to Bngh from Mt~idan is about 3 miles, and the attitude of t h e
tribesmen as the troops aclvanced on Bagh was at first undecided, as
they were seeaingly under the impression that the nlovemelit was in
connection wit11 either foraging or reconnaisance, and that it would be
followed by the usual retirement to Naidan in the evening. As soon,
however, as i t was perceived tliat tlie intention of General Syrnons was
to camp a t Bag11 the enemy's resistance became very strong, and some
portion of the troops were under fire for nearIy eleven hours, i.e., from
about 7 A.M. to 6 P.M., the enemy firing front the surrounding heights i n
tllree-quarters of a circle. The fire was particularly heavy from a hill
noratl1-westof the camp; and this eminence had to be heavily shelled b y
the artillery and then attacked by the Queen's and the 3rd Sikhs before
the force could occupy it. The assaulting troops having capturcd it,
Captain Parker's Battery, No. 2 Dernjttt, came into action on t h e hill a n d
made excellent practice against scattered parties of tribesmen on surrounding hills; but so bold were the enemy that a certain number crept
up to within 500 yards of the battery, and the Battery Officers had some
very narrow escapes. Captain Parker was shot through the clothes
without the bullet hurting him; one subaltern had his ear grazed by
anotller bullet and anotlier Elad the knot of his sword shot away. To
the west and north-west of the camp tlle euemy were holding sumc

towers and houses and were keeping up a very gslli~lgfire, and they had
t o be dislodged from their positions by single conlpanies uf the Yorkshire Regiment, who were most galiantly led,-noktbly so by 2nd-Lie11tenant Edwards, who with a section of 13 men advanced aud turned
t h e enemy out of a house onhis front in the most gsllctllt manner, losit~g
t h e Colour-Sergeant of the company and one man. The total losses
incurred before the eneniy could be expelled from all the position'i
they had been holding and pickets plsced on such of then1 as it was
deemed desirable to hold for the night, were 5 men killed and 2 3
wounded. Undaunted by temporary reverses, the eneniy as soon it.;
darkness came on crept in between the picket posts and opened a most
galling fire, atid a t one time a concerted volley was fired straight a t
Major-General Symoas' head-quarters, the bullets fortunately all being
too high. So excellently had the troops entrenched themselves thab
there wer8eno casualties from this night firing, though sotne animals
were hit. The Gurkha scouts of the 5th Gurkhas did excellent service
during the 18th November, killing several of the enemy and Inany more
were seen being carried awaji wounded.

On the 19th the troops under Major-General Sylnons were empIoyed in still further fortifying tlie picket posts. All the spare anitnctls
were sent back to Camp Mnidan to assist in removing some 10,OM
maunds of stores belonging to the 4th Advancecl DepGL at Maidan, and
so excellent was the work done by the Comn~issa~~iat
and Transport
Officers a t Maidan that the whole of these stores were removed t o Bagh
b y 12 noon on the 20th. On the 19th, too, the 4th Erigade, with most of
the Divisional troops of the 2nd Division, Najor-General Yeittman-Eigga,
and Divisional Staff, accompa,nied b? Sir WiIIiam Lockllart with the
Head-quarter Staff, moved to 13ag11, letving Brigadier-Gcner:~IKempster's Brigade and some of the llivisio~laltroops behind. to cover the
remowl of the 4th Advanced DepBt stores to Bag11 and to follow on
when all was clear. There was a good deal of firing into camp s t Bagh
on the 19th, but Camp Maidan was left conlpletelp alone by the enemy,
though every preparation had been made by Brigadier-General K e n ~ p ster to meet an attack. The temperat~lreat Camp Bagh, although
the ground lies a t a lower altitude than Camp Maidan, was considembly colder, for the minimum tempel7ature on trhe 19th was 21"
and the maximum 113",and after that date the cold glv~a,tlyincreased
in severity so much so tbat on the night of the 33bh '31" of frost \=:ere
recorded.

( 20% )
On the 20t;h Noveniber a t about 10 o'clock in tho xllorl~ingtile
Zakka Khels made a determine4 effort t o c u t off t h e tail of a convoy
proceeding u p towards the Arhanga Pass. No. 4 Conlpany Rlsdras
Sappers were working not very far from t h e scene of the occurrence,
and Major Kelly, Commanding the Boyal Engineers, 2nd Division,
directed the company to cease work and move off to the scene of attack.
So promptly did the company act under Captain Wright's coninmnd
t h a t the enemy were driven up the valley towards the Arli:t~iga,I'ass,
where, as good luck would have it, a half-battalion Gordon Highln~~derx
under Major Downman weye awted. Two companies of this regiment,
moving separately, hurried down two spurs lying on either ~ i d eof t h e
ravine, and t h e enemy were thus caught between two fires, their losses
being estimated a t something like 40. U n f o r t u a ~ t e I ya sowar of t h e
12th Bengal Cavalry who was with the convoy, and four drabies had
been killed before the Madras Sappers could arrive to their assistance. The same day a great number d towers and fortified houses,
from the n d g h h u r h a o d of which foraging parties 11;~clbeen fired on and
from which sniping into camp had taken place, were destroyed, and this
and the further destruction of towers and fortified poits south of thc
camp next day, had a most salutary effect, f u r tliere w i ~ hlittle u r n a

Om.the 21st November B~igadier-GeneralKe~npi-ute~.'~
1Srjq:lilf: wit14
the remainder of the troops of the 2nd Ihvicii{~ll,~~at)vc:d
t o C~LIIIP
B:~gll.
A s the last of the 3rd Brig~cletroops n1archt.d off' ~.'IY)III
( ' ' L I I I ~ hI:~i(f:i~i,
~
t h e enemy, who had been watdiing tho niovrn~c*l~t
ftr~rllnc.i~k~ltc~lirit~,~
hills, swooped down on t h e site of t h e o l k l r:innl), ~*\utrtinaI~itdlc?r;LIIIX
thither i n the hope app%rrr~tly
of finilirig ~ o ~ ~ t ~ t l(f
t iYILIIE~*
n g I~4t1 ) ~ hind, but they were doonled to disnpr,~ointmer~t,
i t ~ ~ <;L
l . f{.w xIit.llw fro~rr
some guns in $he rear-gu;~ril,withira l';tng(! of wl~ic,il t2112y Jtitd i r l c . i t ~ t tiously ventured, troubled the111 conxidcutbl~,nl~cbr.~*;rff
t.r9 t l i v 11ji~r1~1t
of
t h e 3rd Brijiscle w , ~ spractic;~lly~lll~nolt~st.utf,
hft~:irrwhilt~fill. L'tnci ttri.
gade, Brigadier-Generl~lGatlt?Tee's,
hitit vim-c:tl o r ~ tfurtt~Iiccll r t b r y r*;tr.ly
that morning and had set AIY. to sorile (,7) or 'irk towr1r.i rbr;rl l<rc~l~liolvd
houses south of Camp Bag-h.
There being no defir~iteprospect of tlie Xi~liknKIrc'ln tlrrrlrirnfi ,~ilrl,mission the ternls cif the ~ic~vr~rlrrllt~t~t
\v.vebt*~+
lr+!wat. ]:tilt ;~r12it)lktii*f'$i
to
four AEridi jiryahs vvhicli 11aclbeen iu caurp ;tw;bi!iltg thtd d t ' < . I ~ ~ \ ,fa
&ti~t~

?

a b o u t a fortnight. These terms were: the surrender of all stolen property, a fine of Rs.50,000, and the handing in of 800 breech-loading rifles.
The fourjirgahs in attendance represented the Malikdin, Adam,Kambar
and A k a Khels : to the other tribes proclaniations announcing the terms
were sent out by the Political 0ficer.s.
O n the 22nd November a most adventurous and, as i t proved,
successful reconnaissance was made to Dwatoi or Diva, Toi ,signifying two
rivers), at the junction of the Rajgul and Shaloba streams. BrigadierG e n e r a l Westmacott commanded the for@, which Sir William Lockhart,
Brigadier-General Nicholson, and some of the Officers of the headquarter
staff accompanied. The column was composed of the Kings Own
Scottish Bolderers, the Yorkshire Regiment, the 36th Silrhs, the 1-211d
and 1-3rd Gurkhas, the 28th Bonlbay Pioneers, two companies of Sappers,
(No. 4 Madras and No. 4 Bombay) and two batteries Tne route taken
was a difficult one, and goes for the most part along the bed of the
Shaloba stream, thruugh a deep and narrow gorge ; the track crossing
and recrossing the stream, which is knee deep in places. Wet to the
w a i s t s as they were, and with no food beyond what they carried in
t h e i r havresacks, the troops spent amost trying night out in the bitter
cold at Dwatoi without even their blankets and great-mats: Sir Willii~m
Lockhart himself had no great-coat or bedding that night. Although
the tribesmen on either side of the pass were held off as far as was
possible by the Yorkshire Regiment on the right flank and the 1-2nd
G u r k h a s on the left flank, the enemy were nevertheless able by
occupying subsidiary spurs from the main line of hills on both sides to
keep up a well aimed fire on the troops and animals moving d o n g the
ravine below, and they also sniped a good deal a t the pickets placed
r o u n d the canzp a t night, the total casualties on the 22nd being 2 killed
and 15 wounded. Of these casualties, two- were Officers, one being
Lieutenant Jones of the Yorkslzire Regimnt, killed, and 2nd-Lieutenant
W a t s o n of the same regiment, dangerously wounded. I t appeared that
as the Yorkskire Regiment were moving along the crest of the hills on
the r i g h t flank of the line of march, Lieutenant Jones saw a few men on
a spw below b i a g at the troops in the ravine and took t h e e men with
him to try and turn them oust. The enemy were 80 well concealed,
however, that although he approached very near indeed to where they
were thought to be, their exact whereabouts could not be discovered :
and Lieutenant Jones then most courageously, leaving his men where
t h e y were, \.vent off by himself to try and get round the enemy's

One
flank. Eve11 this mnnsu'r.re did not avail him, and he shouted
of his men to come round to llinl : b u t before the m,Ln reached him he
was seen to jurllp on to a I-ocl; and empty his revolver, and then fall back
woullded. H e had succeeded in uneartlling the foe, but 1123 daring cost
hi111 his life. A section of his company hnrrie\l down to his assistance
and 2nd-Lieutenant 1V:itson. who conl~nanclcd, under a heavy fire
proceeded to get the wounded Officer into a stretcher, di\resting hinlself
of his coat to serve as a pillow. By the time this was done Lieutenant
Watson hi~nuelfwas most dangerously wounded. The bullet broke a
rib, having entered his left side and come out between the shoulders;
fortunately without actually hitting any vital part. A Lance-Corporal
with hirn was shot dead. These however were the only casualties in
the yorksllire Regiment that day; though the regiment met with a
good deal of opposition. The completion of the reconnaissance without
further loss on the 21nd and the equal success of the return journey on
the 24th were undoubtedly due to the skilful manner in which the
t~*oops
were handled and to the facility with which the men had adapted
thenlselves to the peculiar condition; demanded in walbfdre against
skilled t~arksmenand skirinishers like tile Afridis. The Yorkshire
Regiment, which left camp before daybreak on the 2 h d , had such
extreniely difficult ground to traverse t l ~ a ttheir baggage mules could
not accompany them, and their baggage had to be conveyed up t o them
by hand on the 23rd, by v l ~ i c htime they had been 36 hours without
great-coats, blauliets or food other than that which they had brought in
their hawesacks. The 1-2nd Gur1~h:~s
performed equslly good service
on the left flanlr with that rendered by the PorkshireRegiment on the
right, and had three men wounded. The grouncl they had to traverse
was also very difficult, and instead of there being one continuous crest
on which they could move smoothly along, the range of hills is broken
up into a series of knolls wit21 cleep ravines between them, so t h a t the
Gurkhas were contiilually ascending and descending over very rugged
ground. A curious incident occurred durinq this portion of the march.
A s the Gurkhas mere advancing ou. the 22nd November the leading
scouts shot an Afridi who was trying to drive off some cattle, and when
the man's body mas found a little Afridi baby was discovered by his side.
It devolved on the Mess President of the regiment, who computed the
baby's age to be 18 months, to arrange for its nourisllment and nursing.
.For the former essential he provxed fro111 the scanty mess stores some
Swiss milk, and for the latter a Kohati follolver was found who, being

next door in blsod to an Afridi, was promoted to the post of nurse, The
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-question of the disposal of the bab!- on the if.ttl1, xvll~ntlic v'turn jrlurn e y to Bagh mas to be made, became ratiler emharrxscin:. : L I K ~ the hfrss
President decided to restore the infant to its kinsfolk. -Sccordingly,
as the house was being passed where this curions napti11.e wa.i made, the
baby was deposited on the threshold in full view of the -\fridi% who as
usual were pressing on the retirement.
As has been said, the Main Colunln effected
nlost successful
retirement to Bagh from Dwatoi on the 24th Norember, the brullt of
covering which fell on the 36th S ~ k h swas adnlirably performed. The
enemy a t first pressed on the retirement strongly, and so boldly at one
juucture that they actually esssyed to cut in between a couipany of the
38th Silrhs and drive off some hospital pollies which were being 'kept
back to carry any slig!ltly wounded men. Another company of the
36th Sikhs, however, charged down on thest adventurous spirits, who
a s a result had several killed and iive or six of their fire-arms captured.
The column moving along the ravine were all back in camp before
dusk; having sufiered losses to the extent of 17, of which the 36th Sikhs
h a d 2 killed and 1 3 wounded, including Captain Venour, 5th Punjab
Infantry, attached to the 36th Sikhs, slightly wounded. Oning to the
very late arrival of the baggage on the "3rd a, thorough reconnaisrance
of Rajgul Valley and the entrance to the Dtra Valley could not be
made, but enough of it was seen to show that the route from D\r:ttoi
onwards through the B ~ r aValley is considerably easier than that
from Bagh to Dwatoi. Thus ended what under the circunistances w;ls
pronounced one of the most successful rec~nnaissancesyet carried out in
Afridi-land. It is worth mentioning here that %\*henthe 3rd Brigade
1eftMaidan on the 21st November, the 15th Sikhs had been obliged
under orders from Sir William Lockhnrt to part conlpany vith the
brigade and march back to the advance base a t Shinamari. Before their
departure Sir William Lockhart issued a most complimentary order in
to this gallant corps, stating that it was only because the regiment
was reduced by wounds and disease that he had decided to send it
back t o the Line of Con~munication. He further said that the regiment
had nobly upheld the grrarld traditiol~sof the Sikhs and of the 15th Siitha
in particular.
place of the regiment in the 3rd Brigade was taken
b y the 2nd Punjab Infantry.

N~~ that Rajgul Valley had been invaded it could fairly be said
-that the wllale of Tipah had been overrun by our troops, nrilo nloreover
to destroying the
had stendily applied thenlselves for many

and fortified enclosures of the obstinate &kka Khels. There was now
apparently no further object to be gained by remgning in Tirah and
wintering in the cold uplands, as the tribsemen, with their homesteads
in ruins and their supplies eaten up, vould of necessity lllove down to
the Bar&and Bazar Vallevs, even if not driven thither by the troops.
I n fact many of then1 had already left Tirah, and those who remained in
Rajgul were proballly regretting they did not make their escape before
our troops apl&ared at Dwatoi. The time had consequently come
for changing the base of operations from Shinawari to Peshawar, and
this transfer was begun forthwith by removing all heavy baggage back
to Shinawari. The troops being then more lightly equipped were enabled
to operate with greater freedom, while the milder climate in the Bara
Valley wtiuld permit uf their bivouacking without serious hardship.
General Hammund's colunln also made ready to move a t short notice.
But before Sir Villiam Loekhart began this movement in concert
with the Pesh:1\var Column, it mas desirable first of all to settle up
accounts in the Kurmru Valley, or at all events to make quite sure that
Colon~rlHill, Comrnttnding the Iiurram Movable Column, was master
o i the situation in that quarter. Captain Ross-Keppel, Political Officer
in the Kurran~,had a few days previously sent out the following declaratiall of terms to the Kflanki Khel Chamkannis :-To pay a fine of
Rs 1,000, to surrender 30 breech-loading rifles, and to restore all Government property lor~ted. On the 19th November the Chamkannis sent in
their reply, deliberately rejecting the Government terms, and defying
Colonel RilI to enforce them. On learning of this, Sir William Lockhart pronlptly orderedan advance into the Chamkanni and Wtssuzai
country, by w ; ~ yof the Lozaka Psss, the movement to be made in concert
with an advance of the Kurram Coiunln up the Kharmana defile. Owing
hoverer to the more ilnportant operations undertaken in the neighbourhood of Bagh, as already described, i t was not until the 26th November
that the 2nd Brigtcle of the Tirdh Field Force was free to start for the
LozaknPass. On the 27th November Sir W~lliataLockhart himself, with
more tloops and accompanied by Brigadier-General Nicholson, Chief
of the Staff, followed the 2nd Brigade into Kurram. The whole
column wds placed under the imrliediate command of Brigadier-General
Gaselee, and consisted of the West Surrey, the 3rd Sikhs, the 2-4th
Gurkhas the 28th Bonlbay Pioneers, No. 1 Kohat MountainBattery,
X o . ri Bombay Slountain Battery and No. 3 and No. 4 Companies Bo*

b y S p p e ~ . The troops following behlnd with Sir William Lockhart
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Were NO. 2 Derajat Mountain Battery, the Yorkshire Regiment, the
2-2nd G u r k h a s and tBe half battalion Scots Fusiliers. Brigadier-Geneml
Gaselee met w i t h no serious opposition when he crossed the Loz~kaPass
o n the 28th November. The enemy occupied a sungar at the top of a hill
Qn the line of advance, and a company of the Queen's Reginlent under
Lieutenant Engledue speedily dislodged them, losing only one man killed.
T h e other casualties were seven sepoys wounded. After the neighbouring viIlagev had been destroyed by way of reprisal, the advance was
continued, a n d on the morning of December 1st Sir Villiam Lockhart
a n d Colonel Hill met a t Lowarimela, about a mile east of Esor (the
scene of t h e unfortunate reconnaissance which three meeks previously
had ended in the disaster to the Kapurthala picket). There was a t this
period much sniping into camp a t night time, and on the 29th November Sir P r a t a b Singh, Extra Aide-de-camp to Sir William Lockhart,
was wounded in the hand. Sir William Lockhart, in reporting the incident t o A r m y Head-Quai-ters, remarked:-" He (Sir Pratab Sin@> had
his hand bound up by his servant and said notlring on the sllbject.
This plucky behaviour on Sir Pratab Singh's paart is only what might be
expected of a man of his race and soldierly instincts."
After the iueeting of the two columns at Lowarimela the Kurram
column u n d e r Colonel Hill marched towards Thabi, the chief village of
the Khanki K h e l Chamkannis with orders to barn and destroy all tillages
on the way. The force was divided into two columns : KO. 1 Column
under Colonel Money, Central India Horse, consisting of the 2 4 t h Gurkhas, a half-company of the Bomhy Sappers and Miners, Ho. 1 Kohat
Mountain Battery, 150 carbines of the Central India Horse, dismounted,
and one field troop Central India Horse; and No. 2 Column under Colod 12th Bengal
nel Gordon, consisting of the 6th Bengal Cavalry a ~ the
Infantry, 2 Maxim guns, the Scots Fusihers, 150 carbines of the 6th
Bengal Cavalry dismounted, the Kapu~thalaInfantry, and the 1-5th
Gurkhas. T h e 1-5th and 24th Gurkha scoutscovered the advance of both
columns o n the left fl,bnk. No. 1 Column advanced upon Thabi from
the south and No. 2 Column from the west. The latter arrived at some
outlying hamlets about one mile south and west of Thabi a t 9-50 A.M.,
and the advanced guard calne under the fire of some sharpshooters occupying the hills beyond; but the two Maxim guns took up an excellent
position in some scrub jungle on a knoll and kept the euemy's fire under.
The Engineer party with a strong escort then proceeded to burn and
destroy the hamlets. Signalling communication was now established

with So. 1 Column, and orders were sent by Colv~lel Hill, t v l l ~
\v~rs ~ ~ i that
t h colr~nlnto proceed right up the defile to T h a b i and join
l~andsv i t h him; he being h e n within one mile of a n d overlooking
a t once issued orders for the l-Bt,h Gurkllas
Thabi. C'olonelGordo~~
to proceed, foliamed by the maxi^^ guns, tlle 6th Bellgal Cavalry, t h e
Kapurthala Infantry and t,he 13th Bengal Infnntry. T h e defile w a s
very narrow, in some places not more than 50 yards across, with p r e cipitous clitis on either hand rising to 800 or 1,000 feet above t h e b e d
of the river. Ou debouclling f r . 0 1 the
~
defile at Thabi t h e head of t h e
column turned to the south to join Colonel Money, whereupon t h e
enemy, following their invariable plan, appeared on t h e high g r o u n d
over he ravine al!d com;aenced a lleavy fire. The 1-5th Gurkhas a n d
the 6th Bengal Cavalry at once extended to cover the withdrawal of t h o
remainder of tlieiorce through the ravine, and while t h i s was b e i n g
done Lieutenant Xichmond Eattye of the 6th Bengsl Cavalry w a s
kiiletl. A little later the two companies of the 1-5th G u r k h a s and t h e
6th Bengal C'a~ralry, after dalouciliug from the defile, came under a
trying fire from the enemy's sl~al,psllouterson the opposite hill. T h e
enemy had excellent cover amoug Lrees wit11 the adclitional advantage
of being posted above the Gurkhas and the cavalry, w h o were on
the edges of rice terraces which formed the side of t h e slope up
\vhich they had to retire to join Colonel Money's Column. I t mas d u r i n g
this period and among these troops that most of the casualties of t h e
day occurred. On the rear of the colunlll reaching Colonel Hill t h e
6th Bengal Cavalry and 14th Qnrkhas retired without f u r t h e r molestation, their return march being covered by the Gorkhas (scouts a n d
2 4 t h ) together with the mountain battery of No. 1 Column, and they
arrived back in camp a t Lowarimela about 7-30 P.X. D u r i n g the general retirement the totill casualties of KO. 2 Columll had been-killed:
Lieutenant R. M. Battye, 6th Bengal Cavalry, 2 sepoys 1 - 5 t h Gurkhas,
3 sepoys 12thBengal Infantry, and 1 sepoyKupurtl~aIaInfai~try;
seuetely
wounded :Lieutenant Villiers Stuart, 1-5th Gurkhas, a l s o wounded, 1
Native Officer and 5 sowars 6th Bengal Cavalry, 2 sepoys 1 - 8 t h Gurlrhas,
3 sepops 12th Bellgal Infantry, 2 sepogs Kapurthala I n f a n t r y ; a n d 1
follower killed. With reference to the death of Lieutenant Battye, tile
P i o n s e ~wrote :-"It is now almost a tradition with the B s t t y e v t h a t all
shall die on the battlefield; but one nray nevertheless regret t h e deat;h
early in life of yet another of this gallarlt family. Richmond Batbye
vias a young Officer of on1j7eight years' service, eager, acbive, alert anld
conscientious in tile discharge of his duties, of a sound understanding

and full of a generous entliusiasrn for his proiasaion. Ilr iriid acted as
correspondent of the Ptoneer. with the Kurram Colun~n for some ti~lnr
back, and his letters and telegrams gave abundant evidence of the interest he took in his work."
While Colonel Hill was engaged in punishing the Vharlnkarlnir,
General Gaselee had the less troublesome task of muvinq agtinst t i i t :
Blassuzai. This clan made their submission a t once, and as tliry readiiy
paid up 67 breech-loaders, including 4 of the Kapurthsla Infantry nii1r.a
captured on the 7th November, and nearly all tl~eirshare of the Orak~ai
fine, their villages for the most part were spared.

It is worth adding here that the Chamkannis do not really beilnly
either t o the Afridi or the Orakzai tribe. They are a distinct race atad
b u t little is known as to their origin. Mr. Oliver in Arrosa the R o d e r
refers to the more powerful mountaineers onthe upper slopes of tlne Safrd
K o h and then goes on to say : " The petty settlement of Cbamkanniu,
dropped in amongst them, deserves a passing word of notice-a people
described by Bellew as originating in a heretical sect of Persian Islarnites,
driven out of their own country by constant persecution on accourit of
their peculiar religious ceremonies and in~moralproceedings. Orre of
t h e stories against them is not altogether without a sarour of the
' Love-feast' of more modern sects in England ;and consisted in putting
~ u the
t lights a t a stage of the religious perforniances in which Luth
sexes joined indiscriminately, The Persians called i t chiragh-kuxh ( l i t ~ i ~ p extinguisher) and t h e Pathans or-mur (fire-extinguisher.) ;but the Chamkannis have turned over a new leaf and becotne orthoclux &Iilallun~edatis."
According to Scott, it is supposed that the Chamkallnis held nlost uf the
best land in the Kharmana Valley, but were pushed back by the Mzauuzai Orakzai into the wilder and colder tracts to the west. The Xmsuzai,
in fact, claim proprietary rights over the whole Kharmana basin, WJ
square miles in area; but neither the Chamkannis nor the ~haotlkanris,
a pastoral race in the upper part of the district, ordinarily have any
clealiugs with them. During the disturbances on the Kohat-Jiurrsaru
border Chamkannis and Massuzai had made common cause agaillst the
British Government, though Chikkai-the " Umra Khan " of the district
--had remaiced loyal to his promise not to Lake part in hostilities and
had kept together a following sufficiently great to prevent his enemies
from molesting him.
Unlike the Massuzai the Chamkannis were not yet conquered ; tho
uperetions of the 1st L)eccinber, just described, having only sn rcd tl
C
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increase their ire. Accordingly, by way of further cl~astisement, Sir
William Lockhart sent Colonel Hill to Thabi again on the 2nd December, and the enemy turned out in great force to oppose him, but were
beaten off a t the point of the bayonet. The colunin on this occasion
consisted of a wing of the Queen's, the Kohat Mountain Battery, a wing
of the 3rd Sikhs, the 2-4th Gurkhas, 200 Inen of the 5th Gurkhas, and
Gurkha scouts. The work of destruction was this time completely
carried out in the face of strong opposition, the heights overlooking
T h a t i on the west having first to be stormed by the Gurkha scouts led
by Captain Lucas. Many of the enemy were killed : ~ n dwounded, some
30 bodies being left behind. Our casualties were : Major Vansittart,
5th Gurkhas, slightly wounded ; killed: 2 men of the 5th Gurkhas;
wounded : 2 men of the 3rd Sikhs.
The power of the Chamkannis, sucli as i t was, having by this second
operation been thoroughly broken, Sir William Lockhart was able to
leave Colonel Hill i n secure command of the Kurram country and turn
his own attention once again to the Tirah Afridis. I n returning
with his column to the main body of his troops in the Maidan Valley he
did not follow the direct route over the Lozaka Pass by which he had
moved into the Kurmm Valley, but struck out south-east, entering
the Khanki and blastura Valleys a t their upper extremities and sweeping through the principal settlements of the Orakzai. No opposition
was encountered. The Orakzai mere conipletely cowed and hastened
to comply with all the terms previously inlposed Lpon them, delivering up to Mr. Donald, the Political Oficer, 317 rifles and 28,250
Government rupees. Sir William Lockhart, having thcs fully accomplished his object in making the detour, returned to Maidan by way
of the Ghingakh Pass and reached Bagh on the 6th December.

THE PLAN OF ChJlPAIGN CONPLETED.

W ~ J X ~ OaUn T
y further delay the combined movement into the Bara
Valley of t h e Main Column in Maidan and the Peshawar Columu a t
Bars was now begun, the village of Barkai being the common objective,
where t h e two colunius were to join hands. Sir William Lockhart's
Column did not make the march en manse: the 2nd Division under General Peatman-Biggs with the Divisional troops and staff being taken
by Sir William Lockhart himself through the Rajgnl Valley vib Dwatoi,
while t h e 1 s t Division under General Symons, after being further
divided, proceeded in two brigades, the one under Brigadier-General
H a r t through the Waran Valley and the other under Brigadier-General
Gaselee through the Mastura Valley.

It will b e convenient to follow first the march through Rajgul of
General Yeatman-Biggs's Division with Sir Willianl Lockhart-a march
which has been severely criticised. The tactical difficulties besetting the
route from Bag11 to Dwatoi had been in a great measure removed by the
fact t h a t t h e Malikdin Khels, who had partially complied with our terms,
had been told that their houses, which are large and solid and amply
stocked with grain and forage, would. be spared if our progress down
the valley was unopposed, and who therefore not only kept the peace
themselves, but probably prevented other hill men from breaking it.
Their neutrality was a most important factor, for although'of course no
military precautions were neglected b y either column, nothing could
have prevented large losses of men and animals had the Malikdin Ehels
been resolutely hostile. As regards the road itself, Major Kelly, R.E.,
with the 28th Bombay Pioneers, No. 4 Company Madras and one company Bombay Sappers had been a t work on it; and by the time the
3rd Brigade marched forward on the 8th December, the track, though
still difficult, had been greatly improved, and in the result out of the
transport of the whole 2nd Division only 15 animals were lost On the
road; though the number of dead ponies and mules which hltd fallen
into the bed of the stream from the rocks above during the reconnaissance nyade b y General Westmacott's Column to Dwatoi on the 22nd
November, offered striking evidence of what the difficulty of the road
h e n before the Sappers ancl Pioneers got to vork on it.
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The head-quarters of the 4th Brigade (General Westmacott's), which
?eft Bagh a t daybreak on the 7th December, arrived a t Dwatoi about
I1 A.M. The 3rd Gurkhas had exceptionally heavy work all day, and
some of them were on picket duty the same night and were employed
again on the 8th December, so that a proportion of them were on duty
for nearly 36 hours. There was some slight opposition when the leading
troops reached Dwatoi, which was easily brushed aside, the total
casualties that day being 2 killed and 2 wounded; but the pickets
guarding the heights round the camp were fired a t during the night of
the 7th December and attempts were made to rush them, the brunt of
the attacks being borne by the King's Own Scottish Borderers. On
the 8th December No. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery Royal Artillery,
about 100 rifles of the 36th Sikhs, and about the same number of the
3rd Gurkhas and the 5th Gurkha scouts were employed to seize a hill
held by the enemy whence the pickets had been fired on and commanding the entrance to Rajgul Valley. This hill was taken in gallant style
by the infantry: Lieutenant West with the Gurkhas and Lieutenant
Van Someren with the 36th Sikhs distinguishing themselves by their
gallant behaviour and skilful leading. The enemy was very quickly
dislodged with a loss on o u r side of 1 killed and 4 mouncled; the
enemy suffering considerably.

I
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The 3rd Brigade (General Kempster's) began its march from Bagln
on the 8th December about 7-30 A.M., and hardly had the last troops
begun to evacuate the camp a t Bagh when unarmed men of the Malikdin Khels with women and children, and showing every sign of being
famine-stricken, rushed into the camp with the hope of picking up food
and grain, a rather forlorn expectation. The 3rd Brigade commissariat
godowns had marched on ahead with the 4th Brigade the previous day;
but had halted about half-way to Dwatoi, and the advance of the remainder of Brigadier-General Kempster's Brigade was much delayed in
consequence; so much so that when night fell the head of the brigade had
only covered about four miles and had then to halt for the night. The
rear portion of the brigade, comprising two field hospitals, was on the
march from 8 A.M. to 9 P.M., and then could only advance about three
miles,. so great was the congestion of traffic on the narrow path ahead ;
and the last baggage did not get into camp, about three miles from
'Bag;h, till very nearly 11 P.X. The day was cold and raw, without any
sun till about 2 P.M, and then only fitful gleams broke the gloom; and
the long standing about, with feet wet and cold from fording snd

',

re-fording the icy streani was very trying to the men, mucli more so than
if they had been on the march throughout. The 3rd Brigade resunled
its march fairly early next day (the gth), the last of the troops reaching
camp about 4 P.M. There were no casualties in the 3rd Brigade either
on the 8th or 9th December.
On the 9th December some troops, mainly of the 4th Brigade
(Brigadier-General Westmacott's), uiz., two companies of the Royal Scots
Fusiliers, the 3rd Gurkhas, the scouts of the 5th Gurkhas, two companies of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, four conipanies of the 28th Bombay
Pioneers, two compauies King's Own Scottish Borderers, two companies
36th Sikhs, No. 8 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery and No. 5 Bombay
Mountain Battery, all under the command of Brigadier-General Westmacott, accompanied by Sir William Lockhart, moved up the Rajgul
Valley and destroyed all the houses in the centre of the valley, some
60 in number, inflicting considerable loss on the enemy. This destruction of villages had been provoked by the renewed hostility of the Kuki
Khels, who inhabit the Rajgul Valley. This clan had apparently
abandoned their intention of submitting the moment the troops appeared
a t their door, for they had opposed the advance even a t Dwatoi and of
course resisted still more strongly any further progress u p their valley.
So admirably, however, were the troops handled b y Brigadier-General
Westmacott, that the casualties numbered only four: while on the other
hand immense damage was done to the K u k i E h e l property,
On the 10th December the movement down the Bara Valley began.
The 4th Brigade with Divisional Staff and Sir William Lockhart marched first, followed by Brigadier-General Kempster's Brigade some two
hours later. The 4th Brigade marched about eight miles that day to a
camp at Shundana, and Brigadier-General Eemspter's Brigade marched
about five miles to a camp near Karana. The day was miserably cold,
without sun, and the stream, which was very chilly, had to be constantly
forded and re-forded. The enemy began to fire from long ranges the
moment the troops prepared to move off, shooting one man of the Royal
Scots Fusiliers dead in the ranks as the company was falling in on the
camping ground. The Bara Valley a t its upper end is wide and the
going was easy, for no rain had fallen, and movements across the cultivated country and dry rice-fields were quite practicable. The casualties
in Brigadier-General Westmacott's Brigade that day numbered seven,
and in the 3rd Brigade f i v e not including Lieutenant F. Fowke, of the
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norsets, severeIy wounded on picket duty in the evening. AbO'lt
Q P.M. that night a cold drizzling rain began to fall and occasioned great
discolllfort t o those who mere sleeping on the ground, a n d who had
not dug trenches. The rain in fact came as a most unpleasant and
uncomfortable surprise: i t had threatened so long that the soldiers
begun to think it would not really come after all.
It had been intended that the 3rd Brigade should start early next
day (the 11th) a t 7-30 A.M., catch u p the 4th Brigade, a n d that the
whole division should continue the march united. But the next morni n g was very dark indeed, the followers were benumbed with cold, rain
was still falling steadily, and the ground was deep i n mud. All these
circumstances unfortunately delayed the start, and moreover there was
n o company of Sappers and Miners with General Kempster'a Brigade,
besides which the means of getting down from the camping ground,
which was on high ground, to the river-bed below, were very inadequate, and so slippery were the descents that animals were falling about,
on all sides, and i t was nearly 11 A . M , before the last animals were
drawn off the hill. To add to all these troubles, the 4th Brigade for
reasons which have yet to transpire, did not picket the heights on the
flanks of the 3rd Brigade, as the latter had expected them to do, a n d in
consequence these heights had to be captured and crowned by troops
of the 3rd Brigade which greatly delayed the advance. The enemy
pressed the rear-guard and flanks of the baggage from the first, the
mist which prevailed enabling them to creep close up unobserved ; the
ground except in the stony bed of stream was heavy and yielding and
quite unlike that traversed the previous day, and the cold a n d wet
combined with the constant fording of the stream seemed to deprive
t h e mule-drivers and followers of their senses and to leave them with
one idea only, viz., to press along as fast as possible, quite regardless
of how their animals or their loads were getting on, a n d to escape the enemy's bullets constantly flying over their heads. Some
extraordinary scenes ensued. Brigadier-General Kempster called sever a l halts in order t o close up the transport and rear-guard, a n d to
send out fresh troops to guard the flanks of the line of march; and
every endeavour was made t o keep the transport in the river-bed a n d to
prevent the mule-drivers taking short cuts across country a n d so getting
entangled i n heavy ground o r in deep-water channels. The moment,
however, t h e head of the colunnl moved on, the wave of transport
swept on after i t like a pent-up stream suddenly released, spreading

o a t so~netimesto a front of half a ntile or more; every mxn pushing
blindly forward, all anxious to avoid fording the river, in places kneedeep, and all acting on the principle of " each man for himself and the
devil take the hindmost." Twenty times the number of Transport
Officers present could not have controlled this seething mass: it was an
indescribable jumble, sometimes all jostled together on a front of 100
yards and sometimes all s p r e ~ dout to a width of over 800 yards.
Those who took short cuts across country, despite every endeavour on
the part of the Transport OfIicers to stop them, seemed to be gaining
ground a t first, and others madly followed them; so that everywhere
were animals either bogged, or slipped up in ditches with their loads
under them; or with the chain broken between them and the leading
animal : while the d~abi,all unconscious or reckless of everything else,
provided he had only the leading animal of his three following him,
pressed on blindly. Where soldiers, British or native, were with the
animals, the situation was of course different, and the dvabi could then
be stopped, though usually only by main force ; but whatever baggage
had no special escort or guard with it ran very little chance of reaching the next camp intact. Where the going was fairly easy, and the
transport was on a broad front, i t moved a t a most extraordinary pace,
certainly not less than four miles an hour ; so eager presumably were
the drivers to get in to the next camp and settle down to a fire, for
the rain was still falling incessantly, and every follower must have
been wet to the skin. About 5 P.M. the head of the main column of
General Kempster's Brigade arrived in sight of the 4th Brigade Camp;
and he had the option of either going on and joining that brigade
or halting where he was for the night. As the other camp, however,
seemed near and as the mass of his transport mas reported close up,
Brigadier-General Kempster decided to push on. This had the disadvantage that i t still further lengthened an already very long march;
but, on the other hand, the 3rd Brigade had now been following the 4th
Brigade for four days in succession and fighting a continuous rear-guard
action during the last two days, and if General Kempster could now
overhaul General Westmacott the order of march might be re\-ersed, the
flanking and picket duties would be lessened and the men enabled to
get more rest. Whether or not these were the reasons which actually
influenced Brigadier-General Kenipster's decision, the fact remains that
the order was given to press on and gain the 4th Brigade Camp, an order
to those
very welcome to the leading troops, but hopelessly impo-~sible
'
in rear. The aclditional march was easily accomplished by the troops of
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the advance-guard and main column of the 3rd Brigade, most of whom
arrived in camp just before dusk ; but the transport and rear-guard had
stiH to come. Darkness now came on rapidly, the rain continued, t h e
road to camp was difficult to see, and many of the d ~ a b i stupidly
s
made
a bee-line for the lights of the camp. Those drabis who took this rash
course were leading most of the animals and loads which >ventually
got lost; for the ground, which was easy a t the start, was afterwards
intersected with deep water-courses nearer the camp, and an animal
once involved was not to be easily extricated. Many drivers deserted
their animals, and many followers disappeared into houses in search
of wood, kc.; while some kahars either broached a keg of rum or
found one already broached a n d got hopelessly drunk: three of those
who got to camp dying from the effects of intoxication, and others lying
about helpless in the camp. Heavy firing could be heard just outside
camp; and between 7 and 8 P.M. a party of Gordon Highlanders with
Surgeon-Major Beevor, who had been escorting and carrying some
wounded whom the dhoolie bearers had deserted, arrived i n camp. So
fatigued were the men who were carrying their wounded comrades,
t h a t Surgeon-Major Beevor himself had helped to carry one man's
stretcher, or rather the bottom of the dhoolie used as a stretcher. A t
that moment several or' the enemy had crept up in the dark to within
20 yards and fired a t the party; and heavy firing had continued f o r
some minutes, but fortunately no damage was done, and t l ~ egallant
Medical Oficer, who had lent such valuable moral and physical assistance, brought all the wounded u p to his hospital without further hurt.
Major Downman, Gordon Highlanders, who was the senior Officer with
t h e last portion of the rear-guard, (consisting of one company of t h e
Dorset Regiment, one company of the Gordons, half a company of t h e
2nd Punjab Infantry, and about three companies of the 1-2ndGurkhas,)
as he was retiring and while still some two miles from camp, came upon
a large number of transport animals entangled in ditches with their
drivers benumbed with cold. Meanwhile the enemy began to press
closely on the rear and flanks. To go on to camp unless t h e aninlals
were left where they were was impossible, and Major Downman with
presence of mind and judgment decided on seizing some houses a n d
holding them for the night. Once in those houses the enemy's attacks
were very easily repulsed, and shelter was gained from the ever falling
rain, which continued till 9 P.X. that night, and then to everyone's intense relief finally stopped.

To contenlplate a resumption of the march early next day from
Sber Khel, where most of the troops of the 2nd Division were now encamped, a s had been previously intended, was clearly out of the question
SO far as the 3 r d Brigade were concerned, since 400 men were still some
three n ~ i l e sbehind on rear-guard duty and probably encumbered with
wounded, niany animals and followers were missing, and many followers
were lying about like logs hopelessly drunk. A t an early hour Brigadier-General Kempster went out with two battalions and a battery to
help t o bring in Major Downman's troops, on whom the enemy had
niade continual attacks a t daybreak, k~llingone and wounding three of
the Gordons i n a single volley. The troops came in by 11 A.M. without
further losses. The casualties in the 3rd Brigade on the 11th and the
early morning of the 12th amounted altogether to between 30 and 40 :
and incl~rded Captain Norie, 1-2nd Gurkhas, very severely wounded
(his arm was afterwards amputated) ; Lieutenant Williams, Ek~mpshire
Regiment, Transport Officer, severely wounded; and 4 men killed and
11 wounded i n the Gordons, and 2 killed and 9 mounded in the 1-2nd
Gurkhas. Retween 100 and 750 transport animals with their loads were
missing, besides many followers, and one unit alone had lost as many as
50 animals. No. 24 British Field Hospital, under Surgeon-LieutenantColonel Bourke, only lost three animals altogether, despite the fact that
a unit like this has a llluch fewer number of Non-Commissioned Officers
and men i n proportion to the animals than any other unit. The
Medical Officer i n charge of this hospital had taken extraordinary
pains to make i n efficient; and not only did the wounded under all
circumstances receive every attention and constant food and care, but
the disciplinary and transport arrangements were equally excellentdoe to the fact that Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel Bourke personally
superintended everything. Surgeon-Major Beevor, previously referred
to in connection with his gallant conduct in helping to carry the
wounded men on the night of the l l t h , was attached to this hospital.
H e had come out to India for a year from England, where he was one
of the Medical Officers attached to the Brigade of Guards, in order to
experiment with the RBntgen rays, and the help he was able to render
to his brother Medicial Officersand the benefits he conferred on wounrled
nlen were enormous. A11 day on the 12th December Surgeon-Major
Beevor and Surgeon-Captain Marder, the third Medical Officerwith this
llospital, were dl.easing tlle wounded, for no sooner had one case been
dealt with than anotlicr was brought in.

On the morning of the 12th December the sun shone out b r i g l l t l ~
again, and seldom has its warmth been more appreciated. Everywhere
wet clothes and blankets were spread out to dry; and soldiers, British
and native, basked in the genial rays. There had been no such day of
sunshine since t h e 2nd December, but though the sun was warm, there
was a very cold wind. All the afternoon and evening there was continnal
firing into camp, and some followers and animals were hit, one Afridi
with a Lee-Metford rifle being particularly aggressive.
On the 13th December the march from Sher Khel was resumed,
t h e idea being to move rather more than half-way to Barkai. The
Sappers had greatly improved the roads out of camp, and the 3rd
Brigade moved off a t 7-30 A.M. ; the 4th Brigade, Brigadier-Gener.1~1
Westmacott's bringing up the rear. 011 this occasion, unlike t h e rn~rcll
of the l o t h a n d 11th December, the front brigade performed t h e task of
picketing the heights on the flanks of the rear brigade, and thus greatly
facilitated the progress of the latter. The leading brigade met with
practically no opposition, but the 4th Brigade had perhaps t h e heaviest
rear-guard fighting that had hitherto occurred in t h e campaign, not even
excluding the operations related in the preceding chapter. The enemy
began to fire before the troops had left camp, and five animals in the
King's Own Scottish Borderers were killed whilst loading u p ; itnd a11
equal number in the 3rd Gurkhas. The latter reginlent acted its rearguard a t first, the Xing's Own Scottish Borderers being on one fla~lk; ~ n d
the 36th Sikhs on the other; whilst the half-battalion Royal S c v t ~Fusiliers moved behind the last of the baggage. Brigadier-General Wrstmscott personally superintended the fighting all through the day,
remaining always with the rearmost troops, and t h e ultimate success of
the day was largely due t o this. The enemy showed great l~oltlnt~ss
and followed across the river ; but the King's Own Scottish 13ordel+er.w
and the 3rd Gurkhas were lining the banks above; and t h e Afridix
came under a hei~vycross fire while in the water, and a180 unt1r.r t l l ~
fire of a machine gun, and their losses were very hesvy. Tile ro;~<l
is
along the bed of the river for about three miles, to CL plr~cti citlltbtl
Gali Khel, and then leaves the strearn up a very steep ;~sci.rlton Gltcr
left bank and passes through undulating country coveted with sc:rlr't,
jungle; with very high hills on the left flank, which were s1,ly c ~ . o w n ~ * ~ I
and held by flanking detachments from Brigadier-Generi~lRt:rrrl'.qt,et;8
Brigade. The enemy's intention in crossing the river was evi<Ierrtlyto
t r y and get a t the left flank of the .baggitge. A n atternpt llatl Lean

niade to keep the 3rd Brigade and 4th Brigade baggage separate;
a whole regiment being behind the 3rd Brigade baggage a t start.
ing and a half-battalion a t the head of the 4th Brigade. A11 this
was in vain, however, for the river-bed was very wide, and the heavy
firing i n rear made the mule-drivers press on regardless of consequences, regiments, roads or even mules. One driver actually
tried to take his mules over a high stone wall ; the leading mule
scrambled over, the other two hung b ~ c k the
, coupling chain broke, but
the mule-driver went on with the one mule, probably thankful enough
t h a t he had a stone wall between himself and the flying bullets. About
P.M. the head of tho 3rd Brigade halted and encamped, having marched
some seven or eight miles ; and as the 4th Brigade were hotly engaged
and could not make such a long march, the Divisional Staff tried to stop
t h e 4th Brigade baggage travelling beyond a camp two miles further
back ; but much of i t came into the 3rd Brigade camp near Sher
Karnar. The 4th Brigade hospital baggage especially had got far
t o the front ; and when dusk fell all the hospitals in the division, or
what could be collected of them, had congregated together. The followers had largely absented themselves; men an followers, though all
warned before starting to carry full water bottles, as no water might
b e obtainable, had in many cases neglected to take this precaution
and no water was obtainable ; and even palckal mules in some cases
came in empty.
To return to the 4th Brigade. The enemy continued to press very
heavily after the river-bed had been left, and casualties were frequent ;
each casualty taking away several men from the fighting line, for from the
12th December till the arrival a t Barkai, kahars and dhohlie-bearers had
t o be almost entirely replaced by fighting men, and especially so on the
14th December. The force a t General Westmacott's disposal wits becoming much reduced, and he had towards dusk only some 200 of the
Northanlpton Regiment and about 150 each of the King's Own Scottish
Borderers, the 36th Sikhs, the 3rd Gurkhas and the Royal Scots Fusiliers.
Seeing how far the 4th Brigade Camp was, he decided to halt for the night
on a convenient ridge, and hardly had he halted than the enenly made
a rush. Bayonets were fixed and the rush repelled with loss, but
Lieutenant West of the 3rd Gurlrhas was shot dead, and many casualties occurred. The enemy continued firing on the pickets till about
9 P.M., and the troops had no water beyond the little remaining in their
bottles; their kits were on ahead and they had the prospect of continued

fighting next day. The losses during this ~llemorable day were
about 70; and in addition to Lieutenant West, killed, Captain BatemanChampain of the same regiment was slightly wounded, and Captain
Short, Royal Scots Fusiliers, and Lieutenant Sellar, Xing's Own Scottist1
Borderers, were severely wounded. The wounded from the previous day
had a most trying time, but all-Captain Norie with his amputated a r m
conspicuously-bore their sufferings most patiently.
The march to Barkai was resumed and completed next day, t h e
wounded in both brigades being carried almost entirely by their comrades, and the head of the 3rd Brigade was soon in contact with t h e
advanced troops of General Hammond's Column which had already
arrived a t Barkai from Bara. All the 3rd Brigade got into camp in
good time ; but the 4th Brigade had continuous fighting till they were
out of the scrub jungle, and they got into their camp just before dusk,
with a further loss of about 10. From the time the brigade left
Camp Sher Ehel on December 13th, and despite the enemy's constant
endeavours to get round the flanks and attack the baggage, there was
practically no loss a t all of baggage or animals; and the general opinion
seemed to be that the troops had been most admirably handled by Brigitdier-General Westmacott during the two days' continuous rear-guarsd
fighting. A rest was now ordered and never had troops better deserved
it than those of the 3rd and 4th Brigades ; and though the division
had lost 166 between Bagh and Swai Kot, they had t h e satisfaction of
knowing that in the last few days a t ally rate the enemy's losses had
much exceeded their own.
Having seen t h e completion of the march of the 2nd Division,
under General Peatman-Biggs, through the Rajgul and Bara Valleys
to Barkai, we have now to follow the less chequered progress of t h e 1st
Division under Genera1 Symons, through the Mastura and Waran Valley,
to the same objective. The whole division marched down the Mastura
River as far as Hissar without meeting with any opposition, t h e 1st
Brigade under Brigadier-General H a r t being in front and the 2nd
Brigade under Brigadier-General Gaselee following a t a distance of a
day's march. On the loth December extremely successful operations
were carried out in the Waran Valley against the Alra Khel Afridis
by way of reprisals for their recent attaclr on General Kempster's rearguard (described in the previous chapter). On a reconnaissance made
by Captain E. W. S. K. Maconchy, 4th Sikhs, orders were issued o n
the evening of the 9th for the 1st Brigade and DiviRinnal troops t,n

cross the range between the Mastura and Waran Valley earIy next
morning. The Aka Ehels were completely surprised, and the whole
of the towers and walled houses in the Waran Valley for a length of
three miles mere burnt or blown up. General Hart commanded the
troops in the valley 90 skilfully that the enemy had no chance. MajorGeneral Symons and St;tff assisted for four and-a-half hours in passing
the troops over the hills, and then watched the proceedings from the
heights. The Mullah Saiad Akbar's towers and village were levelled
to the ground; the damage to these buildings pre~-iouslyinflicted by
General Kempster, having all been repaired. The Afridis were bold and
fired a great deal, but mere prevented from closing a t any point. The
troops in retirement passed through each other, and the successive lines
prevented the enenly approaching within effzctive mnge. During the
day the Zakka Khels from the vest joined the Aka Khels, andused LeeMetford rifles. The troops were all back in their new camp by 7 P.M.
I t had been an arduous day, and extra rations and rum were issued
to all. The two mountdin batteries were particularly well handled, and
their accurate fire was most effective. Our casualties were one Havildar
of the Nabha Imperial Service Infantry killed, and two privates of the
Derbyshire Regiment, one Ber~gal Sapper, one sepoy of the Nabha
Infantry, and one transport driver wounded. The Nabha Regiment were
greatly delighted a t having been in action for the first time. The regiment was well handled by Captain Cox, and by its Commandant Sirdar
Sher Singh, who was a lion under fire.
Later in the day the 1st Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General
Hart, and the Divisional troops of the 1st Division, all under the con]mand of General Syn~ons,marched right up to the southern end of the
Sapri Pass, where a halt v e s called for the night. The Sapri Pass leading from the Mastura to the Bara Valley is a defile of 11miles in length
which had never been crossed by any European and was quite unknown.
The path the vhole way through was commanded" in such a manner
as to require but a few of the enemy to make the passage of a force
very difficult and dangerous, if not impossible. Fortunately the enemy
failed to take advantage of the position. After a reconnaissance all the
companies of Sappers and Miners with the division and a regiment of
Pioneers were set to work on the path, as without this preparation
the passage, though it looked fairly easy from a distance, could never
have been made by the baggage transport. For the first two miles of the
~ l e nthe %went,mnq graclnitl enoncrh and the track a wide, well-vorn one ;
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but the Iast half mile up to the top was extremely difficult. Boulders of
rockhad to be blasted and a zigzag road made to the top, which was about
YO0 feet above the c a n ~ pon the Mastura River. The hills were beautifully
wooded throughout on the south side, principally with the evergreell
holly ilex. B u t the thick weather during the day's halt a t Mastura did
not permit of survey operations. The troops started before daybreak 011
the 11th December, a n d when at dawn the clouds lifted, the view down
the pass showing the snom-covered heights between the steep, dark
wooded slopes mas very fine indeed. The descent for a short distance
from the top of the pass on the north side was easy, but soon the gorge
became more contracted and rocky; and the advance had to be delayed
from time to time to allow of the Sapper companies in front blasting tho
rocks to clear a path for laden nlules. The drup in elevation from t h e
top of the pass to Sapri itself mas about 2,300 feet. With a mass of
transport animals carrying supplies for the force, the long line stretched along the entire road from end to end, a distance of 11 miles, and
it was 5 P.N, before the last of the force was able to make a start. The
rear-guard of the 30th Punjab Infantry had to bivouac on the top of t h e
pass, and the transport that could be passed along down the descent was
collected and parlied a t Khwaja Iihidda, the first place where there was
water and a little open space. General H a r t had bonfires lit a t short
intervals the whole way down the road, wood luckily being plentiful,
and by the light of these fires the animals were passed along during the
dark hours of the night. This mas the most cnrious feature of t h e
crossing, and was perhaps unique in the passage of any military force
through a long defile and over a difficult mountain range. From
Ehwaja Khidda, the path continued down the rocky bed of a mountain
stream, and here and t,here the way for mules had again to be made b y
blasting and clearing a passage over difficult places. General Symons
with half of the force having reached Sapri by nightfall encamped there
for the night, while Brigadier-General H a r t with such troops as could
not get beyond Khwaja Khidda when darkness fell bivouacked there,
t h e remainder of his force coming on by the light of the fires, o r
bivouacking where they were. The bivouac a t Khwaja Khidda was
fired into during the night and a man of the Derbyshire wounded, a n d
the rifle of another smashed. I n the morning when the march through
the defile was continued, some of the enemy fired into the line of

'

transport wending its way down and a . nlule uras killed. There were
also two casualties among the followers. Under the circumstances i t
was renlarkt~blethat more c1am:tge was not done. A t Sapri the troops

had to camp in rice-fields sodden with the rain, these being the only
spaces where i t was possible to get level ground to camp on. Luckily
Xapri is a t a much lower level than the camp a t the Mastura end of
the pass, and the temperature proportion;~telywarmer. The defile the
whole way down was most picturesque.
On the morning of the 12th December General Symons continued
his march mith the troops that had reached Sapri the previous evening, Brigadier-General H a r t following with those that had remained in
the pass. The road from Sapri, after passing some fields, ran through
a very narrow rocky gorge. Rocks had again to be blasted by the
Sappers, who, to the front as usual on this march, had begun this work
on arrival the previous evening. After crossing a stream, the track
ascended on to higher ground to the left, and passing round some low
spurs brought the troops along a level and easy road to the new camp
ground near Swai K o t just beyond Barkai. The march was a short
one, about four miles, and a t the end of i t General Symons joined hands
mith Brigadier-General Hammond. Brigadier-General Hart with the
remainder of the 1st Brigade arrived the same evening, the rear-guard
arriving about 10 P.M. General Symons had reason to congratulate
himself and his Division a t the very successful crossing of his large and
hampered force over one of the most difficult passes in the whole
trans-frontier country.
On arrival a t Mamani, General Symons received orders to proceed
a t once to Bara. This sudden move was one of necessity. The 2nd
Division with Sir William Loclrhart liad not yet appeared on the scene,
but it was expected to arrive next day, and with General Hammond's
force it would have been difficult to feed more than the three brigades
which, besides General Symons's Division, would then be collected a t a
place where supplies had to be brought from India. Shol.tly after these
orders were received i t was brought to notice that the rnarch of the 1st
Division down the road would block the path by which a single file of
mules brought up the daily convoy with supplies. On this General
Symons made inquiries regarding a road reported to be used by the
Afridis. A reconnoitring party was sent out, and the Sappers and
Miners were set to work to make the path down and up tlle steep banks
of the Mastura River passable for mules. The Sappers began operations
very early next morning, long before dawn, by the light of the moon ;
and later in the morning, half the 1st Brigade and Divisional troops
were started on a new and nnlinown road, prepared to pass the night in

bivouac if unable to get through in the day. By the assistance of the
Sappers and Pioneers, however, the difficult part of the road was passed.
The path became easier and finally led out on to the plain that extends
down to Bara. General Symons thus had the satisfaction on arrival a t
Ilam Gudr, only two and-a-half miles from Bara, of being able to
telegraph t h a t he had practically discovered a new road from Bara to
Mamanai and had niade i t as fit for camels as was the road which
General Hammond had followed over the Gandao Pass.

It now only remains for us, in connection with the general concentration a t Barkai, to dispose of the Peskawar Column which, under General
Hammond, hadmarched in from Bara; and before this not very eventful
movement is alluded to a brief retrospect of the doings of the Peshawar
Column from the time i t was constituted may be conveniently introduced.
The constant fighting in Tirah had so completely absorbed public attention that t h e very existence of a brigade a t Peshawar had been almost
forgotten. As a matter of fact nothing had occurred to direct more than
passing attention to this force, as the task origi~lally assigned t o the
column had been to play a waiting game on Sir Williani Lockhart's Main
Column in Tirahand in the mealltime to prevent local raids on the
Peshawar border. But the long staj- a t Peshawar and Bara, though
necessarily uneventful in the absence of concerted hostilities, proved to
be no picnic for the troops. The British Cavalry with General Hammond
i n particular had a most trying time, not so much from sniping by
straggling tribesinen-though they did not escape this experience and
its attendant losses-as from the feverish climate of the Peshawar Valley
during autumn. I n the two squadrons of the 11th Hussars every Officer,
and all the rank-and-file with four exceptions only, had suffered from
fever. Some Inen had been unlucky enough to have three or four
attacks, and the squadrons on arriving a t Barkai were still thoroughly
fever-stricken. The medical returns for the 4th Dragoon Guards were
nearly as bad as those of the 11th Hussars. I n fact even the unfortunate
division in the Tochi had not fared much worse in this respect than had
the Peshawar Column. B u t in addition to much sickness the coIurnn
had also to report a t least one regrettable episode in connection with
the work of reconnoitring: due to the fact that the tribesmen, though
careful not to expose themselves, were always very alert and allowed no
opportunity to pass by of displaying their deadly marksmanship. On
Sunday, October loth, a troop under Captain F. T. Jones of the 4th
Dragoon Qaards mas sent to reconnoitre the Bara Valley, and Captain
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Jones, leaving his troop at the mouth of the Samghakhi, trotted through
the pass with his advance party, consisting of Corporal Walton, one
trooper and a mounted Khyber Rifle. A s they reached the end a party
of the enemy fired a volley a t about 30 yards distance, killing on the spot
C2lptain Jones, Corporal Walton and two horses. The enemy bolted before t h e troop could get a single shot a t them. Information was immediately sent in to Colonel Sulivan, Con~nmndinga t Jamrud, wlzo ordered out
two gnns of "ICiiBattery Royal Horse Artillery under Lieutenant Nairn,
one squadron of the 4th Dragoon Guards under Captain Sellar, two
companies of the Sussex Regiment under Major Donne, and two cornpnnies of the K.hyber Rifles under Captain Barton; the whole being
comnlanded by Major Littledale, 4th Dragoon Guards. Although this
force searcbed the whole of the neighbouring valley and the adjacent
hills, they could find no sign of the enemy, and eventually returned
t o canip about 2 P.M. The two bodies were brought in by Sergeant
Clarke and his party. Captain Jones was hit in two places and Corporal
Walton in four.. I t is scarcely worth while to recount other unfortunate incidents of a less serious nature, but it will he easily credited
fronl what has already been said tliat the troops were highly deligllted
when a t last the order came for them to move up the Bars Valley
and they were thus given a possibIe chance of getting into action.
A s for General E-Ian~mond'smarch to Barkai, owing to the entire absence
of opposition, there were no incidents calling for mention except those
connected with the difficulty of getting the baggage through the valley,
-a purely physical difficulty not enhanced as i n the case of General
Yeatman-Biggs's Division, by fierce hostilities. On the 15th December
t h e column, after regretfully learning that, owing to the flight of the
enemy, no en~ploymentcould be found for them in the BaraValley,
r ~ t u r n e dfrom Barkai to Jamrud, pending a new projected movement,
this time u p the Bazar Valley into which the tribesmen had apparently
retreated.
W e left Sir William Lockhart with General Yeatman-Biggs's
Division on the last stage of his eveutful march to Barkai, but as in
t]le c;lse of G1.eneral Synions's Division and General Hanlmond's Column
tile stny of the troops a t Barksi Camp was a short one, for the Bara
Villlry was by this time clear of large bodies of the enemy, besides
wllic\:ll tllo poverty of the surrounding country ancl its inability to
support a large force, with the consequellt necessity of running daily
convoys mith supplies from Esra, rendered it inexpedient to estabbsb a
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winter ca111pin this inliospitable region. Accordingly a nlorc \vns ~ n : ~ d c
sfor British territory, and by the 17th December the division found ilhc.lf
conlfortably ensconced a t Bars, where there were already g:~t,l~('l'~d
t11($
whole remainder of tlie Tirall Field Force as well as t h e P c s l ~ ; ~ ~ v ; ~ r
Column.
Thus the original plan of campaign was a t an end, and tllc TVIIOICof
the Tirah Field Force was hack in British territory wit11 its t:~sli- the
task of subjugating the Orakzai and Afridis-only l):trtially accolli1)lished. Without n doubt the Orakzai had bee11 brought to their k n r w
but the more warlike of the Afi-idi clans like the Zikka I i l l ~ lwcl*c iLR
fiercely defiant as ever.

It unfortunately happened a t this period that General YeatmnnBiggs, who liad been in ill-health for some weelis past, b u t who llad
nevertl~elesscourageously persisted in carrying on the whole of liis
diEcult and responsible duties, was a t last obliged, owing t o increasing
weakness, to give up the struggle and to relinquish the Commancl of the
2nd Division of the Tirsh Field Force. The Commander-in-Chief 11,zd
arranged that the gallant General should retu1.n to Calcutta and I*rsrn!lc
the less exacting Coi~illlaiidof the Presidency Illstrict, but .1, t h i ~t i ~ , l c
he xvas already too ill to niove back, and after trc~rc~llinq
:I.; f,ir : ~ s
Pesllawar he completely broke down and had to call a Ilxlt. It pror.1~~1
to be " tlze lor~ghalt." Day by day a3 he lay a t P e s l ~ a w a11is
~. C * O I J C ~ I ~ ~ O I I
grew worse until it became first critical and then hopclrss, nnil o ~ lf 11cl
4th January the late Comnlander of the 2nd Divisioil of t l ~ e'l'ir:t11
Field Force breathed his last. Those around him understood tl~ctif ( ~ r
the first time how much he had suffered from broken l~e:tltl~
all :~l,)r~q,
and how for many u7eeks his indomitable spirit llad tri~~rn~)llcd,
ovcxintlic
frailty of his body. The following General Order was is.yuc.il in (',~,Ic.~rtt:~,
January 70th :-"The Conlmandel-in-Chief has it in commsr~tlfro111tltc
Viceroy and Covenlor-General in India to cxpresr t o t l t ~A I ' I J I ~I l i ~
Excellency's deep reglet a t the loss which i t hns H I I S ~ I L ~ I I in
~ ~ Ct11(~
~
cir~:~tl~
of Nlr~jor-GeneralArthur Godolplli~lYe:~tn~u~~-Bigfs,
('.IS., ,irltrl llin I t i q l i
al~p~eciiation
of tlie services r*cnderedto thc: State I)y t l ~ ; ~Olfit.t.1).
t,
'i')~,,
record of General Yeatrnan-Giggs'a services cob ers :r lrc>t.iotl( i f :i:
..I,
d u ~ i n gwliich he was enil~loyedin tllc f o l l o w i r ~(';LllJi);Llgl)~
~
i)llcl It,l]it a l y ex~)edltlons:-The
operations 21g:~inst tllc
r t ~ l I t ~ lillY
Cliina, 1863; t h e South African War, 1879, d u l i 1 1 ~w l ~ i Ire
~ l ~c,orrlrll;bntled one of tlle parties sent in pursuit clf Ketchawayo, and #uLtlctlut.ntly
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served as Staff Olffcer of the Lydenbnrg Colulnn against Sekukuni ; the
Egyptian Campaign of 1882. I n August, 1897, General Yeatman-Biggs
was entrusted wit11 the command of the troops in the ICohat and Kurram Valleys, then threatened by a formidable conlbination of the
Afridi and Orakzai tribes, and he condncterl tlie operations on the
ULlan Pass, as well as those on the Samana, which ended with the
defeat of the tribesmen and t,he relief of Gulistan. On the formation
of the Tirah Expeditionary Force he was appointed to the Comn~anclof
tlic 2nd Division, which he held until a few days before his death. The
Conlnlander-in-Chief sliares the regret which will be felt by the Arnly
at the premature death of this gnllaitt and disti~lguishedOfficer."
Sir Power Palmer, who had hitherto commanded the Line of
Corui-uunication, was appointed to succeed General Yeatman-Biggs in the
Colll~~idnd
of the 2nd IXvision, Tirah Field Force. The vacbnt post of
Comnlandant of the Line of Communication was not filled up, as owing
to the change of base from Shinawari to Peshawar i t had now become
an easy and simple matter for each General of Division to mandge his
o v n transport and supply. The Gwalior and Jeypore transport trains,
which throughout the Tirah Campaign had been of the greatest service
continued in use.
Orders were now issued for the bre:tliing up of tlie Reserve Brigade
a t Rawalpindi, commanded by Brigadier-General RFacgregor ; as the
necessity or supposed necessity for maintaining i t no longer existed.
The brigade consisted of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infaatry, the
Yorkshire Light Infantry, the 1st Baluch Battalion, the 2nd lniantry
(Hyderabdd Contingent) and the Jodhpur Imperial Service Lancers ;
but of these the Baluchis had already been despatched to Mombasa,
while the Hyderabad Contingent Infailtry had gone to Peshawar. The
Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry was now ordered to join General
ICempster's Brigade, (relieving the Dorsets,) and the Yorkshire Light
Infi~ntrywas sent to General Westmitcott's Brigade (relieving the
Northamptons).

THE RE-OCCUPATION O F THE KHYBER AND THE EXPEDITION INTO TIIIC
BAZAR VALLEY.

ITwas now decided to re-occupy the Khyber Pass, and for this pnrpose
General Symons's Division and General HammondJs C ~ l u m nwere ordrred to concentrate at Jamrud. Mo great tribal rising in the l i t ~ g b e v7as
r
expected, ilnd, in any case, once Ali Musjid w , ~ seized,
s
the Zalilta Iillels,
who alone of all the Afridi clans seriously nlenaced the pass, would not
presumably be able to do much mischief. I n concert with this manwuvre the new plan of canipaign also included the despatch of a punitive force into the Bamr Valley, tlae winter quarters of the Z ~ k k a
Khels.
On the 17th December the Peshawar Colurnn marched into Jamrud,
followed by General Hart's Brigade (with General Symous) the same
day and by General Gaselee's Brigade the n e s t day. A t this period, f o r
no avoidable fault of its own, the Devonsl~ireRegimer~tnYasrecnlled
from the front, and General Symons issued a Divisional Order in wllicll
he said : " I n losing the 1st Ehttalion l3evonshire Regiluent f~o111
the
1st Division the Major-General Commanding desires to recvrd 11is gt.eat
appreciat,ion of the good services througllout the can1p;~iynof tl~iv
particularly efficient battalion. I t is returning to cantoriment~solely 00
the recommendation of the Medical Oficers, and on account of tile scmty
numbers to which it has now been reduced owing to fever and S ~ C ~ < I I ( ~ P S
previously contracted in the Peshawar Valley. It hns heen a creat
pleasure to Major-General Symons to have this extremely well-be1l:~veil
and good fighting West Country Regiment in his Conimal~cl."
The morning after his arrival at Janlrud, Dcceruber 1Htl1, ( ~ I ' I I P I ' : L ~
Hammond, wlth an escort of a few troops :tnd two c o t l ~ l ~ i ~ of
n i ~the
'i
Khyber Rifles under Captain Barton, and acconlpanir.d lty C ( ~ ~ l 0 1 l~
l ' ~I H ~ ~ L I I L
Khan, Political Officer in the Khyber, v i ~ i t e dFort . ~ I : I I I ~ ~ Xot
P . a,
soul was seen in the pass, and All Musjid, of which a g ~ ~ view
~ ~ twit+
l
obtained at a distance of abclut three n~iles,a11pc.al.ed to l)a ilihrit*rtetl.
The road through the pass was ia very good corldiL~on. TIII. tclc~gr;~ktlr
posts, witti one or two exceptions, were stantling, 1>11C wit11 I I O u!il.e
attached. Fort Mmde itself and other fortified posts ncarcr Jtrrnrud
had been dismantled and burnt, and the walls in some cdnex breached.
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This reconnaissance being entirely favourable, preparations were
made for the advance up011 the Khyber, and on tlie 23nd December the
Peshawar Colurnn received orders to inarch out next morning. The
advanced guard started about 7 A.M. and proceeded in road formation
as f a r as Fort Maude, up to wllich point the hills on the flanks h,~dbeen
previously crowned by Captain Barton's Kli>-her Rifles. After lenTing
F o r t Maude t h e 9th Gurkhas, who acted as advanccd gilard to the
column, took up the duty of sending out flankinq pRrties and occnpied
all inlportant points r ~ g i l tup to Ali Musjid. About two mi!es beyond
F o r t Maude the vlllage of Lala Cheena was passed on the left, lying
peacefully i n the sunslline i n ~ t sr~verside position, but deserted by
its inhabitdnta. A short way further on theadvanced gu~rdenteredthe
t ~ u gorge
e
of the Kliyber, which Lonlmences a t All blusjid ; and pasing
below the isolated conical hill on whlch the Fort stands, halted. A
company of the 9th Gurkhas was sent up to occupy the Fort till the
arrival of the 45th Sikhs, who were on rear-giidrd, and the Staff 0Ecers
proceeded to lay out the canip on the low spurs and the flat round
bordering the river on the east of the Fort. Not a rndn was seen nor a
shot fired the whole day. Once the camp was marked out, the units
soon got their tents up, and the ordinary routine of camp life was once
more in full swing.
Consiclerable damage hacl been done to Fort 41i illusjid, but the
outer walls were not so seriously dam~gedas had appeared at first srght :
the breaches in the front wall as seen from below being those made in
the original wall, which hail never been rebuilt, Ly our guns in 1878.
Inside, however, everything was dismantled, all the \~oodwork burnt,
all the roofs fallen in, and nothing left standing but blackened crumbling walls. I n one room the concrete floor had been picked up to
uncover an old well-shaped excavation, which had, previous to our occupation of the Khyber, been used as a magazine. I t had been covered ID
by us because a child had accidentally fallen in and been killed, but the
wily Afridi, evideutly thinking i t was likely to contain sometlling of
value had gone for i t a t once, only to find i t empty. Besides the Fort,
there are circular blockl~ouseson the colnmanding points near a t hand ;
these are entered from the outside by a ladder, whlch leads on to a p l ~ t form raised some four feet from the level of tllegrouncl, and the walls are
looplioled a t a convenient height above the platform. These blockhouses
had also been dismantled and the doors and platfornls burnt, so that
the pickets sent up to occupy them found the loopholes out of all reach,
and had t o bivouac outside.

011t l ~ c24th ljecen~berthe 1st and 2nd Brigades arrived at Ali
Mnsjid from Jnmrud, and went into camp on tlle low ground about
Lxln Cli~eena. This was a busy day for tile Pesllawar C'olumn : there
were parties out in four different directions. A wing of the Innis-

k'1111ngs \vent out to cruxn the Leights for the incoming brigacles ; a
'

lying of the Osfo~dswent out to form a covering party to'the 34th
Pioneers w l ~ olvere engaged in opening out the roads that the two
brigades mere to take nest morning ; a party of 100 s Inen from each
regiment x-ith the Sappers :tnd >liners went out to blow up the Lala
Cheena towers and bring: in noocl and forage ; and a fourth party
of the 9th Gurkhas vent out wit11 Csptain Barto11
of tmo conlpc~nies
to reconnoitre the hills on the right of the road to the Alaclli Pass,
with a ~ i e mto finding a way by which General Esmmond's Colunln
could move nest d q , so as to cover tlie riqht flank of the 1st B ~ i g a d e
in its projected advance into t l ~ Bazar
e
Valley.
On Cl~ristmasDay, the 1 ~and
t 2nd Brigades commenced their punitire expedition into the Bazar Te~lley-the 811d Brigade, on the left,
15-ent by the C!hura K a ~ ~ d aPass,
o and tllc 1st Brigade, on the right, by
tl~t?-Aiacl~i
I'ass. Sir Williaril Locli1:art accomp~niedthe 2ncl Brigacle. A
force from the Pesllan-ar Colulnn, coll@istingof FI wing of the Oxfords,
four guns NO. 3 Llouz~taiuBattery Ru?-,xl Artillery, five con~panies
S ; ~ ~ ~ ~ w sSIiners,
a a l ~ dfour coiupanies of tlie 9th Gurkhas and the 45th
Silihs, held tlie liills on the itig!lt :tnd gaarcled that flank for tlieni as far
as t,he pass. The 45th Sikhs fonnd some 30 men on the extreme right
and drove ~ l ~ e ro$
u but not without loss, for one inail was n~ortally
mounded, and two others were severely and one slightly wounded.
~ e n e r aRaxnmond
l
himself pushed on to the pass with the Sappers arid
Miners and blew up the towers of Alachi village. A few shots were
fired here, but without inflicting ally damage. Meanwhile the 1st
Brigade had hardly got two miles from camp; i t was then 4 P.M., t h e
transport ahead was badly blocked, and the troops were obliged t o
spend a cheerless Christmas night in the hills, cold and exposed.
After seeing the 1st Division well started on its way to tile
Bazar Valley, General Hammond marched his column on Decembel.
36th to Lxndi Kohl, a distance of 10 miles, which he covered without
meeting any opposition. AS a t Ali Muslid, the whole place Ilad becn disnlnntled inside. Walls had been left standing, b u t every bit of woodwork
had been removed o r burnt. The house of Captain Barton, late Poljtical
Ofticerirl the Ehyber, mas a wreck; all his property, ~ u u c hof it very
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valuable, had of course been removed, and everything portable had been
carried off. The caravan serni and the blockhouse hncl been treated in a
siniilar manner, nothing but bare walls being left. I n subsequently destroying villages the column came across many small bits of Captain Barton's property, such as boolis, letters, and stray articles of furniture, but
notlling of value was recovered, except his turn-turn, which was found
in a nullah, placed there no doubt by the original thief, who wished to
avoid recognition. Ernpty ammunition boxes mere also found, but
practically all the Khyber villages were empty; household goods, cattle,
aqricultural iu~plen~ents
and such like having been t ~ k e naway to
unknown fastnesses in the high hills, or hidden in caves.
When the Peshawar Column fii,st arrired a t Landi Kotal f l ~ e
attitude of the Kllyber Zaklra Xhels was uncertain. They had been
offered terms, which were that they should pay up half the rifles taken
by them in the late attack on the Forts, in addition to the half of those
demanded as a fine (154 rifles) and should give hostages for tlie payment of the other half, and that they should pay the sum of nine
tilousand rupees as a money fine; and they had been given till the 28th
I)ecember to accept or refuse our terms. The Shinwaris had a t once
acceptcd the terms offered them and were tlierefore not to be reckoned
with, and C.tptain Barton took advantage of their compliance to make
tlienl picket the hills to the north of canip and safeguard i t by ddy and
night fro111 that direction, and also to picket daily the high ridge under
which the road runs through the Saddu Khel country. Pending the
final reply from the Zakka IClzels, General Hanlmond set forth on the
27th December with the 57th Field Battery Royal Artillery, four guns
No. 3 l\;lo~mtain Battery Boyal Artillery and the 9th Qurlrhas, to
reconnoitre the Bori Pass, which runs between the Khyber and the Bazar
Valley and fro111 which General Symonds Division was expected to
emerge on its return from the Bazar Valley. This movenlent necessitated
passing close to t h e Saddu Khel villages, and the nzalilis sent word
that they did not want to fight, but if the troops approached their
villages, they Elad 400 nlen there and would resist. General Hammond's
only reply was to send back for first reserve ammunition, to deploy the
Gurkhas into line, and bring up the field battery. Two companies of
the Gurkhas were then estencled and sent round to flank tlle villages,
commanding heights were occupied and the force advanced through the
villages and u p the pass unmolested. The road to the pass runs through
8 defile in the hills, a t first fairly open, but the valley soon contracts
and is flanked by high, craggy, isolated peaks so placed as to render it
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impossible to efficiently command the flanks. A t a distance of about
three miles from tbe pass the walley still further contracts, i~ncltlie path
runs tl~rougha gorge about one hundred and fifty yarrls in lel~:tll, so
narrow as to be impassable for a laden mule, arid between pl-euipitous
roclts about 100 feet high. The route is in fact impracticable, nur can
it be improved.
The next day, December 28th, was wet and cold, and t l ~ ctroops
dicl not niove out. The tribes liad not come in, b u t on the contrxry 11;td
added to their list of offences by shooting a sepoj. of the 9th Qrrrlillns
during the night, close outside the entrenchments, and by carrying off
a b o ~ five
t miles of telegrzph wire and breaking down tlie prrstu. 011
the 29th, therefore, tlie force moved out, partly to forage, partly to
punish the tribes for their presumption, and partly to guard o\itgoiiig
and inconling convoys ; and operations of this nature continuetl to form
the regular programme of morlr for many days afterwards. Every day
villages were destroyed, and more forage seized, hut not witl~outloss, for
the Zakka Kliels were well armed and were good shots, with ;~llaccurate
knowledge of the country, and of the range of evelay prnnrinent object.
Tlley sniped a t the troops alnlost irtcessantly and illso clcstruyrd t h e
telegraph lines with such persistence that all attempts a t repairs lii~dto
be given up for the time being.

I

On the 30th December the Oxfordshire Regiltlent, ~ 1 1wvel.e
o
out on
convoy duty, met with a serious nlis~dventure. After sceing the dal;
through arld completing the day's work, four companies of the OsR~rds,
who were crowning the Eurchest lleigl~tstowards Ali Musjitl a~ltl11:id to
form tlie rear-guard to the retirement, beci~nles e iously
~
C ~ L I ~ L with
~ I : ~
the enemy. About 5-30 P.M. Genela1 Emmond itt tile ca1l11) ;it Ltrrttli
Kotal receiv~d;L report that the rear-guard was l~arclpreshecl a r ~ t in
l nc~ec2
of reinforcements. The troops in camp were at once hpreacl o~xtsrr~ai,tly
and h u ~ r i e dto the scene of action. T!le 3-4th Piorleers wt.1-c: ~ i l l ~tot
occclpy the villages on the right, and (+ellera1 Eiit~~ln~ortd
wit 11 I,11t?
pushed on, occupying points on the fl,~nkanx 11($;~clv:~rtc~~d.
H e fonnd the Oxfords, as well as 20 men of tlle I~niinhilling~
i ~ r l t l c,iir
conlpany of the 9th Gurlthas (who Ilacl bee11 left on tli~~~liillg
Ileigltt~
to co-operate with the retilement) llolding tlitee vill;~gc~x All iil'il~g
had ceased, and under cover of the reinforcerncnt.~wlricl~htg lrntl Ll+cjllg1r$
General Hari~mondwithrllew the Oxforcls and t h o O ~ i ~ k h nf ~x. t r r t i tlle
villages, retiring off the hills. I t appeared that the O x f o ~ *wlie11
d~
51.st
attacked had taken cover in a deep nullah which proved to he alw
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exposed to the enemy's Ere. The dhoolie-bearersthereupon bolted, and as
i t was found impossible to get away the killed and wounded it became
necessary to occupy the villages till reinforcements arrived from Landi
Kotal. The casualties in the Oxfordshire Regiment were :-killed :one
Sergea~it,one Lance-Corporal, and one private; wounded: LieutenantColonel F . H. Plowden, Commanding; severely wounded :Captain C . Parr,
Lieutenant R. C. R. Owen, Sergeant-Major Den~psay;nzortally wounded :
four Sergeants and six privates. Not only were the dead and wounded
carried safely baok to camp, but all rifles, ammunition and accoutrementn
were brought in, so that nothing fell into the hands of the enemy.
On New Year's Day most of the troops were again employed in
blowing up towers and in foraging. The Zakka Khels, awakening a t
last to the daily seizure of their bhoosa, took the extreme measure of
setting fire to the bhoosa stocks, andafter this date little or no forage was
found in any of the villages. The same day General Eammond, covered
by a wing of the lnniskillings and Oxfords, went up the Tsera Nullall
to examine some caves nightly occupied by the enemy. Eousehold goods
were found in the caves, and while the troops were engaged in clearing
the caves and destroying the goods some shots were fired a t General
Hammond and the group of Officers standing with him. Several bullets
fell quite close, and one hit Lieutenant El. U. Eammond, R.A., General
Hammond's Orderly Officer. Some shots were also fired at t h e troops
when retiring. The day's casualties were :--zoounded : Lieutenant
Hammond ; seaerely wouaded :one Sergeant, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers,
one sepoy, 34th Pioneers, and one follower.

It had been intended to surprise the villagers on the morning of the
3rd January; 200 of the 9th Gurlrhas were to start out into the hills
early and get into position over the Bori Pass by daylight while the
rest of the troops demonstrated over the villages at the mouth of the
pass. The effect would heve been to drive the enemy up t h e pass,
whence the Gurkhas would have driven them back, and further loss
would have been inflicted on any line of retreat they might have taken.
The Gurlchax started a t 4 A.M., but the weather was so inclement with
rain, sleet and snow, that the whole movement. was counterrnanded.
Later the same day Major Hickman of the 34th Pioneers, who was in
eornrnand of a picket p r t y guarding the road between Ali Musjid an$
Landi IiotaI, was shot through. the heart by a stray bullet fired from
a distance of 800 yards.

On January 5th aforaging party went out as usual but failed to find
any sign of the enemy, and not a single shotwas fired, the tribesnien
having apparently crossed over the hills into the Bazar Valley. The
blowing up of their villages was a far greater loss to the Khyber Zskki~
Khels than to those of the Bara and Bazar Valleys, for the Khyber nlen
stay i n t h e pass all the year round, do not migrate, and have no other
homes except caves in the hills. They must have been suffering considerable distress, for it was now very cold, the thermometer a t night
time registering 13 degrees of frost.
The story of the re-occupation of the Khyber is now conlplete, and
in leaving the Peshawar Column in possession of Landi Kotal and Ali
Musjid it has only to be mentioned that from this date the " Peshawar
Column" nominally ceased to exist, the force under General Harnmond
till then so styled being re-named the '' 5th Brigade of the Tirah Field
Force."
W e now return t o General Symons's Division, which we left in the
Khyber a t the nlouth of two passes leading into the Eazar Valley, prepared t o strike another blow a t the Zakka Rhels and their villages of
refuge. Before the advance was continued the In~perialService Troops
with the Division, who throughout the Tirah Campaign liad ,zcqnitted
thenlselves with very great credit, received orders to return to tlleir.
respective States, as their work was over; and General Symons in parting with them issued the following complinlentary order :-" The General
Oficer Commanding the 1st Division, desires to record his appreciation
of the good services nnd soldier-like demeanour of thefie corps. Their
discipline and good behaviour have been beyond reproach, and quite
equal throughout tlie campaign to that of the best of our native troops.
General Sy~nollsi n the name of t h e whole Division bega to thank them
for their incessi~ntand hard work, always cheerfully pcrforn~ed. The
Major-General's especial approbation is due to Comnlandant Si~rdar
Sher Singh, Commanding the Nabha Regiment, and to Commaud;~llt
Sardar Meter Khan, Cornmanding tlie Msler Kotl;t Snppe~ti. TII~~HLL
Officers have displayed zeal, intelligence, and good cl~ialitieriof conrniand. The 1st Division will miss their services, and tliey all leave with
congratulations and good wiuhos."

It was a great disappointnient to the troops nllder Crknerrtl Sgnrons
not to find the enemy in force in the B ~ z a Vsllcy,
r
ax the rttc3r1 of the 1 x t
Division were anxious to avenge tlie recent losses of the %rid Diviuiun
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during the march from Dwatoi to Barkai. The Zakka Rhels had the
whole of the upper part of the Bara Valley once againopen to them, and
they discreetly left Bazar to the care of small bodies of men. Cheena is
t h e only village of importance in the valley, and the enemy did not consider i t worth while fighting for. Their cave-dwellings along the Bazar
River could not be destroyed. During this little expedition the troops
were for the most part admirably handled; but the Alachi route proved
difficult, and a battalion of infantry withcommissariat stores had to be
left all night on the pass : fortunately it was not attacked. General
Gaselee's Brigade alone went as far as Cheena, which was destroyed, while
General Hart's Brigade halted a t Eurg ready for action in case the Zakka
Ehels should show themselves in great strength. The tribesmen however
never numbered Illore than 200 men in any one spot. On the 27th
General H a r t remained a t Burg, whilst part of his force went on to the
Bazar Valley to meet Sir William Lockhart, and to picket the left bank
so as to assist in protecting General Gaselee's Column returning from
Cheena. The rear-guard of the 2nd Brigade was followed up as usual,
b u t when the Afridis met the pickets of the 1st Brigade they transferred
their attention to the latter. The Royal Sussev Regiment, who were
on this picket duty, were engaged warnlly for 26 hours, and when they
retired on Burg the enemy followed then1 close into camp. The regiment
lost 3 killed and 3 wounded. Lieutenant St. de V. A. Julius was also
slightly wounded. A private in the Royal Sussex behaved with great
gallantry. He was shot through the leg and severely wounded, butafter
this he helped a wounded comrade away, and assisted in carrying the
dltoolie all the way back to the camp. He then weut to his company's
bivouac to get some food and then to the hospital to have his wound
dressed.
On the morning of the 28th December a t a quarter to five o'clock
General H a r t started in the darkness and rain to surprise and surround
the Karamna villages as it was reported that the tribesmen had returned.
A11 the villages were surrounded before daylight, but the Zakka Ehels
llad been too sharp and had flown. The subsequent withdrawal of the
force from Eurg up a steep ravine was an extremely difficult operation.
The pickets on the hill tops reported the enemy in force on the south
of the camp ; and the rear-guard, consisting of the Royal Sussex and the
21st Madras Pioneers, the latter in the rear, were heavily engaged for
several hours, The great difficulty was to get the pickets down safely:
there were ten of them all pinnaclecl on the step rocky hills, and Colonel

C. H. W. Cafe, who commanded the rear-guard, managed t h e operation
admirably. The more distant picliets were brought down e n d passed up
the ravine, and the others followed in their turn. The Africlis followcrl
closely and persistently, and approached within 100 yards of the Madras
Pioneers, thus giving our men a much better chance than usual, and many
were seen t o fall. Our losses were two men of the Royal Sussex severely
wounded, one sepoy of the 21st Madras Pioneers Idled, four seve1"el.v
and one slightly wounded. All the valuable towers in Burg :ind
K a r a n ~ n awere blown up, and in carrying out this duty a distressing
accident occurred whereby Lieutenant C. R. Tonge, R.E., and a sappel.
of No. 4 Conlpany Bombay Sappers, were accidentally killed. One of
t h e charges under a tower exploded, and Lieutenant Tonge, thinking
that the other fuse had failed, went up t o the tower, whe11 the second
charge went off.
OntEle 29th December the 1st Brigadel~nderBrigadier-General Hart,
acconlpanied by General Symons, returned to Ali Musjid. Tlie withdrawal was closely and boldly fol!om~edby the Afrid~s,who in places got
quite near, being much aided by clouds on the hills. They followed t h e
rear-guard for six miles, and shot well. Our casualties were : six men of
the Derbysl~ire Regiment sevcrely wounded, and three other men
slightly wounded ; one rifleman of the 2-1st Gurkhas dangerously
wounded. Several of the casualties occurred in withdrawil~gthe pickets
from the hills round Rararnna Camp. They were all c\w~tual\y
passed through the strong rear-gnard placed in position a t tlle exit of
the camp. The baggage was all sent on ahead and tlle operation of t h e
withdrawal was skilfully executed, the troops supporting each o t l ~ e r
admirably. Brigadier-General Havt himself came i11 with the l a ~ cornt
pany. The transport did very well; not one load being l u ~ t . G~11er:~l
Gaselee's Brigade marched by another route to Jamrud. They ;~lsohail
12 or 13 casua1t;ies en route.
The next few weelrs were uneventful, and towarcls the end of
January it seemed as if the efforts of the Political 0fIicel.s were liki:ly tc,
be crowned with success. Even the Zakka Khels merPe kt~owrit u ~ J C
debating for the first time whether i t would not he wiser to C ; ~ ) I I I P t~
terms, than risk another invasion in the spring. Tlie news, idLc.r*cfor.c*,
which reached India on the 30th January that out troops 11i~dxl~ctl v i t l ~
a serious reverse was wl~ollyunexpected. As it a f t e r w : ~ r d ~
c~~~rrgcbtl,
the operations wllich led up to this unfortunate busir~css Iiad L ~ * ~ I L
earefully planned befolehand and cvery oifort had bee11 rriade to keela

the proposed movement of troops secret. News had been received t h a t
the Afridis had driven their cattle and camels to graze on the Kajurai
Plain, which is due east of Fort Bara and is enclosed on the northern,
western and southern sides by spurs which run down from the main
range of hills separating the Bara and Bazar Valleys. It was accordingly resolved to capture the Afridi herds and herdsmen. For this
purpose four columns, one from each brigade, were formed, and ordered
to move concentrically so as to cut off the tribesmen's line of retreat
westwards. The points from which the columns moved on the morning
of the 29th January were Ali Musjid, Jamrud, Bara Fort and Mamani.
General Symons reported that the Ali Musjid and Jamrud Columns
had seen nothing of the enemy, though they had marched over twenty
miles. The Bara Column which presumably moved straight across the
Kajurai Plain, had also nothing of interest to report. The column,
however, further to the west, drawn from General Westmacott's Brigade,
and consisting of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, four
companies of the 36th Sikhs and two guns of No. 5 Bombay Mountain
Battery, with Colonel Seppings of the King's Own Yorkshire Light
Infantry i n command had a very different experience. Little opposition was experienced i n the advance, but when the retirement began
through a narrow defile known as the Shin E a m a r Pass the enemy
appeared i n considerable numbers and pressed hard upon the small
column. It was the old story of a small force completely a t the mercy
of skilful marksmen securely planted on both sides of a narrow gorge.
Too few in numbers to clear the hills, their only course was to retire as
best they could, though men were dropped in their tracks a t every step
and the column was e v e r j moment becoming more and more hampered
with the wounded. Fortunately i t mas found possible to send a message
to General Westmacott, who turned out with 200 of the King's Own
Scottish Borderers, 100 Gurkhas and two guns. H e found t h e little
column retiring in good order, but very sIowly. Promptly grasping the
situation he brought his guns into action from the hills a t the mouth of
the gorge on the enemy's left, and turned the direction of the retirement
through his troops. When the whole had passed through he retired
slowly, reaching camp a t 7-30 P.M., and being the last man himself to get
in. Even as it was our losses were extremely heavy, and our dead had
to be left on the field. The casualty list comprised 1 British Qfficerskilled ;Lieutenant-Colonel Haughton, Lieutenent Turing, 36th Sikhs ;
Lieutenants Walker, Dowdall and Hughes, King's Own Yorkshire Light
Infantry; wounded: Major Earle, Captinn Marrable and Lieutenant

Hall of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry. The rank and file of
the Yorkshires also suffered heavily, losing 22 killed and 17 wounded ;
the 36th Sikhs lost 3 men killed. On the 31st January General Westmacott advanced again to the Shin Eamar Pass for the purpose of
bringing in the dead, and 22 bodies were recovered. His force consisted
of 400 of t h e Gordon Highlanders, 300 Sikhs, 300 2nd Gurkhas, 400
3rd Gurkhas, 250 King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, 400 King's
Own Scottish Borderers, and No. 8 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery.
Little opposition was made to the advance, the few casualties taking
place as the force retired. One gunner was killed, one gunner and one
man of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, one Gurkha, and one
bhisti were wounded. Surgeon-Captain M. Dick and Lieutenant Browne,
30th Sikhs, were slightly wounded,

So ended what was certainly one of the most unfortunate episodes of
t h e campaign. The loss of thr Colonel of the 36th Sikhs in particular
was deeply regretted throughout the army. On more than one occasion
since the operations against the Afridis began, ColoneI Haughton's quick
resolve, magnificent courage, and inspiring leadership had saved a
critical situation, and he was idolised by every soldier in his regiment.
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THE UTMAN KHEL EXWDITIOX.

WHILE
in the early part of November Sir William Lockhart was engaged
in punishing the Afridis in the Maidan Valley, the Malakand Field
Force, which under Sir Bindon Elond had co-operated with General
Elles's Force in subjugating the Mohrnands and the Mamunds, was enjoyi n g a well-earned rest and awaiting fresh employment. After the health
of t h e force had been thoroughly recruited, i t was thought desirable in
t h e absence of any other work to give some portion of the two brigades
a ten days' pron~enadethrough the Utman Khel country, west of the
Malakand. The Utnia Khels had informally expressed their willingriess to comply, as far as possible, with the terms imposed upon them by
Major Deane, and the troops visiting their villages were not likely to
meet with resistance. A certain number of rifles and othcr arms had
to b e collected, and the mere presence of a strong brigade would, i t was
rightly expected, prove sufficient to remind the tribesmen of their
obligations. Preparations for the expedition were accordingly begun
a t Jalala in the Peshawar District, and the Guides Cavalry and Infantry
were ordered to rejoin the Malakand Field Force. Sir Bindon Blood's
plan was to detach a strong brigade to visit the Utman Khels, and yet
have a sufficient force left to keep a close watch upon the still suspected
Buner border.

I

I

I

The Utman Khels are not an important tribe, as their fighting
strength is put a t only 1,200 or 1,500 men, but they have been notorious
evildoers on the frontier for many years past. Years ago they attacked
t h e gangs of labourers employed on the Swat River Canal and cut up a
number of unarmed coolies, an offence for which they were never
tlloroughly punished. They shared in the attack on the Malakand, but

withdrew in haste when the relieving force arrived. The nortllern
section of the clan living beyond the Panjkorn wcre denlt with by
Major Deane, Political Officer, after the opeittztion?rin the 31:~lllurltl
Valley; and it .was the soutllertl sections t h : ~ thad ~ I O Wtrt Lc vinitrrl.
They had hesitated for weeks, tl~inking, perliicps that all 11riliti~l.y
operations were a t an end; but the instant Sir 13ind(ln IJl(~t~l'x
tror,p?r
started, their jirgah hastened to n ~ a l ~fornial
e
xubxuissio~i. Their uljc.ct
was, of course, to prevent our troops entering their country; but it W:LS
important that t h e Totai Valley and the passes leading into i t frolti the
Swat Valley, Dargai and the Pesl~awarDistrict sl~uuldbe thurouglkiy
explored.
Colonel A. J. F. Reid was given the corninand of the cxpetlitionary
force, with the temporary rank of Brigadier-C?eneral, and the force itself consisted of the following troops :-The Buffs, No. 8 ~Mountaiu
Battery, one squadron 10th B e n g ~ Lancers,
l
the 21st Punjab Infantry,
the 35th Sikhs, No. 5 Company Qneen's Own Sappers and Miners, C: "
and " D " Sections No. I British Field Hospital, " A " and ' l B" Sections
No. 35 Native Field Hospital, and No. 50 Native Field Hospital.
The following Officers were appointed to the staff of the column :-Conimanding, Brigadier-General Reid ; Deputy Assistant Adjutnl~t-Cener:~],
Captain A. R. Dunsterville, East Surrey Regirllent ; Deputy Assist:~nt
Quarter-Master-Generwl, Major L. Herbert, Central Indiit Hurse; Ortlcrly
Officer, Lieutenant H . A. Vallings, 29th Punjab Infantry; Extra Orde1.1~
Officer, Lieutenant W. S. Fraaer, 19th Be~igalLancers; Field Enyiaeer,
Captain H. J. Sherwood, Royal Engineers ; Intelligence Ofticel,, Lierltenant A. C. M. Waterfield, 11th Bengnl Lancers ; Conlnii.;sa,riiit Offic.~~;
Captain A. R. Burlton, Staff Corps ; Transport Officer; T~ie~~t.en:irtl
It. S.
Weston, Manchester Regiment ; Provost-M:~rxh:tl, L i e r ~ t e r l t ~If.
~ ~1':.
t
Cotterill, Royal West Surrey Regiment ; SignaIlirig Officel; Licaul t1rl:~rlk
W. H. Trevor, The Buffs ; Senior Medical Officer, 8111-gcc~n-liit~r1teri:~ritColonel P. F. O'Connor, Indian Medical Service ; :tnd Seniur Y e t t ~ r i ~ l i ~ r y
Officer, Veterinary-Lieutenant G. M. Willinnln, Arriiy Vcterini~t:y
Department. Co-operating with General neicl wax a HIII:LIIf,)r('(~t * o ~ i sisting of the 16th Bellgat Tnfantry ancl on(? xc~ctior~
of NO. :il Nt~tivct
Field Hospital, under the conlmand of Lieutcn~t~t-UoIo~icl
A. :Iloliti~lii~~'~.
The expedition started out from Jalala on Xovet~ibcr2:'11tl, it^ rlvr;.
tination being the Totai Valley, about three ~ilnrcllexilistiu~t. 'fl;tr;~i~iIcot
was reached on t h e 24th, and the Utmar~Khul jirgnhs w11icl1h:ttl ~i~ust,t>r.
edat Kot, were so anxious to prcvellt tllcir c;ulultly Lcitrg ci~tci*ail
I I tha
~

*
?

troops that, as already stated, they sent word on ahead that they were
prepared to niake submission. General Hill's reply \Tas that he would
meet thejirgah a t K o t in tlre Totai Valley. To R o t he accordingly
marched that day, crossing over the Bhar Pass en route. The road over
tlie pass, although i t had been considerably improved the day before
by No. 5 Conlpany Queen's Own Sappers and Miners and by working
parties from all COI-ps,proved very difticult for laden camels. The baggage, however, was all got over with the loss of a few camels, and reached
the carup late in the evening. Shortly after passing Bhar on the west side
of the pass the valley aidens considerably, and is very green and full of
cultivation. The villagers of Lower Totili shnwed a n unmistakable
wish to be friendly. Jirgnhs from Lower and Upper Totai and Agrah
auet General Reid on arrival a t Eot, and were told what the Government
terms were, namely,-(1) The surrender of 300 guns and all breechloaders ;(2) survey of the country ; (3) formal subnsission to the Political
Agent a t Malaksnd ; (4) forage for the force ; and (5) road-making a s
required-an
important matter, as the column had 600 camels i n its
carriage equipment. All the clans accepted the terms unconditionally,
except the Agrah j ~ r g a h ,who, as they showed some hesitancy, were told
that the force would exact complianae with the terms a t Agrah. The
force halted on November 25th a t K o t in order that the two routes t o
Agrah might be reconnoitred. That over the Khels Pass was found
i~llpracticablefor camels, and it was decided to use the route vid
Xilipatai which, however, also required m ~ i c work
l ~ to make i t pnssable.
Bargolai was seen to be in a wide cultivated plain among the hills, a n d
the reconnaissance was made to within two irriles of Agrah Pass.
Groups of people were seen here and there, but no shot was fired.
A t 8 o'clock on the morning of the 26th November the force left K o t
a n d marched to Silipatai, about five miles, the road following the bed of
the stream in a deep gorge the whole way. I t wns necessary t o cover
the march of the column by parties on the hillsides marching parallel
to the column. Progress was necessarily slow, but the rear-guard reache d the camp a t P.M. witlaout any mishap. No. 5 Company Sappers a n d
Miners, covered by the 21st Punjab Infantry, proceeded towards Bargolai and made the road passable for camels up to 19 miles from t h a t
plxce. The reconnaissances from this point to Bargolai proved the road
to be quite practicable for the remainder of tlie way. The villagers of
.1Dheri, Silipatai and Bargolai were very submissive, bringing in supplies.
Groups of men were seen on the Agrah Pass and the surrounding hill%

and were raid to be the Agrah ,ji.yah lvho 11adcolne to their boundary t o
te1rJt.r their sub~nissiorlto General Reid a t t h a t place. The force
lsivotracked a t night on terraced l~illsidesnear Bedani village half a
mile south-erst of Siliptai. The surrounding villages were warned t h a t
tlre penalty for an)- sniping into camp would be exacted from them
auci tile>-cruwned a11 the heights in the neighbonrl~oodwith pickets.
Xrst da>-, Sorenlber 2;th, the force niarched from Silipatai t o
E~r:,.ol:ii,the road 11:tving been made passable for camels by the Queen's
0 1 v n Sappers and 3Tinera. Bargolai is a t the extremity of the long narr t , y~ q e that leads fro? Xot, about eight miles long, and the column
birt~a~aekrd
in a pear-sl~apcdvalley with a considerable amount of
cultir;~til~n,
lrills rising to three or four thousand feet all around. A
r~w~nn;ti.s~nce
up the dgrah Pass showed the road to be impassable for
cnnltriz, nnil ( J I ~ Y fair for rnules.

On the ?St11 Xovenlber General Reid with 500 rifles of the 21st
Ponjab Inl;~~ltr>-,
350 of the Buffs, 930 of the 35th Sikhs, four guns of
KO.Y Bengal Xuuntair! Batter>-,and half of No. 5 Conlpany Queen's Own
S:1p1fizrs arid Uiners as a flying column, v i t h mule transport only, marched f r ~ Eiwgolai
t ~
over the Xgrah Pass and bivouacked on a low spur in
tEe centre of the valley which gives the pass its name. NO opposition
TV;LS xnet with, the grain and fodder demanded were brought in at once
atnd the rifles were surrendered the next day. The valley or rather
gruq) of v a l l e ~ swere all under cultivation, the wheat crops being a few
inches lnigh. About 2 o'clock in the afternoon of t h e 28th the advanced
pickets reported the presence of a gathering of about 500 men carrying
a few st:~nd;~rds
on the right bank of the Swat River, about five miles
aw;t~-. Tiley appeared to be Shainozai, but they showed no signs of
intending to cross the river. There are rope bridges over the river a t
this p i n t , but crossing is a slow operation and to get back hurriedly is
iruyttlqsible, so the (supposed) Shamozai contented thelnselves with
w,~tcliingGeneral Reid's movements. The night of the 28th passed
qnietiy, and nest morning a reconnaissance under Lieutenant-Colonel
Faitlifoll went out to the Inzari Pass, which was visible about three
miles off.

The reconnaissance under Colonel Faithfull t o the Inzari Pass
showed the road over the pws to be a very fair one, and quite passable
fur rnules. The ascent for the last 200 yards is very steep. The reconm k a n c e puslied beyond tlle p a s enabliug the Government Surveyor
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to complete his sketch to the point reached from tlle Mahkand side i n
August last. The view froru the top of Inzari ,was mag~lificent. T h e
hill dr'ops almost perpendicularly to where the Panjkora and S w a t
Rivers join, a n d in the distance tlie snow peaks of the Lowari Range w e r e
visible. General Reid accompanied tlie reconnaissance in person, and the
party returned a t 5 P.M. By this time all .the arms demanded had b e e n
surrendered, and the district lrsving made complete submission o r d e r s
were issued for the force to return to Bargolai next day. The n i g h t
passed quietly, and the Flying Column left Agrali at 8 A.M., all being i n
Bargolai Camp by 11-30. The remsinig arms required from Bargolai
having been surrendered, the force took its departure from Bilrgolai on
t h e 1st December and marched to Kot.
As the Kanawari j i r g a h , which had been granted leave to meeh
General Reid on his arrival, had not conle in and had not sent in t h e
arn.ms required of them, i t was decided to visit their villages and enforce
s u b ~ i s s i o n . The villages lie high up in the hills to the west of t h e
site of General =eid9s Camp and about 3,000 feet above it. The r o a d
was very bad andvery steep and progress was slow. About half-way up,
the representatives of the villages were met hurrying down to General
Reid with all t h a t was required of them in the way of weapons, but as
they had neglected to attend a t the prescribed timethe force continued
its =arch on the villages and the arms were accepted there. One of t h e
principal naaliks, however, having refused to appear or tender any s u b mission, the fortifications of his dwelling were destroyed. A survey w a s
made of the heights overlooking the Panjkora River and the force then
returned to camp, arriving a t 4-30 P.N., having been out 11 hours.

.

The Utman E h e l Expedition was now a t an end, its object h a v i n g
been fully accomplished without the necessity of any fighting ; and t h e
column under General Hill broke up. I n his despatches to the AdjutantGeneral in India Sir Bindon Blood wrote:-" You will observe that t h e
objects in view of which the operations reported on were undertaken,
mere fully a n d expeditiously attained, and that no hitcll or cont~,eteuzps
of any sort occurred. I venture to thinli that much credit is due t o
Colonel Reid for the perfect manner in which he arranged and carried
out the movement of his force and overcame the conisderable physical
difficulties which he encountered ;and I fully endorse the favourable
renlarks he makes regarding liis troops and staff. I would further express an opinion tlrat Lieutenant-Colonel Montanaro also carried o u t
what he had to do wit11 tact alicl judguent ; and I have tlie l~onour

(

244

1

a

accordingly to recomrnendbotli these Officers, together with
nllo
served under them, to the favoilrabIe notice of Iris Excclle~ir.~
the (l,lI1,.
mander-in-Chief. I n nlaliing the necessnry prelinlinaly : L I ~ I . ; L I > ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I + ~ I I ~ ~
for t l ~ eopel-ations under reference, I was n1llch auaisted I,y i l l f o ~ . n l i ~ t i ~ , ~ ~
and advice received froxi Mr. Merli, Civil Service, the C k ( > ~ ~ l ~ l l i . ~ ~ i o ~ ~ ~ s ~
Peshawar, from BIajor Dean?, C.S.I., tlle puliticitl A g ~ t ~ ttfle
Malakand, from Mr. C. Bunbury, Civil Service, 1)cl~lty('u1111nir.itr~~~~~
I
of Peshawar, and also from Mr. Stui~rt
Waterficld, Z'l11lji~1)i't,li,-t*, J\,],~,
was specially appointed Assistant Political Officer fur tliu opcr;rti<,llu:J

CBAPTZlr' I%
'PEE E X P E D I T I O ~AGAI&ST TnE BUNERTBLS.

AFTER
the return a t the end of December of the Tirah Field Force
t o British ferritory, the Government turned their attention to the
Bunerwal.; with whom a long outstandiug account had to be settled.
T h e tribesmen of Buner had shown an extrelxe spirit of hostility during
t h e attack on the Malakand in July ancl again a t Landski when Sir
Bindon Blood's Force was advancing into Upper Swat. An ultimatum
w a s now sent to the tribe calling upon them to comply with the following
t e r m s within a week :-(I) A representative jir'yc~hto make complete
submission a t Mardan ; (2) the restoration of all Government property ;
(3) the surrender of 600 guns, including GO Enfield rifles stolen on
t h e Rustam border ; and (4) the p a y n ~ e ~ofl t fine of a Rs.11,500. The
following terms mere simultaneously announced t o the Chanlldwals,
w h o inhabit the small valley southdeast of Buner : the surrender
of 100 guns, a fine of Rs.1,500 and the handing in of 100 swords and
standards from Eoga ancl Nawagai.* The terms for the Caduns, who
live south-east of the Chamlawals, were not for the moment announced,
but like their neiglzbours the Khudu Khel, they were expected to
voluntarily make submission. !Die Pl~arnlawalsand Gaduns, like the
Bunermals, had both sent contingents to fight a t Malakand and in the
S w a t Valley,
Formal notice was given that in the event uf non-compliance with
t h e Government's terms a column commanded by Sir Bindon Blood
would be sent to invade Buner and exact submission by force of arms.
The troops selected for the expedition were :-1st Brigade (General
Meiklejohn's), the Eoyal West gent, Regiment, the Highland Lighfi
I n f a n t r y and the 20th and 31st Punjab Infantry ; 2nd Brigade (General
Jeffreys's), the Eavt Kent, the Guides Infantry, and the 16th and 21st
P u n j a b Infantry ; Divisional troops : four squadrons of Cavalry, 10th
F i e l d Battery, Nos. 7 and 8 Mountain Bntteries, No. 5 Company Queen's
O w n Sappers and Miners and No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and
M'lners.
*'lh~svillage has to be dlst,lngu~shedhorn tho place oi the samc nutlie 111 Dc4]our.

The following staff mas appointed :-Commanding, s i r Bindon
Blood ; Aide-de-camp, Lord Pincastle ; Orderly Officer, Lieutenant
TT. S. Fraser, 19th Rengal Lancers ; Assistzlnt ~djutant-General,Major
H. H. Burney, Gordon Highlanders ; AssisGint &uartelt-Master-Genernl,
Lieutenant-Colonel A. &I:tsters, Central India Horse; Deputy Assistant Quarter->faster-General, Intelligence Departmmt, Captain F. W. S.
Stanton, R.A.; Superintendent, Army Signalling, Captain E. V. 0.
Hewitt, Royal West Kent Regiment ; Chief Cornzui~sd~iat
Officer, Major
H. Wharry ; Brigade T r a ~ ~ s p o rOfficer,
t
Captain C. G. R . Thackwell ;
Assistsnt to Chief Comn~issariatOflicer, Captain R. C. Lye, 23rd Pioneers ;
Assistant t o Brigade Transport Officer, Lieutenant E. F. Macnaghten,
16th Lancers ; Principal Medical Officer, Surgeon-Colonel J. c. C*.
Carnlichael ; Senior Veterinary Officer, Veterinary-Cdptai11 N. T. W.
Miinn ; Conimanding R o ~ i ~Artillery,
l
Colonel W. Aitkeii ; Adjutant,
Royal Artillery, Captain H Rouse ;Commanding Royal Engineers, Colonel W. Peacocke ; Adjutant, Royal Engineers, Captail1 H. G. Sherwood ;
Field Engineers, hhjor R. Blunt and M. C. Barton ; Cl~aplain,Rev.
L. Klugh ; Survey Oficer, Captain C. L. Robertson, Royal Engineers ;
Superintendent of Telegmplis, Lieutenant W. Robertson, Royal Engineers ; Field Intelligence OEcers, Captain J. K. Tod, 7th Bengal Cavalry,
and Lieutenant A. C. M. Waterfield, 11th Bengal Lancers ; Commissariat,
Officer, Advanced DepBL, Captain W. E. F. Bu~lton,S.C.; Transport
Officer, Lieutenant R. S. Weston, Manchester Regiment ; Brigade Cornlnissariat Officer of the Rustani Column, Lieutenant E. G. Vaughan ;
Ordnance Officer, Captain L. Q. Wittkins, Royal Artillery ; Section
C o m m ~ n d ~ nCaptain
t,
C. E. Belli-Biva~,7th Eombny Lancers. The Field
Post31 Staff consisted of Mr. H. C. Sheridan (Senior Postal Superintendent), Mr. A. D. Appleby, and Mr. M. N. Cama. Mr. Sheridan, by t h e
way, had acted in a similar capacity with the Malakand Field Force and
the Mohmand Field Force. I n the former he had been assisted b y Mr.
Appleby and Mr. G. M. Nicholl ;and iu the latter by Mr. C. J. Stowell
and Mr. Nicholl.
Ist Brigade :Commanding, Brigadier-General W. H. Meiklejohn ;
Orderly Officer, Lieutenant C. R. Gaunt, 4th Dragoon Guards ; D e p u t y
Assistant Adjutant-General, Major E. A. P. Hobday ; Deputy Assistant
Quarter-Master-General, Captain G F. H. Dillon ; Assistant Superintendent, Army Signalling, Lieutenant J. W. O'Dowda, Royal West K e n t
Reginlent ; Provost Marshal, 2nd-Lieutenant S. Morton, 24th P u n j n b
Infantry ;Brigade Commissariat OBicer, Captain C. IZ. Beville ; Brigade

Transport Officer, Captain J. M. Camilleri ; Regimental Commissariat
and Transport OEcer, Lieutenant J. Duncan, Royal Scots Fusiliers ;
Veterinary-Lieutenant W. A. Macdougall, Army Veterinary Department.
2nd Brigade :Commanding, Brigadier-General P. D. Jeffreys; Orderly Officer, Lieutenant J. Byron ; Deputy Assistant Adjutant-GeneraI,
Captain A. B. Dunsterville ; Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master-General,
Major H. C. Powell, 8-1st Gurkhas ; Assistant Superintendent, Army
Signalling, Lieutenant W. H. Trevor, East Kent Regiment, ; Provost
Marshal, Captain W. E. Banbury, 25th Madras Infantry ;Brigade Commissariat Officer, Captain G. A. Hswkins ; Brigade Transport Officer,
Captain D. Balrer, 2nd Bombay Grenadiers ; Regimental Con~missariat
and Transport Officer, Lieutenant G.C. Brooke, Border Regiment ;Veterinary Officer, Veterinary-Lieutenant G. M. Williams, Army Veterinary
Departnient.

I t was not a t all easy to predict what course the Bunerwals would
adopt. There were those who believed t h a t as their Swati neighbours
had submitted the men of Buner also would give in, seeing that they
could not well arrange for a great tribal combination : but others argued
that, like tlie Swatis when the Chitral Expedition began, they would
make one stand in the passes for their name's sake and thereafter open
negotiations. The military authorities were fully prepared for either
contingency. The pass by which i t was decided to enter Buner in the
event of the tribesmen withholding submission is known as the Tangi or
Tangao ; i t is imluediately beyond Sanghao where Sir Bindon Elood, on
receiving the order to advance, concentrated his two brigades in readiness. The receipt of the Governn~ent'sultimatum by the Bunerwals was
followed b y a summons from the Buner jirgah to the tribesmen to watch
t h e passes and be prepared to defend them ;the Shaszai sections being
detaiied t o the Tangso Pass, the Malizai sections to the Malendir and
the Chanllawals a.nd Hindustani fanatics to the Ambela Pass. The
Upper Swatis and Yusufzai sections north of Buner refused to join t h e
Bunerwals. These defensive arrangerllents having been made, a reply
was sent in to the Deputy Commissioner of Mardan intimating that the
Bunerwals had decided not to con~plywith the Government's terms.
T h e concentration of the force a t Sanghao was completed on tlie 6th
January, and a t once Sir Bindon 131ood in person, acconlpanied by the
Brigadiers and the Officers Comnlanding the regiments, went out to

ey:inlillc. the T ' L T I P,ISY
~ ~ Oand decide on the plan of attack. The enemy
1vr1.1. seen in I:uyc n ~ l ~ ~ ~cro\~niug
bers
the crest of the hills on the north
of the gu,rge 1r:tding t u the pass, and 011 the top of the pass itself, which
is about 3,FW feet above sea level. As the camp was at an elevation of
about -7,000 feet the rise to the pass vas about 1,800 feet, accomplished
in about ontimile of rand, the hills on both sides of the gorge being
verF steep.
The Snppers and Xiners, covered by the 20th Punjab Infantry,
were b11s~all 11,~y
iulproring the entrance to the gorge, whilst the Buners
were enerqetieall- but ineffectually loosening large rocks from the crest
of the liil!s in the hope of crusl~ingtheworking partiesbeneath. About
30 standard.; were risible on the hill top and the enemy were estimated
at :LEIOU t I,(ICJ~), xuostly Sabrzai, who received the reconnaissance by
firin:_.:L few q u n s :tt intervals at long ranges. After the Sappers had
lirloclietl off work it wis still very uncertain whether the mules would
bt.:ihle togtht a,cer the pass nest day after the fight, but 500 coolies
were t.n$tqeil tu c,irlq up tictual necessities for the troops should i t be
i~ullposhibleti) get the mules Up.

Tltc as>atilt on the T;~naaoPass was successfully delivered on the
Tlie dispositions for the attack were as follows:-20th
7th .J:trlt~:~~'y.
turning movement, scaling the hill to
Punjxl) I n f ' s ~ l t rto
~ execute
the n ~ ~ r it ~hfthe c;rmp solne one and-a-half miles from tlie pass ; the
Royal V e s t Kent, the Highland Liqht Infantry, and the 2lst Punjab
Inf:~nt~.y,
followed by the 16th Bengal ~~~~~~~~~y, to make the frontal
attack ; tlie 10th Field Bat'tery on a low spur a t the mouth of the gorge,
nrlcl two nlonntnin batteries on an eminence to the south of it. The
Buffs nnd the 3rd Bumbay Light Irtfdntry escorted the guns and the
former estended s long
up the higli hills to the south, being overlooked by high impassable cliffs. Tlie 30th Punjab Infantry left camp
altl,outS -\.~r., the batteries and escort a little later, and the remainder
of tllr troops a t 8-30 The 10th Field Battery opened a t 9 A.M., and
throagl~outthe day fired some 460ronnds at langes from 2,200 to 2,600
yards. No. 8 Bellgal &fountain Battery opened at 9 A.M., and No. 7
British Nou~itain Battery at 10-15. A large numbers of standards,
about 28, lined the crest, but few of the enemy were visible a t any time.
The >fountain Eattery ranges were 1,650 yards to 9,050. The frontal
att:~ckwas sent forward about 13 noon, about which time tlle320th
Prlnjab Infantrywere heard heavily engaged e t l 1 tile enemy. ~l~~latter
~ppcar.edto hsve few guns, but kept up a hot fire with what they h a d
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When the frontal attack got somewhat up the steep slopes, the enemy
also tried rolling stones down on the advancing troops, but ineffectually.
The shooting of the guns was remarkably accurate, and prevented the
enemy from collecting. A party of five Buners started for a ghnzi rush,
but only one kept it up and he was quickly shot. About 1-30 the
20th Punjab Infantry had surmounted the high peak, capturing some
standards, and began to descend along the crest to the pass under
a dropping fire. Shortly after this all the standdrds were one by one
carried away from the crest, and the opposition practically ceased. The
crest was crowned by 2 o'clock. One man of the Highland Light
Infantry was dangerously wounded. The operations throughout were
conducted with great skill and were materially assisted by the longrange volleys of the Buffs, who were firing from 1,100 to 1,400 yards.
The Political Officer's report on the operations stated that the tribal
gathering on the Tangao Pass consisted of Salarzai, Asherzai and
Gadizai, numbering in all about 2,000; and that their losses for the day
amounted to about 20 killed and 60 wounded.
After the capture of the pass Sir Bindon Blood went up to the top
and found the road very difficut for mules. These animals, which had
been loaded aboiit 11 A.M. and had been pushed forlvnrd some may up
the gorge, were therefore sent back to the camp, but the blankets and
great-coats for the troops had followed them on coolies. The descent
from the pass 011 the other side was found to be sudden and steep. The
valley to the village of Kingargali is from 400 to 800 yards wide, and
the village lies on the border of a level and well-cultivated plain about
2,500 yards from the top of the pass. The two companies of Sappers
were a t work on the road until dark, and bivouacked there for the
night.
Meanwhile the 1st Brigade went on and occupied the village of
Kingargali, reaching i t about 3-30 P.M. The village was found deserted,
but with plenty of grain and fodder in it. A quiet night was passed,
there being no sniping. Next day more work wits done on the road,
and some 25u mules were passed u p with rations for the brigade a t
Kingargali, but the road was still difficult in parts and very trying to
aden mules, being steep and narrow.
While Sir Bindon Blood was carrying out the main advance from
Sangao a small column acting under his instructions and consisting of
the Guides Infantry, the 31st Punjab Infantry, three squadrons of

I

i

1
f

the 10th Bengal Lancers, and a party of Sappers, the whole under
the immediatecomniand of Colonel Adams, V.C., marched out from
Rustam partly to reconnoitre the Rustam passes into Buner and partly
to distract the attention of the Bunerwals from Sir Bindon Blood's
advance and divide their forces. On the 6th January Colonel A d a m
began work by sending three reconnoitring parties towards the Pirsai,
Malandri and Ambela Passes. All three ~ a r t i e sreported that t h e
passes were held, and a t Pirsai the enemy fired on the cavalry. The
infantry of the C O ~ U ~ left
L I Bustam a t 4 P.M. 011 t h e 6th January, bivouacking near Pirsai village, The night was coldand frosty. A t daybreak
on the 7th the infantry left Pirsai, the Guides I n f m t r y covering the
advance of the 3 l s t Punjab Infantry; and the enemy bolted after a
slight resistance. They were evidently quite taken by surprise, it~ldhad
not time to collect contingents from Malandri Pass, where Hindustani
fanatics guarded the road. The cavalry followed a t noon. After arrival
on the Pirsai Pass Colonel McRae with six companies of the Guides a ~ l d
four companies of the 31st Punjab Infantry pushed on to the village of
Chowbanda on the Buner side. There was no opposition, and all the
inhabitants had fled. Colonel Adams, Guides Cavalry, reconnoitred four
miles on to the village of Kai, and the cavalry after crossing the pass
tried to effect a junction with the mitin body of the Buner force under
Sir Bindon Blood, but as it was nearly dusk Colonel Bdams decided
to return and bivouac with the infantry. Next day the column joined
hands with the main body.
The Salarzai and Asherzai sections of the Bunerwals now hurriedly
sent in tlleir,jirgahs to Sir Bindon Blood's camp and were clearly reduced
to a very subnlissive mood. A few days later other clans followed
suit, and by the middle of January the object of the expedition was
completely accomplished without any further fighting. The power of
the Bunerwals, like that of the Swatis, the Moh~nandsand the Bajouris,
was1for the time being a t least, thoroughly broken, their fighting prestige
destroyed, their strongest defences shown to be futilo, their arms takeq
away, and their country explored.

[ THE

END.]

A P P E N D I X I.
T H E R'E.WARDS F O R MAIZAR,
THE following rewards to the native troops engaged on the Maizar action
were notified in the Gazette of I~tdicz:Subadar Narayan Singh, ~ s Silihs,
t
is admitted to the 2nd class of the
Order of British India with the title of Bahadur.
The admissions to the 3rd class of the Order of Merit are as follows :Havildar Nihal Singh commanded his sub-section with great coolness,
firing blank cartridges when the supply of shell was exhausted, so a s to induce
the enemy to think the gun was still in action, and helped to carry the carriage
back to the relief line.
Naick Shara Ali kept his gun in action under great difficulties. The
gun and carriage twice turned over baclrwards, and twice the lanyard broke,
but he continued to load and fire after getting a spare lanyard from Havildar
Nihal Singh.
Salutri Kevval helped to carry Captain J. F. Browne, R.A., out of action,
and dressed his wound, under a heavy fire.
Driver Havildar R u r Singh carried the body of Lieutenant F. A. Cruickshank, R.A., out of action, and gave great assistance in sending the wounded to
the rear and saddling up the mules under fire.
Gunner Jawala Singh helped to carry the carriage of No. 3 Sub-division
to the relief line, and then returned to help in carrying Lieutenant Cruickshank's
body.
Gunner Diwan Singh, after finishing his duties in limbering up, picked
up Gunner Chet S ~ n g h ,who was lying stunned, and carried him out of action.
1st

Sikh I+zfafnlztuy.

Havildar Maha Singh, Sepoy Tara Singh, Sepoy (Lance-Naick) Jalandhar.
These three men brought Colonel Bunny, when mortally wounded, out of action
under a very heavy fire.
Havildar Mahomed Ralrsh, Sepoy (Lance-Naick) Khoja Nahomed, Sepoy
Isar Singh, Sepoy Habibulah. These four men carried Surgeon-Captain Cassidy
out of action under a heavy fire. Seopy Khoja Mahomed was also subsequently
very prominent in the firing line, and Sepoy Isar Sing11 helped to bring away
the reserve ammunition under a heavy fire.
Naick Lachman Singh was in charge of the reserve ammunition which
was stacked in the valley when the firing commenced. Though under heavy
fire he remained by the boxes, opening two, ready for issue, and subsequently
helped to carry the reserve ammunition away.
Sepoy Sheo S i ~ i g hhelped to bring away the reserve ammunition, returning twice under a heavy fire, each time bringing away a box. H e was subsequently twice wounded.

B

The action of these men in bringing away the reserve ammunition enabled
fire to b e kept up throughout the retirement, and probable was the means
of enabling the escort to secure its retreat.
Sepoy (Lance-Naick) Shah Sowar helped to carry Captain J. F.Browne,
R.A., out of action when wounded, and kept off some Waziris, who came close
up, by his steady firing. H e then again helped to carry Captain Browne when
the enemy fell back.
Sepoy (Lance-Naick) Sundar Singh helped to bring Lieutenant Higginson out of action, when wounded, under a heavy fire, and remained with him
the rest of the day, taking him back from the entrance of the lane to the kotal
under a heavy Ere.
1st Puwjab

Iqzfantry.

Bugler BeIa Singh assisted in saving and distributing the reserve ammunition, and was also one of the defenders of the garden wall, where he fought
hravely with a rifle he had taken from one of the killed.
Sepoy (Lance-Naick) Ishar Singh behaved with great gallantry at t h e
garden wall, where he bayoneted two men, and much encouraged his men by
his example and tenacity, only retiring when actually ordered to do so.
Sepoy Allayar Khan carried Lieutenant Seton-Browne, when wounded,
to the kotal, where the second stand was made.
Naick Assa Singh helped Lieutenant Seton-Browne during the subsequent retirement, though they were hard pressed by the enemy and under heavy
fire. Without his aid Lieutenant Seton-Browne could not have played the
part he did in the conduct of the retirement.
Sepoy Nurdad shot down several of the enemy a t very close quarters,
and subsequently led a gallant counter-charge against them, repulsing them,
but being himself very severely wounded.
The Governor-General in Council is also pleased to notify that had the
undermentioned non-commissioned officers and men survived, the distinction of
the 3rd class of the Order of Merit would have been conferred upon them in
consideration of their conspicuous gallantry and heroic devotion to duty on t h e
occasion referred to. Their widows are admitted to the pension of the 3rd class
of the Order of Merit, with effect from the date of their death.

No. 6 (Bombay) Moutztain Battwy.
Havildar Umardin and Lance-Naick Utam Chand.

1st Sikh Infalltry.
Lance-Naicks-Atr
Singh, Kesar Singh, and Achar Singh. Sepoysbhankar Khan, Mahomed Khan, and Roshan Khan.
1st Pulzjal Infawtry.
Naick Bur Singh, Lance-Naick Khanaya Singh, Sepoy Indar Singh.
The promotion to the 2nd class of the Order of Merit is also sanctioned of
Havildar (now Jemadar) Hussaiu Shah, 1st Sikh Infantry, for consp~cuousgallantry on the same occasion, in having helped to carry Surgeon-Captain Cassidy
out of action under a heavy fire.
The Governor-General in Council is further pleased to sanction the adrnission to the 3rd class of the Order of Merit of Langri (Cook) Jhanda Singh, 1st
Sikh Infantry, for conspicuous gallantry on the same occasion, in having, when
Lance-Naick Atr Singh was killed, run out and brought in the box of ammunition the Naick was carrying when he met his death.
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THEfollowing General Order gives the exact details of the above Force :The Governor-General in Council sanctions the despatch of a force, as
detailed below, to exact reparation for the treacherous and unprovoked attack
on the escort of the Political Officer, Tochi, on the 10th June 1897. The force
will be styled the Tochi Field Force :
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force will be composed as follows :-

~ s Bvigade.
t
2nd Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
1st Regiment of Sikh Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force.
1st Regiment of Punjab Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force.
33rd (Punjabi-Mahornedan) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
Squadron, 1st Regiment of Punjab Cavalry, Pulljab Frontier Force.
6 Guns, No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery, Punjab Frontier Force,
No. 2 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners,
z Sections, No. z British Field Hospital.
No, 28 Native Field Hospital.
z Sections, No. 29 Native Field Hospital.
2lzd Brigadd.
3rd Battalion, The Rifle Brigade.
14th Sikh (The Ferozepore) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
6th Regiment of Bengal (Light) Infantry.
25th (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
1 Squadron, 1st Regiment of Punjab Cavalry, Punjab Frontier Force.
4 Guns, No. 6 (Bombay) Mountain Battery.
2 Sections, No, 2 British Field Hospital.
No. 30 Native Field Hospital,
2 Sections, No. 29 Native Field Hospital,

C and D Sections. No, 32 Native Field Hospital, are detailed for the Line
of Communications, and Section No. I, Field Veterinary Hospital, for the Base.
Corvtmalzds a n d Staff.-The following Ofiicers are detailed for the staff of
the force :Ge~zeral O@cer Co'outzmza?cditcg the Major-General G . Corrie Bird, C.B.
Force,
A ide-decamp
Captain H. M. Twynant, East Lancashire Regiment.

...

...

Ovdorly Ofjicev
Assistarzt Adjuta~zt-Gc?zeral
Assistarzt Quavter-Masterr-GctzeraI

...
... Captain S. W

... Major

Scarse-Dickms, H.LII.
Leinster

J. Wilcocks, D.s.o.,

Regiment.
... Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel
18th Bengal Lancers.

J. E. Niizan,

Dd,btt& Assistngtf Qzd(lrte~-Mastcr-Major G. V . Kernball, R.A.
Ge>zeml(I~zfell&c~2ce).
Field I~ztell&ye~zce
Oficer
.. Lieutenant G. K. Cockerill, 28th
Punjab Infantry.
Superifzte~zdeizt,
A r m y S&ralling
.., Captain G, W. Rawlins, 12th Ben@
Cavalry.
Pri?zct$al Medical Oflcer
... Surgeon-Colonel R. H. Carew, D.s.0-7

.

...

...
...
...

Field Ezgirzeer
Assistalzf Field E~zgilzeev
Assista~ztField E~z,ailzcer
Field Paymaster
...
O~dszalzeeOflcer
Chief Comnzissariat 0flcEj'

A.M.S.

... Major T. Digby, R I E .
... Captain A, L. Schreiber, R.E.
... Lieutenant W. D. Waghorn, R.E.
... Captain P. G. Shewell, Military Accounts Department.
... Major C, H. L. F. Wilson, R.A.
... Major

G. Wingate, Assistant Commissary-General.
Assistagzt lo Chief Commissariat Lieutenant J . L. Rose, 2nd Battalion,
OfSice~.
. 1st Gurkhas.
Divisional Tralzsport Oficer
Captain H. James, Assistant Commissary-General.
A s s i ~ t f l ~ tto Divisio~znl Tra~zsfiortLieutenant E. C. Hagg, 18th Hussars.
0fic.y.
2tzspect~n.gVeten7zary OfSicer
Veterinary-Major G. T. R. Rayment,

...

...

Survey oficer
P~ovost-Marshal

...

...

A.V.D.

... Lieutenant F. W , Pirne, 1 s c.
... Captain P. Malcolm, 2nd Battalion, 4th
Gurkhas.

1st Brigade Sta...
Commanding
... Colonel C. C. Egerton, c.B., n.s.o.,
A.-D.-C. with the temporary rank of
Brigadier-General.
Orderly O f l c ~ r
...
... Captain A. Grant, 2nd Battalion, 4th
Gurkhas.
Deputy AsststagztA~z.~ta+zt-Gerzed
... Captain EX. P. Watkis, gist Punjab Infantry.
Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master- Brevet-Major F. Wintour, Royal W e s t
Ge~zeroZ.
Kent Regiment.
Brkade Commissariat O#cw
Lieutenant E. C. R. Annesly, Deputy
Assistant Commissary-General.
Brzgade Transport Oficer
Captain M. S. Welby, 18th Hussars.
Lieutenant H. W. R. Senior, 20th
Punjab Infantry.
Regimelztal, Commissariat ngzd Tralzs- Lieutenant T . S. Cox, I I th Bengol
port OBcers.
Lancers.
Lieutenant J. Muscroft, 2nd Battalioxr,
1st Gurkhas.
Veterinary Oficer
Veterinary-Lieutenant F. W. Hunt,

...

...

...

...

...

i

A.V.D.

2nd Brigade Stof.
Comnzagzding
... Brigadier-General W. P. Symons, c.n.
Orderly Oflcer
... Captain A. G. Dallas, 16th Lancers.
Deputy Assistant AdJutant-Getzeval
Captain J . McN. Walter, Dcvonhhire
Regiment.
Deprcty Assista?zt Qwarter-Master- Major H. M. Grover, 2nd Puujab Cavalry.
GelzeraZ.
Urfgade Commissariat Oficer
Lieutenant E. A. R. HoweIl, Deputy
Assistant Commissary-General,

...
...

...

...

Bvzgade T~arzspour0 f l c . e ~

... Captain P. W. D.

Brocltman, 5th Bengal
Infantry.
Lieutenant N. J. H. Powell, ~ 3 r d

A.V.D.

R.A.

tant Curnrnir-

ti. R;~yrner~t,

A P P E N D I X III.
THE TOCHI VALLEY DESPATCHES*

--

THEfollowing i s e x t r a c t e d

f r o m t h e Gazetteo f z , l d h :The Governor-General i n Council is pleased to direct t h e publication of a
letter from t h e A d j u t a n t - ~ e n e r a lsubmitting a despatch from ~ a j o r - G e n e l - ~ l
Bird, Commanding t h e T o c h i F i e l d Force, describing the
of t h a t frjrc''
from June to N o v e m b e r last. T h e Field Force has, under Major-General Birtl,
fully carried Out the objects of t h e expedition, and the Governor-General I n
Council, in c o n c u r r e n c e with t h e Commander-in-Chief, desires to e x p r e s s llis
higll appreciation o f t h e discipline, resolution, and patient endurance d i s p l a y e d
by all ranks u n d e r t h e s e v e r e t r i a l s to which they have been exposed.
The Adjutant-General i n h i s letter says :-The force has accomplished t h e
object for which i t w a s detailed, a n d the tribesmen have submitted t o t h e t e r m s
imposed by t h e G o v e r n m e n t o f India. Although practically unopposed b y t h e
enemy the duties d e v o l v i n g o n t h e troops have been of an unusually t w i n y :
nature, owing to t h e u n h e a l t h i n e s s of the climate, Amidst much sickness.
tvhich hns resulted i n a h e a v y death-roll, the good discipline, endurance, a n d
soldierly qualities o f all r a n k s h a v e been most marked, and are, in t h e opiniurl
of the Commander-in-Chief, d e s e r v i n g of high commendation. H i s E x c e l l e n c ~
would draw a t t e n t i o n t o t h e excellent work which the Medical D e p a r t m e n t i s
reported to h a v e p e r f o r m e d d u r i n g the operations, and to t h e g o o d s e r v i c e
rendered by t h e o t h e r d e p a r t m e n t s of the force, and by the Officers w h o s e
names Rre rnentioned i n t h e despatch. I am desired to add that t h e C o m m a n d e r in-Chief considers t h a t m u c h credit is due to Major-General B i r d for the
manner in which he has c o n d u c t e d the operations committed t o his charge.
30th
Major-General Corrie-Bird, i n the course of his despatch, s a y s :-On
October the 3 r d B a t t a l i o n Rifle Brigade, which had been in this Valley f o u r
months, left B a n n u f o r India. T h i s fine corps had been t h e victim o f an
epidemic of d y s e n t e r y a n d e n t e r i c fever, and had lost three Officers a n d 75
non-commiesioned officers a n d m e n , besides a very large percentage of OAiecrx
and m e n invalided or l e f t b e h i n d i n the field hospitals. I cannot b e a r t o o h i g h
testimony t o t h e d i s c i p l i n e w h i c h cheerfully endured, and t h e p l u c k t v h i c h
combated the s c o u r g e d u r i n g a long and trying season, a n d t h e battaliorr
carried away w i t h i t the r e g r e t s of t h e whole force at the losses t h e y lxnii
sustained. The losses b y disease have, I regret to say, beenvery heavy. Thrtut.
British Oficers a n d o v e r 100B r i t i s h soldiers have died from sickness, bc-sides
50 native soldiers and m a n y followers. Great numbers have been invalided or
are still in hospital. T h e t r o o p s notwithstanding these trials h a v e xvorkcrt
and d o n e t h e i r d u t y splendidly, and I thoroughly endorse t h e lriph
opirlior~formed o f t h e m b y the General Officers Commanding t h e Brigades, a n d
would here place o n r e c o r d m y h i g h appreciation of their discipline a n d soldierly qualities.
I submit f o r tbe f a v o u r a b l e consideration of the Commander-in-Chief
names of the f o l l o w i n g Officers :-Lieutenant-Colonel J, E. Nixon, A s s i s t n r l ~ ,
Qunrtermabtcr-General ; M a j o r Wilcocks, D. S. O., Leinster Kegimcrlt,
Assistant ndjutant-General ; Lieutenant-Colonel Wingate, Chief Commissuriae
0fftc.r ; Captairr
James, C a p t a i n Clements and Major Williamson, Surgmrl.colonel C a r e w , ~urgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel Simmonds, Surgeoa-~8jn?ior
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Hudson, Surgeon-Captain Mamby, Major Kemball, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch ; Major Digby, Conimanding Royal
Engineers ; Captain ~Ialcolm,4th Gurkhas, Provost-Marshal ; Captain Rawlins,
12th Bengal Cavalry, Superintendent, Army Signalling ; Lieutenant Cockerill,
28th Punjab Infantry, Field Intelligence Officer.. The Officers of the Personal
Staff:- Captain Twynam, Captain Scarse-Dickens, Highland Light Infantry, and
Lieutenant Talbot, Royal Horse Artillery ; Brigadier-General Symons,
Brigadier-General Egerton, Colonel the Hon. M. Curzon, Rifle Brigade ;
Lieutenant-Colonel Hogge, 33rd Punjab Infantry ; Lieutenant-Colonel Coats,
25th Punjab Infantry, and Major Pollock, 1st Sikhs.
Of t h e Officers specially brought to notice by the General officerscornminding the Brigades, the following are mentioned :-Major FVintour, Deputy
Assistant Quartermaster-General ; Captain Watkis, Deputy Assistant AdjutantGeneral ; Major Grover, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General ; Captain
Walter, Devonshire Regiment ; Lieutenant-Colonel Cunninghame, 1st Punjab
Cavalry, Road Commandant.
Major-General Bird adds :-I desire t o record my recognition of the assistance afforded me by Major 6. T. Younghusband, who has been Chief Political
O E c e r of t h e expedition throughout. I trust his services may receieve a
suitable recognition. My thanks are also due to the other Civil Officers, Mr.
Lorrimer and Mr, Kettlewell. For the good work done by the Telegraph
Department, I would record my special thanks. A new line w a s constructed
from Bannu to Datta Khel most expeditiously by Lieutenant Green, Royal
Engineers. I would commend t h e work done by the Postal Department under
Mr. Van Someren.

( viii
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A P P E N D I X IV.
T H E MALAKAND A N D SWAT VALLEY

DESPATCHES.
WE take

the follo\ving extracts from the despatches which appeared in the
Gu;etto of i):din:727-F.-FieId operations-lfalakand, dated Simla, 15th September 1897.

xu.

Frorw Jfn/bu-Gr,zcunl G. de C . MORTON,
c.B., Adjuta)zt-Gelzeual in India, to
t.4~Sccr~fnuyto tlze Gove~wne~zt
o J l + ~ d i aMilila~y
,
Depnutwelrt.
I have the honour, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to forward,
for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying report
from Brigadier-General W. H. Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G., giving details of what
occurred at the Malakand from the 26th July to the 1st August 1897, on which
latter date Major-General Sir B. Blood, K.C.B., took over command of the
liIalakand Field Force.
2. The Commander-in-Chief desires to draw attention to the success with
ahicli the first sudden attack of the tribesmen was promptly met and repulsed,
while he considers that the subsequent arrangements made to hold the position
reflect great credit on Brigadier-General Meiklejohn and the force under his
command.
3. Sir George White wishes to express his entire concurrence with the
remarks of Brigadier-General Meiklejohn as regards the admirable behaviour
of the troops during the defence of the Malakand, For five consecutive nights
large numbers of the enemy, led on by their Mullahs, and strongly imbued
with a spirit of fanaticism, attacked the position with determination, during
which time the troops had no rest or sleep, Each successive attack was met
and repulsed with steadiness and success.
4. The incident mentioned when an advanced post in the line of defence
was held by a party of a native officer and 25 men of the 3Ist Punjab Infantry
cannot pass unnoticed, The small party detailed for this duty gallantly
maintained their position for 6i hours, and resisted what is described as a most
determined attack, until at length the Serai they were holding was set on fire
and rendered untenable. Out of the party of 26 men detailed for the duty, rg
were either killed or wounded, which in itself testifies to the gallant stand they
made.

5. His Excellency also wishes to express his admiration of the manner
in which the Corps of Guides marched at very short notice from Mardan, a
distance of 32 miles. Despite the intense heat they had gone through, the corps
arrived in such a soldier-like conditiop that, on reaching the Malakand, the
Infantry of the Guides at once took up the position allotted to them in the line
of defence, and were under arms and fighting throughout the same and ensuing
nights. Nor can Sir George White omit a reference to the march of the 35th
Sikhs and the 37th Dogras, under Colonel Reid, which re$ments proceeded to
reinforce the Malakand Brigade as rapidly as possible. The march was carried

out under the most trying conditions and in exceptionally sultry weather, but
all ranks pushed on to reinforce their comrades, notwithstanding that they left
18 of their number dead from heat apoplexy e n route, aloss which His Excellency
deeply deplores.
Sir George White has also heard with the deepest regret of the death of
Lieutenant-Colonel J. Lamb, 24th Punjab Infantry, Major W. W. Taylor, 45th
Sikhs, Lieutenant L. Manley and the non-commissioned officers and men
mentioned in the report.
In conclusinn, the Commander-in-Chief desires to recommend to the
favourable consideration of the Government of India Brigadier-General
W. H. Meiklejohn and the Officers mentioned by him in his report.
Brigadier General Meiklejohn, in a despatch, deals with the attacks from
July 26th to August I st. H e says :Of the behaviour of the troops of all ranks, I cannot speak too highly.
The courage with which they have faced overwhelming odds mght after nlght,
the endurance with which they have stood and fought with next to no sleep for
five days and five nights, has been beyond all praise. The trlal has been a very
severe one, and I trust that His Excellency w ~ l agree
l
that they have come out
of it honourably.
All have done well, but I should like to bring before His Excellency for
favourable consideration the following names of Officers and men :-

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Lamb, on the first alarm being sounded on the night
of the 26th July, took prompt action in reinforcing the outpost line held by his
regiment, and later was of great assistance in directing the defence of the central
enclosure till he was severely wounded.
Captain H. F. Holland showed great courage in assisting to drive a number
of the enemy out of the central enclosure and was severely wounded in doing so.
I would specially wish to mention Lieutenant S. H. Climo, who commanded
the 24th Punjab Infantry after Lieutenant-Colonel Lamb and Captain Holland
had been wounded. This Officer has shown soldierly qualities and ability of
the highest order. H e has commanded the regiment with dash and enterprise
and shown a spirit and example which have been followed by all ranks. I trust
His Excellency will be pleased t o favourably notice Lieutenant Climo, who has
proved himself an Officer who will do well in any position and is well worthy
of promotion.
Lieutenant A. K. Rawlins has behaved well all through. I would recommend
him to His Excellency for the plucky way in which he went to the fort on the
night of the 26th July to bring down reinforcements, and again for the dash he
showed in leading his men on the 27th and 28th, of whlch Lieutenant Climo
speaks most highly.
Lieutenant E. W. Costello, 22nd Punjab Infantry, temporarily attached
to the 24th Punjab Infantry, has behaved exceedingly well, and is the subject
of a separate recommendation.

MaJ'or M. I. Gibbs commanded the regiment in the absence of Major
O'Bryen with skill and in every way to my satisfaction.
Lieutenant H. B. Ford, Acting Adjutant, grst Punjab Infantry, rendered
valuable assistance in helping to bring in a wounded sepoy during the withdrawal from North Camp. He also behaved with courage in resisting an attack
h
he was severely wounded.
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Surgeon-Lieutenant J. Hugo, attached to 3rst Punjab Infantry, rendered
valuable aervice on the night of the 28th in saving Lieutenant H. B. Ford from
bleeding to death. Lieutenant Ford was wounded and a branch of an artery
was cut. There were no means of securing the artery, and Surgeon-Lieutenant
Hugo for two hours stopped the bleeding by compressing the artery with his
fingers. Had h e not had the strength to do so, Lieutenant Ford must have
died. Early in the morning thinking that the enemy had effected an entrance
into Camp, Surgeon-Lieutenant J. Hugo picked up Lieutenant Ford with one
arm, and, still holdillg the artery with the fingers of the other hand, carried
him to a place of safety.
45th Raltray's Sikhs.
Colonel H. Sawyer was away on leave when hostilities broke out, but he
returned on the 29th and took over command of the regiment from LieutenantColonel McRae, and from that time rendered me every assistance.
I would specially bring to the notice of His Excellency the commanderin-Chief the name of Lieutenant-Colonel H.N. McRae, who commanded the
regiment on the 26th, 27th and 28th. His prompt action in seizing the gorge
at the top of the Buddhist Road on the night of the 26th and the gallant w a y
in which he held it undoubtedly saved the camp from being rushed on that
side. For this, and for the able way in which he commanded the regiment
during the first three days of the fighting, I would commend him to His
Excellency's favourable consideration.
Also Lieutenant R. M. Barff, Officiating Adjutant of the regiment, who,
Lieutenant-Colonel McRae reports, behaved with great courage and rendered
him valuable assistance.

The Guides.
I also wish to bring the name of Lieutenaut-Colonel R. B. Adams of the
notice. The prompt way in which the corps
Guides to His ~xce1lknc~'s
mobilised and their grand march reflect great credit on him and the corps.
Since arrival at the Malakand on the 27th July and till the morning of the
1st August, Lieutenant-Colonel Adams was in command of the Lower Camp,
i.e., that occupied by central and left position, and in the execution of this
command, and the arrangements he made for improving the defences he gave
me every satisfaction. I have also to express my appreciation of the way in
which he conducted the cavalry reconnaissance on the 1st August on which
occasion his horse was shot under him.
Great credit is due to Lieutenant P. C. Eliott-Lockhart, who was in command
of the Guides Infantry, for bringing up the regiment from Mardan to Malakarld
in such good condition after their trying march.
Captain G. M. Baldwin, D.S.O., behaved with great courage and coolness
during the reconnaissance of the 1st August, and though severely wounded by a
sword cut on the head, h e remained on the ground and continued to lead his
men.
Lieutenant H. L. S. Maclean also behaved with courage, and displayed
an excellent example on the night of the 28th July, when he was severely
wounded.
I ~ t Begzgal
h
Lancers.
Major S. B. Beatson commanded the Squadron, 11th Bengal Lancers,
~ led them with great skill and dash
which arrived at Malakand on the ~ 9 t hand
on the occasion of the reconnaissamce on the 1st August.
Lieutenant F. A. Wynter was the only Officer with No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery from the 26th till the 30th July, and he commanded it during
that tirne, when all the severest of the fighting was going on, with great ability,

and has proved himself a good soldier. I should like especially to mention him
for His Excellency's consideration. The Battery did excellent work all through.

NO. 5 Compatzy, Quee~z'sOwtz Madras Sappcvs alzd Mirrevs.
Lieutenant A. R. Winsloe, R.E., commanded the company from the 7th
July till the 1st August to my entire satisfaction. His services in strengthening
the defences were invaluable.
Lieutenant F. W. Watling, R.E., was in command of the company in the
absence of Captain Johnson on the 26th, and commanded it well until he was
wounded in gallantly trying to resist a charge of the enemy. After Lieutenant
Watling was wounded the command for the remainder of the night of the 26th
and till Lieutenant Winsloe returned on the 27th devolved on Lieutenant
E. N.Manley, K.E. H e performed his duties with great credit, and afterwards
was of great assistance, by his zeal and his exertions, to Lieutenant Winsloe.

Medical Staf.
Brigade-Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel F. A. Smyth was most zealous and
performed his duties to my satisfaction. H e volunteered to perform the duties
of Provost-Marshal, and did so for a short time during the illness of Lieutenant
H. E. Cotterill.
The arrangements made by Surgeon-Major S. Hassan, Senior Medical
Officer, 38th Native Field Hospital, and the indefatigable attention and care
with which h e devoted himself to the wounded deserve great praise. The list
of casualties is large, and Surgeon-Major Hassan has been untiring in his exertions for thek'relief. I hope His Excellency will think fit to consider his
services favourably.
Surgeon-Captain T. A. 0. Langston, 38th Native Field Hospital, rendered
valuable assistance in attending to the wounded under a heavy fire on the
night of the 26th and each following night, and behaved with courage and
devotion in carrying out his duties under very exceptional circumstances.
Surgeon-Lieutenant W. Corr has worked night and day in the hospitals in
trying to alleviate thesufferings of the wounded, and has most ably and efficiently aided Surgeon-Major Hassan.
Sr&de Sinjf.
Major L. Herbert, my Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter-MasterGeneral, was of the greatest assistance to me by the zeal and energy with which
he performed his duties from the moment the news of the approach of the
enemy was received till he was severely wounded while standing next to me
in the enclosure of the Sappers and Miners' Camp on the night of the 26th.
Since being wounded, he has carried on all his office duties on his bed. I would
wish to commend his gallant conduct for the favourable consideration of the
Commander-in-Chief.
Although Major H. A. Deane is in no way under my authority, I feel I am
under a great obligation to him for the valuable assistance he rendered me
with his advice and for volunteering to put himself at my disposal with the
object of carrying on the active duties of Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General
when Major Herbert was wounded. He was indefatigable in assisting me in
every way he could, and I am anxious to put on record my grateful appreciation
of' the services he rendered me.
The above list of names may appear to be somewhat long; but I would
point out that the fighting was almost constant for a weelr, and was of such a
close nature as to demand incessant exertion from every Officer i11 the force and
to elicit constant acts of courage and gallant example which cannot be overlooked.

( xii

)

I would not like to close this despatch without paying a tribute t o t h e
memory of a fine soldier and charming companion whose death the whole f o r c e
deplores.
Major W. W. Taylor had behaved with the greatest galIantry and d a s h in
meeting the enemy's first charge with Lieutenant-Colonel McRae, and h a d h e
lived he would undoubtedly have distinguished himself i n his career. H i s
loss is a heavy one to his regiment and to the Service, and there is no o n e i n
tile Brigade who does not mourn him as a friend.
I have also to deplore the death of Honorary Lieutenant L. Manley, a s m y
Commissariat Officer. who had rendered me great assistance: and w h o d i e d
fighting manfully. His loss is a very serious one to the Brigade.
I attach separately for favourable consideration a list of Native Officers,
non-commissioned officers and men who have done especially good service, s o m e
of whom I have therein recommended for the Order of Merit.
I trust these recommendations will meet with the favourable consideration
of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

MALAKAND F I E L D FORCE.
Return of casualties bz action at Malakand from z6thJul'y to 1st August
I 697 inclusive.
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No. 728-F -Fiela Operations. -Malakand, dated Simla, 15th September 1897.
From Major-Geneva2 G, de C. MORTON,c.B., Adjutafzt-General ivz Ipzdia,
to the Secretary to the Gouerrzment of I*fn'ia,Mzlitary Department.
In continuation of my letter No. 727-F., dated 15th September 1897,I
have the honour, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to forward h e r e w i t h
despatches from Major-General Sir B. Blood, K.C.B., describing the operations
at the Malakand and in the Swat Valley from the 1st t o 3rd August 1897, including the detence and relief of Chakdara.
2. In submitting these reports 1 3 s Excellency desires to express h i s
approbation of Sir B. Blood's energy, of the sound dispositions made by him a n d
of the able way in which he was supported by Brigadier-General Meiklejohn,
Colonel Reid, and all ranks under his command.
3, The advance from the Malakand to the relief of Chakdara was c a r r i e d
out with skill and judgment The troops, in spite of t h e exertions and h a r d ships they had undergone during the past week, advanced with great e n e r g y
and drove the enemy disheartened and panic-striclren in all directions into the
plain, where they were pursued by the cavalry and still further dispersed.
4. The separate report on the defence of Chakdara speaks for itself, b u t
Sir George White wishes to record his admiration of the manner in which t h i s
small garrison successfully held their own for six nights and days against overwhelming numbers. H e would also specially refer to the patient courage a n d
endurance oE the followers, both at the Malakand and Chalcdara, during the
operations from the 26th July to the 2nd August.

5. Among many other brave acts performed during the defence, Sir G e o r g e
White desires to draw special attention to the gallantry and devotion of the
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signallers who, isolated as they wcre in the signal tower under very trying circumstances, without water to drink, and at times under a heavy fire, continued
to perform their duties in a most soldier-like manner.
That the morale of the sinall garrison of Chalrdara was in no degree shaken
by the severe strain to which they had been subjected is evident from the brilliant
sortie which was made by the party under command of Lieutenant Rattray on
the arrival of the Relieving Force.
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His Excellency desires to commend the services of Major-General Sir
B. Blood, and those mentioned by him in the operations under reference, to
the special consideration of the Government of India.

tive Oficcrs,
service, some
Sir Bindon-Blood closes his despatch describing his relief of Chakdara in
the following terms :The complete and comparatively easy success of these operations, which I
have been privileged to direct, was, chiefly and in the first place, due to the
steadfast courage and conduct of our native soldlers under the gallant leading
of their British Officers. Not a little was also due to the patient courage of our
mule-drivers and other followers, who behaved in the somewhat exciting circumstances of the early morning of the 2nd August, as if they were parading
for a peaceful march in the plains of India. Their confidence in us was something touching, especially when w e consider the scenes they had witnessed for
nearly a week, the heavy and continuous firing at short range which had gone
on round two-thirds of our position-up to an hour or two before the start of the
relieving column, and the constant sight at no great distance of hordes of
wild barbarians thirsting for their blood. These circumstances were calculated
to unpleasantly affect the steadiest nerves, and the way in which all sorts
and conditions of our native soldiers and followers came out of the trial is a
source of keen satisfaction to all of us. Truly these men deserve to bear the
good old motto Nec asperat terrelzt.

:mber 1897.
i72

Zwdia,

In operations such as those connected with the relief of Chakdara Fort, it
is very difficultto select individuals for reward with fairness, and I would accordingly suggest that, if possible, in this case some distribution of rewards should
be made to the native ranks at proportionate rates per unit to be allotted in
each unit by the British Officers acting as a sort of committee.
I have the honour to invite the special attention of His Excellency the
Commander-m-Chief in India to the good services of the following officers during
the operations described above, uiz ;Brigadier-General W. H. Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G., carried out his duties
in command of the force which relieved Chakdara Fort with great gallantry and
judgment.
Colonel A. J. F Reid, officiating Colonel on the St&, Malakand Brigade,
afforded me valuable assistance by carrying out the re-arrangement of the
defensive posts at the Malakand on the 1st August after the Relieving Force had
been drawn from them and in making the preparations for Colonel T. H.
Goldney's attack on the 2nd.
Colonel T. H. Goldney, 30th Sikhs, disposed and led the troops on tht:
rnornillg of the 2nd in the successful attaclr on the hill since named after him
in a most judicious and satisfactory manner.
Major E. A. P. Hobday, R.A., was most energetic and iudefatigable in
assisting Colonel A. J. F. Reid and me in carrying out the multifarious work
which had to be done at the Malakand and in the Swat Valley on the st, and
and 3rd.
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Brigadier-General h1eiI;lejohn reports favourably on the following Officers
xvho Lvere under his command during the operations above detailed, v b :Captait~G. F. H. Dillon, 40th Pathans, who acted a s Staff Officer to t h e
Relieving Force, sho\ved great readiness and resource, and his assistance w a s of
t h e utmost value.
1-ieutenants C . R. Gaunt, 4th Dragoon Guards, Orderly Officer, a n d
E. Christiail, Royal Scots Fusiliers, Signalling Officer, carried out their duties
m o s t satisfactorily.
Lieutenant-Colonel R. B, Adams, Queen's Own Corps of Guides, commanded tlne Cavalry (four squadrons) with the Relieving Force, in the most gallant
and judicious manner.
The following Officerscommanding Units and Detachments of the Relieving
Force a r e stated by Brigadier-General Meiklejohn to have carried out their
duties in a thoroughly capable and -.atisfactory manner, via :Colonel W. A. Sawyer, 45th Sikhs.
Major Stuart-Beatson, 1 I th Bengal Lancers.
hlnjor J. 6. Ranisay, 24th Punjab Infantry.
Captain A. H. C. Birch, K.A. (8th Bengal Mountain Battery.)
1.ieuten:nnt G. de H. Smith, 2nd Regiment, Central India Horse, attached
tu Queen's Own Corps of Guides (Cavalry).
Lieutenant A. R. Winsloe, R.E. (No. 5 Company, Queen's Own Sappers and
Xiners?.
Lici~tenailt.F. C. Eliott-Lockhart, Queen's Own Corps of Guides (Infantry).
Sur,qco~l-Captain
H. F. Whitchurch, V.C., attended to the wounded under
fire throughout the fighting.
T h e follo\ving Officers under Colonel T. H. Goldney's command led their
dct;ishments under my own observation with gallantry and judgment, via :Lieuteriant-Colonel L. J. E. Bradshaw, 35th Silrhs.
Captain L. C. H. Stainforth, 38th L)ogras.
Jernadar Nawab, who commanded two guns of No. 8 Bengal Mountain
I3attery in support of Colonel Goldney's attack, attracted my favourable notice
by his smartness, quickrless and thorough knowledge of his work.
I would also wish to bring to His Excellency's notice the good work done
by Slajur El. Burney, Gordon Highlanders, Assistant Adjutant-General ; Major
I£. \\-hurry, D.S.O., Chief Commissariat Ofiicer, and Captain A. B. Dunsterville, 1 s t Battalion, East Surrey Regiment, m y Aide-de-camp, the only Officers
of the Divisional Staff of my force who had arrived at the Malakand on the and
August. l'hese Ofiicers worked very hard and were of great use to me.
Xajor I-I. A. Deane, C.S.I., Political Agent, Dir and Swat, w a not i n a n y
way under my orders during the operations above described, but, notwithstanding, I hope, I may be permitted to express the obligatioxls under which I lie to
flim for valuable information and general assistance which h e gave me.

MALAKAND FIELD FORCE,

R-dm-,rof castr(iJiies

action at relief of Chakdara osz zlzd ~~~~~t
SUMMARY.

A'olz-co~~lzissio~aed
OfjFcers npzd &felts
Killed
Wourlded

.+.
...

...
...

...

...

...

...

...
...

5

2s
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dated Simla, 15th September 1897.

From Major-Ge9zeral G. d e C. MORTON,c.B., Ad'tagtt-Ge~rcral i j z ltzdia, to
the Secvetavy to the Goverlzv~ejztof I?zdia, Il/liliiary Departme?zt.
I n continuation of my letter No. 728-F., dated 15th September 1897, I
Lave the honour, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to submit for the
,information of the Government of India the accompanying despatch from MajorGeneral Sir B. Blood, K.C.B., Commanding the Malakand Field Force, giving
a n account of t h e operations of the force under his command from the 4th to
26th August 1897 inclusive.
2 . His Excellency has much pleasure in bringing to the notice of t h e
Government of India the admirable manner in which Sir B.Blood has exercised
his command and the skilful way in which that Officer handled his troops at the
action of Landaki on the 17th August, when he dislodged the enemy from an
v t r e m e l y strong natural position.

3, S i r George White deeply regrets the loss of Lieutenants R. T. Greaves,
Lancashire Fusiliers, and H. L.S. MacLean of the Queen's Own Corps of
Guides ; and he also desires to record his admiration of gallantry displayed on
t h e occasion of their death by Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Adams, Queen's Own
Corps of Guides, Lieutenant Viscount Fincastle, 16th Lancers, and the Native
Officers and non-commissioned officers and men of the Queen's Own Corps of
Guides who accompanied them, and whose conduct will form the subject of a
separate cominunication.
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4. The Commander-in-Chief cordially endorses the opinions expressed in
paragraphs 31 and 35 of t h e report, and favourably commends to the notice of
t h e Government of India the Officers therein mentioned.

Sir Bindon Blood in his despatch says :I would wish to express my admiration of the fine soldierly qualities
exhibited by all ranks of the special force which I led into Upper Swat. They
fought the action at Landaki in a brilliant manner, working over high hills
under a burning sun with the greatest alacrity and showing everywhere the
greatest keenness to close with the enemy. They carried out admirably the
trying duties necessitated by marching in hot weather with a transport train
of more than 2,000 mules, and they endured with perfect cheerfulness the discomforts of several nights' bivouac in heavy rain. The Officers of the Divisional
Staff and of my personal staff who were with me, Brigadier-General W. H.
Meilrlejohn, C.B., C.M.G., and his staff and the several heads of departments
and Commanding Officers of Divisional Troops, all carried out their duties i n
a n entirely satisfactory manner.
Major H. A. Deane, Political Agent and his Assistant Lieutenant A. B.
Minchin gave valuable assistance in collecting intelligence and supplies.
While the operations above described were in progress a diversion was
made towards the southern border of the Buner country from Mardan by
the 1st Reserve Brigade, which, on its head-quarters leaving Mardan, came under
my command as the 3rd Brigade, Malakand Field Force.

A force under Brigadier-General J. Wodehouse, C.B., C.M.G., was concentrated on the 17th August at Rustam, 18 miles north-east of Mardan and about
four miles from the Buner border, with the object of acting a s a containing
force, and s o preventing the sections of the Bunerwals who had not already
committed themselves against us from joining in opposition to our advance
into Upper Swat.

The presence of this force had the desired effect, and Brigadier-General
Wodehouse and his staff made good use of the time they spent at Rustam in
acquiring valuable information about several of the passes in the neighbourhood.
Brigadier-General Wodehouse states that throughout the operations of his
force, which involved considerable fatigue and exposure to heat and rain, the
spirit of his troops left nothing to be desired. H e makes special mention of the
work of No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners, under Captain C. E.
Baddeley, K.E. H e also reports very favourably on the assistance given him by
Lieutenant C . P. Down, Assistant Commissioner, and has expressed to me a high
opinion of that Officer's abilities and acquirements, particularly of his proficiency
in the local vernacular.

THE BUNER DESPATCH.
Sir Bindon Blood's despatch on the Bunerwnl expedition was published in
the Gnaetfe of ltzdia with the following comments :The Governor-General in Council concurs in the opinion expressed by the
Commander-in-Chief regarding the skill with which the operations of the field
force were conducted by Sir Bindon Blood, and the discipline and good conduct
displayed by the troops throughout these short but successful operations.
The Adjutant-General in a covering letter wrote :-The celerity with which
the successful result was attained is undoubtedly due to the skilful dispositions
made by the commander of the force, and to the enterprise, judgment and vigour
with which the operations were carried out, particularly in the attack and
capture of the Tangao Pass. His Excellency now commends to the notice of
the Government the services of Sir Bindon Blood and of the Brigadiers and
others mentioned in the despatch. The discipline and conduct of the troops,
British and native, have been all that could be desired, and reflect the greatest
credit on all ranks.
Sir Bindon Blood in his despatch mentioned between sixty and seventy
Officers. H e remarked:-The
1st and 2nd Brigades were most ably and
efficiently commanded by General Meiklejohn and General Jeffreys respectively,
and he recommends these Officers strongly to the consideration of the Commander-in-Chief. The only casualty during the operations was a private of the
Highland Light Infantry, mortally wounded.
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T h e Adjutant-General, in a covering. letter to Sir Rindon RlnoCs dcspatrh,
s a y s :-The
Commander-in-Chief considcrs that F3ripr?dicr-C~z.i:~1';ll.'-I I).
J e f f r e ~ ~ sdisposition
's
of the troops u l ~ d e rhis corumnnd on the 16thScptc:nbc.r
showed that that Officer had greatly underestimated the fishtin< puwer of the
Mamunds as regards both numbers and strength of positit~n. His E:;cellcrlcy
has, however, much pleasure in endorsing Sir Bindon Rlooll's conlmend.dic?nof
t h e subsequent operations of this Brigadc. Sir George liT\Tbitedesires tnc to cxpress his approval of the general conduct of tile operations c:crried out under
S i r Bindon Blood's directions, and of the rescurce and appreciation of the situation h e evinced when confronted with unexpected difficulties. I l e also concurs
the terms in which Sir Bindon Blood speaks of the services rendered by
Brigadier-Generals Meiklejohn and Wodeliouse, the latter of whom was severely
wounded in the night attack on the grd Brigade, on the 20th Septembttr. The
gallantry and discipline of the troops were, in Sir Georxe \Vliitr's opiriion,
conspicuous throughout the operations ; especially so in the night attnclij made
by the enemy on the 1qt11, 16th and 20th September, as \re11 as dnrinz the
trying incidents of the 16th September and in the attack on the vil1:c~cs of
Agrah and Gat o n the goth September. Tlle valuable recnnn:iismnces mode by
t h e I ~ t Bengal
h
Lancers under Major Beatson \\.hen cstahlish~n,q cotlnecti~rrl
with Major-General Elles's force, and the skiliul handlin,o of the cavalr? nt' the
Corps of Guides by Lieutenant-Colonel K. H. Adarns on the 50th Septenabcr
appear to the Commander-in-Chief to be specially \\-orthy of cominrndation.
H i s Excellency has much pleasure in endorsing the favourable terms in which
S i r Bindon Blood has mentioned Colonel A. J. F. Reid, who was responsible for
a great portion of the line of communications and for the efiicient supply of
troops at the front ; a s well a s in commending to the farourable notice of the
Government the Staff, Departmental and Regimental Officers named in the
despatch. T h e advance made in knou-ledge of their special duties evinced b ~ r
t h e Transport Officers during the operations now reported on, and the attention
that has been paid to the care and treatment of Transport animals, are, in Sir
George White's opinion, most satisfactory and creditable. In conclusion, the
Commander-in-Chief desires to bring to the notice of the Government the services
rendered by Major-General G. d e C. Morton, Adjutant-Genera!, and MajorGeneral A. R. Badcock, Quarter-Master-General in India, in the performance of
t h e onerous duties which devolved upon them in connection with these
operations.

I n a letter from the Government of India it is said that the GovernorGeneral in Council concurs in the Commander-in-Chief's expression of approval
of the general conduct of these operations, and of the skill and resource shown by

Sir Bindon Blood. His Excellency in Council also shares with the Comtnanderin-Chief his appreciation of the gallantry and discipline displayed by all ranks
throughout the operations.
SIR BINDONBLOOD'S
DESPATCH.
Sir Bindon Blood gives the follocviag reasons for separating his t'v0
brigades on the march to co-operate with Major-General Elles in the nlohmand
country :Some little delay being necessitated by political arrange~nents with the
Jandoul Chiefs and others, the disposition of the force on the 12th ~ e p t e ~ u b e r
had altered to the following :3rd Brigade, Watelai, three miles south-west of Khai- on the left bank of
the Chaharmung stream.
2nd Brigade, Gosam.
1st Brigade, two battalions and the 10th Field Battery at Panjkora and
Serai, the remainder on the Line.
Divisional Head-quarters, with the 3rd Brigade at Watelai.
On the ~ g t hthe
, 3rd Brigade halted, the 2nd Brigade moved to a point
close to south-west of Khar, and I personally examined the Rambat Pass, finding that the country to the south of it was very deficient in water and fbmge.
This being so, I directed Brigadier-General P. D. Jeffreys, C.B., commanding
the m d Brigade, to encamp on the rqth, north of Markhanai: to improve the
Kambat Pass, to cross it into Butkor on the 15ch with two battalions, a coinpany of Sappers and Miners, a squadron, and five days' supplies, and t o send
the remainder of his brigade on the same day, under Colcnel T. H. Goldx~ey,
55th Sikhs, to join me at Nawagai, to which place I intended to march on tl~c
14th with the 3rd Brigade. I further directed Brigadier-General Jeffreys to
move his special force through Butlior as quiclily as possible to Danish Kol.
where I promised to join hiin or send him further instructions. Both br-igades
carried with them rations for men up to the 23rd September ; and I had
arranged to drop my communications with the Malakand and draw m y next
supplies from Shabkadar, where the Mohmand Field Force, under Major-General
E. R. Elles, C.B., was waiting to march on the 15th to join me in the Mohmand
country, south of Nawagai.
The movements detailed in the foregoing paragraph were duly carried out
by the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, so far as the 14th was concerlled ; the 3rd Brigade,
with Divisional Head-quarters. being encamped on the evenillg of that day about
a mile south of the village of Nawagai, while Brigadier.Genera1 Jeffreys, with
three battalions, a mountain battery and a squadron was on the right bank of
the Chaharmung stream, north of Markhanai, having detached the Hulrs and the
4th Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, to the crest of the Rambat Pass to
prepare it for the passage of his special force next morning.
At about 8 P.M. on the lqth, while it was still quite dark, before the nloorl
rose, Brigadier-General Jeffreys's cilmp was suddenly assailed by a h e a v y
musketry fire from the ravines close by. The attack was continued. with little
intermission for six hours, being directed at first chiefly against the faces of the
camp held by the Guides under Major F. ('ampbell and the 35th Sikhs unrier
Colorlel T. H. Goldney, and afterwards against that defended by the 30th
Dogras under Lieutenant-Colonel F. G. Vivian. The enemy showed no inclination to come to close quarters, and ultimately drew off about 2 A.M., d o u l ~ t l e s s
having in view the desirableness of getting beyond reach of cavalry befc.>r:lre
daylight. This, however, they did not succeed in doing, as they were overtaken in the. Mamund Valley about 8 A.M. on the rgrh by Captain E. H. C d s
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nnd his squatiron o i tllc 14th Bengal Lancers, who killrcl 2 1 of them and dispersed the [rest.
I regret to say that two British ORcers were killed * and one danzerously
wounded .I.in this affair. The other casualties
* Captain W.
To'nkins and
were :-Killed-tx\,o
native soldiers and two
Lieutenaor A . \V. Bazley.
follo~vers; woztrrdtd -- one native officer, five
+
A, Harington,
other native ranks and two followers : ninetveight horses and transport animals mere also killed or wounded.
Meanwhile, on my arrival at Nawagai on tho 14th September, I found the
Khan disposed to be iriendly, and to do all in his power to provide such supplies a s w e required. The Hadda Mullah was reported to be in the Bedmanai
Pass with a small gathering which w a s said to be increasing in numbers ; but
the tribes inhabiting tile Mittai and neighbouring valleys seemed somewhat
half-hearted about opposing us. T h e tribes south of the Rambat Pass also sent
t o disclaim hostile intentions ; but, notwithstanding this, some of their men
joined in the night attack of the 14th-15th on Brigadier-General Jeffreys's
camp.
Early in the morning of the 16th I received a brief report by heliograph of
the attack on Brigadier-General Jeffreys's camp the night before, and at once
sent him orders to concentrate his force and proceed to the punishment of the
tribes concerned. Later in the day I received a fuller report of what had
happened, together with information from Brigadier-General Jeffreys that he
had received my orders and was concentrating his brigade at Inayat Kili in the
Mamund Valley, with a view to carrying them out. Hehad ascertained that the
attack on his camp had been made by a small gathering of Mamunds, who had
been reinforced by some of Umra I<han's followers from Zazi, a village in the
Mamund Valley, and by a few men from the neighbouring tribes.
Naturally the night attack of t h e 14th-rsth, with the consequent turning
aside into the Manlund Valley of Brigadier$ 3 Battalions.
General Jeffreys's Brigade, made a corisiderable
I Mountair, Battery.
change in the aspcct of affairs in South Bajour
3 Squaurons.
I Company of Sappers.
and the Mohmand country ; and the strategical
situation which had now developed itself was
interesting. I found myself at Nawagai mith a brigade of all arms $ in a
strongly entrenched position, faced by the Hadda Mullah's gathering in the
Bedmanai Pass,-a not very difficult defile, some six or eight miles in length, the
mouth of which is about seven miles south-west in a straight line from the site
of my camp,-itself about o n e mile south of Na~vagaivillage The intervening
ground is a plain of which the western halt is cut up by ravines, while the
rest i s favourable for cavalry. East of and behind me lay the road to the camp
of t h e 2nd Brigade at Inagat Kili running for about six miles through a nrtwork of deep ravines, and then for t h e remaining six or seven over a plain.
I was not strong enough to attack the Mullah's gathering in their position
with sufficient amount of odds in my favour, while I did not think it advisable
to rejoin Brigadier-General Jeffreys,-first,
5 4 Battalions.
because h e was strong $ enough already for
I klountain Eattery.
immediate requirements ; secondly, because it
I Squadron.
would
have been most unwise to have retired
I Company of Sappers.
through the ravines above mentioned in h c e of
the Mullah's gathering ; thirdly, because I expected that one of Major-General
Elles's Brigades would join me in the Nawagai Valley on the 17th or the
18th at latest, and finally, because my support was necessary to keep the Khan
of Nawagai with us,-as, if I had cleserted him, he would have been compelled
b y the Mullah's men to throw in his lot with them, which would have been
a serious matter on account of his influence in Bajour. Accordingly, I determined to stay where I was until Major-General Elles's advance should make
it possible to dispose effectually of t h e Mullah's gathering, and to clear cut the
Bedmanai Pass and the Mittai and neighbcuring valleys with completeness,
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The most interesting part of Sir Bindon Blood's despatch is t h a t which
deals with the action of September 16th. It mag be well to give it in full, Sir
U;rldcn Blood says :A: ab9ut 6-30 on the morning of the 16th September Brigadier-General
his camp a t Inayat Kili with the greater portion of
llis ti;rce ill tllree co!umns, to deal xvith the villages of the Mamunds. T h e right
ci:lllmn urlder ~ i ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ F.
t . G.
~ oVivian,
l o n ;Yth
e l Dogras, consisting of six
ccrnlparliej311d a detachnlent of Sappers was directed along the eastern side of
the 31nlnuild Valley on the villages of Shinkot, Chingai, 1)amadolah a n d Baclaln
Kili ; the central column under Colonel T. H. Goldney, 35th Sikhs, consistirlg
of >ix companies, four guns. one squadron, and a detachment of Sappers, was
directed against the villages of AIinar, Hazarnao and Badalai ; while t h e left
culumn under Major F. Campbell of the Guides was composed of five companies
ai;d a detachment of Snppers, and was directed along the right bank of the
\Vatt.lai ravine parallel to the centre column. The right column under
C:~;luriel Vivian having advanced by the route ordered as far as Damadolall,
i;,un<? that place too strongly held to be reasonably attempted without artillery,
and returnrd thence to camp arriving at 4 P.M., with two men slightly
v.o:~ndcd. The centre column under Colonel Goldney, advanced some s i x miles
up :?ie v;z!ley wittiour seeing anything of the enemy, who were first reported
at Eiida~n Kili to mhiuli place a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel
A. E.0:n:nanney was sentto dislodge them. The remainder of the column pushed
on, and at about 10-30 A.31. two companies of the 35th Sikhs whicll led t h e
advn::ce occupied a knoll near Shahi Tar~gi upwards of nine miles from camp.
i n :ills riiorrlnent. however, the tnro companies advanced too far from their
siippor:s and a s the enemy promptly attacked them in force they w e r e compelled to retire about a rniie with the loss of one British Officer and o n e sepoy
killed and >isteen non-commissioned oflicers and sepoys \vounded. S o o n afterwards, the B u f s under Colonel Ommanney coming up, the knoll w a s again
occilpied without much opposition, being the firthest point reached by the
coiulnii during this advance. The guns came into action, first on t h e spur
11orth of Badalai and aftrl.mards on the north of Chingai (11) ; t h e y were
covered in the first position by two companies of the 35th Sikhs posted to
their right, arid on their moving towards the second position one-and-a-half
of :hese compailics unrler Captain W. I. Ryder were ordered to cover t h e movetilent by climbing to the top o f a high ridge to their right and then advancing
zlc~:igit toxvsrds the north. Owing to subsequent orders not reaching him,
C:l!ltniri Rydrr Iverit further. In the earlier part of the d a t~h e~ left column
)>:id ~.ernainedfar behind, being fully occupied for some considerable t i ~ n ein
dralii:g witli tile n:~merous villages met with along the road shortly after
leavirig cainp. Towards g A.X. it was called up by General Jeffrtys, a s the
and it joined the
enemy bcgan to appear in force on his left near .@ah
centre cc>luinnabout noon. At about 2-30 P.RI., a s soon as the fi3rtified villages
or'Chingai ( I I j arid Shahi Tangi had been dismar~tled,General Jeffreys ordered
the troops to return to camp ; Captain Kyder was still on the high ridge above
Chinxai ill), along which he attempted to retire in a direction ~vhich diverged
from the line of the retreat of the main body of the force. Soon after the
rtt:irement commenced n message was received from him stating that h e was
hard Pressed and could not rejoin the main body, whereupon General Jeffreys
ordered lrlajor Campbell with six comp:lnies of the Guides InfantrJ, t o go to
his assistance which they did about 4 P.M., 8 short time being taken u p in
assemblirrg the companies which were in extended order. The fact of this movenlcll! having to be undertaken so late in the afteriioon was a most unfortunate
occurrence, since General jerireys had to wait until the safety of the id^^
2nd Captain Ryder's detachment was assured ; and the ,-onsequent delay at
that time of the day made it impossible for him to reach camp before dark.
'lhi. Guides, under Major Campbell. most successfully and gallantly relieved
and brougfit of Captain Rgder's detachment, which had suffered heavy losses,
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The combined detachments did not, however, succeed in rejoining General
Jeffre~s,being prevented by nightfall and a thunderstorm which came on about
the same time. Ultimately they made their way to camp without further loss,
arriving about g P.M. &leanwhile, as soon as the safety of Captain Ryder's
detachment was certain, General Jeffreys continued his retirement towards
the camp. S o long as daylight lasted the enemy kept at a 'respectful distance
from him, but as it got dark they got bold and the ground being broken and
difficult they were able to bring a hot fire to bear on the troohs, while a heavy
thunderstorm ~vhichcame on at dusk greatly increased the dificulties of the
situation. Ultimately, however, by about 8-30 P.M. all the troops had arrived
in camp except General Jeffreys, four guns of NO. 8 (Bengnl) Mountain Battery, a small party of Sappers and a few men of the Buffs and the 35th Sikhs
who got separated from the rest in the darkness. Abo~itdusk General Jeffreys,
then about three miles and a half from camp, decided to occupy a neighbouring village called Bilot for the night, chiefly with a view to sheltering the
battery mules with him from the enemy's sharpshooters, and while he w a s
engaged in arranging this the thunderstorm before referred to came on causing
sudden and complete darkness. I n the consequent confusion the troops got
separated and only the detachments above detailed remained with General
Jeffreys. H e proceeded to occupy and entrench an angle of the village, part
of which was burning, while the rest was soon occupied by the enemy, who
fired on the General and his detachment from behind walls at a few yards'
range, inflicting serious losses on m+n and animals. This state of things continued, in spite of several gallant attempts to clear the village which were led
by Lieutenants Watson and Colvin, R.E., until the arrival about midnight
of Major J. F. Worlledge, 55th Sikhs, with two companies of Guides and two
of his own regiment. After this the enemy were easily driven off, and gave no
further annoyance during the night. Major Worlledge had left camp about
5-30 P.M. in obedience to an order from General Jeffreys, aild on joining t h e
General about dark had been sent to find and support the Guides under Major
Campbell. Failing to fiud the Guides i n the dark, Major Worllcdge tried to
retrace his steps to the General but only succeeded in finding him after t h e
moon rose about midnight, although he had been close to him for some time
previousljr without knowing. it. General Jetrreys ultimately reached camp at
8 A.M. on the 17tl1, some of the troops there having been sent out to his assistance and returning with him.
After detailing the losses, 1 5 1 killed and wounded, Sir Bindon Blood continues :--The behaviour of the troops throughout this trying day was very
good. The steadiness and discipline shown by t h e Buffs under Colonel Ommanney were admirable, while General Jeffreys has specially commended t h e
gallantry with which the Guides Infantry under Major Campbell brought off
Captain Kyder's detachment of the 35th Sikhs, carrying the wounded on their
backs under a heavy fire. H e has further strongly endorsed Major Campbell's
favourable mention of the courage and judgment shown by Captain G. B.
I-Iodson and Lieutenant H. W. Codrington of the Guides who commanded t h e
companies of the battalion which were chiefly in contact with the enemy;
the gallantry of Surgeon-Captain J. Fisher who made a most determined though
unsuccessful attempt to takz medical aid to the wounded of Captain R~rder's
detachment through a hot fire ; of Surgeon-Lieutenant E.L. Perry ; of Jemadar Sikandar Khan of the Guides, and of several lion-commissioned oflicers
and sepoys of the same corps. General Jeffi-eys has also described in very
favourable terms the gallant and valuable work done on this day by Captain
E. I-I. Cole and his squadron of the I l t h Bengal Lancers. He has commended
the conduct of Captain Kyder and Lieutenant 0. G. Gunning, 35th Sikhs, w h o
were both wounded, and of Jemadar Djarayan Singh, Havildar Ram Singh and
Sepoy I<arram Singh of the same regiment. H e has also brought to notice a
gallant act o< Captain Birch and his trumpeter Juvan in rescuing a wounded
sepoy of the 35th Sikhs, a s well as the distinguished gallantry of Jemadars

Nalvab and Ishar Sing11 and several non-commissioned officers and men of tile
same battery. General Jeffreys further refers in the strongest terms of commendation to the gallant conduct of Lieutenants Watson and Colvin, R.E., a n d
of the handful of men of the Buffs and No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers, w h o
spent t h e nights of the 16th and 17th with him in the village of Bijot. T h e
conduct oi these Officers and men in entering t h e village several times in t h e
dark, in the face of a heavy fire directed upon them at close quarters, seems deserving of the highest recognition, and I have consequently made a special
communication to you on it. General Jeffreys has also commended the gallant
conduct of his Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Major Hamilton ; and finally
h e has praised the courage and resolution of Lieutenant Churchil! of t h e 4 t h
Hussars, correspondent of the Pio,zeev newspaper with the force, who made
himself useful at a critical moment.
Sir Hindon Blood, in closing his despatch, pays a high tribute to t h e
work done by the cavalry. T h e health of the troops was generallv good ;
only seven British and five native soldiers and eight followers died ii-om disease
between September 6th and October 27th. T h e Officers mentioned in t h e despatch include ail the heads of departments, the genera! staff, Major Deane a n d
Mr. Davis, Political Officers. The commissariat, transport and medical arrangements a r e all said to have been excellent. T h e te!egraph arrangements w e r e
we!l carried out by Lieutenant W. Robertson, K.E.,
under the direction of
Mr. C. E Pitman, while the postal service under Mr. H. C. Sheridan w a s also
satisfactory:
Sir Bindon Blood adds :-It will have been gathered from the foregoing
narrative that the three brigades of t h e force mere ably commanded b y
Brigadier-Generals Meil;lejohn, Jeffreys and Wodehouse, ~ v h omere efficiently
seconded by their staffs. T h e line of com~nunicationsand base were also most
efficiently managed by Colonel Reid and by Lieutenant-Colonel V. A. Schalch,
Base Commandant, and their respective. staffs.
A description is given of the movements about Kawagai, and t h e account
of the night attack on the camp on September zoth, closes in the followil~g
words :T h e steadiness of the troops during this somewhat trying action mas quite
perfect, and tlir safety of the camp was never in the slightest degree doubtful,
although the enemy's swordsmen were so determined that many of them w e r e
shot down close to the entrenchment. T h e fire discipline of the infantry w a s
shown to b e excellent, especially that of the 1st Battalion, Queen's ( u n d e r
Lieutenant-Colonel Coiliils,) who a r e in all respects an example of w h a t a
battalion of infantry should be. T h e star shells fired by the mountain
battery w e r e most useful, and shrapnel and case were also fired at different
times with g r t a t etrect, all under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel W. Aitken,
C.B., commanding the Royal Artillery with m y force. I n short, the affair
w a s a most satisfactory one, a s proving t h e admirable discipline, confidence
and steady shootiug of our troops, a s well a s the efficiency of t h e simple
defensive arrangements which had been made.
$

I

T h e following comments a r e made on the operations 1n the Watelai
Valley :I t \vill have been observed, of course, that there was much more difiiculty
in deallne w t h the hlamunds than was experienced 1~1th the Swatis, t h e
Masazai Noilmands, or w ~ t ht h e Mamund's neighbours, the Salarzai a n d
Shamo~ai.
Nuch of this difficulty was d u e to the fact that our invasion of the hfamund
Valley was not preceded by a decisive action lilce that at the Malakand o n t h e
2nd August, at Ladakai on the 17th August, at Nawagai on the night of t h e
20th September, or, as in t h e case of t h e Salarzai and Shamozai, by such aa
object-lesson as our operations against the Marnunds themselves.
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Besides this, however, the special physical features of the Mamund Valley
gave the tribe great advantages, which they utilised with considerable tactical
skill. I t will be seen that t h e valley consists of a broad and gently sloping
plateau, cut u p by ravines, especially towards the top, and with hills rising
somewhat suddenly on all sides. This plateau is well cultivated for rain crops,
but is practically waterless at this season ; the only good water above a point
near I n a ~ a tKili being in the ravines on the sides of the hills where many of
the most important villages are consequently situated, those on the level depending for their water-supply on tanks or, in one or two cases, on doubtful wells.
Thus, as soon as the lower villzges had been dealt with, which was done
without opposition, it was necessary for our troops to attack those on the
sides of the hills. on ground very difficult for assailants and extremely favourable for defenders.
The tribesmen were further much assisted by the circumstances that a
great part of their best lands lie i n Afghanistan, on tlie no~th-westernside of
the high range of mountains whose crest forms the Afghan frontier in that
direction. Thus, much of their property was beyond our reach, while they
had a secure refuge to which they could send their movables from our side of
t h e frontier and betake themselves if pressed. They showed commendable
sltill and patience in adhering to the only tactics
"There was an exception at which could give them any measure of success,
'grab
September.
and Gat On the 3oth always retiringH before our troops so long a s
they advanced, and then following them up in
sltirmishing order as far as t h e open ground on their withdrawal to their
camp, whiLh had to remain low down the valley on account of the difficulty
about water higher up. The morc credit is due to t h e Mamunds for holding
out so well, a s they suffered 1' severely in every
t It is noxv known that 2 2 0 of encsunter with us, besides undergoing much loss
tlie tnnes were k ~ l l e d ,hesldes
about
tneir
who ot property and destruction of their defences
came to help them.
whose speedy reconstruction, though costly and
difficult for them, is necessary to their existence.
~ ~ in t theh ~~~~~~i and Mamund Valleys a considerable number of
Martini-~enlyand ot\ler rifles were used against u s with apparently unlimited
supplies of ammunition.
T h e conduct and discipline of the troops in the operations under reference
w a s in the highest degree satisfactory. The operations, which extended over
seven weeksl were carried on without tents and on a very low scale of baggage,
while the rations though abundant and excellent in all respects, were necessarily ope11 to t h e objection of sameness. Notwithstanding these inconveniences,
the troops remained uniformly cheerful, especially when active hostilities were
going on.
The despatch closes with the following remarks :I have already alluded to the steadiness and gallant bearing of t h e infantry
in the several engagements that took place during the operations under reference, and I would now wish to invite attention to the invaluable nature of t h e
services rendered by the cavalry. At Nawagai three squadrons of the 11th
Bengal Lancers, under Major S. B. Beatson, swept the country everywhere
that cavalry could go, carrying out reconnaissances, protecting signalling
parties, and watching every movement of the enemy. In the Mamund
Valley a squadron of the same regiment, under Captain E. H. Cole, tool; part:
i n every engagement that occurred while they were there, establishing such
a reputation that the enemy even when in greatly superior numbers never
dared to face 'them in the open. Afterwards when Captain Cole and his men
left the Mamund Valley, the Guides Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Adams,
being in greater strength, acted still more effectually in the same manner,
showing tactical skill of a high order, combined with conspicuous gallantry.

A very interesting featnre of the operations was the presence of field
artillerJ- in the RIamund and Salarzai Valleys, where, although active oberations
did not go 011 after their arrival, their presence produced a great effect, while
it was amply prorcd that they could have been brought into most useful action
with comparative ease.
The health of the force \\,as r e m a r k a h l ~~ o o dthroughout, only seven
British and five native soldiers and eight follo.ivers having died from disease
hetxveen the 6th September and 27th October, out of n forcc (including Corntnunications and Base Hospirals') which, for near1.v a month of that time,
included three brigades of infantry, besides a considerable ~roportionof t h e
other arms.
The Commissariat arrangements under Major H. Wharry, D.S.O., were
most successful. The rations were always abundant and of urliformly good
quality; and I may here observe that in iive previous campaigns I have never
seen the supply of bread anything like so continuously good as it has been
throughout the operations of the hlala1;and Field Force. No doubt the excellence of the Commissariat arrangements has had a great deal to do with the
good state of health of the troops vc~hichI have remarked upon.
The transport was most efficient throughout the operations under reference. and its management under the direction of Captain C. G. R. Thackwell,
Divisional TI-ansport Officer, xvho was most ably and ene.getically assisted by
'iTeterina~CaptainH. T. W. Mann, Senior Veterinary Officer, was most SUCcessful. I n proof of this I will cite a report just made to me b y BrigadierGeneral JefrreSs, commanding the 2nd Brigade of my force, that this morning,
on inspecting 1,265 mules attached to his brigade, which have just returned
from seven weeks in the field, he found fourteen sore backs and four animals
ott~enviseunfit for worl;, or a total of only IS disabled animals in all.
The medical service was carried out in a very satisfactory manner. Some
difficulties arose on the transfer of Officers and materials to the Tirah Expeditionary Force on its formation, especially as large convoys of sick and wouiided
were on the line of this force at the time, but these difficulties were successfully
overcome by Colonel A. J. F. Reid, who was in charge of the Line, and matters
were ultimately restored to smooth working on the arrival of Surgeon-Colonel
J. C. G . Carmichael, Indian Medical Service, who is now Principal Medical
Officer of the Force.
T h e tele.graph arrangements were well carried out by Lieutenant W.
Robertson, R.E.,under the direction of Mr. C. E. Pitman. C.I.E. The postal
service under Mr. H. C. Sheridan was also satisfactory.
The working of the several departments of the Head-quarters Staff w a s
most satisfactory and successful. The heads of departments were :Major H. H. Burney, Gordon Highlanders, Assistant Adjutant-General.
Lieutenant-Colonel A. Masters, 2nd Regiment. Central India I-Iorse, Assistant Quarter-Master-General.
Captain H. E. Stanton, D.S.O., R.A., Deputy Assistant Quarter-MasterGeneral (Intelligence).
Captain E. W.M. Norie, Middlesex Regiment, Superintendent, Army
Signalling.
Surgeon-Colonel J. C. G. Carmichael, Indian Medical Service, Principal
Medical Officer.
Lieutenant-Colonel W. Aitken, C.B., R.A., Commanding Royal Artillery.
Colonel J. E. Broadbent, R.E., Conmanding Royal Engineers-relieved
early in October by Lieutenant-Colonel W. Peacocke, C.N.G., K.E.
Captain W. E. Banbury, zjth Madras Infantry, Field Treasure Chest,
Officer.

Captain W. W. Coolrson, R.A., Ordnance Officer.
Major H. Whar& D.S.O., Staff Corps, Chief Commissariat Officer.
Captain C. G. R. Thackwell, Staff Corps, Divisional Transport Officer.
Veterinary-Captain H. T. W. Mann (wounded in action, 20th September),
Army Veterinary Department, Senior Veterinary Officer.
Captain C . L. Robertson, R.E., Survey Officer.
Captain C. G. F.Edwards, 5th Punjab Cavalry, Provost-Marshal.
The Rev. L. Klogh, Chaplain.
Lieutenant W. Robertson, R.E., in charge of Telegraphs.
I am under great obligations to my personal staff-Captain A. B. Dunsterville, 1st Battalion, East Surrey Regiment, Aide-de-camp ; Captain A. R.
Dick, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, and Lieutenant Viscount Fincastle 16th (The
Queen's) Lancers.
It will have been gathered from the foregoing narrative that the three
brigades of the force were ably commanded by Brigadier-Generals W. H.
Meiklejohn, 1st Brigade, P. D. Jeffreys, (wounded in action, 16th September).
2nd Brigade, and J. H. Wodehouse (wounded in action, 20th September), 3rd
Brigade, who were efficiently seconded by their staffs. The Line of Communica.
tions and the Base were also most efficiently managed by Colonel A. J. F. Reid,
and by Lieutenant-Colonel A. V. Schalch, 11th Bengal Infantry, the Base
Commandant, and their respective staffs,
In my final report on the conclusion of the operations of the force, I
shall havethe honour to bring the services of the OFficers above briefly referred
to more fully to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.
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Major H. A. Deane, C.S.I., Political Agent, Dir, Chitral and Swat, was in
separate and independent charge of the political arrangements connected with
the operations I have described as far as Nawagai. H e accompanied my headquarters to Gosam, where I left him on the 12th September, and rejoined me at
Inayat Kili on the 4th October. He gave much assistance in arranging for the
collection of local supplies.
Mr. W. S. Davis was my Political Officer throughout the.operations beyond
Nawagai and in the Marnund Valley prior to Major Deane's return to my
head-quarters on the 4th October. H e carried out his duties to my complete
satisfaction. His native assistant, Khan Bahadur Ibrahim Khan, also made
himself very useful.

IV;IY
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MAJOR-GENERAL
ELLES'SDESPATCH.
Major-General Elles in a despatch, dated October I 3th, gives a very clear
account of the operations in the Mohmand country. The despatch contains the
following remarks :The expedition proved productive of little fighting, but the splendid force
under my command would, I believe, have made little of any possible opposit
tion. I cannot speak too highly of the 20th Punjab Infantry and z ~ s Gurkhas,
on whom the brunt of the work fell. I would wish for no better regiments for
hill fighting under their respective commanders. The work done during the
expedition by the 28th Bombay Pioneers and No. 5 Company, Bengal Sappers
and Miners, is worthy of the highest commendation. The 28th Pioneers also
did excellent work in reserve to the 1st Brigade in the attack at Bedmmai, and
at Jarobi covered the retirement showing high soldierly qualities in both
instances. The main difficulties to contend with were the passes, over which
roads had always to be made, and anxiety regarding water as in the western
Mohmand country; the supply is almost entirely from tanks, the dams of whirh
had been cut by the Mohmands, and they often 'only rontained a little dirty
water.
I
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The Imperial Service Troops under my command proved their fitness to
fight in the first line and were utilised exactly the same as the regular native
troops. The cavalry escorts of the Patiala and Jodhpore Cavalry did g o o d
reconnaissance work on more than one occasion and came under fire. T h e
1st Patiala Regiment was employed under Lieutenant-Colonel Graves in t h e
operations in the Mittai and Suran Valleys, and covered the retirement of t h e
brigade under fire; their good service was brought to my notice by the General
Oficer Commanding the 3rd Brigade. The Nabha Regiment, owing to its having been added t o my force late in September, had to be kept on the Line of
Communications.
I trust the objects of the expedition were fully carried out, thanks to the
fine body of troops I had the honour of commanding and to the hearty co-operation of my staff and of all ranks in the Force.
The follo\ving subsidiary despatch was published in the Gaseffe of I~zdiaby
General Elles in connection with the Mohmand Field Force in continuation of
the despatch of 13th October 1897:-I bring to the notice of the Commanderin-Chief the names of the following for good services during the Mohmand EXpedition :-Xr. Merk, Civil Service, rendered very valuable services as Political
Oificer. The prompt settlement obtained was entirely due to his knowledge of
the tribes, his perfect command of their language, which enabled him to d e a l
directly with the jirgnks, and his firmness in dealing with the jirgahs. His
judicious selection of subordinates greatly contributed to the success of t h e
expedition. My movements were almost entirely based on the i~iformation
obtained by him regarding distances and water. I am under the greatest
obligations to Mr. Merk for the manner in which he conducted the political
business throughout. Lieutenant Waterfield, Assistant Political Officer, carried
out his work very firmly and in great harmony with the Military Officers a t the
various posts. Captain Cox, in charge of the Imperial Service Troops, t h e
Patiala and n'abha Regiments, carried on all the work connected with t h e m
with great smoothness, and was most zealous in his work. Major Bythell,
Royal Engineers, Survey Officer, did excellent work under difficulty, marching daily, and was most keen and energetic. Mr. Stowell carried out all the
~ o s t a larrangements entirely to my satisfaction. Everything was carried on
most creditably by him arid his subordinates. Mr. Pike, Assistant Superintendent of Telegraphs, ably assisted by his subordinate, Mr. J. C. Murphy, laid the
telegraph line rapidly and well. The telegraph work was most satisfactory,
all concerned working very willingly.
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Geflerd oveject-The
general object of this expedition is to exact reparation
for the unprovoked aggression of the Afridi and Orakzai tribes on the Peshawar and Icohat borders, for their attacks on our frontier posts, and for the
damage to life and property which has thus been inflicted on British subjects
and on those in the British service.
It is believed that this object can best be attained by the invasion of Tirah,
the summer home of the Afridis and Orakzais, which has never before been
entered by a British force.
Force which will be styled the '(Tirah
Fomatio~z of the Force.-The
Expeditionary Force " will be distributed for operations a s follo\vs :( a ) A main column of two Divisions, each consisting of two Infantry
Brigades and certain Divisional Troops, will advance on Tirah from
the neighbourhood of the Samana Range.
( 8 ) The Line of Communication of the main column between Kohat and
Tirah (including the posts on the Samana Range) will be held by a
forceconsisting of one Native Cavalry Re&nent and four Native
Infantry Battalions.
(c) A mixed brigade, to be styled the " Peshawar Column " will operate,
as may be required, from Peshawar.
( d ) A force, which will be designated the I' Kurram Movable Columno'
will be formed in support on the Hangu-Parachinar line, for employment as circumstances may require.
A
mixed brigade will be formed at Kawalpindi as a Reserve.
(e)
Cowlposition of tke Force.-These

forces will be composed as follows:-

THE MAIN COLUMN.
FIRST DIVISION.
Fivst Brigade.-2nd Battalion the Derbyshire Regiment, 1st Rattalion the
Devonshire Regiment, 2nd Battalion 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment, 30th (Punjab)
.Regiment of Bengal Infantry, No. 6 British Field Hospital, and No. 34 Native
Field Hospital.
Second I3vigade.-2nd
Battalion the Yorkshire Regiment, 1st Battalion
Royal West Surrey Regiment, 2nd Battalion 4th Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment,
3rd Regiment of Sikh Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force, Sections A. and B.
of No. 8 British Field Hospital, Sections A. and C. of No. 14 British Field
Hospital and No. 31 Native Field Hospital.
Diwisio?ral T~c~ps.-No. x Mountain Battery Royal Artillery, No. z
(Derajat) Mountain Battery, No. r (Kohat) Mountain Battery, z Squadrons 18th
Regiment of Bengal Lancers, 28th Regiment of Bombay Infantry (Pioneers),
No. 3 Company Bombay Sappers and Miners, No. 4 Company Bombay Sappers
and Miners, one Printing Section from the Bombay Sappers and Miners, the
Nabha Regiment of Imperial Service Infantry, the Maler Kotla Imperial Service
Sappers, Section A. of No. 13 British Field Hospital, and No. 6 j Native Field
gosPitaL

SECOND
DIVISION.
Third Brkuade.- 1st Battalion the Gordon Highlanders, 1st Battalion the
Dorsetshire Regiment, 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment, 15th (The
Ludhiana Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry, No. 24 British Fleld Hospital and
No. 44 Native Field Hospital.
Fourth Bvrgade.-2nd Battalion the King's Own Scottish Borderers, 1 s t
Battalion the Northamptonshire Repiment, 1st Battalion 3rd Gurkha ( ~ i f l e ?
Regiment. 36th (Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry, Sections C. and D. of NO9 British Field Hospital, Sections A. and B, of No. 23 British Field Hospital a n d
No. 48 Native Field Hospital.
Divisio~zalTroops.-No. 8 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery, NO. g Mountain Battery Royal Artillerv, No 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery, Machine Gun
Detachment, 16th Lancers, twoSquadrone 18th Regiment of Bengal Lancers.
~ 1 sRegiment
t
of Madras Infantry (Pioneers), No. 4 Company, Madras Sappers
and Miners, one Printing Section from the Madras Sappers and Miners, t h e
Jhind Regiment of Imperial Service Infantry, the Sirmur Imperial Service
Sappers, Section B. of No. I 3 British Field Hospital and No. 43 Native Field
Hospital.
LINE OF COMMUNICATION.
No. x Kashmir Mountain Battery, zznd (Punjab) Regiment of BengaL
Infantry, and Battalion 2nd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment, 30th (Garhwal Rifleb
Regiment of Bengal Infantry, 2nd Regiment of Pun,jab Infantry, Punjab
Frontier Force, 3rd Regiment of Bengal Cavalry, No I Company Bengaf
Sappers and Miners, No. 42 Native Field Hospltal, No. 52 Native Field:
Hospital, the Jeypore Imperial Service Transport Corps, the Gwalior Imperiax
Service Transport Corps. Ordnance Field Park, Engineer Field Park, Britisf-t
General Hospital of 500 beds at Rawalpindi, Native General Hospital of 50Q
beds at Rawalpindi, 'NO. I Field Medical Store Depbt. (For First Division)No. 2 Field Medical Store DepBt. (For Second Division). No 5 V e t e r i n a ~Field
Hospital, No. I I British Field Hospital, No. 25 British Field Hospital, NO. 4 7
Native Field Hospital, and No 64 Native Field Hospltal.
THE PESHAWAR COLUMN.
Second Battalion the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 2nd Battalion t h e
Oxfordshire Light Infantry, Maxim Gun Detachment, 1st Battalion Devonshire
Regiment, 9th Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment of Bengal Infantry, 34th Pioneers, qgtlr
(Rattray's Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry, 57th Field Battery RoyaL
Artillery, NO. 3 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery, 9th Regiment of BengaP
Lancers, No. 5 Company, Hengal Sappers and Miners, No. 5 British Field
Hospital, NO.45 Native Field Hospital, A. and B. Sections, No. 54 Native Field
Hospital, British General Hospital of 250 beds at Nowshera * and Native
General Hospital of 500 beds at Nowshera."
THE KUKRAM MOVABLE COLUMN.
Twelfth Regiment of Bengal Infantry, the Kapurthala Regiment of Imperia'P!
Service Infantry, 4 Guns 3rd Field Battery Royal Artillery, 6th Regiment o f
Bengal Cavalry, one Regiment of Central India Horse, Section D. of No. rj
British Field Hospital, No. 62 Native Field Hospital, Section B. of No. 4&
Native Field Hospital and Native General Hospital of zoo beds at Kohat.
THE RAWALPINDI RESERVE BRIGADE.
Second Battalion the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, 1st Battaliorr
the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, 27th Keigment (1st Baluch Battaliom
of Bombay (Light) Infantry, 2nd Regiment of Infantry Hyderabad Contingent,

-
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Jodhpur Imperial Service Lancers, No. I Z British Field Hospital and No, 53
Native Field Hospital.
All units which will be concentrated at Peshawar, except suchas are
detailed for the Peshawar Column, will march from Peshawar to Kohat through
the Kohat Pass under the orders of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the
Forces, Punjab, under instructions which will be given from Army HeadQuarters. The General Officer Commanding the Expeditionary Force will direct
all movements at and beyond Kohat. and he will also direct all movements of
the Peshawar Column beyond Peshawar.
Kohat will be the Base of Operations for the First and Second Divisicns and
the Kurram Movable Column, but the Line of Communication will commence at
and include Iiushalgarh. Kohat and Kushalgarh will, for the time being, be
dissevered from the Punjab Command.
Peshawar will be the Base of Operations for the Peshawar Column, but
will remain in the Punjab Command.
COlLlMANDS AND STAFF.

ARMYSTAFF.
Lieutenant-Genevol Commaading the General Sir W . S. A. Lockhart, K,C.B.,
FOYC~.
K.C.S.1.
Lieutenant F. A. Maxwell, 18th Bengal
Aide-de-camp
Lancers.
Aide-de-Camp
2nd-Lieutenant J. H. A. Annesley, 18th
Hussars.
Lieutenant G. R, de. H. Smith, Central
Ordeuly Ojicev
India Horse.
Ordeuly Oflcev
2nd-Lieutenant E. H. E. Collen, Royal
Artillery.
Depub A4ittta~tt-Geneua1, C h e f of Brigadier-General W.G. Nicholson, C.B.
the Staff.
Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel E.G. Barrow,
Assistant A@fita~zt-GeneunE
i t h Bengal Infantry.
Major G.H. W. O'Sullivan, R.E.
Assistant Quarter-Master-Getzeval
Deputy dsszstatrt A~utant-GelzeraZ Captain J . A. L. Haldane, Gordon Highlanders.
Assistant Quarter-Master-GetteraZ for Colonel G. H More-Molyneux, AssistZniellzgen ce.
ant Quarter Xaster-General.
Deputy Assistanl Quarter-Moster-Gene. Captain E. W . S. K. Maconchy, D.S.~,,
ral for Intell&ence.
4th Sikhs.
Captain F. F. Badcock, D.s.o., 1st BatField Intelligence Ofleer
talion 5th Gurkhas.
Pvincrpal Medical Oficer (with the Surgeon-Cclonel G. Thomson, c.B.,
tevzpova>y rank of Suvgeo?r-Major- Indian Medical Service.
General).
Secretavy lo Pri+an)al Medical Oficeu Surgeon-Major W . A. Morris, Army
Medical Staff
Buignn'iev-General, Conz~zaadzrtgRoyal Brigadier-General C, H. Spragge, R.A,
Avtrllery.
Captain C, de C. Hantilton, R.A.
Brigade-Majov, Royal Artillery
Ovdr~lyOfice); Royal Arttilevy
. Major H F Mercer, R.A.
Brigadtev-Gejreual Comma~zdt~rg
Royal Brevet-Colonel J E. Broadbent, R.E.
(with the temporary rank of BrigaEngtneers.
dier-General).
Captain S. L. Craster, R,E.
Bri~ade-Majou,Royal Estgizeers
Lieutenant H. B~ddulphR . E .
Ovdevly O@cer, Royal Engzstee~s
Major G. J. K. Logan-Home, 1st BedSupennte~rdent,Avvny Siglralltng
fordsklre Regiment.
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... Captain
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Head-Quartel-s
Co,trmaridrzltt
Assistatzt Iudpe-Advocate-Gerzeral
Pnizn$aZ Provost-Marshal

... Captain F. J. S. Lowry, 29th
Infantry.
... Lieutenant-Colonel E. Balfe,

...
...

Itzspecti>zgre'eferittavyOfFcer

...

Compfroller of Military Accourzts

...

.Field Pay-Master

...

Chief Szrrvey Ojftice~

...

<

Bombay

Deputy
Judge-Advocate-General.
Colonel C. H. Scott. R.A.
Captain G. W. Palin, Assistant Commissary-General.
Veterinary-Lieutenant-Colonel
B. L.
Glover,
Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. LeG. Anderson, Comptroller of Military Accounts,
Punjab command.
... Captain P. G. Shewell, Military Accounts
Department.
Brevet-Colonel Sir T. H. Holdich,

Chief Og*d?zatzceO#cer
..
Commissariat Tnnsport Officer

.

E. Grimston, 6th Bengal

...

K.C.I.E.,

C.B., R.E.

First Divisiote.

Conlmatzditz.~(with the local ratzk of Brigadier-General W . P. Symons, C.B.
Mnjol; Ge&val).
Captain A. G. Dallas, 16th Lancers.
A ide-de-Cavnp
Lieutenant. . J. M, Wikeley, 17th
Bengal Cavalry.
Extya Order& Oficercs
Lieutenant G. H. Badcock, 7th
Bengal Cavalry.
Lieutenant-Colonel C. W. Muir, c.I.E.,
dssistaizt Adjutant-Getzeral
I 7th Bengal Cavalry.
Assistaltt Quavter-Master Ge9zevaE
Major E. A. G. Gosset, 2nd D e r b ~ s h i r e
Regiment.
Depzdty
Assisfa~zt Quarter-Master- Captain A. N~cholls, 2nd Punjab InGetzevalfor I~zfellige~zm.
fantry.
Lieutenant C. E. E. F. K. Macquoid,
k e l d Itzlelligegice Oficer ...
1st Lancers, Hyderabad Contingent.
$n'ncipal M8dical Oficer
Surgeon-Colonel E. Townsend, Army
Medical Staff.
kieutetzant-Colottel Cohmandilcg Royal Lieutenant-Colonel A. E. Duthy, R.A.
Artllery.
kdjwtarzt, Royal Artillevy
captain W. K. McLeod, R.A.
pivisiofzal Ora'3zntzce Oficer
.,. Captain A. R. Braid, R A.
Contnzajzdijzg Royal Eszgitzeevs
... Lieutenant-Colonel H. H . Hart, R.E.
Adjutatzf Royal Engi~ieers
Captain 0. M. R. Thackwell, R.E.
Field Enginrev
Major J. A. Ferrier, D.s.o., R.E.
Assistant Field Engitzeer
... Lieutenant J. F. N. Carmichael, R.E.
Assistant Field Engineer
... Lieutenant W, H Runbury, R.E.
~ i s i s t a n f SupevitztetrL,zt,
Army Captain H. T. Kenny, 2nd Bombay
S&tzalling.
Lancers.
Pvovost-Marshnl
Captain H. W. G. Graham. D.s.o.,, qth
Lancers.
Commissary-Getzeral
.ColonelL. W. Christopher, CommissaryGeneral.
Assistatzf to Commtssary-Getzed
Captain H. S. G. Hall, Assistant Commissary-General.
Chid Tratzspovt O@ca.
Major H. Mansfield, Assistant Commis-.
sary-General.
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Assistatgl to Chief Tralzsport Oficer, Captain T. H . Smith, 12th Bengal
.owry, 29th Bombay

E. Balfe, Deputy
General.
t. R.A.
alin, Assistant Com-

...

Pri~zcipalCliaplailt
Chuvch of E?zgla~zdCtrnplai7z
Rorilalz Cati~ohcChnplnztt
Dtvzsrotzal Cou~~wzissnrzat
Ofjcer

Cavalry.

...
Rev. Saunders Dyer,
...The
The Rev. R. &I. Kirwan, n r . ~
... The Rev Father N.J. Winkley.

n ~ . 4 ,F.S.A.
,

... Major
W. R. Yield~ng, c I.E., D.s.o.,
Assistant Commissary-General.

Asststngzt to Diviszo?zal Cor$~mzssnriatLieutenant C. H. Corbett, 18th Hussars.
Ojj5cev.
Dzvtszo~zal Trarzsport OfJicer
Captain F. C. W. Rideout, Assistant

...

! W. R.LeG. Anderof Military Accounts,
U.

.ell, Military Accounts

T. H. Holdich,

:

Commissary-General

Assistn;zt to Dzvisio?zal Tra~zsport Captain A. 'CV. V. Plunkett, 2nd BatOficer.
talion the Manchester Regiment.
Fzrst Brfgade (Fzrst Dzvtszotz).
Cornma+zdilzg
Brigadier-General R. C. Hart, v.c., c B.
Captaln C. 0. Swanston, 18th Bengal
Orderly O ~ ~ C E Y

...
...

...
...

Lancers.
Dept~tyAssista?zt Aqutalzt-Gelzc~al ... Captain A. G. H. Kemball, 1st Battalion. 5th Gurkhas.
Deputy Assistatrt
Quarter-Mnslr- Captain H . R. B. Donne, 1st Norfolk
Ge~ieral
Regiment.
Captain A. Mullaly, Deputy Assistant
Brigade Coiutmbsartat Oficer
Commissary-General.
Asszsta>zt to BrGade Commissariat Lieutenant H . I. N~cholls,1st BedfordOjjicev.
shire Regiment.
Capta~nE. de V. Wintle, 15th Bengal
Bvzgade T~a?zsportOfSicer
Lancers.
Veterinary-Lieutenant W. J. Tatam.
Veteritzary Ojjcev

...

V. P. Symons, C.B.

,, 16th Lancers.
:, Wikeley, 17th
!$

Badcock,

W. Muir,

,

7th
c.I.E.,

Y.
:, 2nd Derbyshire

and Punjab In-

F. K. Macquoid,
abad Contillgent
Toivnsend, Army

!

R.A.

R.E.

:well, R.E.
0.9 R.E.
nichaei, R.E.
Ul-y, R.E.
I
2nd Bombay
am,

Comma~zn'ilzg
Orderly Ojjcer
Deputy Assistant

Seco2zd Brzgade (First Dzviszo~z).
Brigadier-General A. Gaselee, c.B., A.-D:-c.
... Lieutenant A. N. D Fagan, 1st Lancers,

...

...

...

Hyderabad Contingent.

Adjutaltt-Gelzeual, Major W. Aldworth, D.s.o., 1st Bedfordshire Regiment.

Deputy
Assistant Quarter-Master- Major A. A. Barrett, and Battalion, 5th
Geueral.
Gurkhas.
Brigade Commissariat Oficer
Lieutenant C. S. D. Leslie, Deputy

...

Assistant Cornmissary-General.

Asststa~zt to Brigade Commtssavictt Captain W. de la P. Gough, 16th Lancers.
Oficer.
Lieutenant H. Macandrew, 5th Bengal
Brigade Trarzspovt OfJicev

A.

3.Hart,

...

...
...

D.S.O.,

5th

r, Commissary~ssistantCom-

Veleriltary OfJicev

...

Commam.ir~zg
Aide-de- Camp

...
...

Orderly Ofleer
Order& Oficev

...

...

...
Cavalry.
... Veterinary-Lieutenant W. F. Shore.

Secolzd Division.

... Captain
Major-General A. G. Yeatman-Biggs,
...
E. St. A. Wake, 10th Bengal
Lancers.

C.B.

... Captain R. G. Brooke, 7th Hussars.

... Hony.-Lieutenant-Colonel
H. H. Maharaja Sir Nripendra Narayan, Bahadur,

of Cooch Behar, G,c.I.E., 6th Bengal
Cavalry.
Lieutenant-Colonel R. K. Ridgeway, v,c.
Assistatzt Adjutalzt-Geueral
Major C. P. Triscott, D.s.o., R.A.
Assistant Qunrtey-Muster-GelzeraZ
Dejuty Assistafzt Quarter-Masfeu- Major R. C. A. B. Bewicke-Copley,
King's Royal Rifle Corps.
Geuevaljor Zntelligetzce.

...
...

I'B
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...
O ' C C Y...

r"'r'. "~i I~ltt*Ii'zgrr~;~c~
OFcfr
IP>:r~c@n:
.1?cdjcnI

... Captain H. F. Waltcrs, 24th (Bnluchistan) Regiment of Bombay Infantry.
... Surgeon-Colonel G. McB. Davis, D.s.o.,

L~~r~$i~m;rt.Colot~el
Co,;l7fzatzditzg Royal
-4)
Zii/@Q~
Ac+ttnnr, Royal A v t i l l ~ v ~ f
D.;;,G:l;,z(rlOvd>?ntrccO j i c ~ v
Q'.-.a~z:~:tz~~n"irtgg
Ro-yzl E ~ f g i ~ l r e l g
,i+{jaitrr;zt. Rct~nIE?zgirzeevs
Fidd

~ ~ Z J ~ ~ P I P P Y

...

rlssisfirrzt Fitid Etzgiittev
As;.ist:znt Field E>zgi>rcai -.
t
Szcpr7.ilitrliciel2t,~~i~~fc~zde?zt,
.52g"':?iii~zg.

1

Indian Medical Service.
Lieutenant-Colonel R. Purdy,

R.A.

... Captain H. D. Grier, R.A.
... Captain H. F.Head,
... Lieutenant-Colonel C . B.Wilkieson, R.E.
... Captain T. Fraser, R.E.
R.A.

.,. Captain F. H. Kelly,
... Lieutenant W. A. Stokes, R.E.
R.F.

... Lieutenant C. B.L. Greenstreet, R.E.
A n ~ yCaptain G. C. Rigby, 1st Wiltshire Kegiment.
Captain W. C. Knight, 4th Bengal Cavnlry.
P;r;;.rr~!-.WarsItnI
Lieutenant W. M. Gritnley, 20th P u r ~ j a b
E':r:d TPTNSIOT
Chest Office),
Infantry.
... The Rev. H. IV. Nelson, B.A.
C:i:trrh 03f Esrg?a~zdC/znplaif~
... The Rev. Father Vanden DeysseI.
1Pt:ar:~x Cntkol~cChaplni~z
Ci:~trcd~
t?fSco!luttd(nttn~/ledto
Gordo7zs) The Rev. D. H. Gillan, M.A., E.D.
fi:ri.~~Js~~~S~otla~zdjatfa~Iz~df~K.O.S.B'~,)
The Rev. W. Thomson, M . A .
... The Rev. J. J. Findlater.
l! h!~:vtz>sC%opiaist
Dr'z~is:t~ttzl
Co,;,r>tissavintOFcev
.., Lieutenant-Colonel B. L. P. Reilly,
Assistant Commissary-General.
Ass:ilzuf fo Dizrisio~znlCoi~zunissclvint Lieutenant A. D. Macpherson, 2nd Puni.I#n.v
jab Cavalry.
I)i:&vo,raL Traltspoi-l O@cev
Major H. L. Hutchins, Assistant Commissary-General.
A S . ? ~ Sto
: ~Diaisiotlrrl
PI~
Tvalzsport Ofl-Major H. R. W. Lumsden, 3rd Bengal
C&T.
Infan try.
S Z C POBer
~~E~~
Mr. E. A. Wainwright, Survey of
India Department.
Thid Bl-ikade (Seco7zd Divisiotz).
Consr;m~zdisi,a (EyifJz f / l l tcnqpovavy C ~ l o n e F.
l J. Kempster, D.s.o.,A.-D.-c.
u ~ : ofh Rrigndzcu-GcrrevaL).
Orcier[v Ofiiccr
.. .
Lieutenant G. D. Crocker, 2nd Royal
Munster Fusiliers.
Dcptrfy Assisfnrtf Arljl~2'a7zt-GevaZtMajor H . St. Leger Wood, 1st Dorsetshire Regiment.
T+b~ifv Assis2a?zt Qzrarfcr-Master- Major H . S. Massy, 19th Bengal Lancers.

...

...
...

...

...

...

...

(;i.>,~rnl

D ~ t g c ~ c l f iCoinrrzissal-iafOficev

... Lieutenant

D. H, Dral;e-Brockman,

D.A.C.-G.

Co~nzzissariatLieutenant 3'. W. Birch. 29th Punjab
Infantry.
Bngtzdt, Tyorzsporl Oflcev
Lieutenant R. A, N. Tytler, 1st Gordotl
H~ghlanders.
$ E:i.n~a,y Cficm
... Veterinary-Lieutenant C. Rose.
Fozrvfh Bvrkade Secorzd (Divisio~z),
Coi?rr:~a?tding
Brigadier-General R. Westmacott, c.B.,
A s s k f ~ z n t to Brtgade

O@ter

...

...

...

nyifer(v oficer

Bflpa"
J

...

A A s s f a ~ tAdjnhttt-Ge?zet.al
t

...
D.S.O.
... Lieutenant
R C. Wellesley, Royal
Horse
Artillery.
... Captain W . P. Blood, 1st Royal Irish

Fusiliers
d s ~ i - ~ f a f l fQzia~ie~*-dIasfo~Capbin F. J, M. Ediyar,-lc. 3rd Bombay
Light Cavalry.

GPIW~I~I,

(
alters, 24th (BaluchBombay Infantry.
McB. Davis, D.s.o.,
:rvice.
R. Purdy, R.A.

... Captain E.Y. Watson, Deputy Assistant

Br&ade Coi~zn~issariat
OfFcer

2f
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Commissary-Gener.il.
Assistant to B r ~ & z d e Comjtzissariat Lieutenant N . G. Fraser, 4th Bombay
O'cer.
Cavalry.
B~,zkadeTraltsjort Ofjicer
Captain W . H. Armstrcng, 1st East
Yorkshire Regiment.
Vetcvlizary O@CEY
...
... Velerinary-Lieutenart F. W. Wilson.

...

-,R.A
, RIA.

C. B. Wilkieson, R.E.
Z.E.
R.F.

1

,

tokes, R.E.
Greenstreet, R.E.
, 1st Wiltshire Kegiht, 4th Bengal Cavalry.
Grimley, 20th Punjab
:Ison, B.A.
anden Deyssel.
Ian, M.A., B.D.
Ison, M.A.
later.
B. L. P. Reilly,
sary-General.
cpherson, 2nd Punns, Assistant Commsden, 3rd Bengal
wright, Survey of

:er, n.s.o,,n.-D.-c.
:rocker, 2nd Royal
Wood,

1st

Dorset-

9th Bengal Lancers.
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Gelzenal 0 j j j . c ~
Con~~~za~zcEt~ag
~
AiZe-e-L-Ca?+zp
01,deuly OJ5cev

~

...

...

Lieutenant-General Sir A. P. Palmer,
K.C.B.

... Lieutenant F. C.

Galloway, R.A
Bengal Infantry.
Assistmat ~ c i j u t a l z t asid Quarter- Captain (temporary Major) J. W, G.
ilil~zs&cr~-Gej~~ral.
Tulloch, 24th Bombay Infantry.
Dcputy iissist~zlztAdjutant a d Quay- Captain I . Phillips, 1st Battalion, 5th
t~i~-~lfnsfer-Gr~~ernl.
Gurkhas.
Pri?zcipal Medical O$ccv
(wilk the Brigade.Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel
W.
tervt,hovaty ~aslfiof Sui~eo>z-Colu?zcI). E. S a ~ n d e r sArmy
,
Medical Staff.
Sc+zio+Oidxa?zce Ojicer ...
.,. Captain 'L'datlrins, R.A,
Sectio~zCon~~~a~zlZUilt...
Captain 0. U.S. F. Shore, 18th Bengal
Lancrrs.
Sectio+z Coi.fimarrcEn?tt
... Captain St.'G. L Steel, end Bengal
Lancers.
Sectio~zCow~maltda$zt ...
... Caplaill F. de B. Young, 6th Bengal
Cavalry.
Lieutetra+rt
Cololzcl Commanding Royal Lieutenant-Colonel J.W. Thurburn, R. E.
Kngiszcers.
... Captain H. V. Biggs, R.E.
Adjzitaizt, Royal E~zgitzeers
Field Eg~ehzecr
...
... Captain C. H: Cowie, K.E.
... ~ i & t e n a n t H. S. ~ o g e r s a, . ~ .
~ s s i s t a s zField Es~gh~ecr
...
Assista,lt FieliZ Eizgilze~r...
.. Lieutenant K. P.T. Hawksley, R.E.
Lieutenant A. E. Turner, ILE.
Assista~ztField E?rgilzeer...
Major L. S. Peyton, 14th Bzng-a1Lancers.
Provost Marshal
..
Chief Comvvrissa~iatOJJicer
Lieutenant-Colo~~el C. &I. Keighley,
D.s.o., Assistant Colnmissary-General.
Chief T ~ a m ) o r tOOfJcr, L . of C.
... Major C . V W. iYilliarnson, Assistant
Commissary-General.
... The Rev. W. Pritch1:tt S h a ~ v .
CIZMYC~I
of E~zgZ~z+zd
chap lair^
Y c t e ~ i ~ l aI9rspecto~
y
...
... Veterinary-Captain F. W. Forsdylte.

..,.

... Lieutenant H. 0. P a n , 7th

...

...

...
...

.,.

Drake-Brockman,

S t a f f at the Base.
3irch, 29th Punjab
Tytler, 1st Gordon
t C . Rose.
Westmacott, c.B.,
Wellesley,

Royal

I, 1st Royal Irish
ards, 3rd Bombay

...
... Colonel W. J. Vousden, v c., Indian
Staff Corps.
DcI)7~fyAssisfa*tt AcQ'utant ai?dQz$ar- Major A. J . W. Allen, 1st East Kent
tev-Master Gclie~,al.
Regiment. '
Comnaa~zdant,British Troops Dejdt .. Maior .-\.de B. V. Paget, 2nd Battalion
Durham Light Infantry.
Adjwtaszt a z ~ dQuarter-Master, British C a p t ~ i n A. F. Rundock, 2nd Battalion
Troops Dep6t.
South Lancashire Regiment.
Cowz,t~alzdaz~t,
Native Troops Depdts
Captain S. M. Edwardes, D.s.o., 2nd
Bombay 1ntBnti-y (Grenadiers).
... Captain h'l. W. S. Pasley, R.A.
Base Ord~za>icc
OfJicer
OfSiccv ilz Chalxe of E~zgitzcer Field Captain.U. W . Evans, R . E .
Park
Major H . K. Blarrett, Assistant ComBase Conzrvlissariat OfJicer
missary-General
Base Comla?a~zda+zt

...

...

...

Captain W. H. D. Rich, Assistant
Commissary-General.
Lieutenant F. W. H Forteath, Deputy- Assistant Commissary-General.
Depa~tnieafaEAssista,tls to Base CosnLieutenant L. H. Marriott, Deputy
nrissariat Oflcer.
Assistant Commissary-General.
Lieutenar~tH. G. P. Beville, Deputy
1 Assistant Commissary-General.
Dcpavtnrenfnl A s s i s t a ~ f (for Trans- Captain H . N. Hilliard, Deputy Assistbod) to the Base Corn~zissariat
ant Commissary-General.

i

/Captain W. P. M.Pollock, 18th H u s sars.
Captain H. Smyth,
1st Battalion
Cheshire Regiment.
Regimental Assistants to Base Cont- Lieutenant T. E. Bayley, 20th Hussars.
w~issariatOfiicer.
Lieutenant C. G. E. E w a r t , 5th Bell-

II

Li,",",L,","::pN.
D a v i s , 3rd Infantry
Hyderabad Contingent.
THE PESHAWARCOLUMN.
Coitrnrat~rlin~
...
... Brigadier-General A. G . Hammond,
c.B., D.s.o., v.c., A.-D.-C.
...
Lieutenant H. D. Hammond, R.A.
Ordrr5 Oflcer
Assistant .-f+~taj:f alzd Qziartcr-Mas- Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel F. S Gwatkin, 13th Bengal Lancers.
fer-Gencral.
DepzrQ~Assisfaftt Afifapzf and Q~las--Major C. T . Becker, 2nd King's O w n
!er-1>!aster-Ge~z~ra1.
Scottish Borderers.
Firid I~tteili~e~zce
Oficw
Captam F. H. Hoghton, 1st Bombay
kfantry (Grenadiers).
Brigade-Surgeon-Lieutenantcolonel R.
Prifznj5nl &fedital Olpccr
G. Thomsett, Army Medical Staff.
Liezitewagzf-CololzelCon~malzdi>zp
Roval Lieutenant-Colonel W .M.M. Smith, R.A.
Artillery.
A+utant, Royal ArfilZery ..
... Captain F. R. Drake, R.A.
Bm,bad@Ord~ra~tce
OBcer ..
... MajorT. E. Rowan, =.A.
Field E~tgzizeev...
...
... Major E. C.Spilsbury, R.E.
Assistant Field E~tgilz~er
... Lieutenant C. B. Farwell, R.E.
Assistant Stiperinfe~tdent,A r m y Sip. Lieutenant C. E. Cobb, 1st Battalion
na6litrg.
East Yorkshire Regiment.
Brigade Conzmissariat O#cw
... Lieutenant H. H. Jones, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General.
Assistant to Brigade Commissariat Lieutenant V . R. Pigott, 1st Battalion
ofice+.
Cheshire Regiment.
Lieutenant C. Charlton, Royal Horse
Brigade Transpovi Ojicer
Artillery.*
Vfeuikary Ojicer
-..
... Veterinary-Lieutenant I?. U. Carr.
COLUMN.
THE KURRAMMOVEABLE
C o m m a ~ d i n g(witJz rank a ~ z dpay of Colonel W. Hill, Indian Staff Corps.
Colo?td olz the Staf).
Order& 0fice-r
Captain H. 0.C. Hume, 1st Battalion
Border Regiment.
Depufy Assistanf Adjutant-Gertwal
Major E. F. H. McSwiney, D.s.o., 1st
Lancers, Hyderabad Contineent.

...

.,

...
...

...

...

'2

J

.

...

...

...
...

Lientemnt P. Holland Pryor, 13th Benqal Lancers, took over the appointmen: of
BrigadeTransport Officer on October 18th. 1897, two days before theCulsmn left: Peshawar
IM held it throughout ttt; remaining opera~ions.
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neral.
. H. Forteath, DeCommissary-Gene-

Marriott, Deputy
issary-General.
P. Beville, Deputy
issary-General.
r d , Deputy Assist-General.
Pollock, 18th Nus:h, 1st Battalion
:nt.
Bayley, 20th Hus-
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Deptify
Assistarzt Qztarfer-Maskr- Captain C. P. Scudamore, D.s.o., 1st
General.
Royal Scots Fusiliers.
Principal Medical Officer
Brigade-Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel W.
R. Murphy, D.s.o.,
Indian Medical
Service.
Bvkade Ordna9zce Oficer
Lieutenant D. R. Poulter, R.A.
Field Engilzeev
Captain J.A. Gibbon, R.E.
Assistalrt Field Enmizeer
... Lieutenant E. A, Tandy, R E.
Asststant
~*@e%ztende~zt, A m y Lieutenant C. R. Scott-Elliot, 4th MadSig?zallilzg.
ras Pioneers.
Bvigade Commissariat OfjScer
Captain C. F. T. Murray, Assistant
Commissary-General.
Assistant to Brkade Com~zissariatCaptain P. H . Rogers, 2nd Yorkshire
Oficer.
Light Infantry.
Bripade Transpout Officer
Captain H. W. Colquhoun, 24th Madras Infantry.
Veterinavy Officer
Veterinary-Lieutenant W . N. Wright.

...

...

...

...

Ewart, 5th Ben-

...

...

...

... Brigadier-General C.R. Macgregor,
... 2nd-Lieutenant E. W, C. Ridgeway, 29th
Punjab Infantry.
... Major Sir R. A. W. Colleton., Bart., 1st
Royal Welsh Fusiliers.

avis, 3rd Infantry
ngent.

Commanding
Orderly Oscer

.

Dejuty Assistant Adjutant-General

G.
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-D.-C.

nmond, R.A.
one1 F. S. Gwat-,
mcers.
and King's Own
ton, 1st Bombay
3).

enant-Colonel R.
Medical Staff.
.M.M.Smith, R.A.
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D.S.O.

Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master- Captain H. Hudson, 19th Bengal Lancers.
General.
Brtgade Commissariat Oficer
Lieutenant E. G. Vaughan, Deputy
Assistant Commissary-General.
Assistant to Brigade
Commissariat Lieutenant A. P. Trevor, 20th Bombay
Officer.
Infantry.
Brkade Transport OfSicer
Lieutenant K. E. Nangle, 3rd Infantry,
Hyderabad Contingent.
Veterinary Oficer
Veterinary-Lieutenant W, S. Anthony.

...

...

...

...

T H E S A M A N A A N D MURRAM VALLEY

DESPATCHES.

:.,,

h t i h r 11, n tlta:lIr. ~ s v c r t ~ o r - G e n e rin
a l Council is pleased to direct the pubt.d letter from the Adjutant-General in India, submitting
th,. . u . j
a:p.
,
tr
y,jr-c;elrcral A. G. Yeatman-Riggs. C.B.. Commanding
? ,. 1;
, a I -sf!.,+I ~ - f i . e ,de5criblng the operations which took place On t h e
,*a,.
a;;d In the liurram Valley in August and September last.
J i.? (;,,; t.rlc r-Gc.i:eral in Council concurs with His Excellency t h e Cornm er!:.: in Irrz npptecint~on of the conduct of these operations, and of
I,&r t a : l i trtr jps e1i:agrd.
t3.c t r
rnnr-C~.nrr~l
in Council desires e-specially to express his admira1) (;<
t :. t *i,e 1 :r3:r,ii,t dcferlcr of Fort Gulistan by the 36th Slkhs, and of t h e post
L r *,artc
rr bv .i !,arty of t u e n t y men gf. the same regiment under the com1- a c 1 12 izll i.,r ILhar Slngh, who d ~ e d
fiqhting to thelast, displayinga hero~c,
3 a 1 *e, r: niaa~bh.t> Irer.tr been surpassed In the annals of the Indlan Army.
3, ,*,

,;-"

,,

.*

+

TIIP. CO~~NA~~DEII-IN-CHII:F'S
CODIIIIENTS.

r-l;enrral G. de C. Blorton, c.%',Adjutant-General in India, in fora s ~ r ~ zbar
? ~ desprtches
~;
from the Commander-in-Chief to t h e Government of
Isidt'8. %*ii
* :-It:- I.xre!le.ney is ef opinion that the operations in question were we11
p?,~nnciiand ckilit:l:lly carried out. The march t o the relief of Gullstan w a s
~ * - - i i:a:rtl unc3.r verJr trying circ~mstances,owlng to the heat and to a great
st i a ~
:v c d rax,n:rr m I O P ~ ~ Cbut
,
the force successfully dccomplished its object
P !!is the *ante gallontry and cheerfiilnezs as have been evinced on every occa*iu311 lJ\ cue truo~s.Jut-log- the various operations whlch have recently taken
place cn :hc Kurth-\Vest Frontier.
Ihe
rnnam~der-in-Chiefwishes to draw attention to the admirable conall,t-t i i x i s:c.xdlnr\s of the 36th S ~ k h sunder
,
the command of Lieutenant-Colonel
& I tugi ~ L I , .tiurlr~gthe attack on t h e varlous posts held by that regiment on the
Ial

b d i Z X d . ~ A i*rG#3ye.

.tr Sd:nc.*r, tbcsmall garrison made asortie and gallantly captured a standard

1.9 ti,c elarmy. while the briltiant defence of Fort Gulistan by the detachmc.2.t liiiJer she cornn:;rnd of Major Des Vaeux, reflects the grestest
on
\r%t L\lhc*.r and the garrison of the post.

3 he Gor-e~nmeotof India will, HISExcellency is a s s ~ ~ r eappreciate
d,
fully
in:+d
manner in which the late Havildar Kala Singh led the sortie from
@uEs-lan Fort, and also the conduct of Havildar Sundar Slngh, who assisted

Sara ~mmradcsat a critical moment

-1he Cofnmlnder-in-Chief deeply regrets the loss of the garrison of saraa Imst OeId
21 men of t h e 36th Lilkhs, and h e \vishes to
his
d a ~ r @ l i ~ofnthe heroism shown by those gallant soldiers. Fighting against
%flr*rrv

VALLEY

o v e r ~ v h e l m i nnumbers
~
they died at their post, thus p r o v i n ~their loyalty and
devotion to their Sovereign, while upholding to the last the traditional bravery
of the Sikh nation.
The creditable manner in which the attack of the enemy on the post a t
Sadda was repulsed is due, in H i s Excellency's opinion, not only to the steadiness and good discipline of the garrison, bnt also to the satisfactory arrangements for the protection of his camp which were made by Colonel G, L . R.
Richardson, C.I.E.
In conclusion, the Commander-in-Chief recommends to the favourable
consideration of Government t h e services of Major-General Yeatman-Biggs,
C.B., and those mentioned by him i~ his despatch. Among thenames brought
specially to notice is that of Miss Teresa McGrath, whose heroism is described
in terms which His Excellency cordially endorses.
G E N E R A L WOLSELEY'S COMJIENDATION.

d to direct the pubIndia, submitting
Commanding
took place on the
tember last.
ellency t h e Comoperations, atid of
:press his admiraIS, and of the post
~t under the comisplaying a heroic,
: Indian Army.
in India, in forG o v e r n m e n t of
stion were we11
of Gulistan was
; and to a great
[;shed its object
I o n every occa: recently taken
.admirable conutenant-Colonel
'egiment on the
ptured a standby the detachlatest credit on
spreciate fully
the sortie from
1, who assisted
rison of Sarato record his
:hting against

1-ieutenant-General Sir G. B. Wolseley, K.C.B., Commanding the Forces,
Punjab, sent the despatches to the Adjutant-General. In doing so he said :These operations seem to have been well planned and carried out. The
heroic defence of S a r a ~ h e r is,
i in my opinion, worthy of thehigbest praise, and
I deeply lament the loss of the garrison.
I fully endorse the Major-General's commendation on the defence of Fort
Gulistan and the behaviour of all ranks. Major Des V e u x proved himself a
gallant and skilful leader, and the Major-Geueral's remarks on this Officer's
conduct appear to be fully deserved.

I have niuch pleasure in recommending for the Order of Merit all the non:
commissioned oEccrs and men the Major-General has brought to notice.
THE ATTACKS ON HANGU ANDTHE SAMANA POSTS.
Major-General A. G. Yeatman-Biggs, Commanding the Kohat Field Force,
writing from Fort Lockhart, the ~ 1 sSeptember,
t
says:I have the honour to report, for the information of His ExceHency the
Commander-in-Chief, that news was received hy me from reliable sources at
Hangu on the 8th instant, to the effect that the Afridis had decided to come
and assist the Orakzai in attacks on Hangu and on the Samana posts on
Friday, the 10th instant.
Having o n the same day received reports that the necessary amount of
transport and supplies for ~ u t t i n gthirty
days' supplies into the Samana posts had
4 wuns 9th Field
~attzry,' ~ o ~ aArl
been collected, I gave orders t o start that
tillery.
night with a column, strength as p e r marToba~;ton~~
Eengal Cavalry.
gin. The amnlunition supply had, ten days
I squadron, 3rd
previously, been sent up by me to the
Punjab Cavalry.
Samana, making up the total number of
companies, Royal Iri,h Regirounds to four hundred per rifle, 36th Sikhs.
ment, 300.
I -2nd Gurkhas, 500.
Concentrating at Pat Darband at 1.30
I-3rd Gurkhas, 500.
2nd Punjab Infantry, 500.
A.er. on the 9th instant, the I-2nd Gurlthas
Ilalf.company No. +. Company,
moved up the road a s advanced guard, and
Eombay Sappers and Rl~ners.
Sec No. 8 British Field Hospital.
occupied the plateau on which Dhar i s
~ e c :No. 42: Native Field Hospital.
situated before daylight. At 4 A.M. the
remainder of the column started. No enemy,
and the rohd mas found too bad for guns ; S O I sent the
were reported in
cavalry and artillery back to Hangu, and the convoy proceeded up the road,
arriving at Fort Lockhart about mid-day.
On the 10th I sent the half-company of the Bombay Sappers and Miners
t o improve the defences of Gulistan.
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rlc 7-3" p
~IniorReivicke-Copley reported that h e had seen clouds of
nJrth of the Sampagha Pass, and that the Afridis were coming over t h e

p r-.
!].maring thzt the --hole of the Afridi lashkav had arrived at Khorappa
dms-irrthe njqht. 1 sent a few scouts of the I-3rd Gurkhas down the spurs torr.trtiu
me Kharlki Vallev, to ascertain if the information was correct, a s
K%:>-appz cannot be seen from the Samana plateau. These scouts were sup;* rt-. l bi. the I-3rd Gurkhas and two companies of the 2nd Battalion of t h e
R ,y.il IrnlE~Reziment.
&?at ro A.w., large numbers of the enemy could be seen marching d o w n
the Khinki V.illey. I at once recalled the troops by heliograph. Just before
rrselr:nq time order to retire the I--,rd Gurkhas fired a few long-range volleys

into a p r r y of the enemy, and three were seen to drop. At I P.M. Major
SBrrr~.-ki*-Ctrplev
reported to me from Crag Picket that 22 standards and about
lo,oiscr mzn had passed down the valley.

Ba seemed probable that the tribesmen intended to carry out their threat
W
perhaps Shabu Khel, a small post guarding the Khanki
Vadlev. nbr,rinr four mlles north-west of the point where it is crossed by t h e
KL*t;.it-Maslqm road.

b ~ P ~ t : ~ ~ ~ l : kL Ii ~i U~or
,~

T*:k pmt had been reinforced by me with one company of the Royal Irish
arid 6;rnfles of the 15th Sikhs, under command of Major Forster, Royal Irish

Reqrment.

I ordered the 2nd Punjab Infantry to seize Gogra HilI, supported by the
r-2nd (;riskb.~s.

Tho Co:nmnndant of the Border Militia Police, Mr. D. Donald, informed
th.aa a large number of the enemy were making for the Darband Kotal, and

BrZcer Commandrng the I-2nd Gurkhas reported to me (7 P.M.) that seven
and a considerable number of tr~besmenwere retrac~ngtheir steps up
the valley.

~ t h * c i ~ i - * ~ J s

*convoy with two days' supplies had been ordered out from Hangu to
me at tile Pat Darband Kotal, where I found them when I advanced
*lth the rernalnder of the column. The supplies had been sent up on 51 camels,
no mules were available.

The advanced guard and main column halted for the night a t g P.M. o n
the hill. A few shots were fired at the rear-guard from Gogra Hill, and t h e
whole of the sarwass, except one, bolted, and the camels, being !eft without
drivers and without nose-strings, stampeded. The rear-guard, consisting of a
vvrng 0%the I-3rd Gurkhas, under Lieutenant-Colonel Pulley, and two companies of the I-2nd Gurkhas, under Captain Robinson, withstood several
determined attacks, and did their utmost to save the convoy. At midnight I
sent out two cvmpanies of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, under Lieutenant Elsmie
atmmpnled by Captain Scudamore, Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master-Generd,
to ass~stin bunging the camels in. All but two were found to have thrown
their loads, so it was useless, and by 2 A.m. the rear-guard had taken u p the
p"3";tion assigned to them in the bivouac. The enemy consisted of Sheikhans,
Hshtb, Xalla Khels and Ali Khels, and they admit to their losses being over
l W kiiled and wounded. A leading malik of the Sheikhans was wounded
five l a d i n g Malla Khels killed.
When morning broke (~nth'l,I sent out Colonel Lawrence Royal Irish
Repiment, wjth two companies of his Battalion and five combanies of each

d the rernnlnmg corps, to endeavour to recover the camels and stores, but only
thbtmn -+Is
were recovered, and of these only two had loads. The Royal
fr* f
"n
iang-range
d
volleys to keep the tribesmen at a respectful distance.
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On the return of Colonel Lawrence's reconnaissance, I set the column once
more in motioil towards Lakka, as being the best position from which both
Hangu and Shahu Khel could be protected. I arrived there at I P.M., but,
finding no water, and having lost our food, I issued orders to commence t h e
march to Hangu at 3 p.m. A t 3-30 P.X. I received a message by heiio from
Fort Lockhart that Saragheri w a s hard pressed, and at 4-30 P.M. it was helioed
that Saragheri had fallen, and that Gulistan w a s hard pressed.
Four riflemen of the I-2nd Gurkhas who had been reported missing t h e
previous evening, rejoined, having made their way by the Darband Ilotal.
T h e troops, after their hard day without food o r water, had earred a rest,
but about 3-30 P.M. on the x3th, a letter was brought to me from Major Des
Vceux, 36th Sikhs, Commanding at Gulistan, urgently asking fq; help. 1
immediately despatched two guns of the 9th Field Battery and the ; d Bengal
Cavalry with their signallers to gallop along the road a t the foot of the hills a s
far towards Gulistan as they could go, and sent a wire to Doaba to despatch
two more guns of the 9th Field Battery and the squadron of the 3rd Punjab
Cavalry to join in the demonstration.
T h e guns from Hangu were accompanied by Mr. L). Donald who knows
t h e country well, and he w a s able to show them a position from which they
could fire a few rounds to encourage the garrison, and Major Middletou, commanding the 3rd Brngal Cavalry, sent througl~by helio, just before sunset, a
message to assure the garrison that they would be relieved by mid-day on the
14th.
T h e four guns of the Drrajat Mountain Battery had reached Hangu the
previous day, having marched 35 miles in under thirteen hours, s o they were
added to our column, and w e set out at midnight for Lakka.
At 4 A.M., on the 14th instant, I arrived at Lakka, and sent on two companies of the I-3rd Gurkhas to occupy the hill on which w e had bivouacked on
the night of the I lth.
At 5 A.M. we mdrched for Gulistan. On arrival opposite Tsalai (7 A . M )
the advanced guard of the r-3rd Gurkhas was assailed with a heavy fire. I
brought up the guns and shelled the enemy's marksmen out of Tsalai tower at
a range of goo yards, and a t once ordered the I-3rd Gurkhas to attack the
enemy's position on Gogra, t h e I-2nd Gurkhas following in support. Gogra
Hill was quickly taken under cover of the fire of the guns, and one company of
the Royal Irish fired long-range volleys at the Orakzai retreatingdown the
Sarmela spur. The strength of the enemy w a s estimated at about 4,000.
T h e 2nd Punjab Infantry pressed on followed by the guns, and the
Gurkhas held the position until they had passed through.
As w e neared Sangar the garrison of that post displayed a white standard
which they had captured from the enemy. Sangar and Dhar had been attacked
all night, but a sortie had been made from the first-named as soon as our
guns opened fire, and Lieutenant-Colonel Haughton, commanding t h e 36th
Sikhs, had joined the party with 12 men of the Ro.val Irish and 35 Sikhs, and
had poured long-range volleys into the foe as they retreated down the Sarmela.
At 10 A.M. I reached Fort Lockhart and reconnoitred the enemy's position
from a bastion of the Fort, and found about 8,000to lo,ooo Afridis holdinga
str0n.g position, which was sliilfully occupied w i t h lines of satzgavs on Saragherl ndge.
I ordered up the puns, and by 10-30 A.M., they were playing on t h e
enemy's position with shrapnel, whilst the 36th Silrhs from Fort Lockhart advanced to turn the Afridi right, and the 2nd Punjab Infantry made a frontal
attack on their position, supported by the two Gurkha battalions as they arrived on the ground. The Afridis did not wait for the infantry, but fled from
their position and made for the Khat~ltiValley. I pressed on with ali possible

~ p e e das
, I did not 1tno:v whether Gulistan was holding out or not. Ori reachirig the hiqh around overlooking Gulistan, I found that the Fort was invested
by about 6,0011 Or;il;znis, but they did not wait for theattack of the 2nd Punjab
Infantry and 36th Sikhs, which was made under an accurate fire of the guns
of the mountain battery, and by 8 p.nr. they were in full retreat down the
Khandartang spur and Gulistan was relieved, after having been hard pressed
by s,.mey,ooo to 8.000 Afridis and Orakzais since the 12th instant. 'The
enemy's caszalties are reported over 400 killed.

I wish to bring to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief
for special recognition the -names ofMajor C. H. Des Vmus, 36th Sikhs, who was the life and soul of the
defrnct: of Gulistan. He did ail that could be done, with the slender means a t
his disposal, to frustrate each device of the enemy, whose attack was a most
determined one. with riflemen ready, on ridges and terraces within fifteen yards
of the Fort, to open a heavy fire on any one who exposed hilnsrlf in tile slightest degree. His judcment in pern~itting the sortie was, in my opinion, good,
as the success attending it encouraged the garrison and made the enemy move
away from the walls.
Second-Lieutenant H. R. E. Pratt, 36th Sikhs, who, though suffering from
dysentery, mas always ready for any emergency, and is very highly spoken of
be Major Des Vceux.
Surgeon-Captain C. R. Prall, Indian Medical Service, whose care of t h e
wounded was unremitting, and who was often under heavy fire.
Miss Teresa McGrath, who had been previously attached to the hospital
by my orders, \vho rendered most valuable assistxnce to the Medical Officer.
Her conduct is spolien of most enthusiastically by all ranks.
'
No. 75 5, Havildar Sundar Singh, 36th Sikhs, who is repnrced to have been
conspicuous for his gallantry throughout the siege, and who, of his own accord,
sprang over the mall of the horn-work, carrying with him those who happened
to be near him, to the succour of his comrades who had made a sortie to capture a standard, and were in imminent peril of being killed to a man.
Havildar Bishen Singh, 36th Sikhs, who was in ccmmand at Sangar, and
kept the enemy a t bay against heavy odds, who led a successful sortie, capturing a standard.
T h e rank and file named belom, who took part in the sortie made by the
36th Sikhs from Gulistan :-No.
807, Lance-Naick Sadu Singh. No 1078,
Sepoy Attar Singh Eo. 1046, Sepog Sajin Singh. No. 1380, Sepoy Bakram
Singh. No. 1603, Sepoy Chajja Siogh. No. 1369, Sepoy Badan Singh. No. 1597,
Sepoy Phuman Singh. No. 1741: Sepoy Thamnn Singh. No. 1066, S e ; ~ o y
Sawan Singh. No. 1600, Sepoy Ghuna Singh. )\lo. 1588, Scpoy Bhagvvan
Singh. No. 1589, Sepoy Harnam Singh. No. 180, Sepoy Rur Singh. No. 368,
Sepoy Slier Singh. No. 1632, Sepoy Raila Sinzh. No. 1123, Sepoy Kala Singh.
No. 1177. Lance-Naick Uewa Singh. No. 81j, Lance-Naick Harnam Singh.
No. 939, Lance-Naick Jiwan Singh. No. r 167, Sepoy Mihan Singh. No. 823,
Sepoy Mehma Singh. No. 118- Sepoy Hira Singh. No. rgjg, Sepoy Nabha
Singh. No. 1338, Sepoy ~ c w a i ; rSingh. No. 907, Sepoy Basawa Singh (since
dead). F o , 1146, Sepoy Ghulla Singh. Pu'o. 1854, Sepoy Jicvan Singh.
. No. 2,509, Rifleman Dhanbir Sahai, I-2nd Gurkhas, for helping in a
wounded naick of the same battalion on the night of the 11-12th instant, under
heavy fire.
I should also have brought forward the names of Havildar Kala Singh,
36th Sikhs, who volunteered to command the sortie from Gulistan, and Sepcy
Gnrmukh Singh, 36th Sikhs, for special recognition, but the former has, I
regret to say, succumbed LO hismounds, and the latter was last seen signalling
from Saragheri just before the enemy swarmed in. I trust that in the cases
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of those brave soldiers who lost their lives a t Saragheri and Gulistan, their
wives and families may b e considered for. pension a s if they had survived to
receive the rewards they so justly deserved.
My thanks are due to the various members'of m y staff, Majors BewickeCopley, King's Royal Rifles, and E. F. H. McSwiney, D.S.O., 1st Lancers,
I-Iyderabad Contingent, and Captains C. P. Scudamore, L).S.O., Royal Scots
Fusiliers, and E. St. A. Wake, 10th Bengal Lancers, who, without even the
organisation cf a Brigade Staff to help them, performed the duties of Divisional
Staff to a force larger.than a division, scattered over a wide area, t o m y entire
satisfaction. Ny thanks are also due t~ His Highness the Maharaja of Cooch
Behar, G.C.I.E., Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel, 6th Bengal Cavalry, who
accompanied me throughout a s Orderly Officer, and t o Brigade-Surgron-Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. hlurphy, D.S.O., Indian Medical Service, Captain
'2. F. T. Murray, Staff Corps, Cornrnissariat Department, and Captain P. H.
Rogers, Yorkshire Light Infantry, Transport Officer, who organised their
respective departments under circumstances OF exceptional difficulty.
I wish also to favourably mention the follocving Officers :-Colonel W. W.
Lawrence, Royal Irish Regiment, Commanding t h e Column. LieutenantColonel E. A. Travers, Commanding the I-2nd Gurkhas. Lieutenant-Colonel
C. Pulley, Commanding the I-3rd Gurkhas. Lieutenant-Colonel J. Haughton,
36th Sikhs, Commanding on the Samana. Lieutenant-Colooel K. R. N. Sturt,
Commanding the 2nd Punjab Infantry. Major 13. J. C. Doran, Koyal lrish
Regiment, Staff OFficer to t h e Column. Captain J. I. Parker, R.A., Commanding No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery. Captain J. G. Robinson, I-2nd
Gurkhas, for coolness and gallautry on the occasion of the rear-guard actioo,
12th instant. Lieutenant A. M. S. Elsrnie, Adjutant, 2nd Punjab Infantry,
for coolness displayed in assisting to bring in the camels on t h e night of
11.12th instant. Lieutenant G. W. M. West, I-3rd Gurkhas, for conspicuous
gallantry on the occasion of t h e rear-guard action, IT-12th instant. Jemadar
Narakbir Gurung, I-3rd Gurkhas, for conspicuous gallantry o n the occasion of
t h e rear-guard action, 11-12th instant.
I am also indebted to Mr. D. Donald, Commandant, Border Militia Police,
whose unrivalled knowledge of t h e country and people has been of t h e greatest service to me.
THE ATTACK ON SADDA.

Major-General Yeatman-Biggs, writing from Fort Lockhart o n t h e 30th
September, says :I have the honour to report, for t h e information of H i s Excellency t h e
Commander-in-Chief in India, t h a t the camp a t Sadda was attacked o n the
night of the 16th and 17th September.
Colonel G. L. R. Richardson, C.I.E.. Commanding t h e Flying Column, had
established himself in a well intrenched camp a n d high ground overlooking
Sadda. About 10.10 p.nr. on the 16th, a las/~knr,consisting of Wassuzais and
Chamkannis, numbering about 2,000, collected in t h e Khurmandarra and
attacked a picket of t h e 5 t h 13unjab Infantry about a hundred yards outside
the south-east corner of the camp. T h e picket had t o abandon their sn7zgnv
and retire into camp, losing the Havildar i n s o doing. T h e moon was obscure
by passing clouds, and the noiseof t h e water rushing in the ?tzilla/z prevented
the patrols of the 5th Punjab Infantry a n d 1-5th Gurkhas hearing o r seeing
the approaching enemy.
The enemy's attack was pushed to within twenty or thirty yards of t h e
stone wall with which the camp w a s surrounded with a certain amount of
resolution up to midnight, after which it slackerled off considerably, I n n o
case did the enemy come to close quarters, though two standards w e r e broughr
tlp to within fifty yards of the camp. They seemed to have lost heart a t the
last moment in the face of t h e steady fire which was brougGt to bear on them
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T h e expenditure of ammunition was as follows :6

.

15th Sikhs
15th Punjab Infantry
I-5th Gurkhas

...
...
...

...
...
...

...

...
...
...

...

Total

...

...

Rounds.
525
1,200
373

2,098

T h e usual casualty returns have heell already forwarded.
FURTIIER OPERATIONS ON TI-IE SARIANA.

On the same day Major-General Yeatman-Biggs reporied :I have the honour to report that on the 27th August last, a large gathering
of Orakzai appeared on the Samaoa Sulr, and heavy firing was heard in the
direction of Shinawari, tvhich was held by the Border Police. This w a s
reported to me at Kohat.
Reconnaissances were made from Gulistan towards the Samana Sulr, and
from Hangu to Shinawari.
T h e enemy was found to be about 4,000in number, strongly posted on the
Samana Suk. I n this reconnaissance, I regret to say, Lieutenant A. K. Blair,
36th Sikhs, was mounded in the chest. Reinforcements were sent from Fort
Lockhart, but soon after their arrival at Gulistan information was received
that the enemy's Irrs/~ba~
was assembling to the east of Fort Lrclihart, s o
Lieutenant-Colonel Haughton, 36th Sikhs, Commanding on t h e Samana, decided to return to Fort Loclihart.
The Officer Commanding the reconnaissance made by a squadron of t h e
18th Bengal Lancers to Shinawari, returned the same day to Hangu, and reported all well. This was the second reconnaissance made from Hangu to
Shinawari (a distance of over twenty miles) within the last few days.
T h e follo~oingday the enemy were discovered to be holding the Chagru
Kotal as well as the Samana Suk on the west of the Samana Range, and the
Sarmela spur on the east end of the range. and during the day they burnt the
posts of Gogra and Tsalai, which had been evacuated by the Border Police.
In order t a anticipate the enemy, should a second attack be made o n
Shinawari, I ordered two companies of Gurkhas to march to reinforce the
garrison there. One squadron of cavalry accompanied them, with orders to
return to Hangu as soon as the Gurkhas had reached the post. Reliable
reports were received on the morning of the 29th August that Shinaxvari had
been evacuated by the Border Police, and the post burnt by the tribesmen the
previous evening, so the troops err 7-oute to reinforce thegarrison, were recalled.
The Orakzai held a&-gah this day, and decided that ihe Ali Khel, Mamuzai,
Alsherzai and Aka Khel should attack Gulistan on Friday, September jrd,
whilst the Mishti, Sheikhan RIalla Khel and Kabia Khel attacked Hangu.
During the night of the 29th the post of Sangar was fired into, and a sepoy
of the Border Police deserted from the adjacent post of Dhar with his rifle and
ammunition. This psot was therecore reinforced by one Kative Officer and 37
sepoys of the 26th Sikhs, so that all posts on the Samana should be held by
Sikhs.
T h e three follo?ving days the enemy remained on the east and west ends
of the Samana, but made no further move.
On the 3rd Septeniber a bhisti from Dhar was murdered by the enemy,
and his three mules stolen. Mr. D. Donald, Commandant of the Border Police,
proceeded to Dhar to make inquiries into the circumstances, and h e and his
escort were fired on.
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As tribesmen were reported to be advancing on Gulistan and Saragheri
in force, these posts were reinforced from Fort Lockhart. Towards evening the
enemy, in cons~derableforce, took up a position in and about Picquet Hi11 '400
yards west of Gulistan, and set fire to the thorn hedge whlch had been placed
as an obstacle a few yards outside the horn-work of the place. T h e fire was
extinguished by volunteers, whose names have been brought to notice by me
in a separate letter. At 8 P.M.the bonfire, which had been previously prepared between the horn-work a n d Picquet Hill, was 11tby volunteers, whose
narnes have also been mentioned in the despatch of the 2Ist September,
The enemy kept u p a hot fire until midnight w h e n they retired.
Lieutenant-Colonel J. Haughton and Lieutenant and Adjutant R C . Munn,
of the 36th Sikhs, strove hard, with their httle handful of men from Fort Lockhart, to succour the many small posts scattered over the Samana Range that
were beset on all sides by overwhelming numbers of the enemy.
The expenditure of ammunition between the 27th August and the 3rd
September on the Samana was...
4.10
Ritles
...
..3,649
Rounds expended
I have not considered it necessary to attach any sketch, a s the whole ground
is so well known, and has already been mapped by the Survey Department.
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T~~ following notification and despatch
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The Right Hon'bIe the Goverr~or-C;c*~~t~r:rl
1st 1 1 i11t<11 : i ~ b , r h r t t : x s n i i
gublicatlon of the subjolnrd Icttcl~ t t r r l r r tilib .ht!:lvs.aizl 4 1 r . 6 * : rl juj I t , : I . : , t ,
mlttlog a despatch from Generdl Sir W . 5 , A. 1.1t Ll. li t. 'ii.~
.ll
i<.{ ,\ i
descrlbIng the opperations of the Tlrall k:xp~t~iI~i!r
ia.ily I r s t ca, iri ria It c ibrl,
the 31s' October 1x97.
8:

.

t

~i~ ~
~ t h e Governor-Gencl-:tl
~
k in C<*$rt:r
~ 31 t'sJl!i'ill>
l
\vi!!i !ti.,
~ b:rrsr.l- ~
lencythe Commander-in-Chief in his :rpgreri.rlii::l r "1 l i i * . . t ! d !IIV .!lrtl jilb2gs!it.r)$
shown by General Sir William Loekll.lrt i r t h l r l s r'r k i f ! % : i l I f tirfs r + ~ ~ c j , a t ~ e . t i . . <
Elie
recorded in his despatch, and also of r!w g;~llaiil;irisl > i !s:l*.i :i ii..j~.i'+,aiiil!.
Officers, Non.Commissioned Oficers and rncri tnkiir.r. 1 1 1 . ~ ~ : ~ + l ~ ~ ~ r i . i r i d .
t . i :it'v r\l:ir.ir
His Excellency in Council, while cirt.~iIyrc.grtz:lii:g: t i i t . !,
r ,it* ;. ~ , l q ? ,
occurred in t h e attack on the heiglits c#r' IJ,crx.ii cis1 tf;i: 2t4:dr
fully shares in the admiration cxprerscd liy t f ~ r . Ct,1rl;ur.cl!r!r.1~-8~:-f.,~;1+:1'
c,t the
gallantry displayed by both OfEcers and nren uri rL.tr CicCa:~H,Et,

In the assaults on the Sampagha and r21 l::tn~:r Ea.w w*, t8if' *kilt;!' rii-p - b tions of the General Comrnandi~~g
arid tllc cxcrlPernt c,u.li,tzt " . 1 - $ 6 ? . t ) 1 1 4iy tfte
troops, enabled these strong positions to be uVunrv~llr~trtariiaa,trnvcly little Iribe.

Major-General G. de C. Morton. C.B., Aeljait.iaat-P';c*n~+r:tIi f t ltrnlr u, lu t> rwarding the despatch to the Secretary to tlre Y;uvc*rurrrt*:!t a+t itrc!:a, fltlrr,try
Department, said :-

I have t h e honour, by direction of t h e (:nmrz~?nr!~r-i~r-fi,irl, t c . fi ru ar4.
for the information of the Govcrntnent r,f Intl~rn. r h r . , t i a t , # t i $ iiviilap
;r,tt
!j
f r o m General Sir W. S A. Loclzh:irt, IC.C.B., K.<".S.l , r 1 a . i ~ ,r!tirib: rt,ca a \8tat.a.
t i o n s of t h e Tirah Expeditionary Force fro~tl tlsr: 88th ?u liar 31-1 Qtitiitar

.

3897.
2. Thegeneral object of t h e expedition ivnr4 to *x:~rt ~ P P B I It iP ~ftrr
~ ~tilr
unprovoked aggression of the Afridi n11tI 0 r i l k r : i i trtt,r~~..ern tlica is". 1,.x\~*,,r rzsd
K o h a t borderers, in attacking our frcrrrtier pnct-, :uirl 1t'r st;*. tl.tnr.al:~+a t 8 Irl*. .snd
p r o p e r t y which had thus been itlflictetl on fb~tiwh* t i l l ~ r ~ r s t . atral
t
r ti tltrrur r f r tibr
Britlsh service. The despatch now su1inlitft~ci'.t~v,rv-,tlrr rrtr-a utr's \t!~ti*lo evrre
taken by General Sir William Lorkllnrt to I-rtrry nclt thc* i 4 t c i r r . s c I titt.
tcror.
merit of India and to enter Tirak, a coutltzy wkk$l uidt11Z ~ U Wf ~ xrtrrcr
u ~ best>
invaded by a B-~tish~ O F C ~ .

~

3. The incidents which occurred between the 18th and 20th October, and
which immediately preceded the concentration of both divisions of the force a t
Khangarbur, in the Khanlii Valley, are detailed in t l ~ edespatch. W i t h regard
to paragraph a r thereof the Commander-in-Chief agrees with Sir William Lockhart that a flanking demonstration combined with a frontal attack xvould in
all probability have enabled the Dargai heights to have beer1 taken at less loss
of life, but he is confident that the Government of India millshare his admiration of the distinguished gallantry and the marked devotion to duty evinced by
all ranks in assailing that difficult position, defended as it was by a resolute
and well armed enemy.
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4. T h e measures subsequently taken by Sir William Lockhart to force'
the Sampagha and Arhanga Passes, tvhere it had been anticipated t h e greatest
resigtance would be met, w e r e thoroughly successful, and to their skilful conception and the employment of concentrated artillery fire may be ascrtbed the
small loss of life that characterised both operations.

5. H i s Excellency cordially endorses the remarks which the General
Officer Commanding the Force makes regarding the behaviour of the troops
engaged in these operations, and he desires to recommend for the favourable
consideration of Government the distinguished services of General Sir V17illiam
Loclihart, and of the Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and men mentioned
by him in the despatch.
S I R WILLIAM LOCKHART'S DESPATCH.

T h e despatch from General Sir W. S. A. Lockhart to the AdjutantGeneral in India is dated Head-Quarters, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp
Gwatoi, the 9th December 1897. It is a s follows :I n compliance with t h e instrucflons conveyed in your letter No. 2235-F.,
dated the 20th November 1897,I have t h e hvnour to submit, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, the following account
of the operations of t h e force under m y command from t h e 18th t o the g ~ s t
October 1897.
On October 16th, t h e 2nd Division of the Main Column had concentrated at Shinawari, with t h e exception of the
* No. q Mountain Eattery troops occupying the Samana ridge near Forts
R.A.7 I s t
Uatta1lon, Nor- Loclihart and GulistanN; the 1st Division w a s
champtonshire
Regiment, expected to assemble at the same place o n the 19th ;
36th Sikhs.
and I consequently issued orders for the march of
the Main Column on the 20th and follomii~gdays from Shina~varito Khorappa,
each corps being directed to leave behind its tents and heavy baggage
under charge of a regimental guard. bleanlvhile the road from the Chagm
Kotal towards Khorappa w a s being improved by military and hired labour,
working under the protection of covering parties. It w a s reported, however,
that the troops and labourers thus employed were being so molested by t h e
enemy's sharp-shooters w h o occupied t h e heights to the west of t h e Chagru
defile, especially by those living in a small village called Dargai, about 1,800
yards to the left of the road shortly after it crosses the crest of the pass, that
the improvement of the road could not be continued until the heights h a d been
cleared, while two days' w o r k was said to be necessary to render the road
sufficiently good for the passage of laden transport animals. It w a s further reported that no water mas obtainable in t h e immediate vicinity of Dargai, the.
inhabitants getting water from the valley below to t h e west, where there w e r e
several rich Ali Khel villages and a number of cattle.
2.

3. I therefore determined to attack and destroy the village of Dargai,
while by a simultaneous flanklng moven~ent 1 seized the heights overlookiug

the raiEey to the west, and cleared out the lower villages referred t o above.
Althoilgtl I was aware of a hostile gathering in the Khanki Valley, t h e informatior~1 had received through native channels led me to believe t h a t t h e
Or3kzai, otller than the Ali Khe: section of that tribe, did not intend seriously
to oppose my advance until I had reached Khora~pa,and that t h e A f r i d i ~
\vere too busily engaged in fortifying the Sampagha and Arhanga P a s s e s to b e
able to assist the Orakzai in any considerable strength.

4. . ~ ) ~ ~ my
i n gstay on the Samana, Major-General Y e a t m a n - B k g s had
been In lodifferent health, and though he was able to move to ~ h i n a w a r on
i
October, the 17th, while the troops to be employed were drawn a l m o s t exclusively from the 2nd Division, 1 thought it better to spare him the f a t i g u e of
ccnducting the operations desigr~edtu clear the road and ~ u n i s hthe ~ l Khels.
i
These operations I accordingly entrusted to Lieutenant-General Sir A. PPalmer, Commanding the Line of Communication.

5. T h e front attack on Dargai was directed by Brigadier-~eneral w e s t macott, C.B., D.S.O., who had the following troops placed a t his disposal :So. 5 (Bombay) hlountain Battery, Rocket Detachment, Royal ~ r t i l l e r y ,
2nd Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers, 1st Battalion 3rd Gurkha Rifles.
The Main Column employed on the flanking movement w a s commanded by
Rrigadier-General Kernspter, D.S.O., and consisted of the following t r o o p s :No. 8 Nountain Battery Royal Artillery, Machine Gnn Detachment, 16th
Lancers, 1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders,
rat Battalion and Gurkha Rifles, 15th Sikhs, No. 4 Company Madras S a p p e r s
and &liners, Scouts of the 5th Gurkha Rifles. This column w a s accompanied
by Lieutenant-General Sir A. P. Palmer, K.C.B., with an escort of one
company of the 3rd Sikhs.
Brigadier-General Kempster's Column left Shinawari at 4-30 A.M., and
Br,igadier-General Wrstmacott's at 5 A.M. On the latter reaching t h e C h a g r u
Koatl at 8-30 A.M., it was joined by No. 9 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery,
and the 1st Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment from Fort Lockhart. A t
9 A.M. the attack was ccmmenced, the 1st Battalion 3rd Gurkhas leading, w i t h
the 2nd Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers in support and the 1st Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment in reserve. At the same time a w o r k i n g
party under Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Thurburn, Commanding Royal E n g i n e e r s ,
Line of Communication, consisting of the 21st Madras Pioneers, the S i r m u r
Imperial Service Sappers, and the hired labourers, was pushed forward beyond
the Kolal to improve the road.

6. T h e advance of the troops which was covered by No. g Mountain Bat-

tery Koyal Artillery and No. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery, was necessarily

elow, the slopes being extremely steep and affording but little cover. T h e
enemy at first kept up a vigorous Ere from the walled terraces and r o c k s in
front of the village, but shortly before noon, when the flanking movement
taegan to develop and the tribesmen's line of retreat was threatened, t h e
cpposition slackened and the position was carried by a compally of t h e 3rd
Gurkhas under hIajor Rose. About 20 of the enemy's dead were left o n the
ground, a sure indication of the heavy loss which had been inflicted.

7. &.leanwhilethe Main Column had moved in a north-westerly d i r e c t i o l ~
along a track which had been reported as practicable for baggage animals. At
the fifth mile, however, the road was found to be impassable for mules, and
No- 8 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery with all laden animals h a d t o be
ordered back to Shinawari, escorted by the 1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment
and two companies of the 15th Sikhs. The remainder continued their march,
led by the Gurkha scouts, a few of the enemy's marskmen firing at; tile
advancing troops and wounding two riflemen of the xst Battalion znd
Gurkhas.
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At I 1 A.M., heliographic comrcu~-iicationwas cstalrlishcd \vith brigadierGeneral \Vestmacott's Coiulnn. and shurtly hrforc n u m the ~ u H~ittnlion
t
2nd
Gurkhas, which was leading, reached a comnlnndin~position ;it K11:ind Tal:ru,
about t\ro and a I~nlt'miles \vest of Dargai, th~nscausing :he tribesmen 11ahtily
to evacuate that village a s well a s the v i i l a ~ e sin the valley Irelow. During
their retirement the enemy, estimated to rrwrnber sonle Soo men, came under
the fire of the 1st Enttalion 2nd Guri;has, and suffered considerable loss.
8. At this point, on-ing to the great dificulties of the road, the Main
Column had to be halted to ailow of tlie Gordon Hi:lilandel.s and 1 jth Sikhs
closing up, and also to cover the return to camp at hhinaxvari of the Jleuntain
Battery and its escort. At 2-30 '2.31. the concentration had been completed,
and the blain Column began to move towards Dargai in order to join Brigadier-General S\restrnacott's force, ~vhichin the meantime had destroyed that
village. T h e path mas estremely ditlicuit, and in eonie places precipitous. so
that progress \\-as slow, and it was found inipossible to reach villages belorv
Dargai which it had been intended to deal with, and near ivhicll the watersupply to Dargai rr-as situated. The track to the water was at'tertmrds found
to be about three miles in length, so commanded from \ h e adjacent heights,
that water cculd not have been obtained in the presence of an enemy unirss
these heights as ~ r e l al s Dargai itself had been held.
g. At this time a hostile force, numbering about 4,000 men, was observed
advancing from the Khanki Valley up the Narik Ijarra towards Khand Talno,
while another body of the enemy began to ascend the Dargai heights from the
same direction. It was clear, therefbre, that the gathering of tribesmen near
Khorappa, having heard t h e sound of the guns earlier in the dny, had resolved
to reinforce the Ali Khels who had just been driven out of Dargai and the
neighbouring viIlages. But before the enemy could come xvithin fightin- distance, t h e junction between the two columns had been effected, the 15th Zikhs
covering the climb of Brigadier-General Kempster's Column along the rugged
path described above and the retirement of the Sikhs being in turn covered by
the Gordon Highlanders and two companies of the King's O ~ v nScottish Uorderrrs, who took up a strong position just belo~vthe village of Dargai.
While this w a s going on: Brigadier-General Westmacott began his avithdrawal to the Chagru Kotill, having first posted KO. 5 (Bombay) Rlountain
Battery near the hotel itself, and sent No. g hlountain Battery Royal Artillery
with the 1st Battalion Xorthamptonshire Regimerlt to a pusition on the Samara
Suk, which flanked the road from Dargai to the crest of the pass. The enemy
pre3sing on, a hot engagement ensued between then1 and the rear-guard,
our guns making excellent practice, and the Gordon Highlanders with the two
companies of the King's Oxvn Scottish Borderers, steadily holding their ground
and checking the advance of the tribesmen. The heavy loss inflicted on the
enemy caused them to lose heart, no reply being made t:, a final volley fired by
the rear-guard abor~t7 p.nI., after which the rvithdrawal to the Chagru Kotal
and thence to Shinawari w a s entirely unmolested. Camp was reached by t h e
rear-guard at I r P.N.
lo. Lieutenant-General Sir A. P. Palmer has commented most favourably on the steadiness and gallantry of the troops engaged o n October the rSth,
and nas brought to my special notice the services of the follo\vir~gOfficers with
Brigadier-General Jl'estmacutt's Column :-Major H. Rose, 1st Battalion 3rd
Gurkhas ; Captain A. P. Bateman-Champain, znd Battalion and Gurkhas ; and
Lieutenant W. G. L. Beynon, U.S.O., 1st Battalion 3rd Gurkfas, who led the
attack on Dargai. Also Captain T. G. MacLaren, Captain I). R. 5laden, Captain
A . E. Haig, Lieutenant H. F. Pipe-Wolferstan, and 2nd-Lieutenant T. H.
Keyes of the 2nd Battalion King's Own Scotiish Borderers, who were engaged
jn supporting the attack and covering the xvithdrawal.
W i t h Brigadier-General Iiempst~r'sColumn:Lieutenant-Colonel H. H, Mathias, C.B., 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders.

I.reutrnant-Colonel H. A. Abbott. 15th Sikhs.
I ,~ute-r~n~it-ColoneI
E. A. Tmvers, 1st Battallon 2nd Gurkhas.
C,iptau I. I'hiilips, 1st Battalion 5th Gurkhas, Deputy Ass~stantAdjutant
and tJt:a:-trr->laster-(;eneral, Line of Communication.
Capr.iin F. G. Lucas and Lieutenant the Hon'ble C. G. Bruce, 5th Gurkhas,
whc -.ere in charge of the Gurkha scouts.
So. 26;. Private W. Rennie, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders, who shot
down four of the enemy a t very close quarters.

nr. The casualties on October 18th comprisedMajor K. D. Jeunings-Bramly, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders, killed.
Lieutenant ?,I. L. pears, 1st Battalion Scottish Rifles, attached to t h e
GorScn F4i:hiandrrs, severely wounded.
British Son-Commissioned Officers and men :-Killed 2, wounded lo.
S.::ive ranks:-Killed 6, wounded 21.
Followers:-'Ci'ounded
3.
I am much indebted to Lieutenant-Genenal Sir A. P. Palmer a n d
12.
Bri~adirr-Generals Westmacott and Icempster for the skilful manner in which
the troops were handled and the operatioo described above brought to a satisf~ctoryconclusion.
r j . Waving watched the action from the Samana Suk until Dargai had
been captrlred and the two columns had established communication with each
;.,tl:cr. I rctilrnrd to Fort Lockhart, where at 5 P.M. I received a heliogram
ii'sa.:n I.i*.::trn:;nt-Gei~eral S i r r l . P. Palmer, informing me that the object of t h e
r r3..
~~n.~:s.ni,csl~aci
been attained, and that the troops were returning to Shinawari.
I ;rh~c.crdrnqiydirectrd the General Officer Commanding the 2nd Division to
cr;r?!iriutt xvnrk 011 the road the nest day, under the prokction of two battalions
:ii~i a n;ountain battery. At I r A.M. on October Igth, a heliogram w a s
received from Major-General Yeatman-Biggs, reporting that the troops of his
divisicn had rractird camp so late on the previous evening that h e thought it
P~ckter r:u? to enipioy them in the manner indicated, especially a s an advance
to Kho:.appn had to be made the next day. I regret that my orders w e r e not
car:.irci slut even at t h e risk of fatiguing the troops, as the presence of a force o n
tlic ('il.@jii.t~ Kotai might have detrrred the enemy from re-occupying Dargai,
fntnti i:n any case xvould have enabled the road to be further improved.
But t h e
1:e:i:grnm reached me too late to allow of the employment of the wbrking
part?., which otherwise might have been covered by troops detailed from the
1st Ilivision.
14. O n October 19th t h e Dargai heights were observed during the day
fro33 the Samana ridge, but there was no sign of a formidable gathering,
al:P.c:i:gP~a few tribesmen w e r e seen moving about near the village.

5. Late on the evening of the 19th I. received a telegram from Shinawari,
reporting that Dargai and t h e adjacent heights were believed to be strongly
held by the enemy, and that t h e General Officer Commanding the 2nd DIVIs i ~ sproposed to advance the next day to Rhorappa virj Fort Gulistan, t h e
S.irnaraa Suk,and the Tsalai spur: instead of down the Chagru defile. For reasons
.ivhlch need not here be detailed, I w a s unahle to accept this suggestion,
and in reply desired Major-General Yeatman-Biggs to adhere to the original
pEara of movement. I remarked that whiie it would be necessary to clear the
Dargai heights overlooking t h e road to the west, the enemy would probably
retire as scot1 as troops had been pushed on to the point where the Narik Ljarra
joins the Cllagru defile, a s the enemy's rear would thus be threatened ; and to
assis: him i n the frontal attack, I placed at his disposal two battalions a n d
one moulltain battery from t h e 1st Division. I also informed him that No. 9
h I o u l l t d r ~ Battery Royal iSrtillery and the 1st Battalion Northamptonshire
Iic.yin:ent ssurtld be directed to co-operate from Fort Loclihart, by rziliing u p
a i)t8bitionon the Samnna Suk opposite Vargai at 7 A,M.
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16. O n October 20th the troops of the 2nd Division, as detailed beloup,*
moved as directed, the advance-guard leaving camp at Shiuawari a t 4-30 A.M.
and reaching the Chagru Kotal at 8 a x . At the latter hour the 1st Battaliou
Northamptonshire Regiment and No. g Mountain Battery Royal Artillery were
in position on the Samana Suk. Tlie troops detailed from the 1st Division to
assist in the advance of the and Division were No. I (Kohat) Mountain Battery,
the 2nd Battalion Derbyshii-e Regiment and the 3rd Sikhs.
The 3rd Brigade under Brigadier-General Kempster began its attack on the
Dargai heights a t 10 Am., by a concentrated artillery fire from No. 8 Mountain
Battery Royal Artillery, and No. I (Kohat) and No. 5 (Bombay) Mountain
Batteries, these being posted slightly in advance of the Kotal. No, g Mountain
Battery Royal Artillery, assisted by shelling the enemy's saxgars from the
Samana Suk. The attack was led by the 1st Battalion and Gurkhas, supported
by the 1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment. The and Battalion Derbyshire
Regiment was in reserve, followed by the 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders.
By 11-30 A.nf. the above force was in formation, under cover, in readiness
to capture the heights, but when the and Gurkhas, accompanied by the
Gurkha scouts c)f the 1st Battalion 3rd Gurkhas, made their first rush across the
open, they were met by such a hot and well-aimed fire that all they could do
was to hold cn to the position they had reached, without being able to advance
further.
At 2 P.M., the Dorsetshire Regiment was ordered to storm the enemy's
entrenchments, but though a few men were able to get across the fire-swept
zone, an advance beyond t h e line held by the 2nd Gurkhas was reported by
the Commanding Oficer to be impracticable, owing to the large number of
tribesmen lining the edge of Dargai plateau and the steepness of the slope
leading up to it. Thc General Officer Commanding the 2nd Division accordingly ordered Brigadier-General Kempster to move up the Gordon Highlanders
aud the 3rd Sikhs, the former r e ~ i m e n tbeing replaced on the lower spur which
it had hitherto occupied by the Jhind Imperial Service Infantry. The Gordon
I-Iighlanders went straight up the hill without check or hesitation. Headed by
their pipers and led by Lieutenant-Colonel Mathias, C.B., with Major Macbean
on his right and Lieutenant A. F. Gordon on his left, this splendid battalion
marched across the open. I t dashed through a murdercus fire and in forty
minutes had won the heights, leaving three Ofiicers and thirty men killed o r
wounded on its way. The first rush of the Gordon Highlanders was deserving

* The

troops of the 2nd Division referred to above were as follows :3rd IZ~icnrle.
1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment.
1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders.
1st Bartalion 2nd Gurkhas.
15th Sikhs.
N o ad Rritish Field Flospital.
No. 44 Ndtive Field Hospital.
4flr Brirade.
2nd Battalion K i n z ' ~Own Scottish Bordarcrs.
1st Battalion 3rd Gurkhas.
Two sections, N o . g British Field Hospital.
Two sections, No. 2.3 British Field Hospital.
No. 48 Native Field Hospital.
N o . 8 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery.
No. 5 [Bombxy) Mountain Eattery.
Machine Gun Detachment, 16th Lancers.
zrst Madras Pioneers.
No. 4 Company Madras Sappers and Miners.
Thind Regiment of Imperial Service Infantry.
'sirmur Imoerial Service S a ~ o e r s
One section, No. 13 British ~ ; e l d Hospital.
No. 43 Native Field Hospital.

of the highest praise, for they had just undergone a very severe climb, and
had reached a point beyond >vltich other troops had been unable to advance for
over three hours. T h e first rush was followed at short intervals by a second
and a third, each led by Officers; and as the leading companies went up the
path for the final assault, the remzinder of the troops, atnoug whom the 3rd
Sikhs were conspicuous, streamed on in support. But few of t h e enemy waited
for the bayonet, many of them being shot down as they fled in confusion.
17. The position was won at 3-1; '.&I., with the loss of three Officers
killed, namely :-Major C. B. Judge, 1st Battalion and Gurkhas; Captain
W. E. C. Smith, and Battalion Derbyshire Regiment; a n d Lieutenant A.
Laniont, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders; and nine wounded, namely:Lieutenant-Colonel H.H. Mathias, C.B., 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders;
Major F. hlacbean, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders ; Captain H. P. Uniaclre,
1st Battalion Gordon Iiighlanders; Lieutenant M. F. M. Meiklejohn, 1st
Rattalion Gordon Highlanders ; Lieutenant K. Dingwall, 1st Battalion Gordon
Highlanders ; Lieutenant G. S. G. Craufilrd, 1st Batta1ion:Gordon Highlanders ;
Captain W. R. Arnold, 1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment ; Captain J. G.
Robinson, 1 s t Battalion 2nd Gurkhas (since dead) ; Lieutenant G . E. White,
3rd Sikhs ; of other ranks ;5 were killed, and 158 wounded.
IS. T h e enemy's loss has not been ascertained, but must have been heavy.
Nearly every section of the Afridis was represented, but nct in full strength;
and there were about I , joo Sheikhans, Mishtis, Mallakhels and Akhels, besides
contingents from the Mamozai, Massozai and Althels.
19. T h e General Officer Commanding the 2nd Division has brought t o
my special notice the gallant conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Mathias, C.B.,
Commanding the 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders, in leading his battalion t o
the assault of a most difficult position at a critical period of the fight, w h e n
previous attempts had failed. I recommend this Officer for the Victoria Cross.
Major-General Yeatman-Biggs has also reported most favourably on the
behaviour of the following British and Native Ofticers and soldiers :Major F. Macbean, ~ s Battalion
t
Gordon Highlanders, w h o w a s the first
to spring out of cover and lead his company to the attack, and who, being
immediately afterwards wounded, continued to cheer his men on while lying
on the ground.
Lieutenant-Colonel E.A. Travers, 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas, who led t h e
first rush of his men.
Captains D. C. F. Macintyre and J . G. Robinson, 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas; and Lieutenant A. B. Tillard, 1st Battalion -qrd Gurkhas. commandina
the Gurkha scouts of his regiment.
No. 2951, Piper G. Findlater, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders, who, after
heing shct through both feet and unable to stand, sat up under a heavy fire
playing the regimental march to encourage the charge
No. 3456, Private E. Lawson, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders, w h o
carried Lteutenant Dingwall, when wounded and unable to move, out of a
heavy fire, and subsequently returned and brought in Privzite McMillan, being
himself wounded in two places in so doing.
Subadar Kirpa Kam Thapa, 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas, who, though
wounded in t u o places, corltlnutd to discharge his duties i n the front hne.
I recommend Piper Findlatrr and Private Lawaon for the Victoria Cross.
20. T h e General Officer Commanding the 2nd Divis~on h a s also brought
to notice the servlces of the following Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and
men as deserv~ngof recognition :Major G. T. F. Downman, ~ s Battalion
t
Gordon Highlanders.
Captain C. C. Miller-Wallnut, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders.
Captain and Adjutant W. Campbell, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders.
Lieutenant G. D. Mackrnzle, 1st Battalion Gordon Highianders.
Lieutenant G. E. E. G. Cameron, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders.
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KO. i77?, Colnur-Scryeant J. Craib, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders.
Iqo. 2025, Colour-St rgeatit T. Xlackie, 1st Hzittalion Gordon H~ghlauders.
No. 2021, Sererant F.liichie, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders.
No. 3056, Sergeant D. RIathers, 1st Battalion Gordon H~ghlanders.
No. 1952. Sergeant T. Uonaldson, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders.
No. 2465, Sergeant J. M'Kay, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders.
No. 3711, Lance-Corporal (piper) G. Rlilne, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders.
Captain W. R. Arnold, 1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment, w h o led the
first r u s h of his batt:ilion.
No. 3937, Private S. Vicker~r, 1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regimmt, w h o
ran d o w n the slope, rescued a wounded comrade, and brought him back to
cover. T h i s soldier has subsequently greatly distinguished himself during the
withdrawal of Brigadier-General Kempster's Column from the W a r a n Valley,
and 1 propose in due course to recommend him for the Victoria Cross.
Lieutenant H. S . Pennell, a n d Battalion Derbgshire Regiment, w h o endeavoured to bring in Captain Smith's body, and only desisted on finding that
Captain Smith was dead.
Captain C. E. d e M. Norie, 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas, w h o w a s conspicuously forward at the commencemect of the action.
21. In recording m y acknorvledgments t o Major-General Yeatman-Biggs,
C.B., and Brigadier-General Kempster, D S.O., for the success of t h e operations on October 20til I think i t necessary to point out that the advance was
not conducted in t h e manner in which I had intended, and a s I tllought I had
clearIy indicated. Tl;e General Officer Commanding t h e and Division restricted
himself to a frontal attack on tile Uargai heights, without employing a portion
of t h e !arge force a t his disposal to turn t h e enemy's rear by pushing on a s
rapidly a s possible to the point ofjunction of t h e Narilc Darra with the Chagru
defile
Undoubtedly the troops would have been urider fire and might have
sufpred some loss in moving along t h e road below the heights; but if full
advantage had been taken of t h e inequalities of the ground, I am of opinion
that the loss would not have been heavy, and I fee1 confiderlt that. a s soon
a s their line of retreat n7as threatened, the tribesmen would have begun to
disperse.
~t the same time, I recognise that the enemy's defeat mas rendered more
complete and decisive by their being encouraged to hold on td t h e last, and t h e
result of the action must, be regarded a s satiuf%ctory,inasmuch a s the movement of the troop$, baggage and supplies from Shinawdri to Khorappa,
subsequent t:, the capture of t h e Dargai heights, w a s almost unmolested.
22. On the night of October zoth, Dargai was held by the 1st Bartalion
Dorsetshir-e Regiment and 3rd Sikhs, supported by the 1st Hattalion Gordon
Highlanders, whiie t h e remainder of the troops bivouacked o n o r near t h e
Chagru Kotal.
23. At daybreak on the 21st, t h e march of t h e 2nd Division to Khorapp:~,
or, more properly, to Khangarbur, on t h e left bank of the Ichanki stream, w a s
resumed, while in order to avoid a blocls con the main road, 1 proceeded from
Fort Locktiart to the same point 0% Fort Gulistan and the Tsalai spur. taking
with m e Pio. 9 Rlountain Battery Royal Artillery, the 1st Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment, t h e 56th Sikhs, and E O ;Company Bombay Sapprrs and
Miners. T h e track from the village of Tsalai dolvn to its junction with the
main road w a s so bad, that none of the baggage of the troops accorupenging m e
reached camp a t Ichorappa until late the r?ext day, that of the 56th Sikhs c o t
arriving until mid-day on the ~ 3 r d .
24. l h e 4th Brigade and some of the Divisional troops of the 2nd Division
arrived a t Khorappa towards theevening of t h e ~ 1 sOctober.
t
The remainder of
the division coming in the next day ; but owing to t h e Eteepness and narrcwness
of t h e road, and the inferiority of a considerable proportion of the transport
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animals, several days elapsed before all the baggage of the division had
come up. On October q t h , the troops of the 1st Division began to move
from Shinawari t o Khorappa, and by the evening of the 27th the Main Column,
with its supplies and transport, had concentrated in readiness for a further advance. Advantage was taken of the halt at Khorappa to improve the road from
the Chagru Kotal, to complete the organisation of the transport service, and
to adjust t h e loads of the several classes of animals employed, namely, mules,
ponies and donkeys.
And here I may mention that during the halt at Khorappa, though
25.
every military precaution was taken, the camp was fired into every night,
sometimes by large bodies of the enemy, and our foraging parties were perticaciously opposed and followed up by the tribesmen. The losses from this cause
were heavy, aggregating three British Officers, twenty-five British soldiers, and
twenty-one native ranks, killed o r wounded. The names of t h e Otticers a r e
given below :Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Hadow, 15th Sikhs, severely wounded.
Captain F. F. Badcock, D.S.O., 1st Battalion 5th Gurkhas, dangerously
wounded.
Lieutenant G. D. Crocker, 2nd Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers, wounded.
26. On October zSth, in accordance with instructions issued on the previous evening, the force marched in two columns to Gundaki, t h e 1st Division
across the plain and the 2nd Division up the bed of the l<andi Rlishti stream,
while a detached column consisting of the 1st Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment and the 36th Sikhs occupied the hills to the right of my line of advance As
the left column was threatened from the west, I also occupied three hills which
commanded that flank with the 2nd Battalion Yorkshire Regiment, a wing of
the 2nd Battalion 4th Gurkhas, and a wing of the 3rd Sikhs, respectively. This
display of force led the enemy to believe that I intended to turn their right,
which they at once began to strengthen, and during the night of the 28tk the
detachment of the 4th Gurkhas, which in the evening had been reduced to two
companies, was continuously attacked at close quarters, suffering, however, but
slight loss owing to the care taken in the day time to protect the position by
sa?zxars. The strong flanking parties which had pushed out enabled me to reconnoitre the Sampagha Pass, and having settled on my plan of action, I directed ths whole force to bivouac near Gundaki, and issued orders for the attack on
the following day.
Our casualties on October zSth were :Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. K. Sage, 2nd Battalion ~ s Gurkhas,
t
severely
wounded. Other ranks :-Icilled two, wounded 10.
27. Here it may be noted that, previous to my advance, on October A h ,
I had to detach two battalions to strengthen the force on the Line of Communication. T h e 30th Punjab Infantry was detailed to hold the Dargai heights,
and the ~ 1 s Madras
t
Pioneers to form part of the Khorappo garrison.
, 5 A.M., the 1st Brigade moved out of camp to
28. On October ~ g t h at
cover the advance to the Sampagha. The 1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment
seized the village of Nazeno, thus protecting my right. Lieutenant-Colonel
Yule quickly brushed away all opposition on that side. The 2nd Battslion 1st
Gurkhas covered my left by occupying t h e village of Kandi Mishti and met
with no opposition. The 2nd Battalion Derbyshire Regiment, advancing in the
centre, occupied without resistance a low rocky hill stretching across the plateau
between t h e Kandi Mishti and Sampagha ravines, which I had chosen a s my
first artillery position.
At 5-15 A.M., the 2nd Brigade, preceded by the Gurkha scouts, left camp
with orders to enter the Sampagha ravine, and to advance by a path leading towards the enemy's position up a long bare spur as soon as the guns should have
suEciently silenced the fire from the sa9zgavs; this advance to be supported in
succession by the 4th and grd Brigades.

II
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At 6-30 n.nr, the first shots were fired by the enemy, hut the action did not
really begin until 7-30 A.M., when the three mountain batteries of the 1st Division opened fire on the sn~zpnrsfrom the first artillery position above mentioned. Their fire wnseffective, the rangebeing r,Sjo yards, and the enemy quickly
evacuated the entrenchments which commanded the lower slopes of the pass,
these being seized by the and Brigade at S n.nr. The three batteries of the
2nd Division, together with the rocket detachment, were now pr~shed on,
and opened fire on the crest of the pass at a range of 2,200 yards. The fire
of the guns was, however, soon masked by the rapid advanceof the and Brigade
which, with the 1st Battalion Royal West Surrey Regiment (the Queen's) leadinz, reached the summit of the pass at 9-45 A.nI. The artillery was again
ordered up in support, No. 5 (Bombay) Mountdin Battery in front. On reaching the crrst this battery did excellent service in assisting the infantry of the
2nd Brigade to dislodge the tribesmen from the heights they were holding on
either flank, but w h ~ l eengaged on this duty I regret ti, report that Captaiu De
Butts, Royal Artillery, Commanding the battery, was lnortally wnunded. The
heights on the north-east of the pass were eventually cleared by t h e 1st Eattalim Royal West Surrey Regiment and the 3rd Silrhs, while those on the northwest were stormed by t h e 36th Sikhs, supported by six companies of the and
Battalion Ring's Own Scottish Borderers. The last shots were fired at 11-30
A.M., and the 15th Sikhs were then sent o n as an advance-guard into the
Mastura Valley, where 1 proposed to bivouac.
29. While the troops were moving duwn into the valley some slight resistance was met with, but this ceased a s soon a s the hills commanding the camping ground had been occupied by pickets.
T h e 1st Brigade remained on the Sampagha for the night, with a view to
protecting transport animals and baggage.
30. The casualties during the action were :Captain F. R , McC. De Butts, Royal Artillery, killed.
Major R. T. Hanford-Fiood, 1st Eattalion Royal West Surrey Regiment,
slightly mounded.
Other ranks :.-Icilled one, wounded three.
-71. On October ;oth, t h e Main Column, with the exception of the 1st
Brigade, which continued to hold t h e Sampagha Pass: remained in camp on
the;ight bank of the Rlustura stream. In the morning I made a reconnaissance ofthe Arhanva Pass, and issued orders for the attack on the following
day. My great difficulty was the want of food, some corps having absolutely
nothing in hand and the steep and narrow track over the pass delaying the
arrival of supplies. But by redistributing what there was, and making use of
what could be collected in t h e neighbouring villages, each man w a s eventually
prnvided with two days' rations. I therefore determined not to postpone the
attack on the Arhanga Pass, a s I was convinced that a protracted halt in the
Mastura Valley, expedient a s it might seem from a commissariat point of view,
would not only encourage the Afridis and give them time to collect their fightiug men, but also enable them to destroy, hide, o r remove the forage and grain
stored in their villages, and thus render our sttiy in Tirah a matter of extreme
ditliculty.
32, On October ~ r s t t,h e 4th Brigade crossed the Mastura stream at 6 A.M.
and advanced towards the Arhanga Pass across a broken plain up to a low detached mound, in rear of which the brigade w a s massed ar 8 A.M. Shortly afterwards the three batteries of the and Division opened fire from tnis mound,
at a range of 1,300 yards, on the enemy's main position along the crest of the
pass. Meanwhile the 2nd Brigade had moved up on the right, and t h e 3rd
Brigade was disposedin ecl~clolr on t h e left. with the object of threatening the
enemy's right and jsining t h e central attack when ordered t o do so. The 2nd
Brigade began the action by a flanlc movement on the right u p two rocky spurs
and an interveningravine. thus gaining the cresc east of the pass; while the
4th Brigade attacked in tht: centre, supported Ly the 3rd Brigade. The

2nd Rricndr's atkacl; was led by t h e 2nd Battalion Yorkshire Regiment a n d
the Gurkha scouts, each gallantly racing up the steep slope, the summit
T h e main attack
of xvhich \vns reached by both s i m u l t a ~ ~ e o u sat
l y l o A.M.
was led by the and Battalion King's Own Scottish Horderers. Neither attack
met x i t h serious opposition, and shortly after 10 A.BI. the pass was in o u r
hands, and a11 opposition had practically ceased.
T h e casualties were :-Killed none, wounded two.
I may here mention that the road up the Arhanga Pass though short, w a s
i h e steepest and worst that had yet been encountered,
5;. Immediately after the action I gave orders for the concentration of
the force in Alaidan with t h e exception of the 1st Brigade, which I had t o
leave behind for the purpose of dominating the Mastura Valley and of guarding tile Line of Communication between Tirah and Khorappa.
34. During the period dealt with in this report the troops under m y
command were subjected to much privation and fatigue, to Ereat variations
of temperature, to heavy losses in action, and to continual night alarms. NO
body of men could have shown a better spirit.
That a more formidable resistance was not offered in the passes leading
respectively into Orakzai and Afridi Tirah, I attribute to the lesson taught
those tribes at Dargai in the actions of October 18th and October 20th. They
then lrnrnt t h a t their strongest positions could not avail them against the valour
of British and Sative troops.
35. In si~bmitting this report, I desire to record my acknowledgments to
the General Officer Commanding the Line cf Communications, the General
OSficcrs Commanding Divisions and Brigades, the Chief of the Staff, a n d t h e
Rrigcidier-Generals Conlmanding the Koyai Artillery and Royal Engineers, t h e
Wracls af Lkpartments, especially those of Ordnance, Supply and Transport,
t h e Officers of the Head-Quartel-s, Divisional, and Brigade Staffs, and the Commanding and other Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and men of the several
corps under my command, all of mhoni have done their duty in a manner
befitting Her Blajesty's Army.
My recommendations for the recognition of the services of individual Officers,
Ban-Cornmissicnrd Officers and soldiers, subsequent to t h e action of October
20th. v.-ill be embodied in my final despatch on the termination of the present
expedition.
General Sir William Lockhart's despatch describing the operations of t h e
Tirah Expeditioilary Force from November 1st to January z6th, was published
in a later issue of the G n ~ e f t eof I ~ r r Z i a ,together with comments as follows :I n a covering letter the Adjutant-General on behalf of the Commander-inChief writes :' 4 S o campaign on the frontiers of India has been conducted under more
trying and arduous circumstances than those encountered by the Tirah Expeditionary Force. Its operations have been carried out in a country destitute of
roads, the physical configuration of which i s such a s to present the maxilnu~nof
difficulty to tlte moremeilt of regular troops. T h e enemy were for the most
part skilled marksmen, exceptionally active and well armed, and expert i n
guerilla tactics. tlihile avoiding serious resistance to the advance of our troops,
they have lost no opportunity of harassing them both on t h e march and in
bivouac : a system of fighting admirably suited to the nature of the country, and
which has necessaril~loccasioned us considerable loss not only in action, but
also from toil and exposure. I n spite of these difficulties severe punishment
has bcen meted out to the tribes concerned, with the result that the entire
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Orakzai tribe has submitted and con~pliedwith the terms of the Government, as
have also a portion of the Afridis ;and i t seems probable even now that the re.
mainder of this tribe will not force a repetition of offensive operations, but
tender their submission a t an early date. During the operations tlle fighting
qualities and endurance of the troops have been Ilighly tested, and it is with no
small sense of gratification and pride that the Commander-in-Chief brillgs to the
notice of the Government of India the soldierly conduct and discipline of the
troops amidst all the hardships and exposure which fell to them ; both Oflicers
a n d men having, whether in action or in bivouac, conducted themselves in a
manner thoroughly befitting the traditions of Her Majesty's Army. His Excellency deplores the loss to the Army uf the many brave OHicers and men who
have died in the performance of theii duty, and amongst them such distinguished
soldiers a s the late Major-General Yeatman-Biggs, Lieutenant-Colonel Haughton,
36th Sikhs, and others whose careers were so full of promise.
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" T h e Commander-in-Chief would specially commend to the favourable
notice of the Government the distinguished Oficer selected for the comqand of
t h e expedition, who has exercised an exceptionally dificult and responsible
command with much skill, vigour and judgment; and His Excellency talres this
opportunity of expressing his own acknowledgments to Sir William Lockhart
for the able manner in which he has directed the operations of the Force under
his command. The Commander-in-Chief also endorses the commendatory
remarks made by Sir William Lockhart on the services of General Sir A. Power
Palmer, General Symotls and General Nicholson, and the Officers and others
mentioned in paragraphs 22 to 31 of the despatch. His Excellency fully shares
S i r William Lockhart's appreciation of the assistance rendered by the Imperial
Service troops, whose association with our own troops has given them an opportunity of paining valuable military experience which cannot fail to result in increased efficiency. ,
" Sir George White has much pleasure in commending to the notice of the
Government the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Partab Singh, who accompanied the force throughout the expedition as extra Aide-de-camp to Sir William
.Lockhart ; of Lieutenant-Colonel the Maharaja of Cooch Behar and of Major the
Maharaj Rana of Dholpur, who were employed as extra Orderly Officers to the
Divisional Commanders.
IL
As this despatch will probably be the last that Sir George White will submit
during his tenure of command, he desires to take this opportunity of bringing to
t h e notice of the Government the valuable services rendered by t h e following
Officers and Departments in connection with the recent operations."
The Officers named are: Sir George' Wolseley, Commanding the Punjab ;
General Morton, Adjutant-General ; General Badcock, Quarter-Master-General ;
Colonel Duff, Military Secretary ; Surgeon-Major-General Gore ; Major Mullaly,
D.A.Q.-M.-G. for Mobilisation ; Veterinary-Colonel Tholnson ; Major-General
I-Iobday, Commissary-General-in-Chief; Major-General Wace, Director-General
of Ordnance ; Mr. Reynolds, Director-General of Telegraphs ; the Postal, Telegraph and Survey Officers and subordinates with the Field Force; Colonel
Brackenbury, Manager, Mr. Jacob, Traffic Superintendent, and the subordinate
staff of the North-Western Railway.
I t is further remarked:-"
It has been ascertained that between the 1st July
and the 31st October the additional trains on the North-Western Railway re-,
quired for military traffic amounted to 4,544, or an average of 37 trains per diem
i n excess of the normal traffic. Any breakdown of the railway arrangements
during t h e period when troops and supplies were being pushed to the front
would have had a very serious effect on the military operations ; and that no
such failure occurred, is due, i n His Excellency's opinion, to the able administration of his railway system by the Manager and to the untiring efforts of his subordinates."

The fL,]lo\\.ingare some of the observations in detail :"011I-ieutermnnt-General Sir G. Wolseley and the Staff of the Punjab
Coillnln13ddevolved the duty of carrying out the preliminary concentration of the
rnriuun t;Jrcas \x-hic.h hare been placed in the field. This has been no light task,
but it has been successfully performed. Of the staff at Army Head-Quarters I
aIrl to ~ne:~tian
General SIorton, Adjutant-General in India, who has throughout
proved himself zealous and untiring in the performance of the duties which,
c . ~ p ~ c iduring
~ ! l ~ the Tvnr, pertain to his responsible position, and has at all times
:!R;,l-dell to tlle Commander-in-Chief all the assistance in his power. I am especialIF tt-, brint: to notice General Badcocl;, Quarter-Master-General in India, for his
SupCrl.isi~i~
of all the arrangements for the mobilisation of the large forces now
nrld recently in the field. The difficulty of the task has been greatly enhanced
by the fact that w e \\-ere not only engaged in active operations in sevelaal direct i ~ : ~ats one :lild the same time, but were also compelled to be in readiness to
lllect ally fi~rtl-iercomplication which might suddenly arise aIong any portion of
t!~eSorth-\l7est ti-ontier. That w e have been able to mass the necessary troops
withrrut delay on the point threatened by each successive rising a s it occurred,
and that our mobi!is3tion arrangements have worked smoothly and without
fric:ic.,n. have been very largely due to the Quarter-Master-General's constant and
nsiiduons work. Sir George White also wishes to bring to the special notice
of the G ~ v e r n m m tof India the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Duff, Military
secret:^^^, in \\.horn His Escellency has always found a Staff Officer of the very
highest ability, most earnest sense of duty and soundest judgment, who has
dtme all that n direct personal assistant could do to lighten the work and anxiety
of the Commander-in-Chief in a time of exceptional difficulty."
S I R WILLIAM LOCKHART'S

DESPATCH.

Sir William Lockhart, in his despatch, describes the military operations in
Korember, December and January.
Regarding Sir Henry Havelock Allen's death, for which h e expresses deep
regret, Sir \Villiam Lockhart says:-"Every
precaution had been taken to
emiure his safety, and on bidding him good-bye at Lala China, I had impressed
on him the necessity of invariably remaining with the troops detailed for his
prutection."
The despatch continues :"During the operations described I have received every possible support
and assistance from the General Officer Commanding the Line of Communication, his Staff and the troops under his command. The requirements.of the
blain Column have been promptly and fully met, while the arrangements made
ta protect the long and exposed line between Kohat and the Sampagha Pass and
afterwards to tramsfer the base from Kohat to Peshawar have been all that I
could have desired.
" In bringing this narrative to a close I wish to record my high appreciation
of the conduct of the British and native troops serving with the Tirah Expeditionary Force. Up to the present date their losses have amounted to 1,050
killed and wounded. They have been subjected to great hardship and exposure,
harassed at night by assaults at close quarters or by distant rifle fire, and engaged in long and trying rear-guard actions. Their duties on picket and in
guarding foragng parties, have been specially onerous. Hardly a day or night
has passed without casualties, and whether we advanced o r retired, every
soldier had to be constantly on the alert against the enemy, who made no stand
in the open but were unrivalled as skirmishers and marksmen. The operations
were carried out in a country which offered every natural advantage to the
tribesmen and imposed on regimental Officers and rank and file the necessity
for individual initiative, unremitting watchfulness and personal activity. I am
glad t o say the troops responded nobly to the call made upon them. Cheeerful
and soldier-Iike under exceptionally trying conditions, Officers and men
to
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" The advance into Tirah was delayed, and the subsequent movements of
the force were impeded, by the inferiority of a large proportion of the transport
animals and the want of proper discipline and training amongst many of the
transport drivers and Icahars. But it must be remembered that a peace
organisation which has to b e rapidly expanded when war breaks out takes time
to render it eEcient, and that the requirements, elsewhere had already absorbed
much of the betterclass of pack transport which would otherwise have been available.
The results attained by the expedition may be summarised as follows :-The
troops under my command have marched everywhere within t h o
Orakzai and Afridi limits and the whole of Tirah has now for the first time been
accurately surveyed. Our enemies, wherever encountered, have been punished,
and their losses are stated on unimpeachable evidence to have been extremely
severe. The towers and walls of almost every fortified village in the country
have been levelled to the ground, and the winter supply of grain, fodder and
fuel of both tribes has been consumed by the force. The Oralrzai have been
completely subdued and have complied with the terms prescribed for them ; but
t h e Afridis still hold out, although I have strong hopes that they may before
long submit and thus save their country from a fresh invasion in the spring.
" During the present expedition the scouts, drawn from the 3rd and 5th
Gurkhas, have proved especially valuable Being trained mountaineers and
accustomed to guerilla warfare, they were able to climb most precipitous hills,
lie in ambush at night, and surpass the tribesmen in their own tactics.
" The Imperial Service Corps attached to the force have taken their full
share in the hardships of t h e campaign, and fighting side by side with their
comrades in the regular army have given a tangible proof of their readiness and
that of their rulers to assist in the defence of the Empire.
During the expedition the Mountain Artillery had an important part to
play, and fully sustained its reputation as one of t h e most efficient branches of
that arm of the service.

" Much work of a responsible and arduous nature, principally road-making
and the destruction of village defences, devolved o n the corps of Royal Englneers, the companies of Sappers and Miners and t h e Pioneer regiments. This
work was carried out in a creditable manner."
Sir William Lockhart praises the administration of the Army and Civil
Departments, and says that medical oilicers fully maintained thew high reputation by their attention to the sick and wounded under fire and in hospital ; also
that the signalling and survey work were well done. tlr acknowledges the
public spirit evinced by Mr. Dhanjiboy, who by tonga service facilitated the
transport of t h e sick and wounded to the base hospital.
In recording his obligations to the General Officers, Sir William Lockhart
writes :-" Sir A. Power Palmer has commancled the Line of Communication to
m y entire satisfaction, and has displayed administrative talents of a high order.
Major-General Symons has commanded the 1st Division with marked ability,
and in a manner which has gained t h e confidence of all ranks. Major- general^
Yeatman-Biggs was in a very bad state of health from the outset, but his indomitable: spirit carried him through the whole of t h e operations, only to die at
Peshawar on January 5th. I would fain have sent him back to India from the
Samana or subsequently from Korappa, but the responsible medical officers considered him fit to remain in the field : a decision which gratified him, although I
personally could not agree with it Owing to a regrettable accident t-, BrigadierGeneral Hamilton, Brigadier-General R. Hart wassent to relieve him. General
Hart joined the 1st Brlgade on October 24th, and has commanded lt t h r o ~ g h o ~ t
the expedition with great ability and energy, Brigadier-General Gaselee
has fully maintained his high reputation and proved himself to be an admirable

excellent service, more particularly when withdrawing from the Bara Valley on
December 1 3th and 14th. Brigadier-General Hammond. though until lately he
has not participated in the active operations of the force, has commanded the
Peshawar Column to my satisfaction. I am also much indebted to the Officer
Commanding the Kurram Movable Column, Colonel Hill, who has shown energs,
capacity and judgment in the performance of his duties. His troops were well
handled, both in the reconnaissance to Hissar and during the operations against
the Khani Khel Chamkannis.
LL I desire to bring to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief and the Government of India the following Officers who have rendered exceptionally good
service :-Brigadier-General Nicholson, chief of the staff, an officer of brilliant
abilities, fertility of resource and experience in war, the value of whose assistance it is difficult for me to acknowledge in adequate terms. I would very
specially put forward his services for recognition and reward. LieutenantColonel Barrow, Assistant Adjutant-General and Major G. H. W. O'Sullivan,
Assistant Quarter-Master-General, have fully justified their selection for their
important post on the Army Staff. I consider these Officers are well deservirlg
of advancement. Captain Haldane, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, is a
staff officer of high promise, great abillty and untiring mental and physical
energy."

Other Officers included in this special list are Brigadier-General Spragge,
C.R.A , and his Brigade-Major Captain C De C. Hamllton ; Bngadier-General
Broadbent, C.R.E., and his Brigade-Major Captain Craster; Surgeon-MalorG ~ n e r aThomson,
l
Principal Medlcal Officer, and his Secretary Surgeon-Major
Morris ; Colonel Scott, Senior Ordnance Officer; Colonel Christopher, Commissary-General of the Force ; Major Mansfield, Chief Transport Officer, and his
Assistant Captain Hall ; Lieutenant-Colonels Dixon, Klng's Own Scottish
Borderers ; Abbott, 15th S ~ k h ;s Travers, 2nd Gurkhas ; Haughton, 36th Sikhs
(who are said to have commanded thelr battalions in a manner whlch merits
hlgh approbation), Mr. Van Someren and Mr. Truninger, Postal Department; Slr
Pratab Singh, Extra Aide-de-camp. Sir Wllliam Lockhart says, hls acknowledgments are due also to Lord Methuen, Press Censor ; Colonel Holdich, Ch~ef
Survey Officer ; Veterinary-Colonel Glover ; Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson,
Military Accounts ;Mr. Pitman, Chief Superintendent of Telegraphs, Punjah
Division; Lieutenant Davie, 3rd Sikhs, Commanding the Personal Escort; and
Subadar-Major Bishan Singh.
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The following list includes the names of Officers whose good services came
under Slr William Lockhart's personal notice :-" Officers whose good services
came under my personal notice :Army and Personal Staff.-Colonel
More-Molyneux, Lieutenant-Colonel
Ealfe, Major Logan-Home; Captain Maconchy, Captain Swanston, Major Mercer,
Captain Grimston, Surgeon-Captain Morgan, Captmo Shewell, Malor Scallon,
in charge of Imperial Service troops, Captain Bajee (Haroda State Artillery),
Lieutenants Maxwell and Annesley (Aide-de-Camps), Lieutenants Collen and
Smith (Orderly OEcers), Risaldar-Major Khan Bahadur Kisaldar Kadam Khan,
Jemadar Abdul Ghani.
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Dorsetshire Regiment. Captain Clarkson; Gordon Highlanders. Major Downman; No. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery, Lieutenant Edlmoun; 15th Sikhs,
Captain Rowcroft; and Gurkhas, Captains Macinryre and Norie ; 3rd Gurkhas,
Lieutenant-Colonel Pulley and hlajor Rose ; 2nd Punjab Infantry, LieutenantColonel S t u r t ; 36th Sikhs, Lieutenant-Colonel Des Vaeux and Lieutenant
Munn; Gurkha Scouts, Captain Lucas and Lieutenant Bruce ; Surgeon-Majors
Whitehead, Revor, Gerard, Shearer.
Line of Communicafions.-Colonels Vousden, Keighley, Thurburn, Lieutenant Tomkins, Surgeon-Colonel Saunders.
The following list is given of Officers favourably mentioned b y the different
Generals :1st Divisiotz.-Lieutenant-Colonels
Muir and Hart, hlajors Ferrier and
Yielding, Captains Rideout and Dabas, the Maharaj Rana of Dholpur.
1st Bnkade -Major Donne and Captain Kernball; 5th Gurkhas, Deputy
Assistant Quarter-Master-General, Captain Mullaly.
2nd Bfigade.-Major
Aldworth, Major Barret, Lieutenant Abadie. Regimental : Royal West Surrey Regiment, Captain King King ; Yorkshire Regiment,
,Major Bowles and Lieutenant Noble ;Derbyshire Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel
Dowseard, hlajor Smith-Dorrien; No. I Kohat Mountain Battery, Captain S t
John ;~ 1 s Madras
t
Pioneers, Lieutenant-Colonel Huggins; 1st Gurkhas, Lieutenant-Colonel Sage and Major Martin ; 3rd Sikhs, Major Quin and Lieutenant
Taylor ;4th Gurkhas, Captain Carnegy; 30th Punjab Infantry, LieutenantColonel Maisey.
Avmy Medtcal Staf.-Brigade-Surgeon
Lieutenant-Colonels Swayne and
King, Surgeon-Major Priggs and Corker.
2nd Division.-Major Triscott, Maior Bewicke Copley, Lieutenant-Colonel
Purdy, Major Kelly, Captains Knight, Hilliard and Wake, the Maharaja of Cooch
Behar, Mr. Wainright, Survey Department.
3 r d Brtgade.-Majors St. Leger Wood and Massy.
4th Bn2ade.-Major Doran, Captain Edwards, 3rd Bombay Cavalry. Regimental : Royal Scots Fusiliers, Lieutenant-Colonel Spurgin, Captain Powes;
King's Own Scottish Borderers, Major Mayne, Captains Sladen and Haig ;
Dorsetshire Regiment, Lieutenant Shonbridge ; Gordon Highlanders, Lieutenant-Colonel Mathias, Captains Uniacke and W. Campbell, Lieutenant A. F.
Gordon ; I 5th Sikhs, Lieutenant Gordon ; 3rd Gurkhas, Lieutenant West
(since deceased) ; 25th Bombay Pioneers, Major Chase and Lieutenant Moore ;
2nd Punjab Infantry, Captain Eales ; 36th Sikhs, Captain Custance and Lieutenant
Van Someren ; Sirmur Sappers, Lieutenant Chancellor, Surgeon-LieutenantColonel Bourke, Surgeon-Major Granger, Surgeon-Captains Burtchnell and Selby.
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In addition to the transport officers mentioned.in the preceding paragraphs,
the Commissary-General with the Tirah Exped~tionaryForce brought to special
notice the services of the following regimental officers :-Captains
Weller,
S. D. Browne, Cookson, C. Davies, Pollock, Cotgrave.
Sir SVilliam Lockhart further records his acknowledgments to the Native
Commanding Officers of the various Imperial Service Corps. Among the
honorary commissioned and warrant officers mentioned are: Assistant Surgeons
O'Connor, Charters, Hussey, Captain Bennett, Conductors Land and Thorne,
Ordnance Department; Lieutenant Ezechiel, Conductor Falkland, Commissariat
Transport Department ; L~eutenantJ. McDermott, Conductor Morrison. SubConductor Wiggins, Miscellaneous Departments. The Non-Commissioned Officers mentioned are : Sergeant-Major Diblett, Sergeants Howell. Payne, Blaker,
Tibbs, G. C. White, A. White, Pepper and Ashworth. The Rev. A. S. Dyer
and the chaplains of all denominations were mentioned as having performed
their duties satisfactorily.
Sir William Lockhart concludes by recording his indebtedness for advice
and assistance to Sir Richard Udny, Colonel Warburtpn, Mr. King and other
Officers attached to the force in a political capacity.
Comprehensive lists of Non-Commissioned Officers and men, British and
native, who have shown conspicuous gallantry, and whom it is intended to recommend for the Distinguished Conduct Medal or Order of Merit, will be submitted in a supplementary despatch.
THE VICEROY'S REMARKS.

The Governor-General in Council, in directing the publication of the above
despatch, remarks : - - ' I These operations have been conducted in a country of
great natural difficulty and against an enemy of extraordinary boldness and
activity, armed moreover with weapons of precision, of which they thoroughly
understood the use. The withdrawal from Tirah necessitated by the season
formed part of the plan of operations from the outset, but it was nevertheless an
operation of greatdifficulty under circumstances requiring not only most careful
dispositions, but also avery high degree of discipline, courage and endurance on the
part of the troops. The Governor-General concurs with the Commander-in-Chief
in his opinion that the manner in which the campaign has been conducted
reflectsvery great credit on Sir William Lockhart's skill and judgment, and shares
His Excellency's admiration of the devotion to duty and soldierly spirit displayed
by the t ~ o o p son all occasions. His Excellency tenders to all Officers and men
of the Tirah Expeditionary Force the cordial congratulatio~lsand thanks of the
Government of India. His Excellency also fully shares in Sir George White's
appreciation of the assistance rendered by the Imperial Service Troops, and
takes this opportunity of acknowledging the ready loyalty of the chiefs who have
.placed their regiments and transport trains at the disposal of the Government
and the personal services rendered by Sir Partab Singh, the Maharaja of Cooch
13ehar, and the Maharaja Rana of Dholpur. His Excellency further desires to
aclrnowledge the services rendered during the operations by the Officers of the
Staff at Army Head-Quarters and of the Departments under the Government of
India mentioned by the Commander-in-Chief, and cannot allow this opportunity
t o pass without conveying to Sir George White his sense of the distinguished
ability with which on this occasion and throughout his term of office the 'responsible duties of Commander-in-Chief have been performed."

A despatch from Sir William Lockhart describing the operations of the
Tirah Expeditionary Force from the 27th January to the 5th April, was
published still later with comments :The Governor-General in Council agrees with the Commander-in-Chief in
$is appreciation of the services of the Officers named in the Adjutant-General's
letter, and of the conduct ot the troops during the period in question.
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T h e Commander-in-Cliief endorses the commend at or^ remarks made by
S i r William Lockhart on the services of Brigadier-Ceneral Hamilton,
Commanding t h e 3rd Brigade, Brigadier-General Ottley, Commanding the
Royal Engineer Force, and the others named i n the despatch, as also the
soldier.lilre conduct shown by t h e troops.
Sir William Lockhart in his despatch describes the Shinkamar action, and
adds :-'' Among the killed the country has to deplore the loss of LieutenantColonel Haughton, 36th Sikhs, an officer whose able and gallant leading of the
fine regiment which he commanded had repeatedly come under my notice."
Sir William Lockhart, in concluding his despatch, remarks : " The Afridis
s r e n o w most desirous of resuming their former friendly relations with the British Government, and admit that the recent operations in Tirah have convinced
them of the folly of their unprovoked attack on the Khyber and the Samana
posts and other host~leacts. They express contrition for their misconduct and
acknowledge the justice of their punishment I trust that these tribesmen who
have proved themselves as brave foes as t h e Sikhs did, may like the latter
become our firm friends. No finer iighting material can be found on the borders
of India, and if by firm yet sympathetic treatment w e succeed i n gaining the
ccnfidence and affection of these hardy mountaineers, w e may hope to utilize
their services more fully than before in t h e defence of the Empire.
' I In bringing this narrative to a close I would wish to record my appreciation of the soldier-like behaviour of the troops under my command, not only
while actively engaged in the field, but also while employed on the tedious
a n d monotonous duties of a blockade. Their conduct during the second phase of
the campaign has been as creditable as were their gallantry and endurance
during t h e first. The force can congratulate itself on having,carried out in the
most thorough manner the task entrusted to it. In n o prevlous campaign on
t h e north-west frontier of India has a more exemplary punishment been inflicted, o r a more complete submission been enforced. 1 have to record my
obligations to Brigadier-General Hamilton, who has performed his duties
with marlred ability and energy ; also to Brigadier-General Ottley, who has
rendered valuable service as commanding the Royal Engineers of the force,
more particularly in connection with the improvement of communications and
t h e restoration of the Khyber posts.
<'Durinq the period dealt with in this despatch the follo~ving Officers have
been brought to my notice a s deserving of favourable mention : Major C. St.
L. Barter and Captain H. Wells Cole, King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry ;
Lieutenant A. K. Robb, Durham Light Infantry (attached to King's Own
Yorkshire Light Infantry) ; Surgeon-Lieutenant M. Dick, Indian Medical
Service.
" Since the publication of my previous despatches the undermentioned
OFEcers. whose names were omitted in the first instance, have been specially
recommended for their good services by the general officers concerned :-Lieu.
tenant-Colonel C. H. W.Cafe, Royal Sussex Reglment ; Major G. F. A. Morton,
Commanding No. I Mountain Battery Royal Artillery ; Major E. Hegan, 5th
Dragoon Guards, Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master-General ; Major H. R.
Marrett. Base Commissariat Officer ;Major A. B. Helyar, Commanding 57th
Field Battery: Surgeon-Major Spence, Army Medical Staff; Captain H.B. H.
Wright, Commanding No. 4 Company Madras Sappers ; Surgeon-Captain J.
B. Jameson, Army Medical Staff; Captain A. M. Lloyd, Base Transport Officer;
Captain A. Nicholls, Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master-General for Intelligence ; Captain U. W. Evans, in charge of the Engineer Field Park ; Captain
F. H. Hoghton, Field Intelligence Officer ; Captain G . W.Palin, Commissariat Transport Officer ; Veterinary-Captain Richardson ; Captain H. Smyth,
Cheshire Regiment, Transport Officer; Captain H. F. Walters, Field Intelligence Officer ; Captain Birdwood, Orderly Officer; Captain G. C. Rigby,
Assistant Superintendent, Army Signalling; Captain W. S. Nathan, Fi

Engineer ; Captain H. J. M. MacAndrew, Brigade Transport Officer ; Lieutenant
Hill, 15th Sikhs; Lieutenant C. S. D. Leslie, Brigade Commissariat Officer;
Lieutenant Beatty, Transport Officer; Lieutenant H. 0. Pan, Orderly Officer ;
Lieutenant Ballard, Transport Officer ; Lieutenant Herbert, Royal Horse Artillery, Transport Officer; Lieutenant Sheppard, Bengal Sappers ; Lieutenant
A. E. Turner, Assistant Field Engineer; Lieutenant Harnmond, Orderly Officer
(dangerously wounded and since dead) ;Second-Lieutenant Young, attached to
the Gordon Highlanders.
'' I am much indebted to Subadar-Major Yasin Khan, 24th Punjab Infantry,
for his assistance in dealing with the Afridi representatives, and I trust his
services may be duly recognised."
Sir William Lockhart forwards lists of British, Non-Commissioned Officers
and men and of native ranks who have shown conspicuous gallantry in the field
during the operations subsequent to the 26th January, whom he recommends for
the Distinguished Conduct Medal and the Order of Merit.

